Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

That the advantages acquired by France in these two treatises were not sooner carried into effect was accidental. From the death of Louis XIV. to the accession of Napoleon, the French monarchy was under what we may call an interregnum that court was a college of crapu lous effeminacy and frivolity; the public departmements were filled with intrigue, meanness, and venality; to support the extravagance of the one, and to satisfy the avarice of the other, the country was op pressed, and the state kept suspended on the brink of insolvency. But such were the natural resources of the nation, that, notwithstanding the depravity of the government, and the disastrous wars in which it was fre quently involved, the real internal power of France continued, as we have lately seen, superior to that of the rest of Europe united.

As the military strength of ail states must ever be relative; to esti mate that of France, her natural and moral means and advantages, as they stand in proportion to those of her neighbours, are to be considered.

puerile sophistry, and bombast, made use of to justify such measures, should ever have been heard with patience in a British senate?

When Louis IV. began his military career, Holland and Austria were able to defeat all his projects. At that time the Dutch possessed a national character, wealth, and a powerful navy; by the geographical position of their country, they were the natural allies of Great Britain; and it was the duty of the British govern. ment to have enabled them to extend their territory and maintain their marine, But when Chancellor Shaftsbury, in the House of Lords, cried out, in the vehemence of his patriotic ignorance, "Delenda est Carthago," meaning Holland, his Lords ship's noble zeal seized his peers, and the British navy was sent out to batter down one of the essential out-works of the British empire! In all probability, the great state-herald, in his calculation, had not observed on whom the wrecks of his Batavian Carthage was most likely to fall.

The peace of Utrecht was conducted in a manner so disgraceful to the British name, and concluded so much to the prejudice of Europe in general, and to the detriment of Great Britain in particular, that every honest man must wish the whole transaction erased from the annals of history. In 1709 the French King offered to resign all the pretensions of his family to the Spanish monarchy, and to cede the Spanish Netherlands to the Dutch; but Pensionary Heinsius insisted thatthe frontiers of Holland should be extended to the Somme. Even that would have been agreed to, had not Gaultier, a priest and French spy, with Prior, Hill, and other hirelings, found means to introduce into the Queen's councils nren in whose politics the interests of their country seemed to make bet a secondary consideration. The new ministers were so moderate in their demands, that when Philip declared to Lexington, "That he would no more wear the two crowns of France and Spain, than if he had never been born;" they were satisfied; and, without regard who should hold the dominion over the French and Spanish monarchies, they immediately entered into a conspiracy (it can be called nothing else,) with Louis XIV. against the United Provinces. They demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the British parliament, that the castle of Ghent, in the hands of the Dutch, would prove dangerous to the political existence of Great Britain; and that a German prince on the throne of Spain would be more formidable to the British empire than the monarchies of France and Spain united, under a sovereign of the House of Bourbon!!

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

In relation to other states, the natural advantages enjoyed by France are the climate and fertility of the soil, the geographical situation of her dominions, and the proportion which the population of those dominions bears to the extent of her territory. These, in a military point of view, give to that country an advantage of 20 per cent. at least, over any other part of Europe of equal size and population. That is to say, when any state in Europe, the most favoured by nature, possessing, we will suppose, ten millions of inhabitants, can maintain a standing army, or military establishment of 200,000 men, an equal portion of the population of France can, with the same facility and at the same expence, maiutain 240,000 men.

Next to France, the continental state most favoured by nature is Austria. The population of the Austrian dominions, including Hungary, amounts to about twenty millions; and her peace establishment is usually stated at 290,000 men; but as commissary accounts generally admit of a considerable rebate, we shall state her peace establishment at 260,000 men. The population of France exceeds thirty millions, which, on a par with Austria, gives 375,000 men, the natural advantages at twenty per cent. give 75,000; hence the peace establishment of France would be 450,000 men. By the foregoing calculation, the war establishment of France may be 566,000 men.

Let us suppose, that in case of war, Frauce could not send beyond her frontiers above two thirds of these men, say And that to the Austrian army, of

there might be added the military establishment of Prussia

of the inferior powers of Germany,

and the armies of Denmark and Sweden,

384,000

320,000,

260,000,

Total number of men 760,000.

Deduct from these the number of regular troops necessary to maintain the police and secure the interior tranquillity of those countries in time of war, viz. Austria,

Prussia,

. Other states of the Empire,

Denmark and Sweden,

Acting army

120,000,

150,000,

40,000,

60,000,

370,000

390,000*

* It may be asked, if France could march two-thirds of her army over her frontiers, what should prevent other inferior states to send out an equal proportion of theirs? to this question, we are sorry to say, too many valid reasons might be given; we shall, therefore, only mention here, that the terrirory of France is compact, her frontiers are naturally strong and artfully covered, the military sys tem, or conscription of France, whether considered as offensive or defensive, is far more formidable than the militia-regulations of any other government. The other

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

Thus we find that France can, with the same facility as any of the above mentioned powers, maintain a defensive military establishment, superior to any force that can be brought, against her, and can send forth an offensive army equal to the effective armies of all the independent states of continental Europe, Russia alone excepted.

It may be said, that to defend her foreign possessions, and to secure the free circulation of her national industry, France must maintaiu a navy as well as an army; this is however conditional, and has no connexion with the security and natural power of France. If a navy be necessary to protect the colonies and maritime trade of the republic, these must be of such national importance as to maintain that navy.* The political advantages which France, in a military point of view, possesses, in preference to her neighbours, are,

I. An immense, secure, annual Revenue.

We have already observed, that the European territory and industry of France are capable of producing, without inconveniency to the public, 30,000,000l. sterling to government.

From these thirty millions deduct about two millions, which Buonaparte is yet pleased to allow to the creditors of the state, and there will remain a clear and uniucumbered revenue of 28,000,000l. sterling; a sum equal to, if not exceeding, the unencumbered part of the revenues of all the independant governments of Europe. Add to this, that, in all other European states, the public imposts, as they are raised, amount to upwards of 30 per cent. upon the income of the taxable part

continental monarchies are patched edifices, their dominions have neither frontier nor centre; their subjects have no country, nor do they form a nation; and the soul of their armies is long departed. As to the inferior states, they can have no cause of their own to fight for; whoever be masfers in Germany or France, the weaker princes must, henceforth, be subjects; they will never arm but by compulsion, or for subsidy; when turned out by force, they will only march to run away, and those who arm for subsidy never arm to fight.

* How far navies are, or may be necessary to the security and prosperity of a mation, and whether, as offensive weapons, they are politic and efficacious, depends apon various circumstances.

From the nature and territorial extent of the United Provinces, to raise them to the rank of a political state, commerce, foreign possessions, and a powerful navy, were absolutely necessary. Maritime trade, extensive colonies, and a preponderating navy, are to Great Britain, as an European power, essential to the preservation of her political existence. With respect to France the case is different. Her power and national security is established independent of naval concerns. Considered as offensive weapons, the Dutch and British navies, however preponderant they might be on the ocean, could never become formidable to other nations. Without a military force to second their operations, these states could only protect their own possessions and maritime commerce, by keeping in check the foreign settlements and naval force of their more powerful neighbours.

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

of the community; whereas 28 millions would not be 15 per cent, of the income of France *.

II. The Military Organization of France.

By the conscription-laws, every male is liable to serve in the lowest military capacity; there is neither legal exemption, nor privileged preferment; and consequently there is no subject for jealousy in the army, nor for discontent in the community. In France upwards of six millions of men are able to carry arms; of these, two millions and a half are between 18 and 23. Any number of these young men may be armed and put in motion by a parole d'ordre; for both the legislation and sovereignty of France are in the staff of the army: the military is the only road to consideration and power; and such is now the reputation of that profession, that, to avoid the contempt of the public, it is necessary either to serve or have served. These are advantages which no other government possesses t.

III. The Frontiers and Avant-posts of France.

In a defensive point of view, since the meridian of the Roman power to the present time, no state had ever its frontiers so judiciously covered

Although we have said that 15 per cent. upon the national income of France might produce thirty millions, we would not, therfore, be understood to infer, that to impose 30 per cent. would give sixty millions; on the contrary, there is a point to which taxation, well administered, operates as a stimulation to industry and national improvement. But over that standard, every shilling, exacted from the public, causes a dimunition of 13, 15, and 18 pence, to 3 shillings, on the general produce of the nation.

In most of the continental states of Europe, the public imposts bear beavy on industry; and in some countries the produce of property is over-taxed. In the Aus trian dominions, the several denominations of land-tax amount, at this time, to upwards of 33 per cent. on the rental, or income of the proprietors; and the contributions on the peasantry, or cultivators, exceed 50 per cent. of the produce of their possessions; mechanics, manufacturers, and merchants, or burghers of all descrip tions, pay by law 16 per cent. of their income, but, in fact, they pay 20 per cent. besides excise, barrier and frontier tolls, asscssed-taxes, &c. Iu Prussia, the prilvi leged nobility only being eligible to possess landed property, the soil is not so hea vily taxed as in Austria; but the Prussian cultivators, peasantry, and bourgeois, can be considered as nothing more than menia! servants to the government and the army; the produce of their industry is entirely absorbed by taxes and military contributions. In the inferior principalities of Germany, the public may be said to be nearly in the same state as in Prussia. Denmerk is the state in Europe where the public imposts are the least vexatious and least detrimental to industry.

+ The absurd declamations and fallacious reports which we daily see in the London news-papers, respecting the tyranny of the couscription, and the desertion of the young men in France, deserve no attention; they only shew that these writers are as little acquainted with the military institutions of other countries as they are with the present state of France. In every part of continental Europe, the

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

as those of the French nation now are. The strength of the frontier lines of monarchical France has often been proved; the subjugation of Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, render those lines now, we may say, inaccessible. Those vassal auxiliaries, being acknowledged by the rest of Europe as independent states, may either serve as neutral outworks, or will have to maintain French armies sufficient to oppose any force that can be brought against them. Considered as offensive, the strength of her frontiers, and the localities of her several dependants, must necessarily give to the armies of France a decided preponderance in Europe. From the Ems, up the Rhine to Basil and Feldkirk; from thence, by Verona and the Adriatic, Sea, to Calabria, France is covered with a chain of double and triple lines of natural barriers and military posts. Secure at home, her avant departments open to her armies every part of the Continent from the Morea to Pomerania; Buonaparte's legions may be at the gates of Vienna and Berlin before the Austrian and Prussian cabinets have any suspicion of his hostile intention. Lord paramount of Naples, and of other military and naval stations in the Mediterranean, the Turkish government is under the immediate direction of the French .cabinet. With the command of Constantinople, or only enjoying the freedom of navigating the Dardauelles and Bosphorus of Thrace, France can check the operations even of Russia itself, and may make that mighty empire subservient to her future projects *.

IV. Her Colonies and Settlements Abroad.

Colonies are generally over-rated, and have long engrossed two muc of the attention of all the maritime povers of Europe. To France

lower orders of the community are as immediately subject to military service as they are in France; and with that aggravating difference, that the baptism of every male is the act of his enrolment; infirmity or death is the only term to which he can look forward for release; neither talents, bravery, nor other merit, can advance the rank, or better the condition of an European bond-man. It should likewise he con. sidered, that it is not the low situation in which the great majority of mankind is placed, that induces them to complain of their lot; it is the difference they see between themselves and others that makes them dissatisfied and oppose their superiors. In as far as relates to the conscription system in France, this difference is professed to be done away; and the mass of the nation rejoice at it. Besides, we know for a certainty, that it is only the rich and easy who complain of military fyranny; and their desertion will rather facilitate than impede the operations of government.

The ascendency of the French at Constantinople, and the free navigation of the Black Sea, now allowed to France, cannot fail to produce effects of great importance: these two circumstances must either cement and strengthen the politi cal ties that are already existing between France and the Emperor of Russia, or they must break off the connection. Should Russia and France continue friends, they will co-operate and subdue Asia, as they have done Europe. They cannot now separate without quarrelling, and in that case they will crush the world between their mighty armies.