of confidence in every matrimonial engagement; and leading to consequences subversive of all the grounds on which the law of this country, with respect to the obligations on husbands, by force of the contract of marriage, is founded. On the other side the respondent submitted the following reasons for the affirmance of the decrees. 1o. That by the law of this country a woman, while unmarried, may dispose of and convey her property in any manner she pleases; and a husband whom she afterwards marries, without any settlement made by him, or any enquiry concerning her fortune, has no right to impeach any conveyance which she has made of her property, for her own separate use. 2o. That there was no instance in which conveyances made by a woman of her property, before marriage, had been deemed void, because they had not been disclosed to her husband; unless attended with such circumstances, as proved such conveyances to be fraudulent; and that such conveyances were, in the case of a second marriage, where there were children by a former one, reasonable and laudable; and often favoured in a court of equity. 3o. That it was impossible to look at the circumstances of this case, without perceiving that such a conveyance as the appellant attempted to impeach, night be extremely reasonable. That if it were possible to conceive the husband of all others, who ought the least to be permitted to question any such dispositions made by a wife, the appellant was that husband. That every step by which he acquired his supposed marital rights, was grossly fraudulent: and therefore it would be an extraordinary administration of equity, to give him the property of his wife, which the law had secured to her, as a reward Martins v. Gilb. Cha. Palmer v. 11 Ves.165. Or for an immoral Consideration. of his fraud. That his attempt to invalidate the deed in question, must appear still more extraordinary; it having been determined that he, by the terrors of personal violence, had extorted from the respondent another deed, for the purpose of defeating this, which by the appeal he contended was in itself void. The decree was affirmed. * 41. This doctrine applies as well to a deed made by a man, as to one made by a woman. Thus where a father got his son to execute a deed secretly, on the morning of his marriage, charging the estate which was settled. It was set aside by the Court of Chancery, as being in fraud of the marriage agree ment. 42. Lord Ch. B. Gilbert has said, that if a husband, seised in fee, should immediately before his marriage vest the legal estate in trustees, to disappoint his intended wife of dower; such a conveyance would be reckoned fraudulent; because it was made with an ill conscience, in order to deprive his wife of the provision made for her by the common law. 43. It was decreed by Sir W. Grant, that where a father made a settlement upon the marriage of his son, and the son gave the father a bond, to indemnify him from the payment of the jointure, the bond was void, as a fraud upon the contract. 44. Where the consideration of a deed is contrary to the rules of morality, the deed is void, both at law and in equity; and therefore a bond given to a woman, as the price of prostitution, is void at law. * This case is not reconcileable with the preceding ones. The determination was clearly founded on the very improper conduct of Mr. Bowes, before and after his marriage. Perkins, 517. 45. Upon oyer being prayed of a bond, it appeared Walker v. to be from W. Perkins to the plaintiff Sarah Winter, 3 Burr. 1568. in a penalty, reciting that Perkins and the plaintiff 1 Black. R. had agreed to live together; therefore he had contracted to find her meat, drink, &c. and to leave her an annuity of 60l. a year, if he quitted her, or she outlived him; and if they had any child, he was to provide for it; but if she should leave him, or go to another man, then he should not be obliged to provide for her any longer, or to leave her any annuity. The defendant pleaded, that this was an agreement between the plaintiff and his intestate to live together in a state of fornication; and that such a bond, made upon such an agreement, was void in law. In reply to this plea, the plaintiff alleged that she was a virgin, and was seduced by the intestate; and in consideration thereof this bond was given to her; and that it was præmium pudicitiæ. The defendant demurred. Lord Mansfield said, it was the price of prostitution; for if she became virtuous, she was to lose the annuity. The bond was therefore illegal and void. 46. In a case of seduction, where a bond is given for securing an annuity, or a sum of money for the support and maintenance of the person seduced, and not with any view to a future cohabitation, equity will not relieve. Gray v. Mathias, Ves. 286. v..Harris, 47. The Marquis of Annandale seduced a young Annandale woman named Harris, by whom he had a child: 2 P. Wms. afterwards, by deed poll, he agreed that 2,000l. should 432. be laid out in an annuity for her benefit and that of Cray v. Rooke, the child. The widow of the Marquis brought her Forrest, 153. bill to be relieved against this deed, as made upon an unlawful and wicked consideration; and Ann Harris brought her cross bill to be paid the 2000 7. out of the assets of the Marquis. It was urged on behalf of Title XXXII. Deed. Ch. xxvi. § 47-50. Ann Harris, that the known diversity was, where the woman had before been a common prostitute, and drew in a young man to give such bond or covenant; in such case equity would relieve. But where the man seduced a woman, who was before modest, and gave such bond or covenant, there the obligor, who had done the injury, stated and ascertained himself the damages which were to be the præmium pudicitiæ, and no relief was given in equity. On the other side it was objected, that supposing equity would not relieve against such bond or covenant; yet it being a matter of turpitude, equity ought not to intermeddle. The consequence of which would be, that both-bills should be dismissed; and that the Court should not lend any assistance, on account of assets, or otherwise, in such a case. Lord King said, if a man does mislead an innocent woman, it is botn reason and justice he should make her a reparation; and decreed that the debt should 1 Bro. Parl. be paid out of the assets, which was affirmed by the House of Lords. Ca. 250. Turner v. Vaughan, 2 Wils. R. 339. 48. Although there be no seduction, yet if a man gives a bond to a woman, on account of a former cohabitation, an action at law may be maintained upon it. 49. In an action of debt upon a bond, the defendant prayed oyer of the condition, which was in these words:"Now the condition of this obligation is such, that in consideration of cohabitation had by the above-bounden T. V. with the said Catherine, he the said T. V. hath hereby agreed to secure to the said Catherine the yearly sum of 30%. &c." The Court held that the bond was good. 50. Though the woman to whom such a bond is given was a common prostitute, yet it will not be set aside in equity, The Spencer, 51. A person who had maintained and kept a Hill v. common prostitute for two years, gave her a bond, Amb. 641.. conditioned to pay her an annuity of 50l. a year. Upon the death of the obligor, his brother paid two quarters of the annuity, and then refusing to pay any more, filed a bill for an injunction, to prevent the defendant from proceeding at law, and to have the bond delivered up. Lord Camden said, he was clear that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief. cases which had been determined against securities given to common prostitutes, went upon the circumstance of their being given previous to the cohabition; a consideration which being turpis in its nature, the Court had relieved. In this case the bond was not given for a consideration, but was voluntary. The obligor had resort to her for near two years, before he gave her the bond. Past service could not be a consideration at law, and nothing was stipulated for the future. There was no principle in equity which said, a man might not give a voluntary bond to a common prostitute. It would be going but a little farther to say, he could not give her money, without her being liable to be called upon for it. There was no circumstance of fraud in the case; and he did not think, that where a voluntary bond was given, the obligee being a common prostitute, was of itself a sufficient ground for relief. The bill was dismissed. 52. Lord Hardwicke has laid down a very proper distinction, in cases of this kind, between a married man and a bachelor; and has determined that where a married man gives a bond to a woman whom he has seduced, she knowing him to be married, as a præmium pudicitiæ, it shall not be supported in equity. |