$30.20. A judgment was entered in his favor for this amount on November 14, 1912. Deducting this sum from $675, the amount shown by the disclosure of defendant to be due Elizabeth A. Humphrey, left $466, for which amount judgment was rendered in favor of Alice Brown on February 7, 1913.

Elizabeth A. Humphrey was adjudged a bankrupt on February 16, 1911. This adjudication occurred two days more than four months after her assignment of the insurance money to Thomas J. Cavanaugh, and one day less than four months after the service of the writ of garnishment by Alice Brown upon the defendant company. The plaintiff, as trustee in bankruptcy, claims to be entitled to the sum of $466, for the reason that the lien of Alice Brown as fixed by the service of the writ of garnishment on October 17, 1910, was so fixed within four months of the adjudication of bankruptcy against Elizabeth A. Humphrey. Subdivision "f" of section 67 of the bankruptcy act provides:

"That all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens, obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior to filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected by the levy, judgment, attachment or other liens shall be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same, and shall pass to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt," etc.

This section of the statute has been construed in many cases, and has been given effect according to its tenor. In re Kenney, 105 Fed. 897 (45 C. C. A. 113); In re Lesser (D. C.), 108 Fed. 201; In re McCartney (D. C.), 109 Fed. 621; and In re Beals (D. C.), 116 Fed. 530.

At the conclusion of the introduction of evidence both parties moved for a directed verdict. The mo

tion made on behalf of the defendant was granted by the learned trial judge upon the ground principally that the plaintiff had been guilty of laches in not having secured the right to intervene in the case of Alice Brown v. Elizabeth A. Humphrey, and by such failure permitting a judgment to go in favor of Alice Brown and against the defendant company for the sum of $466. While it is doubtless proper for a trustee in bankruptcy to act with diligence lest the rights of parties may be changed, we are unable to see how the delay in the present instance worked any harm to Alice Brown. The application of the trustee in the district court for the western district of Michigan for an order compelling the insurance company to pay over the money to him as trustee was made prior to the rendition of said judgment in the circuit court in favor of Alice Brown, and a temporary injunction was issued on said application on the 6th of December, 1912, preventing the defendant from turning over said fund. This injunction was dissolved on February 25, 1913, whereupon, as was intimated to the trustee by the referee in bankruptcy in his order dissolving the injunction, the trustee secured authority to bring this suit. We are of opinion that it cannot be said that the trustee did not act with reasonable diligence in the premises.

In this court it is contended on behalf of the defendant that there was no adequate proof of the fact that the plaintiff is trustee of the estate of Elizabeth A. Humphrey, and many cases are cited to the effect that such proof is necessary. A sufficient answer to this proposition is found in the fact that the case proceeded to trial in the court below upon the assumption that the plaintiff was, in fact, the trustee of Elizabeth A. Humphrey, as he claimed. Exhibit B introduced in evidence is his verified petition filed in the district court for the western district of Michigan, in which

there is set up the fact of his appointment. Further than this, although a motion was made for a directed verdict on behalf of the defendant for several reasons, no claim was made by the attorney for the defendant that proof upon this point was lacking or insufficient.

It is urged on behalf of counsel for defendant that to permit a recovery by the plaintiff in this case would result in two judgments against the defendant for the same sum. This view we think untenable, for the reason that a judgment in the case at bar against the defendant can only be predicated upon the fact that the Federal statute above quoted makes absolutely null and void all levies, judgments, etc., obtained through legal proceedings within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. It follows, of course, that the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this suit operates as a vacation of the prior judgment against the same defendant for the same fund in favor of Alice Brown.

We are of opinion that the learned trial judge was in error in directing a verdict in favor of defendant, and that he should have directed in favor of plaintiff.

The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered. MCALVAY, KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

LOCKE v. IONIA CIRCUIT JUDGE.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-PRACTICE OF MEDICINE CRIMINAL LAW-AMENDMENT TO STATUTE-TITLE OF Аст.

The amendment of Act No. 237, Pub. Acts 1899, passed in 1913, Act No. 368, Pub. Acts 1913, defining the practice of medicine to mean the actual diagnosing, curing or relieving in any degree, or professing or attempting to diagnose, treat, etc., by attendance, prescribing, or manipulation, exceeds the power of the legislature in that it attempts to render criminal any acts of kindness to or relief of the suffering, as an amendment to an act which related to the examination, regulation, licensing, and registration of physicians and surgeons: but in so far as the original act applies to practicing medicine and regulates the same it is valid and is not open to the objection of unconstitutionality because it attempts to include persons engaged in the practice of chiropractic or drugless healing.

2. SAME CRIMINAL LAW-TREATMENT OF DISEASES.

Under the police power of the State it is competent for the legislature to regulate and control the examination and licensing of persons engaged in healing and in the medical profession or the treatment and cure of ailments and diseases, so that an information based upon the act of 1899 regulating physicians and surgeons, and charging the respondent with practicing as a chiropractor without complying with the requirements of the law, was sufficient and should not have been quashed upon the motion of the accused. The information was good irrespective of any amendments to the law.

3. SAME

TITLE OF ACT-LICENSING PHYSICIANS. The title of Act No. 237, Pub. Acts 1899 (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] 5108 et seq.), sufficiently covers the practice of medicine or it is suggested by the reference to regulation and licensing of physicians, etc., in said act; and the respondent, a chiropractor, engaged in the treatment of diseases by manipulation of the spine and muscles of the back, was within the prohibition of the statute.

4. SAME DUE PROCESS OF LAW-FEDERAL CONSTITUTION-CRIMINAL LAW-LICENSING CHIROPRACTORS.

It is within the police power also to license and regulate the practice and treatment of diseases and to protect the citizens from fraudulent or improper claims on the part of persons who pretend to practice the profession;-such legislation does not interfere with the unalienable right of a citizen to employ whomsoever he chooses as his physician. The qualifications of persons who hold themselves out as qualified to cure diseases is within the province of the legislature to regulate or license.1

Mandamus by Alfred R. Locke, prosecuting attorney of the county of Ionia, against Frank D. M. Davis, judge of the circuit court, to require respondent to set aside an order quashing the information in a prosecution against one D. J. Healey. Submitted January 19, 1915. (Calendar No. 26,312.) Writ granted March 17, 1915.

Grant Fellows, Attorney General, and Alfred R. Locke, Prosecuting Attorney, for relator.

Hawley & Eldred, for respondent.

STEERE, J. In this proceeding relator seeks by mandamus to compel respondent to set aside an order quashing an information filed in the circuit court of Ionia county charging one D. J. Healey with having from the 15th of August, 1913, to the 23d of March, 1914, wilfully and illegally engaged in the practice of medicine in the city of Belding in violation of the provisions of Act No. 237, Pub. Acts 1899, and acts amendatory thereto.

The record discloses a complaint, warrant, arrest, preliminary examination before a magistrate, and hold

1

For the application of statutes regulating practice of medi cine to persons giving special kinds of treatments, see notes in 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 762; 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 103; 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1297, and 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 179.

Upon the constitutionality of regulations as to practice, see note in 14 L. R. A. 581.