LETTER IV.

REVEREND AND DEAR SIR,

IN my last Letter I endeavoured to offer reasons why I believe that Christ is truly divine. You will very naturally expect me to take some notice of those texts on which you would specially rely, to prove his inferiority to the Father. This I must do; but in as summary a manner as possible. Not because it would not be easy to say much, even more easy than to write briefly, and yet with perspicuity; but because there would be danger of protracting the subject, and tiring the patience of both writer and reader.

Let me begin, then, by stating certain things which are intimately connected with the subject in question. While I believe that Christ is truly divine, I believe that he is as truly human-that he was a real man, and lived, acted, suffered, and died as a man. He resembled, however, man in his primitive state, i. e. Adam, as he came out of the hands of his Maker. He was pure and sinless; but he possessed all the feelings and all the innocent infirmities of human nature. I know no proposition that can be proved from the New Testament, if this cannot; nor do I know of an opinion more inconsistent with the whole history of Jesus than that of the Docetæ, who averred that Christ was a man in appearance merely, and not in reality.

I regret that I am not able to find in your sermon an intimation that Christ was truly and properly a man. All that you appear to maintain is, that he was a being distinct from the Father, and inferior to him. Perhaps I must retract, therefore, my sentence against the Docetæ, lest I should seem to have treated your opinion with severity. But the state of my mind, in regard to the weight of evidence, I cannot retract. If the evidence be not overwhelming that Christ was perfectly a man, I cannot conceive it possible that any point in theology or morals is

capable of being established by the language of the New Testament.

The Gnostics maintained, that from the Supreme Divinity proceeded certain Eons, who were a kind of lesser gods (dii minores), and one of which (Christ) created the world. This Eon descended upon Jesus at his baptism, and forsook him at his crucifixion. In what important respect that opinion differs from this, which holds that Christ had a super-angelic soul united to a human body, I confess I cannot see. The Socinian theory seems to me incomparably more rational and more tenable than any shade of the Arian hypothesis. If the evidence be not

complete that Christ was really a man from his birth, actions, sufferings, death, and affirmations respecting himself, then how is it to be proved that Christ ever existed at all? And will any one refuse his assent to the proposition that Christ possessed a divine nature, because he cannot see how a union of the divine and human natures could take place, and yet believe that a human body was united to a soul not human? To what order or class of beings, then, does this new compound and strangely-mixed person belong? He is not divine-he is not human, for a human soul is surely essential to human nature-nor is he angelic, for angels have no corporeal forms. Are we to be freed from mystery, then, by such a theory? It seems to me if there be mystery in any theory which has ever been proposed, respecting the person of Christ, it may surely be found here. I will not say (as you do, about the twofold nature of Christ, in which we believe) that "it is an enormous tax upon human credulity;" but I can say, that it appears to me as much like such a tax as any theory with which the Church has hitherto been agitated. I can never bring myself to view it as probable, in any degree, unless I find it in the Scriptures. But there I find that the Logos, who existed before the world was made, was God —that God who created the universe. I cannot, then, admit him to be a super-angelic being simply, until I am convinced either that John was mistaken, or that his language has a different meaning from that which it appears to have.

As to the theory which maintains that Christ was God's

own proper Son, before the creation of the world (of course before his incarnation), and God's own Son in the same sense, or in as real and proper a sense, as Solomon was the son of David, it is natural to ask, first, Who, then, was his Mother? and, secondly, How much does such a theory of Divinities in the Christian system differ from that which admitted a Jupiter and his progeny to be gods, among the Greeks and Romans?

We do then (if you will allow me to use your own expressive words, though applied by you in a connexion somewhat different), "we do maintain that the human properties and circumstances of Christ, his birth, sufferings, and death-his praying to God, his ascribing to God all his power and offices-the acknowledged properties of Christ, we say, oblige us to interpret" them of human nature; and to draw the conclusion, that, whatever could be predicated of a real man, pious and sinless, might be predicated of him. How would he-how could he-have assumed our nature (except, as the Docetæ affirmed that he did, viz. in appearance only), unless every thing could be predicated of him which properly belongs to man? Accordingly, we know that he increased in wisdom, stature, and favour with God and man-that he ate, drank, slept, laboured,—was fatigued, hungry, thirsty—rejoiced and sympathized with his brethren, wept, was in an agony -prayed, bled, died, was buried, and rose again. If these things do not for ever exclude all hope of making any shade of the Arian theory probable, I must confess myself a stranger to the nature of evidence, and to what the New Testament contains.

To return to my purpose. The proper humanity of Christ being considered as an established fact, I have one general observation to make on the principles of exegesis which are connected with it.

It is this: That in as much as Christ has truly a human nature, every thing said of him in respect to this nature must necessarily be spoken of him in a capacity in which he is inferior to the Father. In a word, as his human nature is inferior to the divine, so, whatever has relation to it, or is predicated of it, must, of course, be that which implies inferiority to the divine,

Do you ask me how you shall distinguish when a text speaks of Christ in respect to his human nature, or in respect to his divine nature? I answer, just as, when you speak of a man, you distinguish whether what is said relates to his body or his soul. When I say Abraham is dead, I mean, obviously, his mortal part. When I say Abraham is alive, I mean, obviously, his immortal part. When the Evangelist says that Jesus increased in stature and wisdom, and in favour with God and man- - that he ate, drank, slept, prayed, suffered, died, and rose againhe obviously means that his human nature did this. When he affirms that the Logos is God, and made the universe, and when Paul says that he is " supreme God, blessed for ever," I cannot help thinking it to be equally obvious, that they predicate this of his divine nature. The simple answer to your question, then, is, that we must determine which nature is described, by what is affirmed concerning The subject is known by its predicates.

it.

To the remarks just made on the proper humanity of Christ, and the principles of exegesis which result from it, let me add,

Secondly, That the appellation Father is not always used to designate that distinction in the Godhead which we commonly describe by calling it the first person; but that it is sometimes a general title of the divine nature. (See Deut. xxxii. 6. Is. lxiii. 16; lxiv. 3. Matt. v. 16, 48; vi. 4; vii. 11. John viii. 41.) In the same manner (Kugos) Lord is applied often to Christ in particular, and to God as a general appellation. The Divinity is called Father, on account of that peculiar and provident care which he extends to all the creatures of his power. He is called Lord (Kugos), because of his universal dominion.

Proper attention to this obvious principle will explain several passages, which have been thought to relate merely to what is denominated the first person in the Trinity; and to ascribe properties to him in an exclusive manner.

Thirdly, There is another observation which I cannot refrain from making here, and which seems to me of great importance, in regard to our mode of thinking and reasoning, on the subject of the distinction in the Godhead. This is, that no terms, which are applied by the Scriptures

to designate this distinction, or to predicate any thing of it, can be supposed fully and definitely to express what exists in the Godhead, or what is done by it. The obvious reason of this is, that the language of men (being all formed from perceptions of finite objects, by beings who are of yesterday, and whose sphere of knowledge is extremely limited) cannot possibly be adequate to express fully and definitely what pertains to the self-existent and infinite God. How often do men forget this in their reasonings about the Deity! In some things nearly all men agree in observing caution with regard to language which is applied to God. When the Scripture speaks of his having eyes, ears, hands, feet, &c. all men of a sound mind understand these terms as figurative; for the obvious reason that "God is a spirit," and that things of this nature can be literally predicated only of human beings that have flesh and blood. We mean to say, God sees, God hears, God moves, &c. when we attribute to him those members which we employ in performing such actions. And still, this is only the language of approximation to full description. What corresponds in the infinite, omniscient, omnipresent Spirit, to our seeing, and hearing, and moving, &c. must necessarily be different, in many important respects, from all these things in us.

When we say, "God is in heaven; the Lord looked down, or came down, from heaven; Jehovah sits upon a throne high and lifted up," or when we predicate any thing of him, which corresponds to the exaltation and magnificence of earthly monarchs, we understand, of course, that this language is not to be taken literally, and as being fully adequate to the description aimed at, but only as that of approximation. When we say, "God is angry; God hates; God scorns; the Lord will deride, will laugh, will frown, will abhor," &c.,-do we predicate all these things of God in a literal manner, or do we understand them all as conveying to us an idea of something in the divine affections, actions, or mode of treating us, which corresponds to something that is in men, or which they do? The answer is very obvious; and in all this use of language, we apprehend or feel little or no difficulty. At least, none but enthusiastic visionaries, who would fain