Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

thought it necessary to prevent the co-operation of a Russian fleet with the British navy. Consequently, already in 1754, the French ministry proposed to the senate of Stockholm, and to the Danish cabinet, a sort of armed naval convention, for, as they said, the protection of the trade of the states maritime, and to maintain the liberty of the Baltic. Little notice seemed to be taken of this proposal, until the events of the war began to promise an almost certain success to the efforts of France; then in 1758, the Swedish and Danish governments, in hope of gaining as we might lose, did enter into such a convention under the sanction of France and Prussia. But the brilliant exploits of the British navy in 1759, and succeeding campaigns, disconcerted their measures, and for a time suspended the effects.

The next disquisition that took place on the mercantile rights of neutral states, was brought forward by ourselves; not, in the spirit of ambitious France, for the empire of Asia and America; but on an affair more analogous to our system of moderate politics; to wit, some webs of Silesian lineh which our navy had captured, and which the British high court of admiralty had condemned, or detained, no doubt, as contraband of war. Our diplomatic tracasserie with Frederic II upon this national subject, ended in satisfying that prince for his cloth; and that circumstance created a precedent upon which was afterwards founded the avowed pretensions of the armed neutrality.

Having at the peace of 1763, ceded to France, our dearly acquired sources of maritime trade, and the strong holds which should have secured for ever, our naval superiority, that government, as might be expected, soon renewed its former project of confining the British empire, to the island of Great Britain. France possessing at that period but little influence at the court of Petersburgh, and still apprehensive of an alliance between England and Russia, to raise a sort of barrier between these two powers, the French ministry fawned on the Empress; intrigued with her favourites, and caressed her chamber-maids; they sung ballads, and wrote verses on the heroism and legislation of Frederic II; on the patriotism and maternal affections of Juliana Queen of Denmark, and with money, they (from 1772 to 1778) enabled the young king of Sweden to rebuild his decayed navy; all, as they said, to secure for these states, the liberty of the seas. campaigns in 1778 and 1779, the accession of Spain and Holland to the French and American cause, with the retreat of the British fleet before d'Orviliers in our own seas, seemed again to crown the intrigues and perfidious treachery of the court of Versailles with ultimate success all the governments of Europe were now convinced that Great Britain had finally lost America, and that our expulsion from India would be the certain consequence. The ruin of the British nation thus considered as inevitable, the spoils of our empire naturally became a general consideration; the famous convention of armed neutrality, was therefore drawn up, published, and in 1780 acceded to, by all the maritime powers; even by Prussia and Turkey.

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

Thus, this armed neutrality, although its avowed pretention was the protection of maritime trade and indemnification for legal property seized, was, in fact a speculation, supported by the before-mentioned precedent, which we ourselves had established. States, especially commercial states, when once believed to be on the decline, like merchants, whose credit is suspected, must always look for a general run, or an attack to be made upon their property. Not to go farther back into history, witness Sweden at the death of Charles XII, Austria at the death of Charles VI, Great Britain on the success of the American rebellion, and France in the confusion of the revolution. To maintain the political independence of a nation, progression in power is as necessary, as gain in trade is to support the credit of a merchant. When either the state, or the merchant comes to apply to neighbours for assistance, the interest never fails to absorb the capital; and ruin is the necessary consequence.

The covenant of Petersburgh (or of 1800) was planned and acceded to, upon principles very different from those of the former conventions. When the late empress Catherine broke off the commercial intercourse between Russia and the revolutionists in France, she signified her motives to the courts of Denmark and Sweden, for having adopted that measure, and invited those governments to follow her example, Her Majesty however observed, that, with the exception of France in its then state of rebellion, she continued to adhere to the principles of a free neutral trade. The declaration of the Empress, perhaps ill translated, or misconstrued by our diplomatic agents, was considered by the British government as a formal renunciation of all the principles and pretensions of the northern neutrality. On this presumption, and believing that we had Russia to second our proceedings, all neutral vessels, no matter with what they were loaded, nor to where they were bound, whether to France, Spain, Lisbon, or to Kamtchatka, were brought up and detained. The passports of the kings of

*In the long catalogues of information that were made up by our missionaries at the Northern courts and sent home, beans and pease shipt out for the negroes of St. Croix were inserted as gunpowder bound to Guadaloup; Stockfish for our Newcastle and Hull Greenland-men, as fire-arms for Dunkirk; Norway timber and wreck deals for Grangemouth and Aberdeen, as ship masts and crooked wood for Brest; some Jews who, to avoid being hanged, had run away from Hamburgh and went to Copenhagen, were represented as confidential agents sent from Buonaparte to negotiate with the Danish government; a certain minister was said to have contracted with them, to deliver 50,000 muskets every four months for the army of the Rhine! with other such trivial and fallacious nonsense. Neither Denmark nor Sweden have any saltpetre, these countries are therefore not the best markets for gun-powder; nor is there so much oak timber exported from the Baltic annually as would build to France half a dozen sloops. With respect to fire arms, there are made in Denmark and Norway from four to five thousand muskets annually; that quantity is no more than sufficient to supply the Danish army, as may easily be supposed; and we know to a certainty, that there were qo1 2000 muskets in store in the kingdom, that is, exclusive of the king's arsenals. It

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

Sweden and Denmark were disregarded, the declarations of their officers turned into insulting ridicule, their armed ships were attacked and taken, and their ports ransacked. These vexations, for such they certainly were, did not however create in Denmark and Sweden any desire of fighting to be neutral. The power and attitude of Great Britain was at that time such, that all the nations of Europe were forced to admire her glory; the most mighty states wished for her friendship, and the weaker, although they had cause to complain of her conduct, courted her protection. In the British cabinet the governments of Denmark and Sweden could, however, find no quarter; their repeated approaches were repelled with scorn, and although the national interests and political independence of those two northern states, be as intimately connected with the prosperity of Great Britain as the safety of Ireland is dependent upon the power of England, the kings of Denmark and Sweden were driven to solicit the mediation of is a notorious fact, that had the Northern and Baltic trade been carried on to France, during the whole of the war, without interruption, it would not have advanced her cause to the amount of a single gunboat; nor would it have been detrimental to ours to the value of a longboat.

To these mischief-making matters, were added others of a similar tendency; disser tations were written to shew that the Danish and Swedish governments were immediately concerned in every contraband cargo and other transactions that could in anywise favour or promote the cause of the enemies of Great Britain, and that if measures were not timely adopted to crush the mercantile spirit of the Danes, that enterprising nation would snatch away the commerce of both the Indies, and rise formidable to the maritime power of Great Britain herself;

Upon such like informations and apprehensions, were nourished our maritime quarrels, which paved the way for the legions of France to the Hague and Amsterdam; and which have now opened the cabinets of Copenhagen and Stockholm to the domi nion of Russia.

We do not pretend to say that no clandestine traffic was carried on by the neutral states with our enemies during the war; on the contrary, we know there was, and that respected houses in Great Britain and in our settlements abroad, were the principals concerned in it. We however deny that either the kings of Denmark or Sweden did, directly or indirectly, countenance any transaction on the part of their subjects that was not strictly conform to existing treaties, and to the long standing usage of neu trality; nor did they ever reclaim unfair or illegal property, knowing it to be such. To prevent illicit practices in trade is impossible; the connexions between merchants may be made so intricate, as to escape the precautions of the most upright magistrates. But when a minister, or other public agent at a foreign court has cause to suspect that any transaction, detrimental to the interests of his sovereign or his country, is in trame, or in agitation, it is his duty to lay the causes of his suspicion candidly before the minister of that court; the affair would then be examined into, and a satisfactory explanation might be expected; but to bewilder his own employers with denunciations, which cannot be substantiated, and to calumniate the government and sovereign of an independent state, for participating in, and conniving at transactions that never were thought of, is a conduct highly censurable. This sort of diplomacy has produced to Great Britain more mischief than the convention of armed neutrality.

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

Russia: for the interposition of that government the price has long been fixed; it is the implicit obedience of the parties to the will of the Court of Petersburgh. The Emperor Paul believing that he had injuries to retaliate on Great Britain, so peremptory were his orders upon this occasion, that in the midst of winter, he obliged the king of Sweden to come, at the immediate risk of his life, to Petersburgh, and sanction his hostile determination in his presence. The Prince Royal of Denmark having expressed a wish to modify the pretensions set up in the deed that was sent him to sign, the emperor instantaneously decreed, that the race of Danes should be extirpated from the face of the earth; and he dismissed the Danish mission, not only from his residence, but from the territories of Russia. The court of Ber lin, not having forgotten Mr. Fawkener's mission to Petersburgh in 1791, with Hanover, and a prospect of Holland in her eye*, Prussia encouraged the pretensions of Russia; and Buonaparte had a strong army on the frontiers of Westphalia. In this predicament, what were the governments of Denmark and Sweden to do? To forget all their altercations, and offer an accommodation with Great Britain? That they had already tried without success; besides, it was now too late; to have been suspected of such a demarche, would have caused their certain ruin before we could have given them any relieft, and what certainty could they have, that, in case of need we would make any effort to relieve them? We had disregarded all their advances until we saw the emperor's hostile flag hoisted on Cronslot. Had Paul I. agreed to strike that flag, and to accept the export duties on his hemp to be paid in Russian rubles instead of Spanish and Albert dollars, how could the kings of Sweden and Denmark know but it might be inserted in the

It was a speculation of the great king of Prussia, to have settled the crown Poland, hereditary in the family of the Prince of Orange, and to have transferred the Stadtholdership to the House of Brandenburgh. We recollect that this project was mentioned in an indirect manner in London about 20 years ago; but to propose Prussia as a maritime power, was then considered as little less than high treason. This shews that old England is in some things consistent in her politics; that Spaniards and Italians, might not become sailors, we guaranteed the Spanish empire to the French monarchy; and nearly a hundred years afterwards, that Dutch sailors should not become Prussians, we have preferred that the Batavian republic belong to the French consulate; France, Italy, Spain, and Holland make now but one state; whereas had Spain and Holland been enabled (as they but very lately might) to maintain their independency, we would have had still three maritime powers to cope with. By a similar train of good luck, assisted by our steady system of policy, we shall also see incorporated, the powers of Denmark and Sweden, with those of the Russian empire, and all the three will then make only one power.

+ When the king of Prussia was marching his troops towards the frontiers of Holstein, the king of Sweden mastering his whole army, partly on the frontiers of Norway, and partly in sight of Copenhagen, and a hundred thousand Russians cautoned on the coast of Livonia ready to march, or to be embarked, it was scarcely to be supposed that the Prince Royal of Denmark could then, in March 1801, publicly receive two English plenipotentiaries at his court,

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

contract, that Russia should next day possess herself of Finland and the island of Gothland, and that Prussia might march her troops into Holstein, as they left Hanover? Such things they had seen happen before*. In short, upon this occasion, the courts of Denmark and Sweden were absolutely compelled to accede to the emperor's Ukase of armed hostility. The affair of Copenhagen ensued, and that cemented their dependency.

Thus were the powers, and what is of infinitely more importance, the localities of Denmark and Sweden, added to the immense power of Russia. A fair estimation of this aggregate, of the effects which its co-operation with France might produce, and of the probability that such a co-operation may take place, should have made the criterion whereby our propositions to Russia, after the battle of Copenhagen, should have been measured. We had yet then full hands, and might, with perfect safety to ourselvest, have gone to any length that could have been demanded.

* Upon this trying occasion, a retrospective view of our general conduct towards the secondary powers, operated strongly on the minds of the northern governments. Our policy towards the republic of the United Provinces and the House of Orange, from our campaign with Van Tromp in 1652, to that with admiral Story in the Zuyder-zee in 1799. Our desertion of the declining cause of the House of Austria at Utrecht, and on several other occasions, and our suspicious conduct towards the King of Prussia in 1762, were scrupulously analyzed; and upon impartial examination, the result was found, not to be of such a nature as could inspire the sovereigns of Denmark and Sweden with any confidence in our protection. Besides these, the king of Sweden had fresh in his mind the promises we made of fleets and armies, to his father in 1788, 1789, and 1790. Nor had the Prince Royal of Denmark forgotten the blustering menaces of the British ministers at Copenhagen and Petersburgh upon that occasion, Both princes knew, that we had pledged the faith of the nation to Turkey, to Prussia, and to Poland; and they recolected our shameful compromise with the empress Catherine in 1791, whereby, those powers were, for some paltry mercantile consideration, abandoned to the mercy of Russia.

How far our late negociations, and the result of them are calculated to inspire the continental governments with a confidence in our future friendship, will be noticed in a second part of these sketches.

†That Russia, were she as much mistress of the Mediterranean as she is of the Baltic, with St. Domingo, the Philippine Islands, and California added to her dominions, should ever become a naval power in anywise formidable to Great Britain, is, from her geographical situation, and the extent of her inland territories, a moral impossibility, But these, or other such possessions, would have rendered her power by land, and the powers of France by sea, much less formidable to our interests than they are likely to

turn out.

It was a favourite scheme, of the late empress Catherine, to establish, what she called a naval equilibrium in Europe: to accomplish which project, she intended to secure one, or two invulnerable naval posts in the Levant, or in the Archipelago, and to maintain there, as well as in the Baltic, a strong fleet; that in case of war between the great maritime powers, she (Russia) might lend her right hand, or her left, or act with both, for, er against either of the parties, as circumstances and her own interests should point out.