Philadelphia & R. R. Co., Feiser v. (Pa.).. 852 Philadelphia & R. R. Co., Hogarty v. Rhodes, Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. (R. I.).... 50 THE ATLANTIC REPORTER VOLUME 91 Gen. Laws 1909, c. 275, § 3, provides there shall be a vacation of the superior court from the second Monday in July to the third Monday in September of each year, and section 11 provides that in vacation the superior court shall not hear jury trials. Chapter 32, § 12, provides that whenever time is to be reckoned from any day such day shall not be included in the computation. Held, that as the word "to," like the word "from," is generally a word of exclusion, and as chapter 275, § 2, requires the superior court to hold sessions at certain points on the third Monday in September, the superior court may hear jury trials on the second Monday in July. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 230, 246; Dec. Dig. § 65.*] 3. STREET RAILROADS (§ 99*)-INJURIES TO PERSONS AT CROSSINGS-DUTY TO LOOK AND LISTEN. A motorist about to cross street railway tracks is bound to look along the track immediately before driving upon it. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 209-216; Dec. Dig. § 99.*] 4. STREET RAILROADS (8_114*) COLLISION WITH AUTOMOBILE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENCY. In an action for personal injuries received by a motorist and for injuries to his automobile in a collision with a street car, evidence held insufficient to sustain a verdict against the street railway company not showing the motorist's want of contributory negligence. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 239-250; Dec. Dig. 8 114.*] 5. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1005*)-REVIEW VERDICTS. A verdict approved by the trial court will be accorded great deference on appeal. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3860-3876, 3948-3950; Dec. Dig. § 1005.*] Vincent, J., dissenting in part. Action by Charles T. Frey against the Rhode Island Company. After a verdict for plaintiff a new trial was granted unless plaintiff would enter a remittitur, and both plaintiff and defendant excepted. Plaintiff's exceptions overruled, and defendant's sustained and cause remanded. William R. Champlin, of Providence, for plaintiff. Joseph C. Sweeney and Alonzo R. Williams, both of Providence, for defendant. SWEETLAND, J. This is an action of trespass on the case to recover damage for injuries to the plaintiff's person and to his automobile alleged to have been received through the negligence of the defendant. The case was tried before a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $8,000. The defendant duly filed its motion for a new trial. Said justice in his decision on the motion ordered that a new trial should be granted, on the ground that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive, unless within five days after said decision the plaintiff should remit all of said verdict in excess of $6,000. The plaintiff did not file his remittitur. The plaintiff and the defendant each filed an exception to said decision. The case is before us upon the plaintiff's exception to the decision of said justice granting a new trial, and upon the defendant's exceptions to certain rulings of said justice made during the progress of the trial and to the decision of said justice on said motion for a new trial. [1, 2] Said trial was commenced during a session of the superior court holden at East Greenwich within and for the county of Kent on the 8th day of July, 1913, and continued through the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, and the 14th day of July was the second Monday 14th days of July, 1913. In the year 1913 of July in that year. On said 14th day of July, 1913, the counsel made their arguments to the jury, the justice delivered his charge, and the jury thereupon considered the case and rendered their verdict. On said day the defendant moved that the case be taken froin Exceptions from Superior Court, Kent the jury and passed on the ground that the County; John W. Sweeney, Judge. justice and the jury could not legally sit For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes 91 A.-1 "There shall be a vacation of the superior court from the second Monday in July to the third Monday in September in each year." And section 11 of the same chapter provides as follows: "In vacation the superior court shall not hear jury trials (except in special statutory cases), petitions for divorce, or motions to default recognizances." We in the trial of said case on that day, because | date, or act done, or the time of any act it is provided by statute that there shall be done, such day, date, or the day when such a vacation of the superior court from the act is done, shall not be included in such second Monday in July to the third Monday computation." This is conclusive of the quesin September in each year. The justice de- tion before us, for such an interpretation of nied said motion and the defendant duly ex- the word "from," in the section establishing cepted to said ruling. This exception is now a vacation in the superior court, is not inbefore us. Chapter 275, § 3, Gen. Laws 1909, consistent with the manifest intent of the provides as follows: General Assembly, nor is it repugnant to some other part of the statute. It is urged that such an interpretation will carry said vacation into the third Monday of September and interfere with the beginning of the sessions of the superior court on such date. There is no force in that contention. have no rule for the interpretation of statutes which requires the day to which a period of time extends to be included in such period. The word "to," like the word "from," is generally a word of exclusion. In a sense both the second Monday of July and the third Monday of September are days from which the period of vacation is to be reckoned, and hence both are to be excluded. Furthermore, there is a specific provision of law contained in chapter 275, § 2, Gen. Laws 1909, that the superior court shall hold sessions in South Kingstown and Providence on the third Monday of September in each year, thus clearly placing that day within the period of the session of the court and not that of vacation. Although it might be desirable that the superior court should have authority to complete in the early days of vacation a jury trial commenced during a session and not finished before the close of the session, thus preventing a loss to the state and to the parties, yet in view of the prohibitive language of the statute we are of the opinion that said court does not have such power. The ques tion involved in this exception is whether the second Monday of July in each year is or is not a part of the vacation of the superior court; whether the word "from" in said section 3 shall be interpreted as a word exclusive or inclusive of said second Monday of July. It is the well-settled rule that when a period of time is to be reckoned from a certain day, unless there is something in the context or the circumstances to indicate a different intention, the day from which the time is to be reckoned shall be excluded from the computation and from the period. In Ordway v. Remington, 12 R. I. 319, 34 Am. Rep. 646, this court construed a lease which demised the tenement let "from the first day of September now next ensuing, for and during the full end and term of one year and nine months thence next ensuing," and held that: "If the demise is from a given day and there is nothing else to indicate the intention, then, unless there is some particular reason for holding otherwise, according to the weight of authority we think the given day must be excluded." In Millard v. Willard, 3 R. I. 42, the court treated this subject without reference to the statute dealing with construction, which we shall consider later, and said: "In all cases when a point of time or the doing of an act is referred to merely as a terminus from which to measure time, the day of the date or of the act should be excluded." We have, moreover, in this state the following rule for the reckoning of time from any day when such provision occurs in a statute. Sections 1 and 12, c. 32, Gen. Laws 1909, provide that unless such construction is inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly, or is repugnant to some other part of the same statute, "when It is urged that this interpretation is inconsistent with the settled practice of the superior court, which each year has not carried the business of its sessions into the second Monday of July. This interpretation does not require the superior court to hold jury trials on said second Monday of July. The justices of that court can so arrange the business of the court, just previous to the close of the sessions before vacation, that jury trials and other matters which may not be heard in vacation will surely not extend beyond the period of the sessions. If to accomplish that they have as a general rule taken up none of the regular business of the different sessions on the second Monday of July, that is plainly a matter within their power and discretion. It is further urged that this interpretation is inconsistent with the practice of this court with regard to its own sessions. Our attention is called to chapter 275, § 1, Gen. Laws 1909, which provides that: "The Supreme Court shall be in session at Providence from the first Monday in October to the second Monday in July in every year." And it is argued that if the word "from," in the section concerning the vacation of the superior court, shall be interpreted to exclude the second Monday of July from such vacation, a like interpretation should exclude the first Monday in October from our session. This contention disregards the further language of said section 1, which also provides that this court shall be in session "at such |