38 Ala. 44; Dakin v. Allen, Cush. 33; Rich v. Zeilsdorf, 22 Wis. 254; Judevine v. Goodrich, 35 Vt. 19; Perkins v. Stockwell, 131 Mass. 529; Sanborn v. Hoyt, 24 Me. 118. (3) In a case like this the measure of damages is the real value of the buildings at the time of the fire, and not their relative value to the assured for the purpose of the removal. The case Laurent v. Chatham Ins. Co., Hall, 41 disapproved. U. S. Circ. Ct., Massachusetts, Oct. 14, 1882. Washington Mills Emery Manufacturing Co. v. Commercial Fire Insurance Co. Opinion by Colt, D. J. LIFE POLICY ESTOPPEL.- - (1) A person may insure his own life and make the policy payable to any one, though such payee has no interest in the life of the insured. Hence, where a policy was taken out upon the life of one, and made payable to another (who had no legal interest in it) in case he survived the assured, and there was strong evidence tending to show that the transaction was a mere wager, held, that it was properly left to the jury to say whether the policy was obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose of speculating in the hazard of a life in which the plaintiff had no inter INSURABLE INTEREST-MISTAKE est. See Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775; Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643; Campbell v. New England Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 381; Provident Ins. Co. v. Baum, 29 Ind. 236; Lemon v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 38 Conn. 294; Guardian Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35; American, etc., Ins. Co. v. Robertshaw, 26 Penn. St. 189; Farfield v. New England, etc., Association, 51 Vt. 624; Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Shaffer, 94 U. S. 67; Aetna Ins. Co. v. France, id. 561; Wainwright v. Bland, 1 Mov. & Ry. 481; Swick v. Home Ins. Co., 2 Dill. 160; Tuston v. Hardey, 14 Beav. 232. (2) Where an applicant made a full statement of all the facts regarding the name of his usual medical attendant to the sub-agent who took the application, and the sub-agent, putting his own construction upon the facts, filled in the wrong name, it was held the company could not take advantage of the mistake. Woodbury Savings Bank v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 31 Conn. 517; Myers v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 Ins. L. J., 662; Bodine v. Exch. Fire Ins. Co., 51 N. Y. 117; Van Schoick v. Niagara Ins. Co., 68 id. 434. U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Michigan, June 5, 1882. Langdon v. Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. Opinion by Brown, D. J. (14 Fed. Rep. 272.) MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION-DEFENSE--SUICIDE. - In these mutual associations, which proceed upon the plan of assessments to meet their liabilities, and issue no policies, the constitution and laws stand in the place of a policy, and constitute the contract, which determines the mutual rights and obligations of the parties. Greeno v. Greeno, 23 Hun, 478. In the case of a policy of life insurance issued for the benefit of the heirs of the person insured, it is well settled that the fact of his death by suicide, unless otherwise expressly stipulated, is no defense. Filch v. Insurance Co., 59 N. Y. 573. And where the constitution and laws of the association contain no provision qualifying the right of recovery in case of suicide, the heirs of a member are entitled to recover the amount stipulated, irrespective of the mode of his death. Minnesota Sup. Ct., Aug. 8, 1882. Mills v. Robstock. Opinion by Vanderburgh, J. RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. CONTRACT - STIPULATION FOR BREACH - LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OR PENALTY.- If by a contract one certain sum is to be paid as liquidated damages on breach of any one of several stipulations, the real damages for the breach of no one of which can be ascer tained at the date of the contract being entered into, such sum will not be treated as a penalty, even though it is apparent on the face of the agreement that the breach of one stipulation may be more serious in its consequences than the breach of another stipulation. Where however one of the stipulations is to pay a fixed sum of money, and the amount to be paid for breach of any stipulation is a much larger sum. such amount is a penalty, and only the real damage sustained by breach of any of the stipulations can be recovered. The plaintiff, W., and the defendant S., who was a builder, entered into an agreement for developing the estate of the plaintiff and its resources. W. was to sell to S. for 70,000l. S. was to provide capital not exceeding 70,0001, for manufacturing bricks out of clay on the estate, to build houses, and to pay a deposit of 5,000 to a deposit account in a bank in the joint names of S. and W., of which 500l was to be paid on execution of the contract, and the balance within seven months. If a good title could not be made the plaintiff was to return the 500l and pay the defendant 5,0001, as liquidated damages. The estate was to be covered with houses within ten years from the date of the contract, and proper accounts were to be kept by S. The proceeds of sale of bricks and of houses were to be brought into account, and applied in payment of capital expended by S. (in excess of 5,0001, which was to be in lien of the deposit), then in payment of the purchase-money of 70,000 to W., and the rest was to be equally divided between W. and S. All goods or materials provided by S. were to be paid for by him in cash according to the custom of the trade of the sell ers. S. was also to provide all necessary plant; to devote all his time and attention to the scheme, and to do other things of different kinds in relation to the contract. If S. should commit a substantial breach of the contract, either in not proceeding forthwith with all due diligence to carry out and complete the several works contemplated by this contract, having reference to the demands of the public, or in failing to perform any of the provisions therein contained, then and in either of the said events, the deposit money, whether expended upon the estate or not, was to be forfeited; and if the balance of such deposit had not been paid, then S. was to forfeit and pay a sum of money equal to such balance, the intention being expressed to be that, if default was made by S. as aforesaid, he should forfeit and pay to W. as and by way of liqidated damages the sum of 5,000l. The defendant never paid any part of the 5,000 deposit, or expended anything on the works, or otherwise performed his contract. Held, that the sum of 5,000l. was not a penalty against which a court of equity would relieve, but was recoverable by W. as liquidated damages, but that the condition of forfeiture did not apply on non-payment of the 500l. Per Jessel, M. R.: The statement of James, L. J., in Ex parte Capper, Re Newman, 35 L. T. Rep. N. S. 719; 4 Ch. Div 731, that Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141, laid down that "wherever there is a sum mentioned at the end of a contract as damages for the non-performance of any of a great number of stipulations, there it must be treated as a penalty," is incorrect. The dictum of Heath, J., to the same effect in Astley v. Weldon, 2 B. & P. 346, 353, also disapproved by Jessel, M. R. See also, Hardy v. Martin, 1 Bro. C. C. 419n.; Reynolds v. Bridge, 6 E. & B. 528; Magee v, Lavill, 30 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 170; Galsworthy v. Strutt, 10 L. T. Rep. (O. S.) 329; Atkyns v. Kinnear, 4 Ex. 776; Beets v. Burch, 33 L. T. Rep. (O. S.) 151; Hinton v. Sparks, 17 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 60. Ct. of Appeal, March 28, 1882. Wallis v. Smith. Opinions by Jessel, M. R., and Cotton and Lindley, L.J. J.(47 L. T. Rep., N, S. 389.) The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, MARCH 10, 1883. CURRENT TOPICS. YOVERNOR CLEVELAND'S veto of the five cent elevated railroad fare bill was undoubtedly a great surprise and disappointment to the public. But it seems that he has alleged solid reasons for it in his message. The faith of the State was pledged to these corporations upon specific conditions as an inducement to the investment of capital in these public enterprises, and a contract was in effect made that the companies might charge not to exceed ten cents fare. Unless power was reserved in the charter to modify this implied contract, the Governor's position is undoubtedly the law. We regret that the bill in question cannot become a law. The result should teach our Legislature not to grant privileges of such enormous value without hedging them more carefully. But we believe in the inviolability of public contracts, and we hope the Governor will never depart from the sound principle which he has here laid down. Judge Marston, of the Michigan Supreme Court, has resigned, and Chief Justice Graves has declined a re-nomination. The former gentleman, who has been eight years on the bench, withdraws at the age of 44 or less, because he prefers active practice. The Chief Justice is 63 years old and has been in the court for 16 years, having been also a member of the court for a short time in 1857 under the old organization, when the Circuit Judges in banco constituted the Supreme Court. The Republicans have nominated Ex-Governor Austin Blair to succeed Judge Graves, and Thomas J. O'Brien of Grand Rapids, to the vacancy left by Judge Marston, which is for nearly seven years. Judge Marston himself had been chosen in the same way to fill the vacancy left by Judge Christiancy. On the 27th ult., the court decided the last case before it, and now stands with a docket absolutely clean, and the next term more than a month distant. And yet this is not much better than its constant condition. It files about 450 written opinions in the course of the year, and while 30 or 40 cases are usually carried from one term to the next, an interval of two months or three in the the business is always kept up so closely that the majority of cases are decided within two or three weeks after they are submitted. This court is and for many years has been one of the ablest in this country. summer - We must not omit to call attention to another rhetorical flight on the part of the Kansas Supreme Court, in State v. Crawford, holding that when a statute pronounces saloons in which intoxicating liquors are sold to be nuisances and provides that they may be shut up and abated, the keeping one open may not be perpetually enjoined by a court of VOL. 27-No. 10. equity. The court remark: Probably no greater source of crime and sorrow has ever existed than social drinking saloons. Social drinking is the evil of evils. It has probably caused more drunkenness and has made more drunkards than all other causes combined; and drunkenness is a pernicious source of all kinds of crime and sorrow. It is a Pandora's box, sending forth innumerable ills and woes, shame and disgrace, indigence, poverty and want; social happiness destroyed; domestic broils and bickerings engendered; social ties sundered; homes made desolate; families scattered; heart-rendering partings; sin, crime, and untold sorrows; not even hope left, but every thing lost; an everlasting farewell to all true happiness and to all the nobler aspirations rightfully belonging to every true and virtuous human being. If all drinking saloons and all social drinking establishments were utterly overthrown and destroyed, all sales and uses of intoxicating liquors at other places might probably be left comparatively free, with but little danger to the general welfare of society." True, every word, and quite appropriate to a temperance lecture. Speaking of eloquence, a Chicago correspondent sends us the peroration of a speech delivered in the House of Representatives, by the Hou. Richard Warner, of Tennessee, on the 26th of January, 1882. It is not an example of legal eloquence, but possibly some of our rhetorical judges or lawyers may be able to work up and adopt some parts of it in their own deliverances. The passage is as follows: "The argument that I am presenting to this body is addressed to their judgment and reason and not their prejudice; to their calm reflection. When a speaker desires to convince he should use plain and communicative language, and address himself to the higher order of man the mental, the immortal part, the reason that God breathed into the nostrils of Adam and made him a living soul. When they speak to the passions and prejudices they speak to the lower order, the animal and mortal part that soon perishes and dwindles into nonentity. Mind must govern matter and reason control the world. By reason man has traveled through the abstruse regions of the pathless ocean and discovered this grand and glorious continent, planted the white race upon its soil amid the shrieks of wild beasts and warwhoop of the savage that echoed amid the tall cane wafted by the gentle zephyrs, from the fruits of which religion, civilization, and freedom have spread their pure gems to the remotest corners of American soil. By it man has reached forth his hand from earth and grasped the vivid, forked lightning of heaven that lighted the pathway of the dark, dense cloud, marching with the blasts of muttering thunders, and battling with millions of acres of land, and attached it to overland and submarine telegraphs and cables to communicate intelligence to the world's remotes bounds almost in the twinkling of an eye. By it man has wielded the pen and filled the land with Bibles, law books, medical works, and all the sciences that now decorate the libraries of the world and spread the balm of Gilead upon passion's raging breast and calmed its harrowed bosom. By it the ships on ocean's bosom have been taught to ride the heaving waves amid the sweeping sea-storms, and blossom on the placid waters in the entire ports of the world to feed the starving and clothe the naked. By it the puffing steam-engine, as it sends its smoke in the air, has visited the towns and cities of the world and poured their rich treasures into the bosom of the thirsty lands that weep for exchange, and gratify the wants, necessities and desires of the whole. By it this grand and glorious Government was born and breathed its first breath, was rocked in its infant cradle, has grown to its present manhood, now extending its jurisdiction from sea to gulf, north and south, from ocean to ocean, east, west, and reared the mighty colossus with its giant frame touching the vaulted skies, looking with its massive eyes into the face of Europe's crowned heads and rolling its thundering voice into their ears till their knees smote each other like Belshazzar's upon the fall of Babylon. By it the wise sages, with their silvery locks, have from the legal forums planted the bottom sills of great principles of law that have been handed down for thousands of years to the rising generations, and that are now interwoven with the very idiom we speak, and that underlie as the substratum of all civilized governments of the world. By it the gentle hand of the goddess of peace has been extended with its olive branch to calm the raging waters of heated passion between two massive armies, and the lonesome and deathly sound of the sword, the roar of the musketry, and muttering of the cannon have changed their tune into sweet, softening music like that of the angels who sang upon the departure of Christ from earth to Heaven. Within the brain's most secret cells comment in foreign countries. And more seldom still does it cause comment when the retiring lawyer is a foreigner in the place of his residence. The retirement of Mr. O'Conor to the sands of Nantucket at the premature age of eighty or so, created a little ripple of remark in a few newspapers of this country, but it was an exceptional case. The recent retirement of Mr. Benjamin, in London, is a noteworthy occurrence because it fulfills all the conditions above mentioned. He was an American lawyer, who ran the blockade in our civil war, and establishing himself in London, became in a few years a distinguished legal author by force of a single work, and gained the foremost position among the advocates of Englanp. His earnings of late years have been estimated as high as $125,000 annually. His work on Sales is enough to make any lawyer famous, and this alone produces a handsome income. Mr. Benjamin at the age of 70 and at the maturity of his mental powers retires because of a tendency to heart disease. It is to be hoped that his leisure will give birth to some other legal treatise of merit equal to his unrivalled work on Sales. It will be seen from the letter of Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, in another column, that there is a prospect of his attending the next annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association, to be held in this city. This news will give pleasure to American lawyers, who hold the office in high veneration, and who cherish a warm regard for the man who has brought to it so many gifts of intellect and so many acquisitions of culture. The Lord Chief Justice of England will receive a hearty welcome to these shores, and we shall all wish him health and a prosperous voyage. NOTES OF CASES. IN we who has given his 59th Mississippi Reports we find the following This We should have liked to hear this orator address himself to the passions and sympathies, unhampered by "calm reflection." But as to the speech in question, certainly nothing has been heard equal to it since the famous maiden speech, in the same house, of Mr. Knickerbocker, of this State, "the great Congressman," immortalized by Washington Irving, in his Knickerbocker's History of New York. great orator sat in the outer row of seats in the old hall, but as he warmed up in his delivery he walked down the main aisle toward the speaker's desk, and at length reached the front row in which sat John Randolph, of Roanoke, who reached out his hand to him, and exclaimed, "Go on, Mr. Knickerbocker, go on; such a speech was never heard in this hall before!" "Which encouraged me," said Mr. K. in telling the incident. It is seldom that the retirement of a lawyer from active practice causes general comment, even in his own country, unless he has held judicial or political office. Still more seldom does such an event cause -An note to settle a claim for injury to hired property may show, as between himself and the payee, that he was not liable. Gunning v. Royal, 45.assignment for the benefit of creditors, fraudulently intended by the assignor, is not cured by the good faith of the lawyer who draws it up, and for whose compensation a provision is made in the assignment. Craft v. Bloom, 69.- No action lies in favor of a father, upon the official bond of a clerk, for damages by reason of the marriage of his minor daughter under a license unlawfully issued by the clerk without his consent. Holland v. Beard, 161.-To correct spelling in his will already executed, the testator had it copied, and undertook to execute the copy, and destroyed the original. The copy being insufficiently attested, held, that the original was restored to force, and its contents were sufficiently established by the copy, with evidence of its correctness, and evidence of the testator's declarations. Willbourn v. Shell, 205. A written prom ise to pay for the rigging of a vessel ninety days after its first return trip is enforceable, although the vessel is lost and never returns, and the money is payable in ninety days after the time usually required for the trip. Randall v. Johnson, 317. The owners of a foundry for years gave the ashes to their engineer in consideration of his removing them after working hours. The engineer deposited them, to the knowledge of his employers, on an unenclosed lot opposite the foundry, owned by third persons, whose permission he had obtained. young child, running across that lot, fell into a quantity of the hot ashes and was burned. Held, that the owners of the foundry were not liable therefor. Burke v. Shaw, 443.-Confused by an altercation with some passengers, a railway conductor neglected to stop the train at the station to which the plaintiff was bound, and carried him eight miles beyond, but courteously apologized, and gave A him a free return ticket from that station. There was no proof of damages, nor of personal inconvenience or injury, except that the plaintiff suffered some with cold. Held, a case for only compensatory damages, and a verdict of $833.33 (to which the court below had reduced the verdict from $2,500), was set aside. Chicago Railroad Co. v. Scurr, 456. - Declarations of a deceased person that he had a brother living at a certain place, are competent to establish the right of the brother's heirs to inherit from the devisee. Wise v. Wynn, 588. The 87th North Carolina Reports, with advance sheets of which we are favored by Mr. Kenan, the reporter, is not so interesting as some others of the series. We note the following cases: "The defendant warehousemen had fire insurance on leaf tobacco by them "owned, or held in trust or on commission, or sold and not delivered." The plaintiff bought of them twenty-five particular hogsheads of tobacco, and removed but five, and the rest were destroyed with the warehouse by fire. The defendants also lost other tobacco of their own, exceeding in value the whole insurance. Held, that the goods had been sold and delivered, and the plaintiff could not recover any of the insurance. Lockhart v. Cooper, 149.— Upon a question of private boundaries, the declarations of disinterested deceased persons, made before any controversy had arisen, are admissible in evidence, and this is so although the declarant was a slave, then incompetent but now competent to testify if living. Whitehurst v. Pettepher, 179.A witness is incompetent to testify in North Carolina to the market value of a commodity at Boston, Mass., when his knowledge is exclusively derived from market reports in a newspaper published in North Carolina. Fairley v. Smith, 367.- Under the statute against carrying concealed weapons, which declares that having the weapon upon the person is prima facie evidence of concealment, a merchant who bought a pistol merely as a sample, and carried it in his pocket from the store where he bought it to another near by to have it packed with In Gray v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Nov. 20, 1882, 40 Leg. Int. 90, it was held, that although a confession is not evidence in the absence of proof of the corpus delicti, yet the corpus need not be proved beyond possibility of doubt. This was an indictment for murder of Mrs. McCready, who had disappeared in February, 1877. The body was not produced, nor accounted for, unless by the production of a skull, and the identity of that was disputed. The court observed: "On the 4th of April, 1878, a human skull was found on the river shore near the house in which Mrs. McCready lived. The hair attached to the skull was evidently that of a woman; it was black and gray, corresponding to the hair shown to have belonged to her. The skull showed marks of violence, there were two wounds, either of which would be sufficient to produce death. The jaw bone found near the skull was identified by the witness Rudolf, and by Mary Mc Cready, as the jaw bone of the deceased, by reason of certain peculiarities which they described. Under these circumstances we cannot say it was error to admit the prisoner's confession. While it is familiar law that a confession is not evidence in the absence of proof of the corpus delicti, yet I am not aware of any case which holds that the corpus delicti must first be proved beyond the possibility of doubt. It is a fact to be proved like any other fact in the cause, and be found by the jury upon competent evidence. The true rule in such cases is believed to be this: when the Commonwealth has given sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to entitle the case to go to the jury, it is competent to show a confession made by the prisoner connecting him with the crime. Under such circumstances the jury should first pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence of the corpus delicti. If it satisfies them beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime had been committed, then they are at liberty to give the confession such weight as it is entitled to, taking into view the circumstances surrounding it, and the extent to which it has been corroborated. There is no rule of the criminal law which requires absolute certainty about this or any other question of fact. If it were otherwise it would be impossible to convict of any offense in any case, All the law requires is that the corpus delicti shall be proved as any other fact, that is, beyond a reasonable doubt, and that doubt is for the jury. The identity of a human body, or even of a skeleton, may be proved by circumstances, as may any other fact: Rex v. Hindermarsh, 2 Leach. Cr. Cas. 569; McCullough v. State, 48 Ind. 109. When all other means of identification fail the hair and teeth form the chief means of recognition: Wharton Crim. Ev., § 804. In the case of Udderzook v. Commonwealth, 26 P. F. S. 340, a mutilated body, whose face was discolored and swollen, was found, having been apparently buried for some days. The witness who found it had never seen the person before. He was allowed to testify that the face resembled a photograph of a person alleged to be the one found; the question whether the witness could identify it was for the jury. So we say here. The question whether Rudolf and Mary McCready could identify the jaw found, as that of the deceased, was for the jury. It❘ would have been bald error for the court below to have excluded their testimony. We are in no sense responsible for the view which the jury took of it, and it would be dangerous, even if we had the power, to attempt to review their finding. The confession of the prisoner, as detailed by the witness Dixson, was corroborated in a remarkable degree. Not only was the skull found in the immediate vicinity of the place where the prisoner said he threw the body, but the wounds correspond precisely with those the prisoner said he inflicted. | From all that appeared the locality was unknown to the witness; he had never seen the skull, and the facts could only have been known to him from the statements of the prisoner." LORD JUSTICE STEPHEN ON THE JURY.* W E turn with more patience, if not with complete satisfaction from Lord Justice Stephen's views of punishment to his views of the jury system. He inquires, first, are juries just? second, are they sufficiently intelligent? third, what are the collateral advantages of the system. On the first point he observes: "Trial by a judge without a jury may, I think, be made, practically speaking, completely just in almost every case. At all events, the securities which can be taken for justice in a case of a trial by a judge without a jury are infinitely greater than those which can be taken for a trial by a judge and jury. 1. The judge is one known man, holding a conspicuous position before the community, and open to censure, and in extreme cases to punishment, if he does wrong; the jury are twelve unknown men. Whilst the trial is proceeding they form a group just large enough to destroy even the appearance of individual responsibility. When the trial is over they sink back into the crowd from whence they came, and cannot be distinguished from it. The most unjust verdict throws no discredit on any person who joins in it, for as soon as it is pronounced he returns to obscurity." It seems remarkable to us that the distinguished author should thus array in the van of his argument against the jury the very reasons which have always struck us as the strongest in its favor. It is just because the responsibility is divided that more fearless action may be expected, and it is just because the judge is continually before the public that he would be endangered if he should be constituted a sole arbiter of facts. But the author continues: "Juries give no reasons, but judges do in some cases, and ought to be made to do so formally in all cases if juries are dispensed with. This in itself is a security of the highest value for the justice of a decision." This may be *History of the Criminal Law of England. By Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. London: Macmillan & Co., 1883. true in respect to decisions of points of law, but we cannot believe it true of questions of fact. It is frequently very difficult for a judge to set down on paper the reasons for deciding one way rather than another on close and intricate questions of fact. For example, where a judge disbelives the testimony of a particular witness, which constitutes the turning point in the case, because of the witness' tone of voice, appearance, or manner of testifying, things which would constitute valid reasons in the judge's mind might look extremely trivial or even ridiculous if set down in writing. Frequently an expert can assign no better reason for pronouncing a written signature a forgery than its "general appearance," and this is really the best reason in the world; but it sounds very inconclusive when orally given, and it would carry still less weight if pronouned in a written opinion. We do not believe in written opinions on questions of fact. The author continues: "3. From the nature of the case there can be no appeal in cases of trial by jury, though there may be a new trial. There can be appeal where the trial is by a single judge." But why should there be, if the single judge is so nearly infallible? This concession gives away the argument, for it is a concession that one head is not so good as several. But we do not believe in any authority to do more than grant new trials. The issue of fact should be finally pronounced upon by a tribunal having the witnesses before it. ** * The author says again: "Experience has shown that the decisions of single judges are usually recognized as just. Arbitrations, in which the arbitrator gives no reasons and is subject to no appeal, are not only common but are on the increase." (Here the author loses sight of the virtue he has just attributed to the giving of reasons and the right of appeal.) "This would scarcely be the case if confidence were not felt in the justice of arbitrators. As to juries, experience no doubt has shown, and does continually show, that their verdicts also are just in the very great majority of instances, but I am bound to say I think that the exceptions are more numerous than in the case of trials by judges without juries. In cases of strong prejudice juries are frequently unjust. * * *They are also capable of being intimidated." We may pause here to remark that if the decisions of judges on questions of fact are more generally just than those of juries — which we greatly doubt it is only because they are never intrusted with difficult questions of facts to decide. As to intimidation, can any one believe that it is easier to intimidate twelve men than one man? The author then speaks of the weakness of the jury system under the Plantagenets, its blindness and cruelty under Charles II., and its severity under George III. and the French Reign of Terror. He does not offer a conjecture as to what better justice would have been meted out by the craven, cruel, corrupt or fanatical judges, who were the creatures of those sovereigns, or how a Robespierre or a Marat could have been preferable to their juries. On the second point he says: "I think that a |