of Lords, and there affirmed. Rylands v. Fletcher generally has been understood to hold that an owner or occupant of land who brings water on his premises by artificial means, and stores it in tanks or reservoirs for his use, is liable if the water escapes and injures the property of an adjoining owner, and to this extent the doctrine of the case has been quite generally approved; 4 but extensions of the principle to substantially different facts has met with judicial disfavor.5 67. Substances to Which Doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher Applies.— The principle of Rylands v. Fletcher has been applied principally in case of damage from the storage of water, but it applies also to such substances as oil and gas.8 Accordingly it has been held that one who stores upon his premises near a navigable river large quantities of oil, the escape of which is bound to do the greatest amount of damage and injury to persons using the stream, is liable for the injury done in case of an escape of the oil, although it occurs without any negligence on his part. In the early cases this principle was applied also to the safe keeping of fire,10 but it seems never to have been held in America that one who starts a fire on his own premises is liable, absolutely and without proof of negligence, merely upon a showing that it escaped and did damage on adjacent property. The foundation of liability is negligence.12 The same is true of explosive instrumentalities; the owner is not liable in the absence of proof of negligence, unless he is shown to have created a nuisance.13 Accordingly, it has been held that the owner of a steam

3. Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 1 Exch. 265, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 35 L. J. Exch. 154, 12 Jur. N. S. 603, 14 L. T. N. S. 523, 14 W. R. 799, 4 H. & C. 263, 37 L. J. Exch. 161, 19 L. T. N. S. 220, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 235.

4. Brennan Constr. Co. v. Cumberland, 29 App. Cas. (D. C.) 554, 10 Ann. Cas. 865, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 535; Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 62 N. E. 746, 91 A. S. R. 314, 57 L.R.A. 132; Defiance Water Co. v. Olinger, 54 Ohio St. 532, 44 N. E. 238, 32 L.R.A. 736; Weaver Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond, 68 W. Va. 530, 70 S. E. 126, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1061.

Notes: 47 Am. Rep. 384; 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 541; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 272.

5. Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. L. 339, 20 Am. Rep. 394; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476, 10 Am. Rep. 623.

Note: 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 272 et seq. 6. Defiance Water Co. v. Olinger, 54 Ohio St. 532, 44 N. E. 238, 32

L.R.A. 736; Weaver Mercantile Co. v.
Thurmond, 68 W. Va. 530, 70 S. E.
126, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1061 and note.
Notes: 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 541; 18
Eng. Rul. Cas. 725.

7. Brennan Constr. Co. v. Cumberland, 29 App. Cas. (D. C.) 554, 10 Ann. Cas. 865, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 535 and note.

8. Note: 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 537.

9. Brennan Constr. Co. v. Cumberland, 29 App. Cas. (D. C.) 554, 10 Ann. Cas. 865, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 535.

10. Note: 18 Eng. Rul. Cas. 724. See FIRES, vol. 11, p. 940.

11. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476, 10 Am. Rep. 623; Gregory v. Layton, 36 S. C. 93, 15 S. E. 352, 31 A. S. R. 857. See supra, par. 8.

12. Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N. Cas. 468, 32 E. C. L. 208, 4 Scott 244, 3 Hodges 51, 1 Jur. 215, 6 L. J. C. Pl. 92, 18 Eng. Rul. Cas. 715.

13. See EXPLOSIONS AND EXPLOSIVES, vol. 11, p. 651.

poiler, who operates and uses the same, in carrying on his business upon his own premises in such a manner that it is not a nuisance, is not liable for damages done to the property of his neighbor by an explosion of such boiler, without proof of fault or negligence on the owner's part.14 Nor is the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher applicable to damage resulting from the construction and maintenance of ordinary buildings and erections near to the land of an adjacent owner. 15 On this point Mr. Justice Holmes has said that, "as it is desirable that buildings and fences should be put up, the law of this commonwealth does not throw the risk of that act any more than of other necessary conduct upon the actor, or make every owner of a structure insure against all that may happen, however little to be foreseen." 16

68. Fall of Building or Part Thereof.-While the owner or occupant of a building is not an insurer against damage resulting from its fall or collapse,17 yet, so far as the exercise of ordinary care will enable him to do so, he is bound to keep it in such condition that it will not by any insecurity or insufficiency for the purpose to which it is put do damage to adjacent property,18 or injure any person who may be in, on, or passing the premises. 19 In one of the earlier cases it was said: "If a person erects a building upon a city street, or an ordinary highway, he is under a legal obligation to take reasonable care that it shall not fall into the street and injure persons lawfully there. It cannot be aflirmed that he is liable for any injury that may occur, whether by inevitable accident or the wrongful act of others. It is not to be disputed, however, that he is liable for the want of reasonable care." 20 The principle frequently has been applied to injuries resulting from the fall of walls left standing after fire.1

14. Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. L. 339, 50 Am. Rep. 394; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476, 10 Am. Rep. 623.

15. Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 62 N. E. 746, 91 A. S. R. 314, 57 L.R.A. 132.

16. Quinn v. Crimmings, 171 Mass. 255, 50 N. E. 624, 68 A. S. R. 420, 42 L.R.A. 101.

17. Ryder v. Kinsey, 62 Minn. 85, 64 N. W. 94, 54 A. S. R. 623, 34 L.R.A. 557 and note. See supra, par.

74.

19. Ryder v. Kinsey, 62 Minn. 85, 64 N. W. 94, 54 A. S. R. 623, 34 L.R.A. 557; Waterhouse v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 12 S. D. 397, 81 N. W. 725, 48 L.R.A. 157.

Note: 34 L.R.A. 559.

See BUILDINGS, vol. 4, p. 409. 20. Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567, 15 Am. Rep. 530.

1. Hall v. Gage, 116 Ark. 50, 172 S. 18. Cheeseborough V. Green, 10 W. 833, L.R.A.1915C 704 and note; Conn. 318, 26 Am. Dec. 396; Factors', Anderson v. East, 117 Ind. 126, 19 N. etc., Ins. Co. v. Werlein, 42 La. Ann. 1046, 8 So. 435, 11 L.R.A. 361; Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 62 N. E. 746, 91 A. S. R. 314, 57 L.R.A. 132; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567, 15

E. 726, 10 A. S. R. 35, 2 L.R.A. 712;
Lauer v. Palms, 129 Mich. 671, 89
N. W. 694, 58 L.R.A. 67. See ADJOIN-
ING LANDOWNERS, vol. 1, p. 374.

According to some of the decisions, the owner of walls is not relieved of liability by reason of the fact that he has instructed competent architects and builders to take whatever precautions and make whatever repairs may be necessary. Indeed, it has been held that the owner is not exonerated by reason of the fact that a public officer has volunteered to assume control over the walls. The owner of walls is, however, under no obligation to adjoining property owners to remove or protect the walls, until he has had a reasonable time to make necessary investigation and take such precautions as are required. In the absence of any explanation as to the cause of a building falling negligence will be presumed. Buildings properly constructed do not fall from slight causes, only from some adequate cause. Therefore, where a building falls without apparent cause, in the absence of explanatory circumstances, negligence will be presumed; and the burden is upon the owner of showing that he exercised ordinary care to keep it in a safe condition.

7

69. Precipitation of Objects into Street or on Adjacent Land.It may be stated as a general proposition that the owner or occupant of a building or structure, unless he can show that he was not at fault, will be held liable for damage and injury resulting from the precipitation of objects or substances into the street or upon adjacent premises. If, for example, an owner permits a window to remain out of repair until the glass falls into the street, to the injury of a passer-by, an action may be maintained therefor. Similarly, a recovery may be had for injuries resulting from the fall of a brick 10 or a stone from a wall,11 a sign,12 or a lamp suspended over a high

2. Lauer v. Palms, 129 Mich. 671, 77 N. W. 948, 44 L.R.A. 500; Bannigan 89 N. W. 694, 58 L.R.A. 67. See also v. Woodbury, 158 Mich. 206, 122 N. Cork v. Blossom, 162 Mass. 330, 38 N. W. 531, 133 A. S. R. 371; Soriero v. E. 495, 44 A. S. R. 362, 26 L.R.A. 256. Pennsylvania R. Co., 86 N. J. L. 642, 3. Anderson v. East, 117 Ind. 126, 92 Atl. 604, Ann. Cas. 1916E 1071, 19 N. E. 726, 10 A. S. R. 35, 2 L.R.A. L.R.A.1915C 710; Busse v. Rogers, 120 712. Wis. 443, 98 N. W. 219, 64 L.R.A. 183; Tarry v. Ashton, 1 Q. B. D. 314, 45 L. J. Q. B. 260, 34 L. T. N. S. 97, 24 W. R. 581, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 4 and note. See infra, par. 158.

4. Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 62 N. E. 746, 91 A. S. R. 314, 57 L.R.A. 132.

5. Cork v. Blossom, 162 Mass. 330, 38 N. E. 495, 44 A. S. R. 362, 26 L.R.A. 256; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567, 15 Am. Rep. 530.

Note: L.R.A.1915C 709.

6. Ryder v. Kinsey, 62 Minn. 85, 64 N. W. 94, 54 A. S. R. 623, 34 L.R.A. 557.

7. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hopkins, 54 Ark. 209, 15 S. W. 610, 12 L.R.A. 189 and note; Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217, 36 Am. Rep. 367; Detzur v. B. Stroh Brewing Co., 119 Mich. 282,

8. Notes: 12 L.R.A. 189; 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1171.

9. Detzur v. B. Stroh Brewing Co., 119 Mich. 282, 77 N. W. 948, 44 L.R.A. 500; Bannigan v. Woodbury, 158 Mich. 206, 122 N. W. 531, 133 A. S. R. 371.

10. Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217, 36 Am. Rep. 367.

11. Soriero v. Pennsylvania R. Co.. 86 N. J. L. 642, 92 Atl. 604, Ann. Cas. 1916E 1071, L.R.A.1915C 710.

12. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hop

way.18 And the fall of accumulations of water, snow, and ice has frequently been recognized as a ground of action.14 Again, a person who piles lumber on his own property may be liable for the injury to his neighbor's house by boards blown against it by such a windstorm as might reasonably be expected to occur, if he did not exercise the care and prudence of a prudent man in like circumstances, to guard against the probable consequences of such winds. 15 And it has been held that one who shovels coal from a wagon to the ground, near the unprotected edge of a steep decline at the bottom of which are dwelling houses, without exercising any care to prevent it from going over the edge, is liable for injury to a person while at work near a house, by a piece of coal which goes over the edge and rolls down. the decline.16

V. ATTRACTIONS TO CHILDREN

Doctrine of "Turntable Cases"

70. Import of Doctrine.-It is a general rule that a trespasser takes his chances and must look out for himself; and that no duty rests upon the owner to keep his property in such condition or so guarded that a wrongful intermeddler shall not be exposed to danger.17 But inasmuch as children are less able to foresee and appreciate danger than are persons of mature years and intelligence, is it is generally recognized that they are entitled to a greater degree of care than adults: 19 and this has been particularly emphasized in the class of cases dealing with injuries from what have been termed "attractions to children" or "attractive nuisances." These decisions establish that while a proprietor may owe no duty to adults with respect to instrumentalities maintained by him, he may be liable for injuries to a child of tender years for injuries sustained from the same instrumentalities. The doctrine has been well stated in the following

kins, 54 Ark. 209, 15 S. W. 610, 12 L.R.A. 189.

ADJOINING LANDOWNERS, vol. 1, pp. 374-376.

15. Bishop v. Readsboro Chair Mfg. Co., 85 Vt. 141, 81 Atl. 454, Ann. Cas. 1914B 1163, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1171.

16. Furkovich v. Bingham Coal, etc., Co., 45 Utah 89, 143 Pac. 121, L.R.A. 1915B 426 and note (considering negligence in permitting articles to roll down a hillside or decline).

13. Tarry v. Ashton, 1 Q. B. D. 314, 45 L. J. Q. B. 260, 34 L. T. N. S. 97, 24 W. R. 581, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 4. 14. Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 106 Mass. 194, 8 Am. Rep. 318; Smethurst v. Burton Square Independent Cong. Church, 148 Mass. 261, 19 N. E. 387, 12 A. S. R. 550, 2 L.R.A. 695; Hannem v. Pence, 40 Minn. 127, 41 N. W. 657, 12 A. S. R. 717; Garland v. Towne, 55 N. H. 55, 20 Am. Rep. 161; Bishop V. Readsboro Chair Mfg. Co., 85 Vt. 20. Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 141, 81 Atl. 454, Ann. Cas. 1914B 1163, 39 N. E. 484, 45 A. S. R. 111, 27 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1171 and note. See L.R.A. 206; South Bend v. Turner,

17. See supra, par. 53.
18. See infra, par. 105, 106.
19. See supra, par. 32.

terms: "One who maintains dangerous instrumentalities or appliances on his premises of a character likely to attract children in play, or permits dangerous conditions to remain thereon with the knowledge that children are in the habit of resorting thereto for amusement, is liable to a child non sui juris who is injured therefrom." 1 This doctrine is an exception to the general rule that a property owner owes no duty to trespassers except not wilfully or intentionally to inflict injury upon them. Whatever the legal theory may be, however, the doctrine is the dictate of a policy that is becoming very generally recognized. Conservation of child life and safety as to artificial perils is one of such importance that ordinary care may well hold everyone responsible for creating or maintaining a condition involving any such, with reasonable ground for apprehending that children of tender years may probably be allured thereinto.3 Whether the doctrine. applies to municipalities is a point on which the authorities have disagreed. Many, if not a majority, of the decisions have held that municipal corporations are liable equally with industrial corporations and individuals.5

71. Origin and Extent of Recognition of Doctrine.-All courts. point to Lynch v. Nurdin (1 ̊Q. B. 29, decided in 1841) as the pioneer case on what has now come to be known as the attractive nuisance doctrine; but not until the first turntable case had been decided by the supreme court of the United States, in 1873, was there any extended discussion of the questions involved in that doctrine. The supreme court decision referred to has been recognized on every hand as the leading authority in the establishment of the turntable doctrine. In that case a railroad company was held liable in an

156 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271, 83 A. S. R. 200, 54 L.R.A. 396.

Note: 49 A. S. R. 416.

1. Mattson v. Minnesota, etc., R. Co., 95 Minn. 477, 104 N. W. 443, 111 A. S. R. 483, 5 Ann. Cas. 498, 70 L.R.A. 503.

For other well formulated statements of the turntable doctrine, see the following cases: Cahill v. Stone, 153 Cal. 571, 96 Pac. 84, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1094 and note; Wilmot v. McPadden, 79 Conn. 367, 65 Atl. 157, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1101; Dahl v. Valley Dredging Co., 125 Minn. 90, 145 N. W. 796, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1173.

2. Dahl v. Valley Dredging Co., 125 Minn. 90, 145 N. W. 796, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1173. See supra, par. 53.

3. Kelly v. Southern Wisconsin R. Co., 152 Wis. 328, 140 N. W. 60, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 487.

4. Note: Ann. Cas. 1915C 287.

5. Doyle v. Chattanooga, 128 Tenn. 433, 161 S. W. 997, Ann. Cas. 1915C 283 and note. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, vol. 19, p. 1135.

6. Conrad v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 64 W. Va. 176, 61 S. E. 44, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1129.

Note: 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1100.

7. Sioux City, etc., R. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 21 U. S. (L. ed.) 745.

8. Lovejoy v. Denver, etc., R. Co., 59 Colo. 222, 146 Pac. 263, Ann. Cas. 1916E 1075, L.R.A.1915E 888; Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39 N. E. 484, 45 A. S. R. 114, 27 L.R.A. 206; Riggle v. Lens, 71 Ore. 125, 142 Pac. 346, Ann. Cas. 1916C 1083, L.R.A. 1915A 150; Franks v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 78 S. C. 10, 58 S. E. 960, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 468.