of his errors and extravagances, as it will appear, were derived from the corrupt philosophy which was then prevalent in Egypt, and with which his mind had become deeply imbued in the schools of Clement and Ammonius, the latter of whom was, at that time, chief of the sect of Alexandrian Platonists, and one of its most distinguished ornaments. Origen's views of the Deity will not long detain us. He was accused by subsequent Fathers of circumscribing the power of the Divine Being, asserting that he created only as much matter as he could dispose and adorn, and that by his omnipotence we are to understand simply a dominion over things actually existing, 'the heavens, the earth, sun, moon, and stars, and all that is in them.' We shall not pause to examine the foundation of this charge, which may be regarded as in itself frivolous, and the discussion of which would plunge us into the dark abysses of the Alexandrian philosophy. 6 It has been made a question, whether he regarded the Deity as corporeal, or incorporeal. On this, as on several other points, his opinions, or at least his language fluctuates, and he appears not always consistent with himself. In the present instance, however, we believe that it is not difficult to reduce his apparently conflicting expressions into harmony with each other. With the ancients generally, he believed spirit to consist of an exceedingly subtile and attenuated substance, wholly unlike the gross and palpable bodies we bear about with us, but still not destitute of materiality, and in some sort strictly corporeal.* In this sense, he seems to have supposed the Deity corporeal. True, in parts of his writings, particularly in his books Of Principles,' if we may trust to the version of Rufinus, he says distinctly and repeatedly that God is incorporeal. But the term is evidently to be understood as subject to the qualification just pointed out. The Deity is not corporeal in the gross sense of the term, but he is so in the more refined sense, in which all spiritual beings, according to Origen, are to be regarded as such, all, from the Deity down to the human soul, being supposed by him, as we shall hereafter show, to partake of the same essence. Tertullian expressly ascribes a body to the Deity. But Origen has not expressed himself so grossly, though, as we have † Adv. Prax. c. 7. * De Princip. Præf. seen, he supposed a very intimate union between matter and God.* In other respects, he appears to have entertained just and elevated conceptions of the nature and attributes of the Divine Being. He ascribes to him the greatest goodness and equity, and an absolute supremacy over all other beings, including the Son. With regard to the latter, he participated in the sentiments which were common to the age, and which were originally derived, as we contend, from Platonic sources. A rapid glance at the history of these sentiments may be necessary to put our readers in complete possession of the views of Origen, and fulfil our design of tracing the rise and progress of the doctrine of the trinity. The first century was characterized by great simplicity of doctrine. The primitive Christians, it is true, appear to have sometimes applied the title God to Christ, but in a sense totally different from that in which it came afterwards to be attributed to him. His miraculous birth, his Messiahship, and the state of glory to which he was advanced after a painful and ignominious death, God having raised him up,' and highly exalted him,' making him 'both Lord and Christ,' for the suffering of death' crowning him with 'glory and 6 6 *He taught, according to Jerome, (Epist. 94, al. 59, ad Avitum,) that all bodies, that is, all of the grosser sort, will be finally converted into spiritual substances, that all corporeal nature will be reduced back to the divine, which is the most excellent,' and then 'God will be all in all.' This was the Alexandrian principle, which taught that matter originally flowed from the bosom of God, and which Origen has been considered as adopting in full extent. The principle well accords with several parts of his system, though we are not aware that he has any where expressly asserted it as regards the origin of matter. Beausobre thinks, that his real opinion was not that matter originally emanated from the substance of God; that all he meant to affirm, was, that God never existed for a moment without exercising his perfections, and consequently without an act of creation; and that in this sense he supposed matter to be eternal. Upon the emanative principle it might be regarded as eternal, as proceeding from the bosom of the Eternal One. The Egyptian Platonists, who were Origen's masters, admitted it to be eternal in this sense alone, thus departing from the dualistic system of the Athenian Sage. See Beausobre, Histoire de Manichée et du Manichéisme, T. 11. pp. 284, 285. Also Brucker, Hist. Crit. Phil. T. 1. p. 443, and Huet. Origeniana, Lib. II. c. 11. Quæs. 2, § 24. Quæs. 12, § 2. To the learned labors of the latter especially, we acknowledge ourselves indebted for no little assistance in our attempt to collect and classify the opinions of Origen. honor,' were circumstances on which they dwelt with wonder, delight, and gratitude; and they did not hesitate occasionally to bestow, on a being thus favored and exalted, some of the epithets of Divinity. Thus they sometimes call Christ, God, and Jewish usage fully sanctioned such an application of the term. Magistrates and judges are repeatedly denominated Gods in the old Testament, and our Saviour alludes to this application of the word as well known to the Jews; John x. 35. It is not surprising that the primitive Christians, who as Jews, were familiar with this use of the term, should sometimes apply it to their master. Accustomed to hear the great and good prophets, judges, and magistrates of their nation called Gods, they would very naturally suppose that there could be no impiety in occasionally bestowing the title on Jesus, whose extraordinary birth, character, and offices were so fitted to inspire admiration and love. They never, however, thought of confounding him with the One Infinite Father, or making him in any sense his equal. The title in question was one of dignity and honor, applied primarily to the Supreme One, but in a secondary sense to beings inferior to him, to angels and men; and this use of it was too common to occasion any surprise, error, or embarrassment. But when Christianity, in the second century, began to number among its converts men wearing the garb, and claiming the character and name of philosophers, this simplicity of faith, which till then remained, became corrupted. Educated as Platonists of the Alexandrian school, these philosophers were familiar with the belief of a sort of second God, logos, or reason, originally emanating from the fountain of the Divinity. This doctrine they took along with them on embracing the religion of Jesus; and misled by some obscure and figurative expressions employed by the Evangelists and Apostles, especially by John, they gradually incorporated it with the Christian system. Thus Jesus, who, before this time, had been called divine, and sometimes God, solely on account of his miraculous birth and exalted character and office, now began to be termed such in a different sense, that is, as a being from eternity existing in God, not personally, but as an attribute, as his reason, wisdom, or energy; which, a little before the creation of the world, was emitted, or thrown out, that is, converted into a real being or person, a kind of second God. After this event, he became, as these Fathers imagined, a be VOL. XI. -N. S. VOL. VI. NO. I. 4 ing wholly distinct from God, was inferior to him, and his agent in forming and governing the world. They never apply to him the title 'God over all'; never ascribe to him supreme divinity. They did not suppose him eternal, except as an attribute of the Father. He existed in God, as reason exists in us, so existed from eternity, a mere quality or attribute. He was produced, that is, became a real being, when God, being about to create the world, had occasion to use his ministrations. Thus, as an attribute, he was, in their view, eternal; as a person, or being, he was not so, having been begotten or made (for they originally used both terms) in time. This is what these Fathers meant by the generation of the Son, which, as we have seen, was regarded by them as temporal, not as eternal. The logos, or Son, being then produced, afterwards became incarnate, was made flesh, and became susceptible of suffering, and, as they thought, actually suffered, in his whole nature. Το suppose that part of his nature was exempt from suffering, though deemed orthodox now, was then pronounced heresy. Such is a general view of the doctrine of the Fathers, who were converts from Platonism, during the second and third centuries. This doctrine, which contains the germ of the trinity, was introduced into the Church, as we have satisfactorily shown, we trust, on a former occasion,* by Justin Martyr, who wrote about the middle of the second century. We shall now adduce evidence to prove that it was held by subsequent Fathers down to the time of Origen. We will begin with Tatian, the Syrian, who was a disciple of Justin, and who flourished near the end of the second century. In language similar to that employed by his master, he describes God alone as without beginning, invisible, ineffable, the Author of all things visible and invisible,† epithets uniformly applied by Justin and the early Christian writers, to the Father, and never to the Son. He speaks of God's power as the beginning of the logos,' or Son. Considered in relation to the world not as yet actually existing, he was, says Tatian, alone. 'But in regard to his power, by which he * Vol. 11. pp. 303-328, New Series, where we introduced a discussion on the subject of the Origin of the Trinity. + Contra Græcos Oratio. ، was the cause of all things, visible and invisible, all things were with him;' that is, as he had the power of producing them. 'With him, by virtue of his rational power,' or as he was a rational being, the logos which was in him, subsisted ' : that is, potentially, as he had the power of producing it. By a simple act of his will, his 'logos leaped out from him, being his first begotten work,'* or beginning of the creation. From this and similar language, it is evident, that Tatian considered the logos, or Son, as originally, and from eternity in and with God, not as a real being or person, but only as an attribute, or by virtue of his power of producing it; in him and with him, only, as all things created were, by his power of voluntarily producing them. This, indeed, he asserts almost in so many words. He speaks of the Son as having a beginning, that is, considered as a real subsistence or person; and he evidently regarded him, after his production, as a being distinct from the Father, and inferior to him. The Son was produced by the Father, he tells us, as one torch is lighted from another, or as speech is produced in us from the faculty of speech within us, illustrations which were common with the Fathers, and imply a numerical distinction of being and essence. This distinction is expressly asserted by Justin, Tatian's master, who contends, in words as plain and unequivocal as language affords, that the Father and Son are two in number, two beings, the one visible, the other invisible, the one remaining fixed in his place, the other capable of motion from place to place; and Tatian obviously trod in his steps. 6 Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, and contemporary with Tatian, taught the same doctrine. He speaks of God as Supreme, the true and only God,' without beginning,' 'invisible,' 'unbegotten,' and as such immutable, and finally as incapable of being comprehended in space'; and of the Son as inferior, having, as a real being, or person, a beginning, 'visible,' 'begotten,' and therefore, according to his philosophy,† not possessing the attribute of immutability, which belonged * Contra Gracos Oratio, pp. 246 - 248, ed. Paris. annexed to the works of Justin Martyr, Paris, 1742. This edition of Justin contains, also, the writings which are extant, of Theophilus of Antioch, and Athenagoras. In citing these authors, our references are uniformly made to this edition. Ad Autolycum, Lib. 1. pp. 149 - 280. |