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of the stream to identify the lines run to the | river, as well as the return of course and distances measured along the margin, necessarily to ascertain the quantity of land in the survey, will not restrain the title to the bank or margin only."

The plaintiff relies chiefly upon the cases of Kelly v. Graham, 9 Watts, 116, and Wharton v. Garvin, 34 Pa. 340; but these cases are clearly distinguishable from the case now before us. This distinction will appear in Wood v. Appal, supra, where Chief Justice Agnew says, quoting Justice Kennedy in Kelly v. Graham: "The survey, as returned here by the deputy surveyor, as also all the other evidence on the subject, shows most unequivocally that the river is not made a boundary in it, and, indeed, that it could not have been so intended. The draft of the survey returned is made out according to the courses and distances actually run and marked upon the ground, and not made to call for the river on any side or point whatever. At some distance from the survey, however, the Allegheny river is laid down upon a straight line without any regard to its meanders as if it were intended by the artist merely to show that the land included within the survey lay near to the river."

The case of Wharton v. Garvin is distinguished in the following reference by Chief Justice Agnew: "The diagram exhibited no protraction to the river, and the closing line was represented as a straight line of 238 perches long, leaving a large vacancy between it and the river. The return did not call for the river as a boundary, but it was represented as some distance off with the words written within representation, 'up Allegheny,' The opinion was written by Justice Thompson, the present Chief Justice, who was careful to distinguish the case upon its facts. He remarked that generally a survey is to be carried to its calls, unless there are actual lines on the ground excluding them that a call to stand as a boundary must be indicated to be such with sufficient certainty to show that it was so intended. The representation of an object at a distance from a closing line, without any words indicative of an intent to make it a boundary, would hardly be sufficient to constitute it such. The line plotted at a distance would have little weight, he remarked, if the river had been made the call; and as it is not so made in terms, and appears to be excluded by the draft, it is a circumstance of controlling influence, as held in Kelly v. Graham, supra. Thus it was the intent of the surveyor (appearing clearly in the return of survey) to bound the survey on the 238-perch line, and not on the

river, which controlled the decision. Instead of

impugning the general doctrine, the case supports it, and the judge remarked: "We are predisposed to presume the existence of an intent to bound surveys on navigable waters by the stream, not only on account of the supposed advantage arising from such location, but because it is in accordance with practice."

There are other reasons to support the conclusion, to which we have already come, that the western boundary of Pine lots 4, 5, and 6 is the Lackawanna river; but it is unnecessary to refer to them.

[9] Whether or not the Lackawanna river was a call, and the western boundary of lots numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6, is a question of law for the court, and not of fact for the determination of the jury. "What are boundaries is a matter of law for the court; where they are, a matter of fact for the determination of the jury under proper instruction from the court." 5 Cyc. 969. "The meaning of a deed-that is, what it covers-is a question of law for the court; what the boundaries of a given piece of land are is a question of construction for the court also; where they are is a question of fact for the jury." 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) 809. "Where the

boundary lines of a grant are fixed by the grant itself, the question as to what these lines are is purely one of law." 3 Enc. of Plead. & Prac. 676.

As the Lackawanna river is the western boundary of Pine lots Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6, and as the land in dispute is located within them, the jury should have been instructed to find a verdict for the defendant. The question of the location of this boundary having been submitted to the jury, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff, the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto should now be sustained.

Verdict for plaintiff for the land described in the writ. The court subsequently entered judgment for defendant n. o. v.

Argued before FELL, C. J., and BROWN, MESTREZAT, ELKIN, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.

S. B. Price, C. B. Price, and J. H. Price, all of Scranton, for appellant. James H. Torrey and John P. Kelly, both of Scranton, for appellee.

river was a call of senior surveys and a PER CURIAM. Whether the Lackawanna boundary line of the land in dispute was submitted to the jury, and their verdict was for the plaintiff. A different finding would have established conclusively the defendant's right, and have entitled it to judgment in its favor. On its motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, the court properly held that the question was one of construction. What are boundaries is a matter of law for the court, to be determined by construction of the deed or survey; where they are is a question of fact for the jury.

We are not convinced of error in the conclusion reached that the surveys called for the river as a boundary, and we affirm the judgment entered in the common pleas, for the reasons stated in the opinion of Judge Johnson, specially presiding at the trial.

(245 Pa. 608)

STEINGUEST v. WHITE et al.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. July 1, 1914.) MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 281*) INJURY TO SERVANT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

In an action to recover for the death of an employé, evidence held to show that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and

Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 987-996; Dec. Dig. § 281.*]

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas; Philadelphia County.

Action by Amelia Steinguest against Charles G. White and Christian E. White. From judgment for defendants notwithstanding the verdict, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before FELL, C. J., and MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.

Victor Frey and Augustus Trask Ashton, both of Philadelphia, for appellant. William A. Gray, of Philadelphia, for appellees.

POTTER, J. The plaintiff brought this ing this position of authority and responsiaction in trespass to recover damages for the bility, he more than any one else was bound, death of her husband, resulting, as alleged, for the protection of himself and his fellow from the negligence of the defendants, his workmen, to see that the cable was properly employers. On August 2, 1909, the date of clamped fast to the top of the elevator. The the accident, Steinguest was employed by the fastening of the clamps was merely a matter defendants as foreman in charge of a gang of properly screwing up the nuts upon the of bricklayers and laborers. They were en- bolts passing through two small iron plates, gaged in erecting the brick work of a build- which pressed tightly upon the cable. Whething at the corner of Thirty-Fourth and Chest- er or not they were properly tightened at nut streets in the city of Philadelphia. To first, it is well known that nuts have a tendhoist material an open elevator was employ-ency to become loosened, or unscrewed, and ed. It was supported by a cable, which must be tightened at proper intervals. Clearpassed through an eyebolt, and was then ly the foreman in charge had the responsiturned back upon itself, and clamped in place bility of doing this, or of seeing that it was by means of two iron plates secured by bolts. done. The evidence shows that in this case At the time of the accident Steinguest, as Steinguest was not without knowledge of foreman, was helping to get the materials the condition of the cable. There was testiready for the bricklayers. A loaded wheel- mony that at least he had warning which barrow had been hoisted to the third floor, should have put him upon his guard. Two and Steinguest attempted to take it off the witnesses, Taylor and Young, testify without elevator, but found that it was a little below contradiction that on the Saturday, before the proper point. He called to the engineer, the accident, which happened early Monday "Up a little," and the engineer raised the morning, they noticed the end of the cable elevator platform a few inches, when the did not seem to be tight, but seemed to be cable slipped from between the clamps, and slipping; it did not seem to them to be right; the elevator dropped, carrying Steinguest it seemed to be loose, and they each spoke with it. He had been standing with one foot to Steinguest about it; but he answered on the floor of the building, and one foot on them, "That is all right, go ahead." Had the platform of the elevator. It was alleged this direct warning been heeded by Steinthat the cable slipped because the clamps guest, and had he been less self-sufficient, were improperly fastened. Upon the trial in the accident would in all probability have the court below, the jury returned a verdict been avoided. His lack of prudence in this in favor of plaintiff, which the court after- respect brought a most regrettable penalty wards set aside, and entered judgment for upon himself. the defendants non obstante veredicto, upon the ground that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence in standing with one foot on the floor and the other on the elevator, and while in that position, directing the engineer to move the elevator. It appears from the testimony of the engineer that whenever the elevator is at a floor, for service, it is customary to throw in a dog, or rachet upon the drum, to hold the elevator in a fixed position. This had not been done at the time of the accident, for the elevator was not yet quite at the right place. The testimony also shows that it was not necessary for Steinguest to have placed his foot upon the elevator at all. He could have taken the wheelbarrow off, by taking hold of the handles, keeping his feet upon the floor of the building. That it was regarded as dangerous to be on the elevator clearly appears from the testimony. The workmen were instructed never to ride upon the elevator. Steinguest was instructed not to permit any one to do so, and he did tell others to keep off. A danger signal was also up, which read, "Danger, keep off."

Our examination of all the testimony has satisfied us that in entering judgment for the defendants non obstante veredicto the court below properly discharged a plain duty. The assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.

(245 Pa. 605) COMMONWEALTH v. CONSOLIDATED DRESSED BEEF CO.. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. July 1, 1914.)

1. LICENSES (§ 15*)-MERCANTILE LICENSE TAX-"DEALER."

A purchaser of material for resale is a "dealer" within the act of May 2, 1899 (P. L. 194), providing for the imposition of a mercantile license tax upon dealers in goods, wares, and merchandise.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Licenses,
Cent. Dig. §§ 30-35; Dec. Dig. § 15.*
First and Second Series, Dealer.]
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases,

2. LICENSES (§ 15*) MERCANTILE LICENSE TAX-"WHOLESALE VENDOR."

A person, engaged in the business of purchasing cattle, slaughtering them, and selling puttered animals to dealers, was a "wholesale venthe beef and other products from the slaughdor" of merchandise, within the act of May 2, 1899 (P. L. 184), which imposes a mercantile license tax on wholesale vendors.

There is other testimony which points with even greater directness to the contributory negligence of Steinguest. It was shown that he was the foreman of the job, and as such assisted in putting up the elevator. Occupy

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Licenses, Cent. Dig. §§ 30-35; Dec. Dig. § 15.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Wholesale Dealer.]

For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County.

Action by the Commonwealth against the Consolidated Dressed Beef Company. From judgment for plaintiff on case stated to determine defendant's liability to pay mercantile license tax, defendant appeals. Affirmed. See, also, 242 Pa. 163, 88 Atl. 975.

Appeal from assessment of the board of mercantile appraisers for the county of Philadelphia. From the record it appeared that case was heard in the court below on a case stated, which was as follows:

"1. It is hereby agreed by the parties to the above proceeding that the following case be stated for the judgment of the court:

"2. The Consolidated Dressed Beef Company is a corporation of Pennsylvania, organized for the purpose, and engaged exclusively, in the city of Philadelphia, in the business of the purchase of cattle, the slaughtering of the same and the sale of the beef and other products obtained from the animals slaughtered. The cattle are slaughtered and dressed by the defendant at the abattoir in the West Philadelphia stockyards. All sales made by the defendant are sales of the beef and other products of the cattle slaughtered by the defendant. All sales made by the defendant are made at the place where the defendant slaughters the cattle. The defendant does not keep a store or warehouse for the purpose of vending and disposing of any goods, wares, or merchandise. All sales made by the defendant are made only to dealers in or vendors of beef or other products obtained from the animals slaughtered. The sales of the defendant during the year 1913 amounted to $4,334,500. The board of mercantile appraisers for the county of Philadelphia assessed against the defendant, as a wholesale vendor for the year 1913, a mercantile license tax of $2,167.45, from which assessment the defendant appealed to the said board on May 8, 1913, the day assigned by the board to hear the appeal. The appeal was dismissed by the said board and the defendant on May 9, 1913, appealed to this court.

"3. If, under the above facts, the defendant is liable to the said mercantile license tax, judgment shall be entered for the commonwealth of Pennsylvania for $2,167.45; otherwise judgment shall be entered for the defendant.

"4. Each party shall have the right to appeal from the judgment entered by the court."

The court entered judgment for the plaintiff for $2,167.45. Defendant appealed. Argued before FELL, C. J., and MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.

Theodore F. Jenkins, of Philadelphia, for appellant. John T. Murphy, of Philadelphia, for the Commonwealth.

POTTER, J. This is an appeal from the assessment of a mercantile license tax. From the facts as set forth in the case stated for the decision of the court below, it appears that the defendant is engaged in the business of purchasing cattle, slaughtering them, and selling the beef and other products obtained from the slaughtered animals. The sales are made only to dealers in and vendors of the beef and other products. The court below held that under the facts as stated, the defendant was properly assessed for a mercantile license tax, and is liable for the payment thereof, and judgment was therefore entered against it accordingly.

[1, 2] From our review of the record, we are unable to see how the court below could have reached any other conclusion than that defendant is a dealer in and vendor of goods and merchandise. It buys cattle, which are for it the raw material, and it converts that material into forms and sizes suitable for the market which it supplies, and it then sells the material, as merchandise, to others who vend and deal at retail in the same products. It buys material, to sell again, and therefore comes within the proper definition of a “dealer," as the term is used in the act of May 2, 1899 (P. L. 184), under which the mercantile license tax is imposed. It subjects the material which it buys to certain manipulations, but those are not such as to properly constitute it a manufacturing corporation. This was decided in the case of Com. v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 242 Pa. 163, 88 Atl. 975. Nor does the defendant make sale of that which it raises upon its own premises, as in the case of a farmer who sells his own cattle, raised upon his farm. The defendant carries on a business properly termed as merchandising, and a large one at that. It would be difficult to find a better example of a dealer or vendor of merchandise, upon a large scale. Defendant buys for the sole purpose of selling again that which it has purchased. We think the learned court below was clearly right in holding that the defendant company was liable to assessment as a wholesale vendor of merchandise, and judgment was therefore properly entered against the defendant, upon the case stated.

The assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.

MEMORANDUM DECISIONS

Baltimore, for appellant. William A. Wheat-
STOCKBRIDGE, J., delivered the opinion of

BICKNELL v. MORSE et al. (Supreme ley, of Baltimore, for appellee.
Judicial Court of Maine. Oct. 5, 1914.) Excep-
tions and Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, the court.
Knox County, at Law. Action by Charles E.
Bicknell against James A. Morse and others.
On exceptions and motion by defendants. Over-
ruled.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and BIRD, HALEY, HANSON, and PHILBROOK, JJ. M. A. Johnson, of Rockland, for plaintiff. Reuel Robinson, of Camden, for defendants. PER CURIAM. This case comes before us on exceptions and motion by the defendant. We have examined the bill of exceptions and the arguments of counsel, and can perceive no error on the part of the presiding justice in giving the instructions concerning which the defendant complains. We have also examined the testimony upon which the jury, in the light of the instructions given, rendered the verdict. That verdict was justifiable, and we cannot set it aside. Exceptions and motion overruled.

HOGAN v. GREAT NORTHERN PAPER CO. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Sept. 29, 1914.) Action by Vinton A. Hogan against the Great Northern Paper Company. On motion for a new trial. Granted. Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, BIRD, HALEY, HANSON, and PHILBROOK, JJ. W. H. Judkins, of Lewiston, for plaintiff. Newell & Skelton, of Lewiston, for defendant.

PER CURIAM. We have examined the entire evidence in this case with great care and are unable to discover sufficient testimony to warrant a finding that the defendant was negligent in the performance or nonperformance of any duty which it owed the plaintiff. The jury must have been influenced by sympathy or misconceived the force and application of the evidence. It is the opinion of this court that the verdict was manifestly wrong. Motion for new trial sustained.

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OUTLAW v. OUTLAW. (Court of Appeals of Maryland. Feb. 13, 1914.) Appeal from CirF. Outlaw' against Charles W. Outlaw for alicuit Court, Baltimore County. Bill by Laura mony and custody of infant child. From an order modifying an order dismissing the bill without prejudice, and from an order declaring plaintiff in contempt for failing to produce the child in court as ordered, and from orders as to alimony, plaintiff appeals. Certain orders modified, and others reversed, and cause remanded.'" Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, THOMAS, PATTISON. URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE. JJ. E. Allan Sauerwein, Jr., and Joseph C. France, both of Baltimore (Victor I. Cook, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant. S. S. Field, of Baltimore, for appellee.

PATTISON, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

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(85 N. J. L. 367) BLANZ v. ERIE R. CO. (Court of Errors Appeal from Supreme Court. Action by Lenand Appeals of New Jersey. Oct. 17, 1913.) nia Blanz against the Erie Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed on the opinion of the Supreme Court, reported in 84 N. J. Law, 35, 85 Atl. 1030. Collins & Corbin, of Jersey City, for appellant. John A. Bernhard, of Newark, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The judgment under review will be affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Swayze.

(83 N. J. Eq. 347) BLOHM v. HANNA et ux. (Court of Er1914.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Suit rors and Appeals of New Jersey. Aug. 24, by Charles H. Blohm against John M. Hanna and wife to foreclose a mortgage. cree of the Court of Chancery (88 Atl. 622) for complainant, defendants appeal. Affirmed. J. Emil Walscheid, of Union, for appellants. McDermott & Enright, of Jersey City, for respond

MARSHALL v. MARSHALL. Appeals of Maryland. Feb. 6, 1914.) Appeal ent. from Circuit Court of Baltimore City. Action

From a de

by Thomas W. Marshall against Laura Mar- PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from shall for divorce. Judgment for defendant, and will be affirmed, for the reasons stated in the plaintiff appeals. Reversed. Argued before opinion filed in the court below by Vice ChanBOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOM- cellor Lewis.

AS, PATTISON, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, BERGEN, MINTURN, VREDENBURGH, and CONSTABLE, JJ. William Colton, of and WHITE, JJ., dissent.

(85 N. J. L. 725)

91 ATLANTIC REPORTER

BOWLBY v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREE-
HOLDERS OF MORRIS COUNTY. (Court
of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March
10. 1914.)
Charles W. Bowlby was removed from the of-
Appeal from Supreme Court.
fice of County Superintendent of Weights and
Measures by a resolution of the Board of Chos-
en Freeholders of the County of Morris. From
a judgment of the Supreme Court (83 N. J.
Law, 346, 85 Atl. 229) on certiorari, affirming
the resolution, he appeals. Affirmed.
A. Heisley, of Newark, for appellant. George
Wilbur
G. Runyon, of Morristown, for respondent.
PER CURIAM. The judgment under review
herein should be affirmed, for the reasons ex-
pressed in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice
Trenchard in the Supreme Court.

(86 N. J. L. 680)

DELAWARE RIVER TRANSP. CO v. INHABITANTS OF CITY OF TRENTON. (No. 70.) (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. July 10, 1914.) Appeal from Supreme Court. Proceeding by the Inhabitants of the City of Trenton against the Delaware River Transportation Company. The proceedings were affirmed by the Supreme Court on certiorari (90 Atl. 5), and the Transportation Company appeals. Affirmed. Peter Backes, of Trenton, and Gilbert Collins, of Jersey City, for appellant. Charles E. Bird, of Trenton, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The judgment under review herein should be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Parker in the Supreme Court.

(86 N. J. L. 679)

DELAWARE RIVER TRANSP. CO. v. INHABITANTS OF CITY OF TRENTON. (No. 71.) (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. July 10, 1914.) Appeal from Supreme Court. Proceeding by the Inhabitants of the City of Trenton against the Delaware River Transportation Company. were affirmed by the Supreme Court on certioThe proceedings rari (90 Atl. 731), and the Transportation Company appeals. Affirmed. Trenton, and Gilbert Collins, of Jersey City, for Peter Backes, of appellant. Charles E. Bird, of Trenton, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The judgment under review herein should be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Trenchard in the Supreme Court.

DELAWARE RIVER TRANSP. CO. v. INHABITANTS OF CITY (No. 72.). Court of Errors and Appeals of New OF TRENTON. Jersey. July 10, 1914.) Appeal from Supreme Court. Proceeding by the Inhabitants of the City of Trenton against the Delaware River Transportation Company. were affirmed by the Supreme Court on certiThe proceedings orari (90 Atl. 731), and the Transportation Company appeals. Affirmed. Peter Backes, of Trenton, and Gilbert Collins, of Jersey City, for appellant. Charles E. Bird, of Trenton, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The judgment under review herein should be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Trenchard in the Supreme Court.

(86 N. J. L. 356)

FEIGHAN v. SOBERS et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. (No. 82.) May 8, 1914.) Appeal from Supreme Court. Action by Annie L. Feighan against Jacob Sobers and another. There was a judgment for plaintiff. Defendant named having died, his executor obtained a rule to show cause why the judgment should not be set aside. absolute to the end that the judgment should be From a rule set aside (87 Atl. 636), plaintiff appeals. Af

(N..

pellant. U. G. Styron and John F. X. Ries, firmed. H. H. Voorhees, of Camden, for apboth of Atlantic City, for respondents.

pressed in the opinion delivered by Mr. Jus herein should be affirmed, for the reasons exPER CURIAM. The judgment under review tice Voorhees in the Supreme Court.

TON. (85 N. J. L. 384) GLAZER V. BOROUGH OF FLEMINGCourt. Proceeding between Marcus L. Glazer (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Oct. 16, 1913.) Error to Supreme ment of the Supreme Court, affirming a judg and the Borough of Flemington. From a judgfirmed. ment for the borough, Glazer brings error. AfWilliam C. Gebhardt, of Jersey City, for plaintiff in error. Flemington, for defendant in error. George H. Large, of

will be affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion (Board of Education of Flemington v. PER CURIAM. The judgment under review State Board, 81 N. J. Law, 212, 81 Atl. 163), filed in the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Swayze.

May 4, 1914.) (83 N. J. Eq. 342) (Court of ErAction be

rors and Appeals of New Jersey.
GOERZ v. GOERZ. (No. 24.)
Appeal from Court of Chancery.
tween Edward V. Goerz and Mathilda Goerz.
former appeals. Affirmed. McDermott & En-
From a judgment in favor of the latter, the
Lichtenstein, of Hoboken, for respondent.
right, of Jersey City, for appellant. Weller &

PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from
will be affirmed, for the reasons stated in the
Master Hartshorne.1
opinion filed in the court below by Advisory

(85 N. J. L. 384)

OF CITY OF HOBOKEN et al. GONZALES v. MAYOR AND COUNCIL Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Nov. 17, (Court of orari by George Gonzales against the Mayor 1913.) Appeal from Supreme Court. Certiand Council of the City of Hoboken and others to review a resolution passed by the council designating an official newspaper for the city. From a judgment dismissing the writ, prosecu tor appeals. Reversed. Merritt Lane, of JerHoboken, for respondents. sey City, for appellant. John J. Fallon, of

PER CURIAM. The questions raised in this case are precisely the same as those existing Law, 226, 86 Atl. 1025, and the judgment of in the case of Fagan v. Hoboken, 84 N. J. reversed, and the proceedings and resolutions the Supreme Court entered in this case will be under review set aside, for the reasons given in that case.

(83 N. J. Eq. 343)

ICA, v. COURT CAVOUR, NO. 133, FORGRAND COURT, FORESTERS OF AMERESTERS OF AMERICA, et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. May 4, 1914.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. (No. 31.) State of New Jersey, against Court Cavour, No. Bill by the Grand Court Foresters of America, 133, Foresters of America, and others. From a decree dismissing the bill (88 Atl. 191), plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Newark, for appellant. Anthony R. Finelli, Philip J. Schotland, of of Newark, for respondents. will be affirmed, for the reasons stated in the PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from opinion filed in the court below by Vice Chancellor Stevens.

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