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title to be physicians and surgeons in the pursuit of their calling—the practice of medicine and surgeryand it distinctly suggests the purpose of the act to be surveillance of such vocation, by examination, registration, license, and regulation. Auxiliary details and collateral provisions depending upon, and germane to, the principal purpose are by rule included, and need not be enumerated at length. The words “persons practicing medicine" are held to be synonymous with “physician” in Harrison v. State, 102 Ala. 170 (15 South. 563).
It needs no citation of authority to sustain the proposition that practicing medicine, surgery, and the healing art generally or professing to heal the afflicted in any manner by any means as a vocation for hire are related subjects, ostensibly to the same end, naturally affecting one way or the other, and germane to the public health.
In recognition of such relation, although somewhat conversely to the question here, it was held in People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6 (37 N. W. 888), that under a law entitled "An act to promote the public health,” a statute prescribing conditions for practicing medicine and punishment of violators was sustained, though by a divided court, and respondent, who claimed to be a "magnetic healer," and treated the sick for pay according to his so-called system, without com• plying with the statute, was held properly convicted of unlawfully engaging in the practice of medicine.
We are unable to discern any material difference in scope and meaning between this title and the titles of similar laws in other States passed "to regulate the practice of medicine" dealing with the various activities of those who, assuming special skill and knowledge in the treatment of disease, engage in such work for profit, and which, under such titles, provide for their examination as to qualifications, registration,
and license to practice, with resulting punishment for those offending against such provision.
The original act of 1899 and the amendment of 1913 both make it a misdemeanor to practice medicine or surgery in this State without complying with the provisions of the act, the amendment including also advertising in any form or holding one's self out “to the public as being able to treat, cure or alleviate human ailments or disease." We conclude that regulation of the practice of medicine, as construed in People v. Phippin, supra, and the great weight of more recent authority in other courts, is a provision fairly related to and naturally suggested by the title in question.
That the practice of various systems of drugless healing which have been devised and exploited from time to time, the respective merits of which the courts cannot and do not assume to decide, is to be regarded as practicing medicine, has been held in the following States and decisions, as well as many others therein cited, and every feature of the many questions raised so thoroughly analyzed and discussed that any attempt to go over them here in detail would be superfluous duplication: Bragg v. State, 134 Ala. 165 (32 South. 767, 58 L. R. A. 925) (osteopathy); Little v. State, 60 Neb. 749 (84 N. W. 248, 51 L. R. A. 717) (osteopathy); State v. Pollman, 51 Wash. 110 (98 Pac. 88) (osteopathic and magnetic); People v. Gordon, 194 Ill. 560 (62 N. E. 858, 88 Am. St. Rep. 165) (magnetic healing in the nature of osteopathy); State v. Wilhite, 132 Iowa, 226 (109 N. W. 730, 11 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 180) (neurology and ophthalmology); State v. Yegge, 19 S. D. 234 (103 N. W. 17, 69 L. R. A. 504, 9 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 202) (ophthalmology, or fitting eyeglasses); State v. Adkins, 145 Iowa, 671 (124 N. W. 627) (vital science); State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21 (73 N. E. 1063, 70 L. R. A. 835, 106 Am. St. Rep. 570, 2 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 898) (Christian Science for pay); Witty v. State, 173 Ind. 404 (90 N. E. 627, 25 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1297) (suggestive therapeutics); O'Neil v. State, 115 Tenn. 427 (90 S. W. 627, 3 L. R. A. [N. S.] 762) (functional ray treatment); Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211 (64 N. E. 862, 59 L. R. A. 190) (magnetic healer); Milling v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) (150 S. W. 434) (manipulation); State v. Johnson, 84 Kan. 411 (114 Pac. 390, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.] 539) (chiropractic); State v. Miller, 146 Iowa, 521 (124 N. W. 167) (chiropractic); State v. Smith, 233 Mo. 242 (135 S. W. 465, 33 L. R. A. [N. S.] 179) (chiropractic); People v. Allcutt, 117 App. Div. 546 (102 N. Y. Supp. 678) (mechano-neural therapy).
The substance of conclusions reached in this line of authority upon the scope of medical practice is comprehensively expressed in Commonwealth v. Jewelle, 199 Mass. 558 (85 N. E. 858), as follows:
"It would be too narrow a view of the practice of medicine to say that it could not be engaged in in any case or class of cases otherwise than by prescribing or dealing out a substance to be used as a remedy. The science of medicine, that is, the science which relates to the prevention, cure, or alleviation of disease, covers a broad field, and is not limited to that department of knowledge which relates to the administration of medicinal substances. It includes a knowledge, not only of the functions of the organs of the human body, but also of the diseases to which these organs are subject, and of the laws of health and the modes of living which tend to avert or overcome disease, as well as of the specific methods of treatment that are most effective in promoting cures. It is conceivable that one may practice medicine to some extent, in certain classes of cases, without dealing out or prescribing drugs or other substances to be used as medicines. It is conceivable that one may do it in other ways than those practiced as a part of their respective systems, by either 'osteopathists, pharmacists, clairvoyants, or persons practicing hypnotism, magnetic healing, mind cure, massage cure science, or the cosmopathic method of healing.'
We are not unmindful of the authorities to the contrary of the foregoing views, some of which can be distinguished by reason of special statutory provisions in their jurisdictions, and others which cannot, but an examination of the many decisions upon the subject which that fruitful source of litigation has demanded leads clearly to the conclusion that the great weight of authority and soundest reasoning sustains the views voiced in the cases cited. In the State of New York, Smith v. Lane, 24 Hun, 632, a leading case to the contrary, has been overruled by People v. Allcutt, supra. The comparatively early case of People v. Phippin, supra, plainly aligned this State with those “refusing to restrict the practice of medicine to the administration of drugs or the use of surgical instruments,” and, although then rendered less binding as a controlling precedent by a division of the court, it has not since been questioned, but on the contrary, both cited with approval by this court and strengthened as an authority by abundant and carefully reasoned decisions in other jurisdictions.
As to other constitutional questions raised, touching the inalienable rights of the accused as a citizen to equal protection under the law, etc., we are well satisfied that not only is the abundant authority elsewhere conclusive to the contrary of the contentions made, but the subject is fully and finally disposed of in People v. Reetz, 127 Mich. 87 (86 N. W. 396), referring in strong approving terms to the Phippin Case as follows:
"Notwithstanding the former decision of this court in People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6 (37 N. W. 888), counsel again attack the constitutionality of this legislation. That case settled the question against the contention of the respondent. See, also, People v. Moorman, 86 Mich. 433 (49 N. W. 263). Counsel argue that such legislation is an interference with the inalienable right of a citizen when ill to employ anybody he chooses as his physician. This contention is not supported by authority or reason. The practice of medicine affects the public health, and it is clearly within the police power of the State to provide that those dealing with disease shall be amply qualified to do so, so far as human experience and education may qualify them.
This legislation has been almost universally sustained by the courts of other States and the Supreme Court of the United States. Among the cases are the following, which we cite without further comment: State v. Dent, 25 W. Va. 1, affirmed in Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (9 Sup. Ct. 231); State v. Webster, 150 Ind. 607, 50 N. E. 750 [41 L. R. A. 212], and authorities there cited."
As before suggested, the validity of this information is not contingent upon the legality of provisions relative to licensing in the amended act. That it is within the police power of the State and the scope of the title to so provide, or not, in the discretion of the legislature, we are well satisfied. Neither can the court concern itself with whether "the system of treatment practiced by chiropractors is a separate, systematic, coordinated, and arranged branch
which has firmly established its worth," or merely of the class of alleged methods of treatment without proved merit, often skillfully heralded with extravagant assurances and new-coined names as a thing inspired for the healing of the nations, to which the sick and afflicted searching a cure in their extremity are prone to harken with credulity. Those questions are for the legislative, and not for the judicial, branch of this government. The defendant is charged with, and has claimed, the skill and right to practice as a profession for profit his system of healing. It may be all he claims for it, but it is a calling directed to the serious business of treating human ailments