adverse possession of the land from the time of its occupancy, in 1848, until her death, which occurred in 1879. Her possession did not begin until 1872, after the death of her husband. Her adverse possession continued in the successor, Robert E. Little, up until the 21st day of September, 1887, when Little executed the deed to the premises and gave up possession to the appellee company. The evidence shows that Peter Rich, from whom it is claimed that Mary Anne Hunt purchased the land, received the possession on the 16th day of April, 1860. He had occupied said land from about the year 1860 until 1864, using the premises as a resort for hunting and fishing, and in the meantime had made some additions and repaired the fences, and accumulated some boats, fishnets, cows, chickens, etc., and on the date she claims to have taken possession he transferred them to William Hunt, her husband, and she was in joint possession with him from 1864 until the time of his death, in 1872, during which time, as above shown, William Hunt accepted from four different lessors who claimed to be owners in succession of the land, four different leases for successive terms of the land, covenanting therein to pay, and actually paid, rent therefor, the last of which leases bears date of January 1, 1870, and is executed by and between the said William Hunt and the defendant dock company. All of this was done with the knowledge, and apparently without the dissent, of Mary Anne Hunt. It necessarily follows that up to the time of his death, and by his acts and conduct, Mrs. Hunt, his wife, was deprived of the character and quality of adverse possession. It would make no difference whether William Hunt was principal and acting in his own behalf, or that Mary Anne Hunt was the principal and William Hunt acting as her agent. The evidence abundantly shows that Mary Anne Hunt acquiesced, until after his death, in all the acts of William Hunt relating to the land and the possession thereof.

We think the evidence abundantly shows that up to the year 1872 there was no adverse possession, and inasmuch as the adverse possession, as shown, only ran during the years between 1872 and 1887, being for a term of fifteen years, the Statute of Limitations did not run.

We think the evidence sustains the findings of the master, in which he reports that "the possession of the said premises described in the bill filed in this cause was not held by complainant and his predecessor in possession for twenty years prior to the 21st day of September, 1887, in actual, visible, notorious, exclusive, continuous and adverse possession thereof, claiming title thereto, and that the said complainant is not equitably the owner of said lands and premises described in said bill or of any interest therein, and has not, by the evidence in this cause, sustained said bill in respect thereof."

After a careful review of the evidence we are of the opinion that the decree of the superior court approving the report of the master and dismissing the bill for want of equity is correct, and the decree will accordingly be affirmed. Decree affirmed.

Subsequently, on consideration of the petition for rehearing prepared and filed in the above cause by the appellant, pro se, the court announced, through Mr. Justice BOGGS, the following additional opinion:

The petition for rehearing filed in this case is prepared in disregard of the rule of this court which directs that causes shall not be re-argued in petitions for rehearing. The petition contains fifty pages of argument, going over the case in substantially the same manner as was done in the brief and argument filed in the first instance. Admitting that this is a violation of the rule, appellant has filed, in connection with the petition for rehearing, printed suggestions, some ten pages in length, which suggestions are largely an attack upon the rule but partially devoted to the claim that there are some

peculiar features in this case that justify a departure from the rule. We have examined the petition and have considered what is said in the suggestions, and are not disposed to depart at all from the rule, which is founded upon the long experience of the court. We are not moved at all to depart from or abandon the rule. The opinion in the case has been slightly modified with reference to the statement of a fact, which in nowise affects the conclusion reached by the court or any principle of law announced in the opinion.

The petition for rehearing, being a violation of our rules, will be stricken from the files.

Petition stricken.

CHARLES D. LUSK et al.

V.

THE CITY OF CHICAGO.

Opinion filed June 23, 1904—Rehearing denied October 15, 1904.

1. RES JUDICATA-when questions are res judicata though not presented. When litigation is prosecuted to an appellate tribunal and passed upon, all questions relating to the same subject matter which were open to consideration and could have been presented are res judicata, whether they were presented or not.

2. SAME-all abjections to an ordinance must be raised on first appeal. Upon reversal of a judgment of confirmation upon the ground of insufficient description of the improvement, new objections which existed when the assessment was confirmed cannot be urged to the validity of the ordinance when the cause is re-docketed, nothing having been done in the meantime to call for new objections.

3. SAME when dismissal of petition is not a bar. Dismissal of a petition for a new assessment upon the ground that it was brought under the wrong statute does not bar a subsequent petition under the statute authorizing its presentation.

4. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS—when appointment of commissioners is unnecessary. Appointment of commissioners to estimate the deficit is not necessary in a proceeding to levy a supplemental assessment under the City and Village act of 1872, where the work is completed and accepted, bonds and vouchers issued in payment, and amount of the deficit is a mere matter of computation.

APPEAL from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. F. W. SHONKWILER, Judge, presiding.

F. W. BECKER, for appellants.

WILLIAM M. PINDELL, (EDGAR BRONSON TOLMAN, Corporation Counsel, and ROBERT REDFIELD, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE RICKS delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment of confirmation entered by the county court of Cook county in a proceeding brought by the city of Chicago to pay the unpaid balance of the cost of improving Bonney avenue from Ogden avenue to Douglas boulevard.

This case is known as the original "flat-stone" case, being the first of many cases passed upon by this court where it was held that an ordinance for paving and curbing a street, which merely stated that the curb-stones of the street about to be paved should be bedded on flat stones, without giving the dimensions of the flat stones or other details by which the size and number of such stones could be determined, was not a compliance with the statutory requirement that the ordinance should describe the "nature and character" of the improvement. (176 Ill. 207.) For this defect in the ordinance, on the objection and appeal of the present appellants, the case was reversed and the cause remanded. When the case was re-docketed in the county court, appellants, by leave of court, filed additional objections, inter alia, that the original ordinance was void as tending to create a monopoly in the provision relating to the character of the cementing material or asphaltum to be used, to-wit, "a paving cement prepared from pure Trinidad asphaltum, obtained from the pitch or asphaltum lake in the island of Trinidad." A hearing was had upon the objections, and evidence was introduced by appellants that the said

Pitch Lake, in the island of Trinidad, referred to in said ordinance, was, when said ordinance was passed and at the time of said hearing, a private property and under the absolute control of the Barber Asphalt Company, a private corporation having its principal office in the city of Chicago; that there were at least five other corporations having offices in the city of Chicago engaged in the business of selling, for street paving, asphaltum procured in the island of Trinidad and elsewhere, but not from Pitch Lake, in said island, which asphaltum was the equal, for street paving purposes, of the asphaltum obtained from said Pitch Lake, and that all of said companies and the Barber company were competitors in the business of supplying asphaltum for paving purposes in Chicago. These objections were sustained and the petition dismissed, and no appeal from the order dismissing the petition was prosecuted by the city.

On December 24, 1901, a petition for a new assessment to pay the unpaid balance of the cost of said improvement, based on a new ordinance passed December 16, 1901, to cover said deficiency, was filed. Appellants filed objections to that proceeding that the original proceedings were pending when the act of 1897, in relation to local improvements, went into effect, and therefore the new assessment proceeding should have been instituted and carried on under the act of 1872 instead of the act of 1897, under which said proceeding was instituted and carried on, and the further objection that the original ordinance was void because it tended to create a monopoly in the clause relating to asphalt from Pitch Lake, in the island of Trinidad. Upon the hearing, evidence in support of these objections was introduced, and the court, after hearing the cause, entered an order sustaining the objections and dismissing the petition. This latter order was not appealed from.

On September 22, 1903, the city filed another petition (the one now involved) for a new assessment to pay the