of suing its debtors; and to remedy this serious evil a fresh campaign had to be undertaken. On the 7th of May, 1834, just three months after they commenced business, the directors of the London and Westminster Bank applied by petition to the House of Commons for powers to sue and be sued. On the introduction of the bill granting such powers, the Bank of England was not ashamed to appear by counsel against it, notwithstanding which opposition it passed the House. Even this was not the last shot fired from behind the walls of Threadneedle Street. In the ordinary course of business, bills of exchange were drawn upon the London and Westminster Bank from the country, and accepted, as a matter of course. The authorities of the Bank of England immediately gave notice to their young rival, that by accepting bills they were "infringing the privilege of the Bank." Here was the opening of another mighty battle, accompanied by a splendid harvest for the lawyers.

The matter was dragged, with desirable slowness, through all the courts of law and equity, and, in due course, made its appearance before the Areopagus of the British Isles. The Lords called in the assistance of the twelve judges, and

after much high-feed-or high-fed-eloquence, the decision went in favour of Threadneedle Street. Four years' litigation, and the loss of as many thousand pounds, was the only misfortune experienced by the London and Westminster Bank in this struggle. The adverse decision of the Lords cost the bank not a single customer, the law being circumvented, as usual, by a clever business contrivance. All that was done was an arrangement with the country joint-stock banks to draw upon the London and Westminster Bank "without acceptance," in the same way as the Bank of Ireland draws upon the Bank of England. In this case, as well as others, it is satisfactory to see that, in the battle between law and common sense, the latter seldom fails in getting the upper hand. The principle of joint-stock banks was established in apparent defiance of an Act of the House of Commons, and the originators upheld their work in defiance of a decision of the House of Lords.

Its juvenile struggle overcome, the career of the London and Westminster Bank was one of unclouded prosperity. The first annual report, issued March 4, 1835, stated that the paid-up capital of the bank-increased by two calls of £5 each upon the shareholders—had risen from

£50,000 to £244,945, while the business done was such as to allow a dividend of 4 per cent. By the end of December, 1835, the number of shares issued had increased to 17,818. Soon afterwards the directors ordered a fourth call of £5 per share, payable the following April. This made £20 paid upon each share, the whole capital exceeding now £400,000. In 1836, the paid-up capital rose to above half a million; reaching £800,000 in 1842, and £1,000,000 in 1847. It was in the latter year that the new joint-stock bank commenced its course of retributive justice by devouring its old enemies, the private bankers. The first bank which was absorbed was the old firm of Young and Son, formerly Weston and Young, carrying on business in Southwark. The last victim, devoured

in 1864, was the old-established firm of Jones, Loyd, and Co. The ancients of Lombard Street now began to tremble for their existence; and as they had formerly sneered at joint-stock banks, they now expressed their hatred with still greater cordiality. Though having risen in a few years to the position of the second greatest bank in the kingdom, the London and Westminster was unable to obtain admission to the Clearing House. Its portals were as

jealously guarded as the entrance to those sacred regions—

"The Elysian plains, earth's farthest end,

Where Rhadamanthus dwells."

Rhadamanthus, of Lombard Street, did not open the golden (or paper) gates of the Elysii Campi till the month of June, 1854, after more than twenty years' knocking at the door. An extra bonus of £80,000 to the fortunate shareholders of the London and Westminster proved the final sop to Cerberus.

XVII. A TALE OF FORGERY.

ONE of the chief causes of the immediate success of the London and Westminster Bank, or, in other words, of the principle of joint-stock banking, was the degraded social position of many private bankers, particularly in the country. They availed themselves to the fullest extent of the right, granted to them by the Legislature, of issuing small notes, in not a few instances without the least solid cash foundation. By an extraordinary anomaly, the Bank of England was not allowed to issue a single one-pound note, while country bankers, many of whom were mere retail shop-keepers, deluged the provinces with millions. The repeated failures of these so-called bankers, caused of necessity terrible suffering among the middle and the lower classes, who chiefly held their worthless notes, and gave rise to more or less extensive financial crises. It was in vain that leading papers, such as the Times, lifted their voice against this un