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to be passed at the meeting but that Murphy was not. The jury obviously did not ultimately interpret the facts that way because they also found Murphy guilty, but at least they did, or reasonably could have, interpreted Murphy's culpability as being differently based than that of Thompson.

Thompson also complains about the court's supplementary instruction to the jury in response to their notes during deliberations. As indicated under the Murphy motions above, these arguments were carefully reviewed on the record at trial and need not be rehashed here.

Defendant Thompson's motions are therefore denied.

X. CONCLUSION

In these three cases the congressional defendants were caught on videotape in flagrante delicto, 26 accepting money in relation to their official conduct as public servants. By overwhelming evidence the other defendants were proven guilty of aiding and abetting the Myers bribery. None of the defendants was a “deprived" citizen. All of them occupied honored, well-rewarded, and highly respected positions in our society. Four of them sat in the highest legislative body of the country. Another, a former state prosecutor, was a respected lawyer in a well-known law firm, serving in an ancient and honorable profession. Still another combined a legal career in the same firm with a political career in Philadelphia's local government. the seventh occupied a dual position of public trust as mayor of a large city and state senator of New Jersey. Despite their respected and trusted positions, defendants' crass conduct here reveals only greed, dishonesty and corruption. Their major defense has been that they were tricked into committing the crime on videotape.

The government's need to unmask such conduct more than justifies the investigative techniques employed in these cases. Without question these convictions were reliable, and no constitutional right of any defendant has been infringed. While the government' conduct of the investigation was not flawless, the overall work of the FBI, of the Eastern District Strike Force and of their superiors in the Department of Justice reflects a moderate, fair, careful approach to an undercover investigation which suddenly and unexpectedly proved effective in uncovering corruption in Congress.

The investigators on Long Island and their supervisors in Brooklyn kept extensive records and provided reasonable information to their superiors in Washington. Contrary to defendants' claims, this was not a runaway investigation. True, it moved fast, impelled by greedy middlemen and cooperative corrupt public officials who appeared so frequently they made life hectic for the investigators. În large measure, the undercover agents and the FBI were able to keep straight the various deals with the corrupt officials. Their record-keeping fell behind at times, but always the evidence of the crucial meetings was accurately and permanently secured in the videotape cassettes.

26 Latin: "in the very act of committing the offense. [lit., in blazing crime, i.e., in the heat of the evil deed]" The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, The Unabridged Edition. (1971).

In addition to the particular points discussed in this decision, the court has considered all the other arguments raised in the prehearing, mid-hearing, and post-hearing submissions of counsel and has found them lacking in merit. After careful consideration of the many problems raised about Abscam over the course of these cases, which have now covered approximately one year, this court is satisfied that all of the defendants were proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trials accorded to them were fair, that the arguments advanced for setting aside the convictions and dismissing the indictments on "due process" grounds are without merit, and that there are no circumstances requiring a new trial for any of the defendants.

Accordingly, all of defendants' motions directed to the verdicts and to the indictments are denied, Defendants Myers, Criden, Errichetti, Johanson, Thompson, Murphy and Lederer are directed to appear before this court in the ceremonial courtroom of the United States Courthouse, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York, for sentencing on August 13, 1981, at 10:00 a.m.

So ordered.

Dated: Westbury, New York, July 24, 1981.

GEORGE C. PRATT,
U.S. District Judge.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,

V.

PEOPLES TEMPLE OF THE DISCIPLES OF CHRIST, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. Misc. No. 81-0066

April 10, 1981

[246] The United States sued to collect costs accrued in searching for the living and [247] transporting the dead after Jonestown, Guyana tragedy. The clerk and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives, moved to quash defendants' deposition subpoena, with defendant seeking evidence that remained unpublished following completion of congressional investigation. The District Court, Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., J., held that investigation of Congressman's assassination in Jonestown, publication of report thereon and discretionary inclusion or omission of information was within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity protected by the speech or debate clause and clause required quashing of subpoena as producing documents and testifying at deposition would disrupt the functioning members of Congress. Motion granted

1. United States 12

For purpose of "Speech or Debate" clause, a "Speech or Debate" is any action within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. U.S.C.A.Const. Art. 1, §6, cl. 1.

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

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Investigation of congressman's death in Jonestown, Guyana, publication of report and discretionary inclusion or omission of information was within sphere of legitimate legislative activity for purpose of "Speech or Debate" clause and such clause required quashing of subpoena served on clerk and congressman by defendants in action by United States to collect costs accrued in searching for the living and transporting the dead after Jonestown tragedy, with defendants seeking evidence that remained unpublished following completion of congressional investigation. U.S.C.A.Const. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.

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Primary purposes of speech or debate clause are to preclude possibility that a member of Congress will become the target of civil or criminal liability while in pursuit of legitimate legislative activity and to obviate possibility of compulsive testimony by the executive branch. U.S.C.A.Const. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.

92

4. United States 12

Primary purpose of speech or debate clause involves precluding direct hardship to the legislative branch or any of its members; however a broader purpose is also served as separation of powers principles dictate that once it is determined that Congress or any of its members have acted within the legitimate legislative sphere neither the executive branch nor judiciary shall interfere with legislative discretion. U.S.C.A.Const. Art. 1, §6, cl. 1.

er.

Stanley M. Brand, Steven R. Ross, Washington, D.C., for petition

Jeffrey L. Kestler, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM

AUBREY E. ROBINSON, Jr., District Judge.

Before the Court is the Motion of the Honorable Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr. and the Honorable Clement Zablocki to Quash a deposition subpoena in the above captioned action. The underlying facts may be thus summarized:

The merits of the instant case involve an attempt by the United States to collect from Defendants costs accrued by the United States in searching for the living and transporting the dead after the Jonestown tragedy. Investigations were conducted by both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government subsequent to the occurrence of the tragedy, and it is apparently undisputed that to some extent conflicting conclusions resulted from the different investigations. Defendants have already received unprivileged evidence underlying the investigation conducted by the Executive Branch. They now seek evidence that remained [248] unpublished1 following completion of the Congressional investigation.2

Defendants seek the documents in question to facilitate the formulation of certain defenses in the instant action. They claim that the documents are relevant to such issues as (1) why the United States undertook the rescue mission, (2) whether it had any genuine intent to be paid therefore, and (3) whether it played some part, however inadvertently, in precipitating the tragedy. For the purposes of Movants' Motion to Quash, this Court assumes the relevance of the documents to the instant litigation.

Movants' Motion to Quash is premised on the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, §6 cl. 1. That Clause states, in pertinent part, that "for any Speech or Debate in either House [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." Two issues present themselves here, to wit: (1) do the requested documents and testimony fall within the parameters of the Clause, and (2) if so, does the Clause preclude judicially compelled production of the documents and testimony requested.

The results of the Congressional investigation have been published, as have many of the bases underlying the conclusions. See The Assassination of Representative Leo J. Ryan in the Jonestown, Guyana Tragedy, H.R. Doc. No. 96-233, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Investigative Report).

2 Congress was, to some extent, investigating the role of the executive branch as it related to the Jonestown tragedy. It is therefore understandable that the results of the Congressional investigation differed from the results of the investigation conducted by the Executive Branch.

[1, 2] A "Speech or Debate" is any action within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S., 491, 503, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 1821, 44 L. Ed.2d 324 (1975); Gravel v. U.S., 408 U.S. 606, 616, 92 S.Ct, 2614, 2622, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). It is not and cannot be disputed that the investigation of Congressman Ryan's death, publication of the report, and discretionary inclusion or omission of information is within that "sphere of legitimate legislative activity." See Doe v. McMillian, 412 U.S. 306, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L.Ed.2d 912(1973.. Thus, the sole remaining question concerns the parameters of the Speech and Debate Clause.

[3] It is undisputed that the primary purposes of the Clauses are (1) to preclude the possibility that a Member of Congress will become the target of civil or criminal liability while in pursuit of legitimate legislative activity and (2) to obviate the possibility of compulsive testimony by the executive branch. Gravel v. U.S., 408 U.S. at 616-617, 92 S.Ct. at 2622. Defendants contend that none of these purposes would be served by granting the Motion to Quash, that the instant litigation is unique because the United States is the plaintiff, and that no hardship results to Congress should this Court enforce the subpoena.

[4] Defendants misconstrue the purpose of the Speech and Debate Clause and the relevant case law. While it is true that the primary purpose of the Clause involves precluding direct hardship to the legislative branch or any of its members, a broader purpose is also served. Separation of Powers principles dictate that, once it is determined that Congress or any of its members have acted within the legitimate legislative sphere, neither the Executive Branch nor the Judiciary shall interfere with legislative discretion. As the Supreme Court stated in Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503, 95 S.Ct. at 1821.

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The applicability of the Clause to private civil actions is supported by the absoluteness of the term "shall not be questioned," and the sweep of the term "in any other Place." In reading the Clause broadly we have said that legislators acting within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity "should be protected not only from the consequences of the litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves. [W]hether a criminal action is instituted by the Executive Branch, or a civil action is brought by private parties, judicial power is still brought to bear on Members of Congress [249] and legislative independence is imperiled. We reaffirm that once it is determined that Members are acting within the "legitimate legislative sphere" the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference. (emphasis added)

The Supreme Court has rarely spoken with greater clarity. Once it is determined (as it has been in the instant case) that the Movants' actions fall within the "legitimate legislative sphere," judicial inquiry is at an end. Otherwise, Members of Congress conducting investigations would be forced to consider at every turn whether evidence received pursuant to the investigation would subsequently have to be produced in court. This would "imperil" the legislative independence protected by the Clause. Moreover, producing documents and testifying at a deposition would certainly disrupt the functioning of a Member of Congress. Movants' Motion to Quash must be granted.

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