his house is frequented by thieves and bad characters (q); to Chap. III. state of a bank that it had stopped payment (r), and to state that a joint stock company is insolvent (s). All published statements, in writing or printing, which tend to degrade or disparage a person and hold him up to ridicule or contempt are libellous. Thus to charge a man with cheating at cards (t), to impute cheating at a horse race by fraudulently withdrawing a horse (u), to charge a man with insulting females (x), to call him a "black sheep" (y), or to impute that he has been mistaken for "Jack Ketch" (z), are all libels. All statements tending to injure a man's credit are libellous (a). In general, any charge of immoral conduct, although in a matter not punishable by law, is a libel (b). Thus to write to the members of a charitable institution, calling on them "to reject the unworthy claims of Miss H.," and stating that " she squandered away the money which she obtained from the benevolent in printing circulars abusive of Commander D.," was held libellous (c). To charge a man with ingratitude is libellous (d), and even statements charging persons with unfeeling conduct have been held libels (e). Where a man brought an action of libel against a newspaper for publishing a ludicrous story concerning the plaintiff, the fact that the story was only a repetition of what the plaintiff had told of himself, was held to be no defence, "for there is a great difference between a man's telling a ludicrous story of himself to a circle of his own acquaintance, and a publication of it to all the world through the medium of a newspaper" (ƒ). 3. Imputing ing to degrade, conduct tend &c. An action will lie for a libel published in a foreign lan- Libel in foreign guage (g). language. Province of In actions for libel and slander, it is for the Court to decide judge and jury (q) Broome v. Gosden, 1 C. B. 728. (r) Forster v. Lawson, 3 Bing. 452; see Capital & Counties Bunk v. Henty, 7 App. Cas. 741; 52 L. J. C. P. 830. (s) Met. Saloon Om. Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87; 28 L. J. Ex. 201. (t) Digby v. Thompson, 4 B. & Ad. 821. (u) Greville v. Chapman, 5 Q. B. 731. (x) Clement v. Chivis, 9 B. & C. 172. (y) McGregor v. Gregory, 11 M. & W. 287. (z) Cook v. Ward, 6 Bing. 409. (a) Metropolitan Saloon Om. Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 146; 28 L. J. Ex. 201; Eaton v. Johns, 1 Dowl. N. S. 612; Cheese v. Scales, 10 M. & W. 488. (e) Hoare v. Silverlocke, 12 Q. B. 625; (d) Cox v. Lee, L. R. 4 Ex. 284; 38 L. J. Ex. 219. (e) See Churchill (Lord) v. Hunt, 2 B. & A. 685; Teacy v. M'Kenna, 4 Ir. R. C. L. 374. (f) Cook v. Ward, 6 Bing. 415. (g) Zenobio v. Axtell, 6 T. R. 162; Jenkins v. Phillips, 9 C. & P. 766. in actions for defamation. Chap. III. whether the words complained of are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning (h), and if so, whether in the present instance they do bear such meaning (i). If the words are capable of a harmless meaning, it is for the plaintiff to show that they were used in a defamatory sense, and this may be shown by evidence of the circumstances under which they were spoken or written (k). When an action Words of common abuse not actionable. The utterance of defamatory words only renders the speaker for slander lies. liable in an action for slander when the words either impute an indictable offence, or are spoken in reference to a man's trade or profession, or are the immediate cause of special damage. Words of common abuse, such as "low fellow" (1), "blackleg" (m), "swindler" (n), "gambler" (0), "welcher " (p), “rogue" (q), have been held not to be actionable. To impute to a woman that she gets her living by prostitution (r), to say of a lady that she "is a notorious liar, and infamous wretch, and has all but been seduced by a notorious libertine," though grossly abusive statements, have been held not to amount to legal slander, as words imputing want of chastity are not actionable unless attended by the loss of some temporal advantage (s). It has, however, been held, that to state of a person that he is suffering from a disease which may cause him to be shunned and avoided in society, is actionable (t). Same liability attaches to verbal as to written defa matory state With respect to defamatory statements charging a person with a criminal offence, or attacking him in relation to his trade or profession, the same liability attaches to verbal as to written or ments in certain printed statements, and the cases which have been cited as applying to actions for libel in these two instances equally apply to actions for slander. Verbal statements imputing robbery (u), forgery (y), buying goods, knowing them to be stolen (z), per instances. Slander imputing indictable offence. 54. (h) Hunt v. Goodlake, 43 L. J. C. P. (i) Homer v. Taunton, 29 L. J. Ex. (k) Griffiths v. Lewis, 8 Q. B. 841. (n) Saville v. Jardine, 2 H. Bl. 532. L. J. Q. B. 249. See two old cases in the books, Parrot v. Carpenter, Cro. Eliz. 502, and Wharton v. Brook, 1 Vent. 21, in which a clergyman (unbeneficed?) could not obtain damages for having adultery imputed to him, nor a schoolmistress for being charged with prostitution. (s) Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. C. 577. (t) Bloodworth v. Gray, 8 Scott, N. R. 9, 7 M. & G. 334; Carslake v. Mapledoram, 2 T. R. 475. (u) Rowcliffe v. Edmonds, 7 M. & W. 12, 4 Jur. 684. (y) Jones v. Herne, 2 Wils. 87. (z) Alfred v. Farlow, 8 Q. B. 854, 15 L. J. Q. B. 259. jury (a), bigamy (b), the unskilful administration of noxious drugs, Chap. III. and thereby causing death (c), and charging a military officer with having incited his forces to mutiny (d), are actionable per se. respect of person's profession or business. Any words which charge a man with misconduct or incapacity Slanders in in his profession, business or occupation are actionable without proof of special damage, but they must be shown to be used in connection with his profession or business (e); words imputing general immorality do not constitute a sufficient specific injury to the trade or profession, such accusations would only become actionable when followed by special damage (f). It is slander to say of a medical man, that he wants skill, and is ignorant of his profession (g); that he is an unqualified practitioner (h); that his character is so bad that his professional brethren will not meet him in consultation (i); to say of a barrister that he has wilfully and corruptly deceived his client, and revealed the secrets of his cause; or that he has given vexatious counsel, and seeks only to fill his own pockets, without regard to the interests of his client (k); of a solicitor, that he deals corruptly in his profession (1), and is guilty of malpractices (m); of an architect, that he is incompetent and inexperienced in his profession (n); of a stockbroker, that "he is a lame duck” (0). In the case of a beneficed clergyman, it is slander in respect of Slander of his profession to impute to him any form of immorality, as, if the clergymen. statement were true, it would render him liable to be deprived of his preferment, and so lead to his temporal injury. In this respect the law makes a distinction between the clerical and other professions (p). It is a slander to say of a banker or tradesman that he is Slander in (a) Roberts v. Camden, 9 East, 93. (b) Heming v. Power, 10 M. & W. 570. (c) Edsall v. Russell, 4 M. & G. 1090. (d) Beatson v. Skene, 29 L. J. Ex. 430. (e) James v. Brook, 9 Q. B. 7; 16 L. J. Q. B. 17. (f) Ayre v. Craven, 2 A. & E. 2; Galwey v. Marshall, 9 Ex. 294. (g) Smith v. Taylor, 1 B. & P. N. R. 196. (h) Collins v. Carnegie, 1 A. & E 695. (i) Southee v. Denny, 1 Ex. 196. (k) Snag v. Gray, 1 Roll. Abr. 57; King v. Lake, 2 Vent. 28. (1) Birchley's Case, 4 Rep. 16a, pl. 6. (n) Botterill v. Whytehead, 41 L. T. (0) Morris v. Langdale, 2 B. & P. 284. (p) For instances of slanders against clergymen, see Dodd v. Robinson, Aleyn, 63; Cranden v. Walden, 3 Lev. 17; 1 Roll. Abr. 58; Musgrave v. Bovey, 2 Str. 946; Walton v. Brogden, 19 C. B. N. S. 65; Pemberton v. Colls, 10 Q. B. 461, 16 L. J. Q. B. 403; Gallwey v. Marshall, 9 Ex. 205, 23 L, J. Ex. 78. respect of business. Chap. III. bankrupt or insolvent (q), to impute to a master mariner that he was drunk whilst in command of a vessel (r), to impute to a gamekeeper that he killed foxes when it was his duty to preserve them (s), to charge a shipowner with using unseaworthy ships for passengers (1), or to impute to a manufacturer that he used old worn out materials instead of new (u). Verbal statements rendered actionable by reason of special damage. When defamatory verbal statements which are not actionable per se are followed by special damage, an action for slander will lie. Thus where the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the wife of the plaintiff, who assisted him in his business, certain words charging her with having committed adultery upon the premises where the plaintiff resided and carried on business, whereby the plaintiff was injured in his business, and certain specified persons ceased to deal with him, it was held that an action was maintainable (x). Loss of hospitality of friends is sufficient special damage to support an action for slander of a married woman, although her husband is living and bound to maintain her (y). Where a wife brought an action for defamatory words occasioning to her the loss of the consortium of her husband, it was held that the cause of complaint would not sustain the action, for that the special damage did not show in the conduct of the husband a natural and reasonable consequence of the slander (z). Where by reason of the defamatory words spoken, a woman was excluded from a religious society, it was held that the action would not lie, as she did not receive any temporal damage (a). If in consequence of the utterance of a slander a man breaks off his engagement to marry a woman, the woman will have a cause of action against the utterer of the slander (b). Where a servant Wils. 62. (y) Davies v. Solomon, L. R. 7 Q. B. 112; 41 L. J. Q. B. 10; Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. 39. (z) Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577. (a) Roberts v. Roberts, 33 L. J. Q. B. 249, 5 B. & S. 384. This appears to be a very unsatisfactory decision: the decision is said to have been reversed in the Exchequer Chamber, see "Roscoe's Evidence "(11th ed.), at p. 517; if so, none of the Reports have noticed it, and the only reference given is to the case when it was before the Court of Queen's Bench. (b) Davis v. Gardiner, 4 Co. 166, pl. 11; Moody v. Baker, 5 Cowp. 351. loses his situation in consequence of a defamatory statement, he Chap. III. can maintain an action against the person uttering it (c). It is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that he has suffered some temporal disadvantage in consequence of the utterance of the slander, there need not be an actual pecuniary loss (d). Where an action for slander is brought in respect of words not actionable in themselves, but only in respect of the special damage caused thereby, the words used must be of a defamatory nature, otherwise the action is not maintainable (e). It is also essential that the special damage should be the natural and probable consequence of the slander (f). Thus, where the plaintiff alleged in his claim that he was a candidate for membership of the Reform Club, but upon a ballot of the members was not elected; that a meeting of the members was called to consider an alteration of the rules regarding the election of members; that the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff as follows: "The conduct of the plaintiff' was so bad at a club in Melbourne that a round robin was signed urging the committee to expel" him; "as, however," he was "there only for a short time, the committee did not proceed further," whereby the defendant induced a majority of the members of the club to retain the regulations under which the plaintiff had been rejected, and thereby prevented the plaintiff from again seeking to be elected to the club; it was held that the claim disclosed no cause of action, as the damage alleged was not the natural and probable cause of the defendant's words (g). The unauthorized repetition of the slander by some third party is not the natural and probable consequence of the words spoken, and therefore will not constitute special damage sufficient to support an action against the original utterer (h). Where special damage is the direct consequence of the utterance of a slander, it is no defence for the utterer to allege that he (c) Knight v. Gibbs, 1 Ad. & E. 46; see also Payne v. Beaumorris, 1 Lev. 248. (d) Haddan v. Lott, 15 C. B. 411; 24 L. J. C. P. 49. See, however, Allsop v. Allsop, 5 H. & N. 534, where sickness and distress of mind were held insufficient. (e) Miller v. David, L. R. 9 C. P. 118; Sheahan v. Ahearne, 9 Ir. R. C. L. 412; Kelly v. Partington, 5 B. & Ad. 645. (f) Lynch v. Knight, supra; Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1; Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48, 1 Peake, 194; Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211. (g) Chamberlain v. Boyd, 11 Q. B. D. 407 (C. A.). (h) Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211, M. & P. 808; Parkins v. Scott, 1 H. & C. 153, 31 L. J. Ex. 331; Dixon v. Smith, 5 H. & N. 450. See judgment of Kelly, C. B., in Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. D. at p. 94 |
