terest in lands, 32 Hen. VIII., c. 28, (A. D. 1541). Bruce v. Wood, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 542; Coale v. Barney, 1 G. & J. (Md.) 324. Westminster the Second, 13 Edw. I., c. 34 (a. D. 1285). Coggswell v. Tibbetts, 3 N. H. 41. Contra, Lecompte v. Wash, 9 Mo. 551. Jointure, 27 Hen. VIII., c. 10 (a. D. 1536). Hastings v. Dickinson, 7 Mass. 153. Attornment, 4 Ann, c. 16 (A. D. 1706). Burden v. Thayer, 3 Metc. 76; Coker v. Pearsall, 6 Ala. 542; see Baldwin v. Walker, 21 Conn. 168. (3.) In aid or amendment of the common law. Commonwealth v. Leach, 1 Mass. 58, 61; Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 354; Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 530, 535; Boynton v. Rees, 9 Pick. 528, 531; Hamilton v. Kneeland, 1 Nev. 40; Gwin v. Hubbard, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 14; Plumleigh v. Cook, 13 Ill. 669; see Steere v. Field, 4 Mason 486, 511. As an action of account, 4 Ann, c. 16 (A. D. 1706). Griffith v. Willing, 3 Binn. (Pa.) 317. (4.) Or declaratory thereof. Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 583; Hudnal v. Wilder, 4 McCord (S. C.) 294; Hamilton v. Russel, 1 Cranch 310, 316; State v. Hudson Co., 1 Vr. 130, 131. (5.) Or merely cumulative. Goodwin v. Thompson, 2 Greene (Ia.) 329; Commonwealth v. Ruggles, 10 Mass. 391; see Commonwealth v. English, 2 Bibb (Ky.) 80. (6.) All statutes for the administration of justice were adopted. Sibbey v. Williams, 3 G. &. J. (Md.) 52; Pemble v. Clifford, 2 McCord (S. C.) 31; Craft v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 219. 'Ease and Favor,' 23 Hen. VI., c. 9 (A. D. 1445). Koons v. Seward, 8 Watts (Pa.) 388; see Winthrop v. Dockendorf, 8 Me. 156, 161. Additions to names of defendants in indictments, 1 Hen. V., c.

(t) Does not include prisoners for crime, as poachers, Thrupp v. Collett, 26

5 (A. D. 1413). Commonwealth v. France, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 568. Limitations of actions, 21 Jac. I., c. 16 (A. D. 1624), does not extend here. Den, Bickham v. Pissant, Coxe 220; Den, Johnson v. Morris, 2 Hal. 6, 11; Den, Gardner v. Sharp, 4 Wash. C. C. 609; Morris v. Vanderen, 1 Dall. 64; Boehm v. Engle, 1 Dall. 15. Contra, Calvert v. Eden, 2 H. & McH. (Md.) 290; Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige 178, 198. Costs, 6 Edw. I., c. 1 (A. D. 1278). See Aller v. Shurts, 2 Harr. 188. Bills of exceptions, 13 Edw. I., c. 31 (A. D. 1285). See Colley v. Merrill, 6 Me. 50. The construction of an English statute is adopted with it. Brown v. Burke, 22 Geo. 574; Fowler v. Stoneum, 11 Tex. 478. As far as the revolution. Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264, 280." So in Carter v. Balfour, 19 Ala. 814, Coleman, J., says: "It ap-. pears to be settled that English statutes passed before the emigration of our ancestors to America, and which were applicable to our situation and not inconsistent with our institutions and government constitute a part of the common law and are in force (unless repealed) in all the states of the Union." And in Commonwealth v. Leach, 1 Mass. 59, Sedgwick, J., says: "It appears to me, generally speaking, that the English statutes which were in force at the time of the emigration of our ancestors are common law here;" and to the same effect, Dana, C. J., in the same case: Generally when an English statute has been made in amendment of the common law of England it is here to be considered as part of our common law." "The common law, it is said, we brought with us from the mother country and we claim it

"

Beav. 125. A bequest for such a purpose is against public policy and void.

as a most valuable heritage. This is admitted but not to the extent sometimes urged. The common law in all its diversities has not been adopted by any one of the states. In some of them it has been modified by statutes, in others by usage, and from this it appears that what may be the common law of one state is not necessarily the common law of any other. We must ascertain the common law of each state by its general policy, the usages sanctioned by its courts and its statutes, and there is no subject of judicial action which requires the exercise of this discrimination more than the administration of charities. No branch of jurisprudence is more dependent than this upon the forms and principles of the common law," McLean, J., in Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 55. "Having adopted the common law of England so far as it was applicable to our circumstances and conformable to our institutions, the law of charitable uses is in force here unless, 1st, it was established by an English statute which has been abrogated; or 2d, unless there is something in the system repugnant to our form of government; or 3d, unless it can be shown by the history of our colonial jurisprudence that it was not in force here prior to the revolution; or, lastly, unless it has been abrogated by the revised statutes," Denio, J., in Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 540. The statutes of 23 Henry VIII. and 1 Edward VI., referred to at the beginning of the chapter, forbid gifts to superstitious uses, neither of them, however, as has been remarked

(u) It makes no difference that the fund is raised by tax on the inhabitants of the town; the purpose alone is the criterion. Att.-Gen. v. Eastlake, 11 Hare 205.

in the text, reaching the case of gifts of personal property made after the passage of the statute. These statutes have always been held to be local in their application, and have not been extended as part of the common law to the United States. The same thing is true of the socalled mortmain act of 9 George II, which reached beyond the earlier statutes against superstitious uses, and forbade gifts to charitable uses, unless made in a mode therein prescribed. 2 Redfield on Wills 510. In his Equity Jurisprudence, section 1194, Mr. Justice Story says of it: "This statute of 9th Geo. II., c. 36, was never extended to or adopted by, the American colonies generally. But certain of the provisions of it, and of the older statutes of mortmain, have been adopted by some of the states of the Union. And it deserves the consideration of every wise and enlightened American legislator, whether provisions similar to those of this celebrated statute are not proper to be enacted in this country with a view to prevent undue influence and imposition upon pious and feeble minds in their last moments, and to check an unfortunate propensity, (which is sometimes found to exist under a bigoted fanaticism,) the desire to acquire fame, as a religious benefactor, at the expense of all the natural claims of blood and parental duty." "It hath also been held that the statute 23 Hen. VIII. before mentioned did not extend to anything but superstitious uses, and that therefore a man may give lands for the maintenance of a school, a hospital or any other charitable

(x) Jones v. Williams, Amb. 651.

(y) Att.-Gen. v. Earl of Lonsdale, 1 Sim. 105; Att.-Gen. v. Webster, L. R., 20 Eq. 483.

main have been extended to this state only so far as they prohibit dedications of property to superstitious uses and grants to corporations without a statutory license." Potter v. Thornton, 7 R. I. 252; McCarter v. Orphan Asylum, 9 Cow. 437. So, too, in the State v. Griffith, 2 Del. Ch. 400, Chancellor Johns says: "The mortmain acts did not extend to the British colonies and Sir William Grant says in Att.-Gen. v. Stewart, 2 Mer. 164, that in its causes, obligations, provisions, qualifications and exceptions it is a law wholly English, calculated for purposes of local policy, complicated with local establishments, and incapable, without great incongruity in its effects, of being transported, as it stands, into the code of any other country. It thus appears that anterior to the statute 9 Geo. II., ch. 36, a devise of land to charitable uses was not invalid and was only rendered so by the provisions of that act and further that the rule of perpetuity was inapplicable." In many of the states statutes have been passed restricting the power of corporations to take and hold land, and this more especially as to religious societies and churches. These latter restrictions relate generally to the quantity or value of the land which such society may take and hold. Whether a devise to such society of property in excess of the permitted amount can be objected to on that ground by any private contestant of the will, or

by anyone but the state, is a question on which the authorities are not perfectly agreed. It may be added that the statutory restriction upon charitable or other corporations taking land in excess of a certain value, is now held to be rather a restriction laid upon the testator than upon the corporation, (especially if it be incorporated, as is usual, in the statute of wills,) and as such will not prevent the corporation so incorporated from taking lands by devise in another state, where such restriction does not exist. In Thompson v. Swoope, 24 Penna. St. 474, Lowrie, C. J., says: "Where a corporation of another state is generally competent to take and hold lands, the prohibition in the statute of wills against all devises of lands to corporations does not prevent them from taking and holding land in this state by devise; for the statute of wills is intended to regulate the testamentary power of their own citizens, not of ours-to define the capacity of testators, not of corporations." See also Methodist Episcopal Church v. Remington, 1 Watts 218. "It is however," says Runyon, C., in De Camp v. Dobbins, 2 Stew. (N. J.) 42, "enough to say on this head, as has been before suggested, that if the corporation exceeds the prescribed amount, though it be by an original purchase, nobody but the state can interfere with the holding of the property which it acquires, and it is a matter of which individuals cannot avail themselves in

(f) Att.-Gen. v. Comber, 2 S. & St. 93; [Thompson v. Corby, 27 Beav. 649.] (g) Att.-Gen. v. Clarke, Amb. 422, also 14 Ves. 364.

(h) Bishop of Hereford v. Adams, 7

372; [and see Att.-Gen. t. Bovill, 1 Phill. 762; Att.-Gen. v. Corporation of Exeter, 2 Russ. 45.] As to a gift to the inhabitants of a place, see Rogers v. Thomas, 2

Kee. 8.

(i) Doe v. Howell, 2 B. & Ad. 744.