was inconsistent with, and therefore revoked, the devise for life without impeachment of waste; but Sir W. Grant, M. R., held, that there was no inconsistency, and nothing to take the timber from the tenant for life. (t) General excodicil confined in the will. pression in to its meaning Again, where a testator by his will bequeathed as follows: "As to my leasehold house in S., and my household goods and furniture there and at S., and as to all my plate,.linen, chinaware, pictures, live and dead stock, and all the rest and residue of my goods, chattels, and personal estate," he gave the same to A. By a codicil he revoked the bequest of the residue of his personal estate to A, and gave the same to B. It was held, that the revocation was confined to the "residue," and did not extend to either the leasehold house and furniture, or the other enumerated articles, namely, the plate, &c. (u) [And where by his will a testator devised tithes, and then devised all his real estates of what nature or kind soever, and by codicil devised in a different manner all his real estates of what nature or kind soever, Sir L. Shadwell, V. C., held that the second gift in the will did not, but that the gift in the codicil did, include the tithes; the Court of Q. B., however, differed from him on the last point, holding that the words "real estates" in the codicil were to be interpreted in the same manner as in the will. (x) "instead of" Again, in Doe d. Murch v. Marchant, (y) where by will an estate was devised to A in fee, and by codicil "instead of" that Gift in codicil devise the estate was given to A for life, with alternative gift in will. contingent remainders to her children and her collateral relations, which failed; A was held entitled to the fee: "instead of the devise in the will" being read "instead of so much of it only as was incompatible with the codicil," and the codicil not disposing of the ultimate fee. And where a trust fund, which by will was given to the children of A living at a stated period, with a power of advancement in the trustees, was by codicil, *"in lieu of such disposition," given to the children of A living at a different period, and in other respects the will was confirmed; it was held that the power of advancement (t) Lushington v. Boldero, G. Coop. 216. [See also Green v. Britten, 1 D., J. & S. 649.] (u) Clarke v. Butler, 1 Mer. 304; [see also Barclay v. Maskelyne, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 12; Hinchcliffe v. Hinchcliffe, 2 Dr. & Sm. 96. (x) Evans v. Evans, 17 Sim. 86; Williams v. Evans, 1 Ell. & Bl. 727. (y) 6 M. & Gr. 813, 7 Scott, N. R. 644. See the case more fully stated ch. VIII., on the question of republication. was not revoked. (y) But though the expression "instead of" need not mean total substitution, it naturally implies some substitution; as was held still in favor of non-revocation-in Barclay v. Maskelyne, (z) where the will gave legacies to the six children of A, naming them, and the codicil revoked the legacies "to the children of A, and in lieu thereof" gave a sum amongst "the children of A, to wit" (naming five of them); and it was held that the legacy to the sixth was not revoked, because nothing was substituted for her. Again, in In re Arrowsmith's Trust, (a) where by will a testator Specific gift bequeathed a specific fund to his nephews and nieces, and after the death of his wife gave them all his remaining property; he then by codicil bequeathed certain legacies (one of them to be paid at his wife's death), and gave "all his real and personal estate" to his wife for her life: it was held that the specific gift to the nephews and nieces was not disturbed, and that the codicil was meant only to remove the doubt which might arise on the will whether the wife was to take the residue for life. Case where held change of and no revocation of trusts. Where a testator directed his trustees, to whom he had given all his property, to carry on his business for ten years, and then trustee merely to sell and hold the proceeds upon trust, as 'to one moiety for his daughter and her children, and as to the other moiety for the children of his son, and by a codicil revoked that part of his will which empowered his trustees to sell, and instead thereof authorized his daughter to take possession of his property and to dispose thereof at her discretion; it was held, that this was not an absolute gift to the daughter, but only constituted her a trustee in place of the trustee named in the will. (b) Revocation as to one office does not extend to other offices. Where a person is appointed to more than one of the offices of guardian, executor, and trustee, a revocation by codicil of his appointment to one of the offices, is not a revocation of the appointment to any other office; (c) unless the context shows, as *by directing "trustees" to pay debts and legacies, that the several offices (of trustee and executor) are to be filled by the [(y) Hill v. Walker, 4 K. & J. 168; see also Butler v. Greenwood, 22 Beav. 303. (z) 5 Jur. (N. S.) 12. (a) 2 D., F. & J. 474. (b) Newman v. Lade, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 680; and see Barry v. Crundall, 7 Sim. 430; Froggatt v. Wardell, 3 De G. & S. 685; and compare Schofield v. Cahuac, 4 De G. & S. 533. (c) Ex parte Park, 14 Sim. 89; Fry v. Fry, 9 Jur. 894; Graham v. Graham, 16 Beav. 550; Cartwright v. Shepheard, 17 Beav. 301; Worley v. Worley, 18 Beav. 58; and see Hare v. Hare, 5 Beav. 629. same persons; (d) nor is a legacy to a trustee, as a mark of respect, revoked by the appointment of another trustee in his place.] (e) Estates A and to the same tion as to A B are devised uses: revoca does not affect B. It may be observed, that where a testator, in order to avoid repetition, has by his will declared his intention respecting a property, (say Whiteacre,) then being devised by him, to be similar to what he had before expressed concerning another property (say Blackacre) antecedently given, and he afterwards by a codicil, or by obliteration, or otherwise, revokes the devise of Blackacre, such revocation does not affect the devise of Whiteacre. Thus, in Darley v. Langworthy, (f) where a testator by his will devised a certain estate to certain limitations, and then proceeded to annex thereto another estate, declaring that the same should go unto and be enjoyed by the possessor of the other estate, and not be separated therefrom, and subsequently, by an act in his lifetime, he revoked the devise of the principal estate, the property so annexed was held not to be affected, but went according to the uses declared of the principal estate by the will. So, where a testator by his will bequeathed a specific fund to his residuary legatee after named, and then bequeathed the residue to A, and by a codicil revoked the bequest of the residue, it was held that this was no revocation of the specific bequest. (g) [And where a testator bequeathed several pecuniary legacies, including one to A, and the residue to his before-mentioned legatees in proportion to their pecuniary legacies; and by codicil executed after A's death gave A's pecuniary legacy to B, but was silent as to the residue: it was held that B was not entitled to A's share of residue.] (h) Again, where a testator by his will devised certain freehold property (on failure of the objects of a preceding devise) to trustees to be sold, and directed the produce to be applied upon the trusts thereinafter expressed concerning his residuary personal estate; he then bequeathed his residuary personal estate *upon certain trusts, and afterwards, by a codicil duly attested for devising freehold estates, revoked the residuary bequest, and disposed of the personalty in a different man(d) Barrett v. Wilkins, 5 Jur. (N. S.) Beauclerk v. Mead, 2 Atk. 167; [Salter v. Fary, 12 L. J., Ch. 411; Martineau v. Briggs, 21 W. R. 620, 23 W. R. 889 (in D. P.); Bridges v. Strachan, 8 Ch. D. 558.] 687. (e) Burgess v. Burgess, 1 Coll. 367. See also Bubb v. Yelverton, L. R., 13 Eq. 131.] (f) 3 B. P. C. Toml. 359, reversing Lord Camden's decree in Darley v. Darley, Amb. 653. See also Lord Sidney (g) Roach v. Haynes, 6 Ves. 153. (h) [In re Gibson's Trusts, 2 J. & H. 656.] Rule different as to heirlooms. Distinction devise is modi fied only. ner: Sir J. Leach, M. R., held, that by this alteration in the disposition of the personal estate, the devise of the realty was not affected; the effect being the same as if the testator had in terms applied the trusts in question to the produce of the freehold estate, in which case it is obvious that the revocation by the codicil of the residuary gift of the personal estate by the will, would have been no revocation of the disposition of the produce of the freehold estate; and his Honor observed, it could make no difference in principle, that the testator saves himself the trouble of repeating those trusts, intents and purposes, by compendious words of reference. (i) [This construction, however, does not seem to apply where plate, pictures, &c., are directed to go along with a mansion-house.] (k) If the devise of the principal estate is not simply revoked, but is modified only, it is not too hastily to be concluded, that where the first the construction adopted in the class of cases just stated would apply, however forcibly the reasoning in some of them, and especially that of the M. R. in the last case, might seem to conduct to such a conclusion; for a different construction prevailed in Lord Carrington v. Payne, (1) where a testator devised his real estate to trustees to be conveyed to certain uses, and bequeathed personal estate to be laid out in land to be settled to such uses and upon such trusts, &c., as he had declared concerning his real estate. By a codicil he revoked so much of his will as directed the settlement of his real estate to those limitations, and devised it to other limitations, the effect being merely to change the order in which some of the devisees were to take. Sir R. P. Arden, M. R., held, that the bequest of the personalty was not revoked. He considered that though the devisor had used the expression "revoke," yet the codicil was not a revocation as to the union of the estates, but merely an alteration in the order of the limitations to be inserted in the settlement (of both properties;) and that it was no more than if the devisor had with his own hand inserted the name of one devisee before another, and then republished his will. Unless Lord Carrington v. Payne can be referred to the distinction above suggested, which is very doubtful, it seems to be untenable. *It is to be collected from Holder v. Howell, (m) that where a tes (i) Francis v. Collier, 4 Russ. 331. (m) 8 Ves. 97; [and see Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves. 46; Viscount Holmesdale v. West, L. R., 3 Eq. 486, on app., (but this point not touched,) L. R., 4 H. L. 543.] Absolute re not restrained tator in a codicil recites that an inconvenient consequence may result from a devise in his will, as that in a particular event the devisee or legatee would be unprovided for contrary to vocation held his intention, and then, instead of confining himself to by recital. simply effecting the declared purpose of the codicil, he proceeds to revoke the whole devise, giving the land again to the same trustees upon certain trusts which he particularizes, and which are the same as the former trusts, with the exception of the matter expressly intended for correction, and of one other of the trusts, which he wholly omits; this omission, though probably undesigned, cannot be supplied. The principle of this case seems to be inconsistent with, and it may, therefore, be considered as overruling, the earlier case of Matthews v. Bowman, (n) where a testator, having devised the residue of his estate to his daughters as tenants in common, by a codicil made for a particular purpose re-devised it to them, omitting the words of severance, and it was held, that the legatees were tenants in common. Clear gift in will not revok Another principle of construction is, that where the will contains a clear and unambiguous disposition of property, real or personal, such a gift is not allowed to be revoked by doubtful expressions in a codicil. 64 (n) 3 Anst. 727, a reporter of very doubtful authority, [and see In re Lewis, 14 Jur. 514, 7 No. Cas. 436.] * (0) 3 Sim. 24, 2 R. & My. 624; [compare Baldwin v. Baldwin, 22 Beav. 413. 64. "A codicil is an addition or supplement to a will. * * It is no revocation of a will, except in the precise degree in which it is inconsistent with it, unless there be words of revocation." 4 Kent 531. Therefore, if a codicil is void for uncertainty, it cannot work a revocation of the residuary bequest in a will. Carpenter v. Miller, 3 W. Va. 174. And it is a general rule, that in order to revoke a clear devise, the intention must be as clear as the devise. Wms. Ex'rs (6th Am. ed.) 220. And this rule has been sustained in many American cases. Kane v. Astor, 5 Sandf. 467; Bosley v. Bosley, 14 How. 390; Nelson v. McGiffert, 3 Barb. Ch. 158; Jenkins v. Maxwell, 7 Jones L. 612; Boyd v. Latham, Busbee L. 365; Pickering v. Lang ed by doubtful expressions in codicil. don, 22 Me. 413; Quincy v. Rogers, 9 Cush. 291, 295; Tilden v. Tilden, 13 Gray 103, 108; Homer v. Shelton, 2 Metc. 194, 202; Smith v. Bell, 6 Peters 68, 84; Collier v. Collier, 3 Ohio St. 369; Snowhill v. Snowhill, 3 Zab. 447; Boyle v. Parker, 3 Md. Ch. Dec. 42; Joiner v. Joiner, 2 Jones Eq. 68; Lee v. Pindle, 12 Gill & J. 288. And in commenting upon this topic, it was said by Battle, J.: “In construing a codicil in reference to the will, the leading and controlling object is * to ascertain the intention of the testator. So far as a purpose to vary the will, either by adding to or subtracting from it, can be discovered, that purpose, if a lawful one, is to be carried out, but the intention of the testator, as declared in his will, is not to be varied further than is necessary to carry out such purpose." Bradley v. Gibbs, 2 Jones Eq. 13, 15. In Homer v. Shelton, ubi supra, it was said by Wilde, J.: "The rule is that when two parts of a will are totally irre * * |