without issue of their bodies, then to remain, &c.; and of another part of his land, to the use of C., D., and E., and the heirs of their bodies, and if they die without issue of their bodies, then to remain, &c. That here, there are no cross remainders created by implication; for there never shall be such remainders upon the construction of a deed, though sometimes there are in the case of a will. Dorvell, 64. A. upon the marriage of his son B., who had Doe v. two children then living, conveyed lands by deed 5 Term Rep. to trustees, to the use of himself for life, remainder 518. to B. for life, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to the use of such child or children of B., and in such shares, &c. as B. should appoint; and in default of appointment, to the use of all and every the children of B., and the heirs of their several and respective bodies, as tenants in common; but if only one child, to the use of such only child, and the heirs of his or her body; and in default of all such issue, to the right heirs of A. for ever. B. had other children, and died without having made an appointment. It was held, that B.'s children took vested interests as tenants in tail, notwithstanding the power of appointment; and that there were no cross remainders between them, but on the death of each child without issue, his share fell into the reversion. every the Worsley, 1 East R. 65. By a settlement made previous to marriage, Doe v. lands were limited to the use of all and daughter and daughters of the marriage, share and 416. share alike, equally to be divided between them, and of the heirs of the body and bodies of all and every such daughter and daughters lawfully issuing; and for default of such issue, to the use of the right heirs of the husband. A question arose upon this settle ment, whether there were cross remainders between the daughters and their issue. Lord Kenyon said, this was the case of a deed, in which by the practice of centuries no such implication could be raised. And it would be of most dangerous consequence to have this point disputed, upon which so many titles must depend. It was probably intended, that no part of the settled estate should go over, as long as there was any issue of the marriage remaining; but the parties had not said so. There were certain words used to express such an intention in deeds, which were well known; those had not been adopted in the present case, but the framers of the settlement had left that intention to be implied from other words, which could not be done. He would not go through all the cases, because they were collected with great ability by Mr. Serjeant Williams, in a note, in his edition of SaunVol. 1. 185 a. ders Reports, to which he referred. They established the proposition he had before laid down, in respect to the construction of deeds, which never had or could be suffered to be doubted, without affecting an infinite proportion of the property of the kingdom, and removing land-marks. n. 6. Mr. Justice Lawrence observed, that in order to raise cross remainders in a deed between the issue of the first takers, there must be a limitation to the heirs of the body, which was not necessary in a will. And Mr. Justice. Le Blanc remarked, that it was not sufficient in a deed, that one may collect such an intention of the parties from the words; but cross remainders must be expressly limited, by proper words of conveyance. It was resolved, that no cross remainders were created in this ease. 66. The limitations in a deed were, to the use of Doe v. Wainwright, such child or children as Mary Abell should there- 5 Term R. after have, as tenants in common (if more than one), 427. and the heirs of their several bodies issuing. "And in case any such child or children should die without issue of his, her, or their body or bodies issuing, then the part or parts of him, her, or them so dying without issue, should be and remain to the use of the surviving child or children of the said Mary Abell, and the heirs of his, her, or their respective bodies issuing, and so toties quoties, as any of the said children should die without issue, till there should be only one child left; and in case all the said children should die without issue, or if the said Mary Abell should have no issue of her body, then to Robert Abell, his heirs and assigns for ever." The question was, whether there were cross remainders between the children of Mary Abell. Lord Kenyon said, this case did not involve any question respecting the raising of limitations by implication, because the deed on which the question arose, contained express limitations by way of cross remainders, not indeed in the formal language used by conveyancers, but in terms sufficiently denoting the intention of the parties to the deed, that there should be cross remainders, as to some of the children. Therefore, all the cases which were cited to show that cross remainders in a deed could not be raised by implication, might fairly be laid out of the case; because this case, when considered, did not resolve itself into any question of that kind. No technical precise form of words was necessary to create cross remainders; it was sufficient to say, that there should be cross remainders; though in the verboseness of conveyancers, an abundance of words was generally introduced in deeds for this purpose. Here the single question arose on the meaning of the word, surviving, which indeed was the only word that distressed the case. But taking the whole context together, he did not think that that word rendered the case doubtful. The fair construction of that word, standing in the context, was, that on the death of one child without issue, that portion should go to the surviving line of heirs, and not entirely to one child surviving. It must go to the surviving children in their own persons, if living, or if dead, to their issues. And in putting this construction, he did not think the Court proceeded on conjecture merely, for the conclusion of this sentence was" and in case all the said children should die without issue," then the remainder is limited to R. Abell in fee. The Court could not give effect to the word all, without determining that there must be cross remainders, not only as long as the individual children, but as long as the several lines of those children, existed. The whole context required this construction, and the last clause could not be satisfied with any other, Judgement was given, that the deed created cross remainders between the children of M. Abell; and that on the death of one without issue, his share vested in a surviving child, and the heir of one deceased, as tenants in common. 67. In the case of marriage articles, the construction is founded on the apparent intention of the parties, however untechnically expressed: and is therefore more liberal than in the case of deeds. 68. By articles entered into previous to a marriage, the intended husband covenanted to transfer stock to trustees, to be laid out in the purchase of land, which was to be settled to the use of the husband and wife for their lives; and after the death of the survivor, to the use of all the children, male and female, of their bodies, equally, as tenants in common, and their respective issue: and for default of such children and their issue, to the use of the heirs and assigns of the survivor of the husband and wife. Lord Camden said, he was clear there could not be cross remainders by implication in a deed; that this was not the case of a settlement completed, but of articles executory: by the first part of the articles, which considered the fund as money, nothing was to go over till the children were dead without issue; this would assist him in construing the limitations of the land. As the survivor of the husband and wife was to take nothing in the money, till all the children were dead without issue, so they should not take any interest in the reversion of the land, but in the same way. Decreed that there were cross remainders. Richmond's 347. 69. By articles of agreement made between Charles Duke of Duke of Richmond and William Earl of Cadogan, Case, Collect. previous to the marriage of Lord March the Duke of Jur. vol. 2. Richmond's eldest son, with Lord Cadogan's daughter, Lord Cadogan covenanted to lay out 60,000 l. in the purchase of lands, to be settled on Lord March and his intended wife for their lives, remainder to the children of the marriage, except an eldest son, as the father and mother should appoint; and for want of appointment, to all the children, except an eldest son, equally to be divided between them, share and share alike, as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants, and to the several and respective heirs of their respective bodies issuing; and for want of such issue, to the use and behoof of such eldest son in tail, remainder to Lord Cadogan in fee. Lord March, who was afterwards Duke of Richmond, had issue by |