« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »
ASSUMPSIT; BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 1. 2-10; CONFISCATION; CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 10; DEBT; FRAUD; PRESIDENT.
1. An information in the district court to enforce the forfeiture of a vessel for export-
. ing arms and ammunition contrary to the act of May 22, 1794, (1 Stats. at Large,
369,) is a civil cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and not to be tried
by a jury. United States v. La Vengeance, 230.
2. So the admiralty has jurisdiction over a question of forfeiture arising under the act
of March 22d, 1794, (1 Stats. at Large, 347,) prohibiting the slave-trade. United
States v. Schooner Sally, 513.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 6. 27; EVIDENCE, 2; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2;
PRACTICE, 3; PRIZE; SALVAGE.
1. A lease to S. D., secretary of war, and his successors, containing covenants for him-
self and his successors, being a contract which he had authority to make in behalf
of the government, does not bind S. D. personally. Hodgson v. Dexter, 423.
2. Where consignees had been accustomed to insure the property of the consignor only
when ordered to do so by letter, a promise by an agent of the consignees to write to
them to obtain insurance, which he failed to do, does not render the consignees liable
for not insuring. Randolph v. Ware, 650.
3. An agent to collect debts, merely, is not a factor. Hopkirk v. Bell, 640. `
CONTRACT, 3. 5; PRIVATEER; PRIZE, 1.
Writ of Error, 13. 14.
1. A decree for a sale under a mortgage is such a final decree as may be appealed from.
Ray v. Law, 553.
2. A citation is not necessary, if an appeal be taken during the same term at which the
final decree is made. Reilly v. Lamar, 495.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 2–6. 8. 9. 11; PRIZE, 2. 3.
PRACTICE, 2. 3.
1. Assumpsit will not lie upon a policy of insurance under seal. Marine Insurance Co.
of Alexandria v. Young, 421.
2. If goods are sold and delivered on the faith of a promise in writing by a third per-
son to become security for the payment of their price, an action of assumpsit will
lie on the promise, though not originally made to any particular person. Lawrason
v. Mason, 647.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 1.
H. having been originally admitted as an attorney of this court, on motion, his name
was taken from the roll of attorneys and placed upon the list of counsellors, and he
was qualified de novo, as counsellor. Ex parte Hallowell, 290.
DEPOSITION, 1-3; PRACTICE, 2.
A prisoner committed by a district judge, on a charge of treason, admitted to bail.
United States v. Hamilton, 76.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.
1. By the law of Virginia, no promise is implied in favor of an indorsee, by any but
his immediate indorser; an action of assumpsit does not lie by an indorsee against a
remote indorser, founded on the indorsement. Mandeville v. Riddle, 412.
2. Under the Virginia act of 1775, the actual consideration, though different from that
stated on the face of the bill, governs, and the jury having found that to be such as to
take the case out of the statute, the statement on the face of the bill is immaterial. Ib.
3. If the jury find specially the value of foreign money, the want of an averment of
the value in the declaration is cured. Ib.
4. In such a case a declaration in the debet is not erroneous. Ib.
5. In a count against the drawer for non-payment, it is not necessary to aver that the
bill was accepted, or if not accepted that it was protested for non-acceptance.
Brown v. Barry, 261.
6. When the action is founded on non-payment of bills of exchange, it is not necessary
to produce protests for non-acceptance. Clarke v. Russell, 295.
7. If the vendee of goods indorse to the vendor a negotiable note of a third person, as
a conditional payment for the goods, and the vendee uses due diligence to obtain
payment of the note from the maker, he may then sue the vendee on the original
contract of sale. Clark v. Young, 392.
8. It is not necessary first to tender the note to the vendor. 16.
9. Nor is a judgment in favor of the indorser, in an action by the indorsee, a bar to an
action on the contract of sale. Ib.
10. If a negotiable note has been received as a conditional payment, and has been passed
to, and is owned by a third person, the creditor cannot sue on the original contract.
Harris v. Johnston, 592.
COURTS OF UNITED STATES, 13; DEBT; PLEADING, 1; PRACTICE, 7.
BILL OF PARCELS.
1. The real intent, and not the literal meaning of a condition, is to govern. Cooke v.
Graham's Adm. 565.
2. A departure from prison rules, under the authority of a judgment of a competent
tribunal, obtained by the fraud of the debtor alone — his sureties being innocent-
is not a breach of a bond conditioned that he would not depart until discharged by
due course of law. Simms v. Slacum, 587.
3. To raise a presumption of payment of a bond, twenty years must have elapsed ex-
clusive of the period of the plaintiff's disability. Dunlop v. Ball, 468.
4. The 6th section of the act of the 29th of April, 1802, (2 Stats. at Large, 163,) trans-
ferred the jurisdiction over forthcoming bonds given in suits pending in the courts
abolished by that act. Stuart v. Laird, 414.
5. Where a forthcoming bond taken upon an execution, recited the aggregate sum of
the execution correctly, but stated one of the items at $20.33 instead of $12.33,
it was held correct in substance. The judgment of the court below thereon for the
plaintiff was affirmed with ten per cent. damages and costs. Williams v. Lyles,
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 20. 21 ; PLEADING, 3; REVENUE Laws, 1. 2.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTION, 2. TREATIES, 3.
1. The capture of a vessel of a country at peate with the United States, made by a
vessel fitted out in one of our ports, and commanded by one of our citizens, is ille-
gal, and if the captured vessel is brought within our jurisdiction, the district courts,
upon a libel for a tortious seizure, may inquire into the facts, and decree restitution,
and if a privateer, duly commissioned by a belligerent, collude with a vessel so fitted
out and commanded, to cover her prizes and share with her their proceeds, such
collusion is a fraud on the law of nations, and the claim of the belligerent will be
rejected. Talbot v. Janson, 128.
2. Damages for the tortious seizure, as well as restitution, decreed. Ib.
3. In 1799, there was a limited state of hostilities between this country and France,
and the capture of a private armed vessel, officered and manned by Frenchmen, and
sailing under the French flag, was lawful, though the vessel was the property of a
neutral, from whom the French possessors had captured her. Tallot v. Seeman,
4. If a vessel has a Spanish register, and sails under Spanish colors, and has on board
accounts describing her as Spanish property, there is probable cause for seizing her
as belonging to Spanish subjects. The right to seize, and send in for further exa-
mination, is not the right to spoliate and injure the property captured ; for any
damage, or spoliation, the captors are answerable to the owners, if the property be
not condemned as prize. Del Col v. Arnold, 248.
5. If an unlawful seizure is made by a public armed vessel upon the high seas, without
probable cause, and the vessel seized is afterwards captured by a belligerent, and
condemned as lawful prize, being actually neutral property, the seizor is liable to
make restitution in value, with damages; and the neutral owner is not bound to
appear and defend in the prize court. Maley v. Shattuck, 642.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 27. 29. 31; INSURANCE, 1. 5; INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 3. 4; SALVAGE, 1-4; STATUTES, 5. 9.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 19; LAND Laws, 3.
A certiorari does not issue to remove a cause, on account of want of jurisdiction in
the court in which it is pending. Fowler v. Lindsey. Fowler v. Miller, 291.
WRIT OF ERROR, 10.
WRIT OF ERROR, 6-10.
Whether a right of expatriation exists under our constitution and laws, quære. But
if it does, not only a renunciation of citizenship of the United States, but actual
removal, for some lawful purpose, and the acquisition of a domicile elsewhere, are
necessary to effect it. Talbot v. Janson, 128.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 11-16; STATUTES, 7. 8.
The act of the State of Georgia did not confiscate, but only sequestered British debts,
and the right to recover them revived at the peace. Georgia v. Brailsford, 71.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14; INJUNCTION, 4. 5.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Rights to personal property are regulated by the law of domicile of the testator, but
remedies by the law of the forum. Dixon's Executors v. Ramsay's Executors, 594.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-7; COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1-3.
CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE.
1. An act of congress repugnant to the constitution is not law. Marbury v. Madison,
2. When the constitution and an act of congress are in conflict, the constitution must
govern the case to which both apply. Ib.
3. Congress cannot confer on this court any original jurisdiction. Ib.
4. To issue a writ of mandamus, requiring a secretary of state to deliver a paper, would
be an exercise of original jurisdiction not conferable by congress, and not conferred
by the constitution on this court. Ib.
5. The 13th section of the Judiciary Act, (1 Stats. at Large, 81,) is inoperative, so far
as it attempts to grant to this court power to issue writs of mandamus, in classes of
cases of original jurisdiction, not conferred by the constitution on this court. · Ib.
6. The power to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the
powers granted, confers on congress a choice of means, and does not confine it to
what is indispensably necessary. United States v. Fisher, 496.
7. The compact between two States cannot deprive congress of the power to regulate
the appellate jurisdiction of this court. Wilson v. Mason. Mason v. Wilson, 346.
8. A resolution, or law of the State of Connecticut, setting aside a decree of a court of
probate, and granting a new hearing before the same court, with liberty of appeal,
is not an ex post facto law, within the meaning of the 10th section of the 1st article
of the Constitution of the United States. Calder v. Bull, 269.
9. That article has reference only to crimes. Ib.
10. Under the Constitution of the United States, as originally adopted, a State could
be sued by an individual citizen of another State. Chisholm v. Georgia, 16.
11. The eleventh amendment of the constitution deprived this court of jurisdiction over
suits against a State by citizens of another State ; and suits pending at the time
of its adoption can be no further prosecuted. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 266.
12. The fact that the land demanded in a suit was granted by and is claimed under a
State, does not make the State a party to the suit, within the meaning of the second
section of the third article of the constitution. Fowler v. Lindsey. Fowler v. Mil-
13. Nor does an issue upon the point whether the land demanded is within the limits
of the State. Ib.
14. An act of the legislature of the State of Georgia, passed in 1782, banishing the
plaintiff in error from that State, and confiscating his property, is not repugnant to
the constitution of that State. Cooper v. Telfair, 314.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1. 26; STATUTES, 13. 14; Taxes.
EVIDENCE, 3. 5; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2.
1. A correspondence held not to amount to a concluded agreement, but only to nego-
tiation. Head v. Providence Ins. Co. 459.
2. If a written instrument exhibits an usurious contract, it is for the court to construe
it, and the jury are not at liberty to infer extraneous facts which would remove the
taint of usury. Levy v. Gadsby, 553.
3. A bill of exchange, drawn by the consul-general of France on the public treasury
of his country, shows on its face that the contract was on account of the government,
that the engagement was official and not personal, and that it is not a cause of action
against the drawer. Jones v. Le Tombe, 267.
4. A bill of parcels is not the contract of sale, and it is open to explanation by extra-
neous evidence. Harris v. Johnston, 592.