bile, and such negligence, if any, directly and proximately contributed to the injury of plaintiff's wife, if she was injured, you will return a verdict in favor of defendant." Judgment was rendered for defendant and plaintiff appealed. The court, in reversing the judgment and remanding the cause, held that the court erred in its instruction relating to contributory negligence, and said: "If the appellee discovered the peril of appellant's wife in time to have avoided injuring her by the use of every means in his power, consistent with the safety of himself and others, the previous negligence of appellant's wife in going upon the highway in a buggy drawn by an unruly horse, if such was the fact, would not bar a recovery in this case, and the charge of the court to this effect was error." Blackwell v. McGrew, Tex. Civ. App. 141 S. W. 1058 (1911). As plaintiff was driving his horse and buggy northerly on the easterly side on a street, he met defendant's automobile coming from the north. His horse took fright at the automobile, jumped to the right and threw plaintiff and the buggy into a ditch, so inflicting the injuries complained of. Plaintiff's testimony tended to show that the horse was an extra gentle animal and that he was driving along the highway with a line in each hand and a whip in his right hand when he met defendant's automobile; that he had passed other automobiles without difficulty; that defendant's machine appeared to be coming directly at his horse, when the horse wheeled and went over the embankment and turned the buggy over on its side; that, as defendant's automobile passed the horse and buggy, plaintiff had pulled out to the right along the edge of the grass; that the automobile kept com18 N. C. C. A.-38

ing directly towards his horse, and turned a little to the right as it came opposite the horse; that the left automobile track was about a foot and a half east of the center of the road at the place of the accident. One witness testified that the automobile was going at a good rate of speed and did not slow down as it approached plaintiff. Another testified that there was no cessation of speed as the automobile approached plaintiff, but admitted on cross-examination that the automobile was receding from her and that she could not tell to a certainty whether the speed was slackened or not. De fendant's testimony tended to show that the automobile was not running, at any time, more, than 25 miles an hour after turning into the road where it met plaintiff, and, that just before meeting him the speed was reduced to 3 miles an hour; that plaintiff's horse manifested no signs of fright, until the machine had passed or was either directly opposite or quite beyond the animal. Defendant appealed from a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. The court, in reversing the judgment because of error in authorizing recov. ery because of an excessive rate of speed, held that considering the question of excessive speed alone, there was not enough testimony to justify a finding for plaintiff; that as different minds might reach different conclusions upon the questions of negligence, it became a question for determination of the jury; and that it was for the jury to say whether under all the circumstances defendant's failure to observe the law of the road was the proximate cause of the accident, and said: "The fact that one does not give another the full half of the road to which he is entitled is not conclusive evidence of negligence." Needy v.

Littlejohn, 137 Iowa 704, 115 N. W. 483 (1908).

Plaintiff sued defendants to recover damages for an injury sustained by him when his horse took fright at defendant's automobile in a public highway, overturning plaintiff's cart and dragging him for a considerable distance. The facts, as stated by the court, were that plaintiff was driving a high-spirited and restive horse attached to a two-wheel cart along a public highway; that he was driving behind other persons who were in buggies; that as he drove along he discovered that his horse had become frightened, but did not know at first the cause of the excitement, but almost immediately discovered that he was frightened by an automobile approaching from the opposite direction; that plaintiff, to avoid the automobile. turned his horse and cart into a space by the side of the road formed by the fence being set back from 15 to 18 feet from the road line and about 60 feet in length; that about this time defendant stopped his automobile by the side of the road near the other end of the offset and about 100 feet from where plaintiff had turned in; that plaintiff, finding that he could not control his horse, he concluded that he would get back on the road, and drive his horse by the automobile, which had not moved from the time it stopped; that when his horse got back on the road and was going in the direction of the automobile, and just before reaching the place where it was standing, it ran into a buggy that was attempting to go by the automobile, and in the collision the buggy was overturned and plaintiff thrown out of his cart, and dragged about 100 feet before his horse could be stopped. The evidence showing that the automobile came to a stop some 100 feet from

where plaintiff drove into the offset was practically uncontradicted, but there was a sharp conflict as to whether the motor of the automobile was shut off when the car was stopped. There was no evidence that the failure to give warning had anything to do with the fright of plaintiff's horse, or the injury that was sustained by plaintiff. The state statute relating to the operation of motor vehicles upon public highways provided that upon approaching a person or a horse ridden or driven upon a public highway, the driver of a motor vehicle should give warning of his approach, and use every reasonable precaution to insure the safety of such person or animal, and in case of a horse, to prevent frightening the same. In reversing a judgment recovered by the plaintiff and remanding the case for a new trial, the court held that while, if plaintiff had remained in the offset into which he drove, or if he had turned and attempted to drive his horse farther away from the automobile, there was sufficient evidence to make an issue for the jury as to the alleged negligent failure of the defendant promptly to stop his car and the engine thereof, yet in view of the fact that plaintiff, being in such a perilous place elected to attempt to drive his frightened animal nearer to and pass the automobile, "he took the risk of accident and injury into his own hands and must answer the consequences of his own fault or recklessness." For this reason, the court held, the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict.

"In this case," said the court, "the speed at which the automobile was running before it stopped, although we may add there is no evidence that it exceeded the statutory rate, or the failure to stop the motor or sound the horn, did not cause the injuries of

which appellee complains." Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Yeiser, 141 Ky. 15, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137, 131 S. W. 1049 (1910).

In an action to recover damages which resulted from the fright of plaintiff's horse at defendant's automobile, the facts established beyond substantial controversy were that plain tiff was driving a single horse along the north side of a street, going west, when defendant approached from the west in a small automobile, at considerable speed; that defendant, then noticing that plaintiff's horse was restless, turned to the south side of the street and proceeded without stopping or materially lessening the speed of the automobile, until he became aware, after he had passed the point where plaintiff was, that plaintiff's horse had been frightened, and had run the buggy on the guy wire of an electric pole which stood at the northeast corner of the intersecting street, upsetting the buggy and causing plaintiff severe injury; and that defendant then stopped his automobile and came back to render plaintiff assistance. The grounds of negligence submitted by the court to the jury were running of the automobile at an excessive speed, and failing to stop on request of plaintiff when her horse became restive. The jury, in answer to a special interrogatory, found that defendant was not operating his automobile at an unlawful rate of speed at the time of the accident, but returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, on which judgment was entered. In affirming the judgment the court said: "The court was asked to instruct the jury that plaintiff could not recover by simply proving that her horse was restive, and that defendant knew of that fact, if it should be found that plaintiff made no signal to defendant to stop; but the refusal

to give such an instruction was not error, for while, under the provisions of Act 30th Gen. Assem, p. 45, c. 53, § 9 (Code Supp. 1907, § 15711), it is made the duty of the operator of a motor vehicle immediately to stop when sig. naled by a person driving a restive horse, yet, under general rules of law requiring reasonable care on the part of such person, he might be in duty bound, on seeing that another driving in the highway was being put in imminent peril by the frightening of his horse, to stop his machine, although no such signal was given. This rule was recognized in some of the instructions asked, and is unquestionably sound. But, however this may be, the court did not authorize recovery on proof of breach of duty on the part of defendant to stop on observing plaintiff's danger without regard to the giving of the statutory signal, but instructed only in this respect as to the failure of defendant to stop after signal was given, and, as it is not contended that the instruction thus given was without support in the evidence, there is no occasion for complaint as to not giving an instruction with reference to a ground of negligence on the part of the defendant not submitted to the jury." Walkup v. Beebe, 139 Iowa 395, 116 N. W. 321 (1908).

Plaintiff and two other men, his guests, were driving northward at a walk on the east side of a street in a single-seated runabout drawn by one horse. The conveyance belonged to plaintiff, who was driving, seated between his companions. The horse was 9 years old, very gentle, and accustomed to being driven in the city and to meeting and passing automobiles. A two-seated automobile owned and operated by defendant and occupied by five persons approaching from the north without checking speed or de

viating from a course in the middle of the street, ran so close to plaintiff's horse as to cause it to jump suddenly to the right, and thereby run the wheels of the vehicle part way down a 3 or 4 foot embankment on the east side of the street, with the result that plaintiff was thrown to the ground and sustained injuries. The speed at which the automobile passed was variously estimated at from 15 to 20 miles an hour. Testimony on behalf of defendant tended to show that the automobile kept well to the west side of the street, and did not come in close proximity to the horse in passing; that its speed did not exceed eight miles per hour, and that it could not be run fast at that place because of the fact that it was in bad order, and had just climbed a hill on low gearing. An ordinance was pleaded limiting the speed of automobiles to a speed of 9 miles per hour. The court denied defendant a peremptory instruction and gave judgment for plaintiff. Affirming the judgment the court said: "The weakness of defendant's position is that it rests entirely on his own evidence, which is contradicted in very material respects by substantial evidence introduced by plaintiff. It was the duty of the trial court in ruling on the demurrer to the evidence to give due weight to the facts in evidence most favorable to the cause of action asserted. These facts, we think, tend to accuse defendant of negligence in the respects charged in the petition, and thus to raise an issue of fact to go to the jury." And said further: "Though, as we have said, automobiles are lawful vehicles and have equal rights on the highway with horses and carriages, their drivers should operate them with that degree of care and prudence and that consideration for the rights and safety of others to be expected

of ordinarily prudent and humane persons. Being heavy, powerful, fast, and noisy, motor cars, if carelessly handled, are as terrifying as they are dangerous. A reasonably considerate person in the situation of defendant would have anticipated the danger to the safety of the occupants of the buggy in running his car headlong in such close proximi. ty to the horse." Hall v. Compton, 130 Mo. App. 675, 108 S. W. 1122 (1908).

A horse driven along a public highway by plaintiff took fright at defendant's automobile and caused plaintiff to sustain personal injuries. He sued defendant to recover damages therefor, charging defendant with negligence in running the automobile at excessive speed, thereby frightening plaintiff's horse, and in not bringing the automobile to a stop when it was apparent that plaintiff's horse was frightened. Plaintiff, who was the only witness in his own behalf, testified that the automobile first stopped within 8, 10 or 12 feet of him, and then started up and ran by him very fast. Defendant, and his sister and cousin, who were in the automobile with him, testified that the car was running less than 15 miles an hour, that it was stopped 50 or 60 feet from plaintiff, and that the power was shut off and the automobile did not again start until after appellee was injured. Defendant appealed from a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and the court, in reversing the judgment, without remanding the cause, held that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and that the trial court should have granted a new trial. Anderson v. Strawn, 179 Ill. App. 389 (1913).

Plaintiff's horse, which she was driving along a highway, became frightened at defendant's automobile which he drove very close to the horse, causing it to shy and overturn plaintiff's

man.

wagon, inflicting personal injuries for which she sued defendant. It appeared that defendant, who was driving the automobile, was a man 63 years old, and quite inexperienced in the handling of automobiles. He was driving on the wrong side of the road and saw plaintiff approaching with her team. His speed was apparently not excessive, and the accident evidently resulted from his failure seasonably to turn from the left to the right side of the road. Defendant continued on his course until within 15 or 20 feet, as claimed by plaintiff, or 40 or 50 feet, as admitted by defendant. It was shown that defendant was driving at a speed of about 10 miles an hour, and ran so close to plaintiff's horse that it took fright and whirled quickly to the left; that plaintiff was familiar with the horse, which was 10 years old and gentle, and not ordinarily afraid of automobiles, and that the horse was walking, and plaintiff driving with loose rein, the horse showing no signs of fright until the machine was in close proximity. Plaintiff recovered a verdict, and defendant moved to set it aside. The court, in overruling the motion, held that the jury were warranted in finding the defendant's conduct negligent, and in finding the plaintiff free from contributory negligence. Hobbs v. Preston, 115 Me. *553, 98 Atl. 757 (1916).

Plaintiff's buggy was overturned in a public highway when his horse, attached to the buggy, became frightened at defendant's automobile, and plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in such accident. Plaintiff recovered a judgment and defendant appeal

ed to the appellate court, and the cause was transferred to the supreme court, and there affirmed. A statute in force at the time of the accident required drivers of motor vehicles, upon meeting a person driving a horse on a public highway, to proceed at a rate of speed not exceeding 6 miles an hour until past such horse, and also to drive the motor vehicle to the right so as to give one-half of the traveled portion of the highway to the driver of the horse. The complaint was drawn upon the theory that defendant was guilty of negligence, first, in driving in excess of 6 miles an hour, second, in violating the statute requiring him to drive his car to the right so as to give half of the traveled portion of the highway to the driver of the horse passing in the opposite direction. The complaint alleged that the horse and buggy were going south, and on meeting defendant's motor vehicle, turned to the right to permit defendant's car to pass on the other side; that, as defendant approached, he was driving his automobile along the center of the road; that he continued to drive it in the center of the road, and that when it was at a point directly opposite the horse, it was 3 feet west of the center of the road, and so close to the horse as to cause it to become frightened and to overturn the buggy into a ditch, resulting in plaintiff's injuries. The supreme court held that plaintiff's complaint was sufficient, as against a demurrer for want of facts, to constitute a cause of action. Carter v. Caldwell, 183 Ind. 434, 13 N. C. C. A. 1008n, 109 N. E. 355 (1915).

Plaintiff sued defendants to recover damages for personal injuries which