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Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia. round, and cast their baneful shade over all the hopes of his adversaries ! Our cuckoo song on subsidy, the dangers of Jacobinism, export-duties on hemp, tallow, and iron; and the import duties on coals, calicoes and cutlery; with a long chapter on the formalities under which a British officer Rico given to Denmark and guaranteed by Russia and England. Another sugar island to Sweden, to be guaranteed by the same powers. Holland, as far as the Scheld, to be given to Prussia ; and the Prince of Orange to be indemnified in Poland. The Cape of Good Hope should be a free municipal settlement under the immediate protection and support of Great Britain and Russia. That Russia sbonld enjoy a free and unrestricted trade from the Elbe to India, China, &c. With some efficacious measures to be adopted for the delivery and independency of Spain and Italy from the yoke of France; for the security of the Portuguese settlements abroad, and for the exploration of the country and improvement of the trade of Brasil.

Whether, by this presumed treaty, it was intended to secure as much of the Cousul's influence as possible on the side of Brandenburgh, in the general partition of Germany, or whether a plan for such an arrangement did really exist, we shall not here give any opinion. Certain it is, however, that to prevent its being carried into effect, all the talents and invention of the cabinet of Malmaison were occupied; and what, we must allow,'did more credit to the capacity of Buonaparte's ministers than to thie' diplomatic sagacity of some other parties, before it was either known at the courts of Berlin, Vienna, or London, that any intercourse between France, Russia, and Turkey, was opened, the conventions now subsisting bel ween the Emperor Alexander and the Consul, and between the latter and the Grand Signior, were signed and ratificd. It then that Buonaparte resolved upon the entire subjugation of Italy, the partition of Germany, the acquisition of the kingdom of Fez, and the dominion of Brasil.

With respect to Brasil, next to Indostan, that country is the object that most iminedi. stely oecupied the cabinet of St. Cloud. The Consul knows, that were it possible to dispossess Great Britain of her settlements abroad, should the British government secure. the empire of Brasil, our maritime and naval superiority would be consolidated in spite of all his effóris. It is the only country on the globe which neither France ror her allies could ever molest; she cannot approach it by land, and in our possession, it could alone maintain a navy that would bid defiance to the naval power of the rest of the world. To prevent Brasil falling under our donvinion, the Consul lately spread out his protecting arm over Lisbon, and forbade his soldiers, as well as those of the king of Spain, to pillage that capital. Had General Lasnes managed his instructions more French-like, than he did, or until the British troops had evacuated the posts and places ceded, or given up by the late truce, we should have heard of anotber cause for liis quarrel with the Regent of Portugal than the entry of a pair of lace ruffles! and by this time Brasil would have been guaranteed in a more effective manner than it has been on our sheep-skins at Amiens !

When Buonaparte guarantees the settlements of his allies, he secures the contract in its full sense, by either the possession of the settlement itself, or by taking his ally under the dominion of the republic. But when we send out our ambassadors to guarantee the domir.ions of our friends, they are not instructed to furbid such a friend to cede these same dominions to the Consul next day; any such restriction would be to intertere in the affairs of other states! When the rulers of France see a post or couptry, which in other hands might, on some future occasion, prove detrimental to their projects, as a duty they owe to the republic, they secure it, Although we know, that settlements, or naval and military posts, in our power by conquest, are by their former owners ceded to our Lstimates of the Strength of France and Russia. may yet be permitted to go on board of a Russian or Danish vessel at sea, loaded with timber or stockfish, made up the whole amount of our negociations with the court of Petersburgh. So that our political relationship with the northern states, stands now (in January 1803) nearly upon the same footing as it did in January 1801*. During this period, however, the connexions between Russia and France were strongly censenled. .

The Chief Consul negociates with foreign stales on more liberal principles than we do. Where he can command by force, friends, or foes, he does it without reserve; and when conditions are necessary, his propositions are regulated by circumstances. Instead of asking Russia to fight his battles for a paltry subsidy, he offers her an empire to remain at peace; in place of menacing her with visionary dangers from abroad, he asks the support of the Czar, for the republic; and rather than wrangle about port charges, sugar and muslin duties, Buonaparte will stipulate with the senate of Petersburgh, that the Russian flag shall have open and free intercourse with the Havanna, Rio Janeiro, the Gangest and Japan. Such propositions as


enemies, ye', should our dearest interests depend upon the possessicn of them, our magnanimity disdains to retain them! Worthy John Bull! We sincerely wish, that your magnanimity, so tempered as it frequently is, with other heavy ingredients, may not one day meet witb such a reward as will make you stare and say, who could have tbought it!

* With that difference, however, which the change of leading characters may have produced ; and, that in 1801 our naval and military posture commanded the respect and admiration of our enemies, and our national weans were sufficient to have secured the lasting friendship of the world: whereas a general belief that our powers are reduced, and our nationel means absorbed or given away, makes the world now seek cause of enmity against us.

The power of a state no longer formidable, and when more may be gained by its ruin thau can be acquired by its friendship, it is the direct interest of its neighbours 10 become its enemies,

+ The British parliament might perhaps be as well employed in providing efficacious means to preserve Indostan, as in quibbling about the legality of our sovereignty over that country.

'To insinuate that the safety of our possessions in India can be in any wise affected by the growing powers of our enemies, we know, will be sneered at in England, and we are sorry for it: we have already noticed the facility of marching • Russian army through Persia, &c. And as the cousulate may now muster a French arıny in the plains of Syria, Egypt, and Asiatic Turkey, with the same facility and safety as in Italy or Sicily, to tell Buonaparte that such an army could not reach the frontiers of Indostan, he might sneer likewise.

But then say the folks in Leadenball-street, our European army, with the native troops, tributary princes, and dependent allies in India, will repel any force that Russia and France can ever march, or carry out against them. We wish this may prove to be the case, for we have little doubt but a trial will soon be made. We must acknowledge our ignorance of the state of our army in India, as well as of the disposition and means of our allies there. It should not be forgotten, however, that in these times, we see that generals like to be kings, soldiers to become legislators; and that, to have faithful allics, we must make them obedicat subjects.

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia. these are national considerations ; they will therefore be heard, where our commissary and chupman overtures will be deservedly spurned at. Nor is there any thing extraordinary or unnatural in the present connexion and co-operation which subsist between the courts or Russia and St. Cloud, These two powers in accord with one another, have Europe and Asia at their dispusal; and if personal jealousies, pride, or ignorance do not intervene, they will, in all likelihood, pass on in conjunction from the partition of Europe, direct to that of Asia.

In the foregoing sketches, we have been so far from exaggerating the sources and power of France, that since our statements were sent to the presse we are officially informed, by the Chief Consul himself, that the public reve. nue of the tenth year, independent of colonies and foreign trade, amounted to the enormous sum of 1160 millions of French livres; or, in sterling, lo £48,000,000. And that the peace establishment of the army of the republic in Europe, exclusive of les conscripts for the year, is to be kept up at 500,000 men.

The revenues of the Russian government are undetermined; but the sources of the empire are infinite. Russia is yet a new country, but few of its natural treasures are explored, and none of them exhausted. A sovereign, possessing energy and talents, may raise the produce of that nation, and the income of the state to any amount". Besides, the military operations of

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Since the time of Peter 1. Russia cannot be said to have been governed by national vigour and conspicuous talents combined. 'The brilliant reign of Catherine II. was a series of splendid victories, pompous intrigue, and licentious luxury; should the present turn out a reign of domestic improvement, and be invigorated by military pursuits of a national nature, Alexander may make Russia the universal monarchy which his great progenitor predicted she should be.

In 1714 Peter I. with 16 sail of the line and 180 gallics, defeated the Swedish Acet gear the island of Aland, in the mouth of the gulph of Bothnia; when he returned to Petersburgh he was, by bís Vice Czar Romanodowski, promoted to the rank of vico admiral; upon which occasion he gave a fête to his brother officers, and harangued them as follows: Brother sailors, la journée d'Aland is the most glorious day in the life of le Vainqueur de Pultowa ; we have, in the work of our own hands, (meaning his feet) not only conquered the ancient masters of the Baltic, but we have by that conquest made the Baltic ours. It is the finest bay on the globe, and we will make it the most useful to mankind. Fellow soldiers! 'history placed the original seat of heroisui, legislation, and science, in Greece, then in Italy, from whence they were disseminated in certain portions through the several parts of Europe; it is now our turn, and if you will continue to second my designs, and to act upon the principles which I have laid down, legislation, and science, or the great schools of hunan happiness, shiall, by our vatour, establish their empire under the sceptre of Russia; through us their infidence shall again warm their native soil, and the re-action shall be felt in the remotest corners of the globe. Nature hus mnade but one Russia, and she must have no rival.” This discourse, we believe, may be considered as the political directory, or guide of the Russian government.

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Estimares of the Strength of France and Russia,

Russia depend but little on financial calculations; ber armies always find magazines before them. Possessing twenty millions of taxable male peasants employed in agriculture, her military force may be easily calculated; as we have already said, ber peace establishment consists of 700,000 enrolled sol. diers, and 50,000 nilitary servants to attend the staff of the army.

All the powerful states of which political Europe was formerly composed being either entirely subdued, or become dependent upon two mighty empires, France and Russia, and these governed by two absolute chiefs, Great Britain, insulated and alone, and still daring to keep up pretensions of independency, must consider herself as the object against which tbe intrigues and hostile preparations of these two governments are now most immediately directed".

The intrigues of the courts of St. Peterburgh and St. Cloud are universal; they are to be met with in the cabioet of every state, in the closet of every statesman, in the tent of every officer, from the corporal to the general, and in the apartment of every chamber-maid. However, when honesty, candous, spirit, and talents are charged with the adıninistration of the public affairs, the effects of contemptible intrigue cannot be formidable to the British nationt. The public measures of those two powers, and our own means of defence, are what we have to look after. We cannot know the particulars of their arrangements with one another, nor can re see their plans of operation iv detail; that is, we cannot know what they intend to do to morrow, or on any determined future day; but as we know their powers, and our own strength, we ought to know, to a fraction, what they can do. When our 'enemies' force is known, three-fourths of our line of defence may be said to be completed. But the remainder should be added with all possible speed; and the whole kept in constant repair.

The intrigues of our enemies are, we know, exercising; and will, while they have any hope of success, continue to act upon the following speculations, to wit. 1. To form amongst the native princes of India a hostile combination against the British government there; they will promise those princes support from their neighbours on the Indus, from Persia, Arabia, Aracan,

While Russia and France continue in political connection with one another, we have the most upquestionable certainty, that they will continge conjointly at enmity with the British government. 1. They believe themselves our superiors in power. 2. We are a wealthy nation, and have yet valuable possessions. 3. We have not acknowledged our nullity in the political world, nor the right assumed the Consul and the Czar to govern it. No declaration of war ever advanced more valid allegations to justify hostilities.

+ The statesman who can be imposed upon by intrigue, address, or the bad faith of others, is more criminal than he wbo sells Jamaica for a bribe, for he may lose the entpire, en bonne foi. Ignorance in public functionaries is treason against the state. The country has a right to call upon every man for his service, but no man is justifiable who accepts an office that he is not qualified to fill,

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia. Tartary, from France and Russia; they will create discontent, and prepare insurrection in the British army in Industan.

It might defeat these machiuations, were we to, subdue the princes of Indostan, by military authority, to legal obedience; to organize that empire under one rational, vigorous, and just government; admit of no settlements ror factories from other nations; and lay the trade open by land and sea, tu the whole world.

2. To prevent our receiving supplies of corn from abroad; they having all the ports of Europe and Africa under their command, and America under their intluence.

If we will but cultivate our own waste lands; improve those that are ia culture; look after that shamefully neglected country, Canada; gire neither premium nor bounty for the exportation, nor importation of corn, nor any other sort of provisions, we shall have no occasion for foreign supplies

3. To mislead our sailors and soldiers, and create mutiny and insurrection in the navy and army, at home as well as abroad, and anjongst our manufacturers, they will expend millious upon millions. Give the sailors and soldiers employment in peace, as well as in war; the first in the British fisheries, to be carried on upon a national scale, and the latter in national improvements on shore. When they are in the royal navy, and on military service, let them be com:nanded with firmness, intelligence, and humanity, and have sound provisions ; pay for their service to the state, as it would be pait for by individuals, and provide ainply for those who suffer in the defence of their country, and in protecting the property of their more fortunate country. inent. Allow the officers, both naval and military, such subsistence as their ranks in society require, and such as their bravery and generous spirits de.

When coro is exorbitantly dear, to grant bounties to import from abroad, raises the price still bigher. When a bounty on importation of corn is voted in England, the markets in foreign countries rise in proportion; so that the money granted in preniums, is in reality given to foreigners, to enable them to enhance, and keep up the price of grain above its natural level. When corn is cheap in Great Britain and Ireland, to sell and export it, to be laid up in magazines abroad, a year or two, until scarcity shall again raise the price in England, is an economy on which we shall not here pronounce an opinion. But we hope that its baneful effects will be seen into, and that measures will be taken to prevent the continuance of a practice, which is no less inconsiderate on the part of the legislature, than it is pernicious to the state. When the necessaries of life are almost beyond the reach of the produce of common lahour, and the annual im. posts already begin to benurub the arms of industry, the super-drawback on exported sugars, by which foreigners are enabled to sweeten their tea and coffee five per cent. cheaper than the English themselves, sceras the counter-part of the abuve national economy, and clearly illustrates our system of bounteous liberality in commercial inter. course with foreign states.

+ It is a well known fact, that the inferior quality of provisions, especially of bread, 20d the unfair distribution of bounty.money, were amongst the leading grievances that

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