atom of the human body does to the whole: the atom is introduced into the system by the laws of nature; it passes through the several stages of assimilation, becomes capable of feeling, and again passes away; so does man from the great body of society. He, however, makes himself the centre of time and space, and if one within his little world is removed by death, the whole economy of nature must be inverted to afford him relief; yet from the great body of mankind some hundreds depart and are born every minute. To the eye that views mankind and not man, it would seem as wise to mourn for the departed,—supposing even that they exist no more, and are to us as before they were born,—as to mourn for those who might have been born, but yet were not.

In the moral government of the world we everywhere find individual happiness made subservient to the general good. Moved on all occasions by necessity, man can merit nothing, and can, in justice, claim nothing but a balance of enjoyment upon the whole of his being. To the very existence of man, as man, general laws are necessary, and the result of these general laws is to produce great variety of conditions with reference to the relative quantity of happiness enjoyed by each creature. Throughout social existence, as we have previously seen, man is made to suffer for the faults of his fellows; the effects of his neighbour's ignorance or injustice fall upon himself, and by this arrangement

the general well-being is secured, by creating the strongest of all motives for each to dispel the clouds of ignorance around him, and to endeavour to carry others forward with himself in the march of improvement.

The principal reason why Morality has not advanced as a science is, that the mental constitution has not been understood, and in ignorance of this, laws for the production of the greatest happiness were empirical and fruitless, as they could have no more foundation in real knowledge than the science of Medicine before the discovery of the circulation of the blood; but as knowledge of the structure and functions of the several organs of the body is essential to minister to their disorders, so an intimate acquainance with the faculties and functions of the mind is requisite to remedy moral disease.

Man is a compound of instincts, and of reason or intellectual faculties for the proper direction of these instincts. The instinct is the incentive to action, and reason the guide to the object of such action. Some of these instincts have reference to our individual welfare. They induce us to cling to life, though excessive pain should for the moment predominate, rendering life for the time being undesirable; they induce us to supply our body with the material necessary for its sustenance; to attach ourselves to those who administer to our pleasures; to accumu

late for a future day; to defend ourselves and repel aggression; to meet necessary danger; cautiously to avoid that which has a tendency to injure; to desire approbation; to exalt ourselves, and to view things only with reference to self. These are called the selfish feelings. Another class of our instincts leads us to seek for gratification in the welfare of the great body of society; to desire the happiness of our fellow-creatures; to treat them with deference and respect; to do justly ourselves, and to see that justice is done to others. These are termed disinterested feelings, not because they have not as direct a reference to individual happiness as any of the others, but because the happiness derived from their gratification is a consequence and reflection of the happiness of others. We are thus connected by one part of our organization with the earth, and our happiness requires obedience to the physical and organic laws: by the other portion we are connected with the whole mass of sensitive existence, and our happiness equally requires that the laws that connect us with these should be obeyed.

All our faculties are sources of happiness when exercised legitimately, and all have a wide field of action without interfering with the rights or happiness of others, and the object of the moralist is to show how each may be gratified consistently with this limitation. The greatest possible amount of happiness can only be experienced when the disinterested feelings predominate, and in proportion

as these take precedence over the rest, does happiness increase; the reason of which is, that the gratification of the selfish desires decreases with age-it is single and solitary, and confined to one object while that of the disinterested feelings is boundless in its range, and is composed, not only of the enjoyment which always results from the legitimate exercise of the faculties, but also of the happiness reflected from that of all benefited by such exercise: the former is ever but an unit; the latter always compound.

Not only is it necessary to morality that those feelings which have the interest of others for their object should have the supremacy, but the intellectual faculties must also be cultivated and enlightened; for the feelings that prompt us to action are mere blind impulses; those that have for their object our own individual welfare are as likely to damage as to benefit us, unless guided by reason, and those that have for their object the welfare of our fellow-creatures are as likely to injure them as to increase their enjoyment, unless similarly directed.

As almost all the "evil" in this world originates in passion and perverted feeling, and in error consequent on the limitation of our faculties, and as it is not only necessary to wish to do right, but we must also know what is right, perhaps the highest pursuit of all is the elucidation and spread

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of truth. We may not all be able to discover new truths, but we may all aid in making what truth there is shine a little brighter. Truthfulness and sincerity therefore must always be reckoned among the first moral duties. It is the one thing needful in this world of shams. So long as merit and demerit are attached to opinion, as if we could form what opinions we liked, insincerity is likely greatly to prevail. The best mode of attacking error is by spreading truth, and whatever may be the convictions at which we may arrive, and whatever may be the opinion of society with respect to such convictions, we are bound to state them if called upon. Were each mind thus honestly to declare the faith that it holds, truths that are now treated as errors dangerous to the interests of society, would be at least regarded with respect, out of deference to the talents and character of those that entertain them, and the improvement of our institutions would be more rapid. For though the "world has ever shown but small favour to its teachers; " though it has ever regarded with an evil and a jealous eye the propounders of new truths, yet the honest expression of all that we believe will be found to be most in accordance with the promotion of our own well-being. We may be neglected and even persecuted by society at large; yet the sympathy and friendship of the few real lovers of truth, who are capable of appreciating our motives and views, and the internal consciousness arising