Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

such possessions are, in reality, concerns of a very subordinate nature: she neither depends upon their produce for a revenue, nor upon their trade to train up sailors for her defence.

For these hundred years past, the leading principle in the politics of France has been, the reduction of the power and political influence of Great Britain. We have already observed that, for ninety years of that period, the French government was so relaxed, that the British empire might have acquire 1 and consolidated a decided superiority; but, fortunately for her enemies, the foresight of our statesmen kept steadily in the rear of their indifference and imbecility. The present government .commands means far superior to those possessed by any of their predecessors, and Buonaparte has personal, as well as public motives, for acting upon them.

On the Politics of France.-The politics of every state is to secure its independence, augment its power, and elevate its rank. These objects cannot be pursued singly; they are interwoven with one another. The independence of a state can only be secured by an unremitted progression in power, of which rank is a consequence. Almost all states

have begun to decline as soon as they ceased to rise. The ambition, avarice, and ignorance of individuals, allow nations no interval of stationary quiet and security.

In modern times, the only governments that seem to have acted upon any digested system, are the French since the commencement of the reign of Louis XIV. and the Russian since that of Peter I. These two monarchs felt the internal strength of their respective empires, and measured the powers of their neighbours.

When Louis assumed the direction of affairs, he found himself hemmed in, on the side of Germany, Italy, and Spain, by Austria; and on all other sides by Great Britain and Holland. To break through that circumvallation was an enterprise worthy of a young aspiring monarch; and, as enterprising princes generally do, he succeeded. By the valour of his arms, seconded by the infatuation and treachery of his neighbours, he levelled down all the bulwarks of his opponents, and laid Europe open to the inroads of France. He broke the power of Austria, and thereby destroyed the union and force of the German empire: he made Spain a province of his dominions; annihilated the arrogant and independent spirit of the Dutch*; and deprived Great Bri

The Dutch struggled long and bravely to consolidate the independence and political rank of their country; from 1709 to 1712 they believed they had succeeded; but one of those unforeseen fatalities, which in a moment destroys the work of ages, blasted all their hopes. The change of system in the British cabinet, or rather the change of men (for it is not known to us that ever a system was adopted there), produced the infamous treaty of Utrecht. The Dutch have spent immense treasures during the war, and, obliged to abaudon all the advantages they had acquired by it, their proud spirit of independence, and ambition for military and naval glory,

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

tain of all her useful connections on the Continent of Europe*. His successors made but a poor use of the means he left at their disposal, it is true, but they adhered to the leading principles of the system; they kept fast hold of Spain; took all the measures which a court like that of Versailles could be expected to devise, to weaken the House of Austria; to attach Holland to France, and undermine and divide the British empire t.

The revolution has in no wise altered the politics of France; it has changed the actors, and they have adopted new measures. But they are measures much more dangerous to the peace of the civilized world than those of their predecessors. Instead of grovelling in obscure intrigue, deceit and circumvention, the champions of France have substituted a bold system of treachery, violence, and military despotism. During the few years that they have exercised the supreme authority, France has atchieved all that Louis XIV. perhaps ever intended. It is raised to an eminence, of power, which, in that prince's time, would have made him as completely master of Europe as he was of Alsace and Navarre. The treaties of Luneville aud Amiens have made Buonaparte a more formidable potentate than those of Utrecht and Rastadt made the chief of the House of Bourbon.

However, although France may certainly be considered as completely mistress of the south-west half of continental Europe, there is another power, of equal force, that claims a similar dominion over the north and eastern parts. The political powers and military force of continental Europe are divided between the governments of France and Russia. These two mighty empires are come in contact: Berlin, Vienna, and Constantinople, can only be considered as three neutral posts, situate in their line of demarcation. By the reduction of other states, the politics of Europe are much simplified, but that very cir sunk into a sullen hatred towards Great Britain. That hatred never diminished; on the contrary, the connexions between the Houses of Brunswick and Nassau Orange, and our interference, sometimes by intrigue and sometimes by force, in favour of the Stadtholderate, made every Dutchman our inveterate enemy, and has, in the end, made Holland a department of France.

* Since the peace of Utrecht, Great Britain has had for allies Portugal, the Stadtholder, Hanover, and the Langrave of Hesse Cassel. In every continental war, these powers have been conquered by the arms of France, and have been rausomed either by British money, or by British conquests, or retaken by other powers subsidized for that purpose. Witness the surrender of our colonies at every peace, and our subsidies to Prussia, &c.

To direct the government of Spain, to subdue the Low Countries, and to attach and secure Holland in the interests of France, were considered as the most cffectual means to ruin the maritime trade, and destroy the power of Great Britain. These three objects were the principal articles in the political creed of the French monarchy. They are now accomplished! How far their effects may ultimately justify the calculations that have been made upon them, will depend upon the British cabinet. The result will, in all likelihood, be shortly seen.

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

cumstance renders the respective positions of the two dictatorial powers more critical. The intermediate field of their usual machinations is cleared; the slightest notion of the one must now directly affect the ether.

A free, independent, and secure communication between the southern provinces of Russia and the Mediterranean, was an essential article in the fundamental system of Czar Peter: it has been pursued, with more or less energy, by all his successors; and it is of such importance to the Russian empire, that it can never be abandoned.

In the present state of things, can Russia and France go mutual sharers in the trade and government of the Turkish empire? This is by no means likely; nay, we may venture to say, it is impossible. Which of the parties then is to give up its pretensions? The cabinet of Petersburgh must certainly know, that should France be allowed to assume an ascendency at Constantinople, or to interneddie in the affaire of Turkey, the fate of Moscow may again be disputed at Pultava! Will the present goverument of France retract, and leave the Seraglio and St. Sophia to the desecration of the Russians? Or, can the ambition of Russia, and the avarice of France, be satisfied with a partial partition of Turkey? It is a known fact that Buonaparte did propose to the court of Petersburgh to leave Moldavia, Walachia, Bessarabia, Bosnia, and Servia, to the disposal of Russia and Austria, on condition that France might possess Candia, Negropont, and other Greek islands in the Archipelago. But Russia would as soon see Frauce in possession of the canal of Constantinople and the Crimea, as suffer her to fix her feet on posts that might soon command the communication between the Black and Mediterranean Seas*. To propose an entire partition of the European dominions of the Turks, to whom give Trace and Constantinople? Besides, Russia will never agree to a divison that shall leave the Grecian islands to France; nor can it be expected France will leave the Bosphorus to Russia.

Thus, between these two governments, matters seem to be coming nearly to a crisis. Considering the characters of each respectively, and the powers and attitude of the two empires, if Buonaparte possess only the half of those transcendent talents which his panegyrists are willing

Oczakow was not only the key to the northern provinces of Turkey; it was to Constantinople what Bergen-op-Zoom and Maestricht formerly were to Amsterdam; and what the Pyrences mig! t yet be to Madrid. That post in the hands of Russia, to offer her the sovereignty of Moldavia, Walachia, and Bessarabia, was ridiculous enough.

The Russians at Akkirmann and Soroko, and the French, or their auxiliaries in Naples, the Sultan with his scraglio have the comfortable prospect of very soon passing, either au fil de l'épee, ou sous le knudt, into the kingdom of Mahomet. It is remarkable, that when the Emperor of Turkey was obliged to surrender Oczakow, the King of England was mediator with thirty six line-of-battle ships armed, in his favour.

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

to allow him, he must certainly see that their present cordiality cannot be of long duration; and he is no doubt likewise aware, that while Great Britain can powerfully interfere, to risk a quarrel with Russia would be imprudent and dangerous.

Buonaparte's opinion on the finances of England has been repeatedly expressed to the following effect :

1. That the annual expenditure amounting to such an immense sum, the ministry dared not augment it; and therefore they made the peace of Amiens.

2. That should a ministry obtain the confidence of the public, so as to be able to raise the funds, to re-equip the navy and organize the army, with the other expences attendant on war-like preparations, would, in the course of a very few years, absorb a capital, the interest of which would require ten or twenty millions sterling to be raised annually upon the public; a sum that, added to the present expenditure, would either revolutionize the country, or make a national bankruptcy inevitable.

It is said and industriously propagated, that Buonaparte having established his authority in France, it is become his personal interest to cultivate a pacific understanding with all his neighbours. And that, as he is now capable of maintaining ties of political relationship with other powers, it is their interests to support his authority.

This reasoning has no doubt originated with Buonaparte's confessor, Bishop Talleyrand. That it should have gained admittance and approbation in the councils of Europe and America, seems to be owing to the baneful influence of that hideous genius, which jacobinism and rebellion have set loose upon mankind. The fact is, when Buonaparte signified his desire for peace, his authority was not

*It is truly pitiful to see public ministers and men charged with the defence of nations, cajoling themselves in the hope, that Russia and France will quarrel and fight! Quarrel they certainly will, but when that event takes place, woe to their neighbours! While at peace, their mutual preponderance requires only dependency andi obedience: at war, their hostilities will impose upon the eastern Continent submission and slavery.

When the Czar and Buonaparte draw forth their legions in hostile array, mediation, armed coalitions, neutral conventions and demarcation-lines, will be of little avail. Those powers have long been unused to cabinet warfare, and to courtier etiquette, in the field. The intervention of other states may hasten their own subjection, but cannot ward off their fate. The chieftains of Russia and France will meet nearly on the centre of the world: the object of their quarrel will not be a bishopric, a sugar island, nor who shall read their mass in Latin, or say their prayers in Greek: they will fight for the possession of the Hellespont and Bosphorus, two posts on which hangs now suspended, the empire of our eastern hemisphere. Such contending parties will not come out to skirmish and then mutually retire; nor will they fight for conquests to give away; the one will keep the field, and with it, the dictatorship of the world.

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

established; his situation, as well as that of France, was, as we have mentioned, extremely critical; he sought peace with his neighbours, that he might have time to establish his authority, and to save France from what he considered, and what might have easily been brought about, its almost certain destruction. Buonaparte foresaw the effects which the conquest of Egypt was to produce in both England and France; he saw the still greater effects, which, Great Britain holding the destiny of the Turkish empire in her hand, might then have produced at Petersburgh; and he knew that in America, a single word to the purpose would have obliged President Jefferson to change his system or his place, and might have barred France for ever from that side of the Atlantic; nor could he consider Portugal an equivalent for Brazil. Besides, the arms of both Portugal and Spain might have been turned against him*. Under these circumstances was peace obtained, and it is no wonder Buonaparte should wish to preserve it; at least until he acquire the means to command peace, or to defy war. When he believes himself in that situation, we shall see how far, and upon what terms, he is disposed to maintain his pacific relationship with his neighbours t.

In this position, Buonaparte knew, that to have adopted a certain system of politics (which may yet be necessary when it will be more difficult to carry it into practice) the British government might, in the space of six months, after the surrender of Alexandria, have drawn forth into action all the dower of Austria, Russia, America, and Spain, against France: not to fight for subsidy, nor for the commercial interests of Great Britain, but to fight for their own interests.

It may be said, that had Buonaparte felt himself in the predicament we have mentioned, he would not have been so haughty and imperious during the negocia tion. The contempt with which Buonaparte seemed to treat the negociation, and bis arrogance upon that occasion, might be accounted for by several reasons; but that to mask his anxiety was one leading motive is certain.

+ Buonaparte has great advantages over his cotemporaries. He was brought up in the world, and in active life. Beginning his career as a subaltern, his profession obliged him to think; and the habit of thinking no doubt taught him to calculate. The revolution enabled him to see men of all descriptions exposed without disguise; and now Emperor, he easily sees through the masks of those who have the vanity or folly to attempt to deceive him. This adventurer is in possession of absolute power, has the means to make that power irresistible, and has experience at an early period of life. He is the patron and protector of all sorts of principles, professions, and prejudices; and is bimself bound by none.

Amongst the absurdities of the times, it is not one of the least, to hear the legislators of Great Britain propping up the power of the British empire by the discontent and broils which they foresee generating in France, and with the jealousy which the politics of France is said to be raising amongst other continental governments. The obstinacy of infatuation is astonishing! Should the people of France be angry with the man who snatched their country from the precipice of inevitable ruin, aud who raised them to the dictatorship of the world? And will they oppose his endeavours to consolidate their situation? But they are oppressed, says John Bull! If we ask with what? the whole of John's corps diplomatique.