increase their stock of corn, which they are (or were) compelled to keep for the London market, is not charitable, since it is in effect a gift to the company absolutely. (q) A devise of lands upon trust to distribute the rents on certain days amongst several specified families according to their circumstances, as in the opinion of the trustees they might need assistance, has been held not to be a devise for a charitable purpose, but a trust for the families named, and good for so long as the rule against perpetuities would allow. How long that was, was not decided.] (r)

In Ommanney v. Butcher (s) the testatrix declared as to certain Bequests to be money that she wished it to be given in private charity. Sir T. Plumer, M. R., held that the words did not create a trust which could be carried into effect. The charities recognized by the court were public in their nature, and such as the court could see

to the execution of; but here the disposition was confined to private charity. Assisting individuals in distress was private charity; but such a purpose could not be executed by the court or the crown. (t) [So a gift to found a private *museum, (u) or in aid of a subscription library, (x) or of a friendly society, (y) or for the benefit of an orphan school kept by an individual substantially at his own expense, (2) is not charitable. '

Bequest not charitable on fessional or off

necessarily

account of pro

cial character

A gift to an institution having a charitable object specified in the gift, or to the governors of such an institution, (a) or to the minister of a chapel and his successors, (b) will generally be deemed a gift for the specified charitable object or chapel.] But a gift will not be deemed charitable merely from the nature of the professional character of the devisee, or on account of the testator having accompanied the gift with an expression of his expectation, that the devisee would discharge the duties of legatee. incidental to such character, however intimately those duties may concern the welfare of others, as this merely denotes the motive of the gift, and not that the devisee is to take otherwise than beneficially. Thus, in Doe d. Phillips v. Aldridge, (c) where the devise was to the Rev. A. A., a dissenting minister (described as preacher at the meeting house of L.) for life, the testator adding, “And I further expect that he will, with the help of God, after my decease, without delay, settle

(t) Lord Langdale, M. R., thought a bequest "for the relief of domestic distress, and assisting indigent but deserving individuals," a good charitable bequest, Kendall v. Granger, 5 Beav. 303.

(u) Thomson v. Shakespear, Johns. 612, 1 D., F. & J. 399.

v. Prujean, 6 Ves. 567; and Cocks v. Manners, L. R., 12 Eq. 574. In the last case the gift to the convent, though held not charitable, was still treated as a trust for the purposes of the institution; not involving a perpetuity, but capable of being performed by the existing members

(r) Carne v. Long, 29 L. J., Ch. 503, 2 spending the gifts as they pleased; (as D., F. & J. 75.

(y) In re Clark's Trust, 1 Ch. D. 497; also In re Dutton, 4 Ex. D. 54 (Mechanics' Institute).

(2) Clark v. Taylor, 1 Drew. 642.

(a) Per Lord St. Leonards, Incorporated Society v. Richards, 1 D. & War. 291; and per Lord Hatherley, Att.-Gen. v. Sidney Sussex Coll., L. R., 4 Ch. 730; In re Maguire, L. R., 9 Eq. 632.

(b) Grieves v. Case, 4 B. C. C. 67, 2 Cox 301, 1 Ves., Jr., 548; Thornber v. Wilson, 3 Drew. 215, 4 Id. 351. See also Smart

to which, see Brown v. Dale, 9 Ch. D. 78:
and cf. Thomson v. Shakespear, Carne r.
Long, In re Clark's Trust, sup., which
were void for perpetuity). In Aston v.
Wood, L. R., 6 Eq. 419, a legacy "to the
trustees of Zion Chapel, to be apportioned
according to statement appending," no
such statement forthcoming, was held to
fall into the residue. The express refer-
ence to a trust to be declared appears to
have rebutted any presumption in favor
of the chapel.]
(c) 4 T. R. 264.

and forward everything in his power, to promote and carry on the work of God at L. aforesaid, both in his lifetime and after his decease;" it was contended, that the devise to A. A. was void, as charitable, being not in his individual capacity, but in the character of preacher, and in confidence that he would discharge the duties of that station. But the court held that it was not charitable, and thought the point too clear for discussion.

*Again, in Doe d. Toone v. Copestake, (d) where an estate was devised to trustees, to be applied by them and the officiating minister of the congregation or assembly of the people called Methodists assembling at L., and as they should from time to time think fit to apply the same; it was held, that the devise was not charitable, the application being left to the trustees still more indefinitely than it was in Bishop of Durham v. Morice, [and it was not argued that the trust was restricted to charitable purposes merely because the Methodist minister was appointed a trustee. (e)

Legacy may be charitable though pay

A legacy payable once for all may be charitable as well as one given for the creation of a perpetual trust; as, a legacy to the widows and orphans of a named place, (ƒ) or to six honest and sober clergymen that are not provided with a living of £40; (g) which could not in their nature have proceeded from motives of personal bounty to particular individuals.

able at once to individuals.

A legacy to

But a legacy payable once for all to poor relations (which includes none more remote than the statutory next of kin) (h) is not charitable. (i) If it were, only such as were actually ·

poor rela

tions" is not charitable:

(d) 6 East 328.

[(e) In the two cases last stated it was only decided, that the devisees could recover at law the property devised, the trust (if any) not being charitable; whether they took beneficially, or whether as trustees for the heir-at-law, the trust being void for uncertainty, it was not within the province of the court to determine.

(f) Att.-Gen. v Comber, 2 S. & St. 93; see also Russell v. Kellett, 3 Sm. & Gif. 264.

(g) Att.-Gen. v. Glegg, Amb. 584. But see Thomas v. Howell, L. R., 18 Eq. 198, 209, where it is said that the legacy to sixty poor clergymen in Att.-Gen. v. Bax

ter (stated ante p. *206), was held not to be charitable. Lord Hardwicke's note of the decision is that it was good, "as if a legacy of those sixty individuals" (7 Ves. 176); but that appears to be in answer to the argument (1 Vern. 219) that "to suffer them to take by such a devise was almost to make a corporation of them, and would keep them in a perpetual schism." Elsewhere (1 Ves. 536) he says of the case, "The court held the charitable use was not contrary to law." If Baxter had declined to select, would the gift have been void for uncertainty? (h) See ch. XXIX.

(i) Brunsden v. Woolredge, Amb. 507, where by will dated 1757 (see R. L. 1764,

poor in contemplation of the court could take; (k) there might be many comparatively poor relations, yet none of them would take, and the legacy would be applied cy pres, or (if the doctrine of cy pres were thought inapplicable) (7) would wholly fail; either of which results would probably be a surprise to a testator who had intended to benefit his "poor relations."

unless intended as a provision.

perpetual

*But the gift of a fund for the perpetual benefit of poor relations has frequently been supported as a charitable trust. (m) If otherwise it would be void for uncertainty, since it would be impossible to confine a trust for relations when soever existing to next of kin by statute. It would also be void as a perpetuity, though this is not a recognized ground for varying the con

struction.

Savage.

And in the case of a simple legacy the context may show that charity and not kinship is the prevailing consideration; Mahon v. as seems to have been the case in Mahon v. Savage, (n) where the bequest was to "poor relations or such other objects of charity as the testator should mention," and Lord Redesdale held it to be a charitable bequest and not transmissible to representatives.

trusts void un

The court does not take upon itself to frame schemes for the disposal of money for any other than charitable purposes. All All indefinite moneys, therefore, not bequeathed in charity must have less for charity. some definite object, 3 or must devolve as undisposed of, (o) except in A, fo. 536,) land was given to poor relations, which, if a charity, would have been void by 36 Geo. II., c. 9 (1736). See also Widmore v. Woodroffe, Amb. 636 (stated post ch. XXIX.), where the L. C.'s arguments from uncertainty and from degrees of poverty assume that it was not a charity.

3. With reference to the matter of uncertainty and indefiniteness, it may be remarked in genera! that a stricter rule is observed in the American than in the English courts. In the latter, the established construction of the statutes of Elizabeth, and the practice that has grown up under it, has made of "charity" a

(k) Att.-Gen. v. Duke of Northumber- charm to dispel all that in another gift land, 7 Ch. D. 745.

(1) As to cy pres, see below.

(m) Isaac v. Defriez, 17 Ves. 373, n.; White v. White, 7 Ves. 423; Att.-Gen. v. Price, 17 Ves. 371; Gillam v. Taylor, L. R., 16 Eq. 581; Att.-Gen. v. Duke of Northumberland, 7 Ch. D. 745. See also this distinction made in Brunsden v. Woolredge, Amb. 508.

(n) 1 Sch. & L. 111.]

would be deemed fatal uncertainty, and the rule applied to other non-charitable trusts has been in this regard greatly enlarged. Whether this is so at all, or how far it is so in American law, is matter of disagreement between the states, and, in some instances, between the courts of the same state. The discussion to which this question has given rise, as to

[(0) Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399, 10 Id. 522; James v. Allen, 3 Mer: 17.]

cases where it may be held that the trustee takes absolutely. The general consideration of such gifts will be reserved for a subsequent chapter, as more properly falling under the head of gifts void for uncertainty; but it must be here noticed, that where the other indefinite bequest is for charitable purposes, and also for purposes of an indefinite nature not charitable, and no apportion