ing for trial in the circuit court according to the regular course of procedure in criminal prosecutions, followed by filing this information, arraignment in the circuit court, refusal to plead, the entry of a plea of not guilty by order of the court, and, when the case was brought on for trial, a motion to quash said information and discharge the accused because of the invalidity of the act under which it was filed, which motion was granted.

The record does not contain any testimony taken on the preliminary examination, and the only official information as to what the accused actually did, aside from practicing medicine without a license in violation of the provisions of said statute, stated in phraseology purporting to follow the statute with proper allegations negativing exceptions, is that:

"The said D. J. Healey then and there wilfully and illegally did advertise and hold out to the public himself as being able to treat, cure, and alleviate human ailments and diseases, and claiming to be capable of curing diseases and human ailments, and did then and there, for hire and reward, treat for diseases, prescribe for, and advise as to health and diagnosis, and give consultation and advice as to health and disease, divers persons, and did then and there attempt to treat, cure, and relieve human diseases, ailments, defects, and complaints of physical and mental origin, by attendance, advice, appliances, manipulations, divers persons, and did then and there treat and attempt to cure of ailments and disease one Albert Hammond and divers other persons then and there consulting him, contrary to the provisions of" said act and to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, etc.

It is stated, however, in the people's brief that the prosecuting attorney admitted, at the time said motion to quash such information was presented and argued, that he did not claim, or propose any proof tending to show, that the accused made use of drugs, but would prove that he designated himself as a

"chiropractor," and engaged in the practice of the system of that so-called school; that the proofs would show that he treated his patients in attempts to cure disease and relieve suffering by manipulation of the spine and muscles of the back.

The scope of the information being accepted as settled by this concession, the trial court, after argument, granted said motion, holding the act of 1899, as amended in 1913 (Act No. 368, Pub. Acts 1913), unconstitutional, for the reasons, briefly stated, that its title, relating only to the examination, regulation, licensing, and registration of physicians and surgeons and punishment for offenders against said act, did not include nor apply to persons assuming to treat diseases by mere manipulation, without surgery or the use of drugs and medicines; that the provisions of section 9 of said act, as amended, defining the practice of medicine, is both beyond the scope of said title and unconstitutional, in the further particular that it is "unreasonable, unjust, and deprived citizens of this State of their liberty, rights, and equality before the law;" that the provisions of section 7 regarding licensing persons who claimed to cure disease otherwise than by surgery, drugs, and medicines is not only beyond the purview of said title, but in its terms "confusing, conflicting, and contradictory, insomuch as to render the law incapable of construction or enforcement as to that paragraph."

A motion to set aside the order quashing said information being denied, application was made to this court for mandamus.

The substance of the attack upon this information is that it rests upon amendments to the act of 1899, passed without changing the original title, which provide for licensing persons desiring to practice a system of treatment of human ailments without resort to drugs, medicine, or surgery, subjecting them to the punishment provided in said act for practicing

medicine without a license, and in the concluding paragraph essays to stamp them beyond question as medical practitioners by coining the following definition:

"In this act, unless otherwise provided, the term 'practice of medicine' shall mean the actual diagnosing, curing or relieving in any degree, or professing or attempting to diagnose, treat, cure or relieve any human disease, ailment, defect or complaint, whether of physical or mental origin, by attendance or by advice, or by prescribing or furnishing any drug, medicine, appliance, manipulation or method, or by any therapeutic agent whatsoever."

This sweeping effort at definition, with all provisions "otherwise" taken into account, would render criminal numerous gratuitous and humane acts of relief and kindness to the suffering common amongst mankind in all ages and places. The police power of the State, though comprehensive, is scarce adequate to compass the possibilities of such a definition, and it is difficult to discern in the title of the act any warning of a purpose to make such a definition a part of the law of this Commonwealth. That attribute of sovereignty known as "police power," though difficult of definition, includes the power of legislation deemed essential for protection of the public peace, good order, morals, safety, and health. Preservation of the public health is universally recognized as a matter peculiarly within the police power, and to that end it is competent to control, under proper legislation, the activities of those who claim especial skill or knowledge in the healing art, and who seek for gain to engage as a business in the practice of their art upon the public, to regulate such practice, to prescribe qualifications necessary to be possessed by persons making such pretensions, and to grant them licenses before they may engage in the serious business of treating human ailments as a vocation. The power

to license involves the power to prohibit and punish those attempting to practice the healing art without a license.

The title of the original act under consideration is:

"An act to provide for the examination, regulation, licensing and registration of physicians and surgeons, and for the punishment of offenders against this act, and to repeal acts and parts of acts in conflict therewith."

The amendment of 1913 refers to the original act by title and proposes to amend sections 3, 7, 8, and

9. Otherwise than as pointed out and as applied to "those persons who desire to practice (and do practice) a system of treatment of human ailments and disease without the use of drugs and medicines," the amendments of 1913 are, in detail, of slight importance here.

The respondent, against whom this information is filed, does not claim to hold or to have applied for a license under any provision of the act. He claims to be without the pale and purpose of the act as expressed in its title. His defense is that he is neither a physician nor surgeon, and does not practice medicine within any meaning of the title in question, and that, as applied to the things with which he is charged, such legislation is in any aspect unconstitutional and void, because it would operate to abridge his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States, to deprive him of his property-the right to earn-without due process of law, and thus denies him equal protection under the law.

The issue here is the validity of this information. It turns, in our opinion, upon the two questions of whether that with which the accused is charged can, in common acceptation and as generally construed by the courts, be regarded as engaging in the "practice of medicine," and whether the title of the act is sufficiently broad to include the same. If so, the informa

tion is good under the original act, irrespective of the amendments.

In Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 23 Sup. Ct. 390, appealed from this court (People v. Reetz, 127 Mich. 87 [86 N. W. 396]), in an opinion written by Justice Brewer, it is said:

"The power of a State to make reasonable provisions for determining the qualifications of those engaging in the practice of medicine, and punishing those who attempt to engage therein in defiance of such statutory provisions, is not open to question. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (9 Sup. Ct. 231); Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (18 Sup. Ct. 573), and cases cited in the opinion; State, ex rel. Burroughs, v. Webster, 150 Ind. 607 (50 N. E. 750, 41 L. R. A. 212), and cases cited."

Does the title of this act cover and apply to the practice of medicine? It is not so stated in express language, and respondent contends that:

"The act is not one for the regulation of the practice of medicine, but is an act for the regulation of physicians and surgeons."

The act is not only one to regulate, but to examine, register, and license, them. The police power to license, as indicated in said title, is the recognized power to authorize persons to engage in vocations which need special surveillance without which they would not be permitted. The object of this act would be no more clearly expressed if it proposed to provide for licensing physicians and surgeons to practice medicine and surgery. An act to license a class of persons designated by their trade, profession, or business is commonly understood to mean, and can only mean, to authorize and legally qualify them to pursue the vocation or business which the identifying names used necessarily point out. The subject-matter of this statute is fairly stated and indicated by its