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Advance to Naulniah.

should move forward separately towards the enemy, and attack them in the morning of the 24th.

The disposition which the confederate Rajahs had hitherto evinced, of wishing to avoid an action, and the necessity of making a vigorous effort against their main force, afforded no other means of effecting this important object, except the one now undertaken; and therefore, the two divisions united on the 22nd; Colonel Stevenson taking the western route, and the General advancing on the eastern line of march, round the hills between the Budnapore and Jalna.

Having arrived at Naulniah on the 23rd, and there received a report of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off in the morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but were still in camp, at the distance of about six miles from the ground on which he had intended to encamp, it seemed obvious that the proposed attack was no longer to be delayed; and having, therefore, provided for the security of his baggage and stores at Nauluiah, he marched to the attack.

The importance and rapidity of this decision are strongly illustrative of our hero's military character; for if he had not adopted this spirited and judicious resolution, the enemy would probably have harassed him during the whole day of the 23rd; and, as he could afford no other security to the baggage and stores, than the entrenchments which he might be able to construct, it must have been exposed to loss, if he had waited until the 24th, according to the plan proposed for the junction of Colonel Stevenson's detachment; at all events he would have been obliged to leave more than one battalion for their protection.

There were other imperative reasons for hastening the attack, which seemed to have weighed much with him; for he considered that by this prompt measure the enemy would be kept in complete ignorance of the position of the baggage and stores; and as there was every reason to believe that the confederate Rajahs

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Battle of Assye.

would get information of Colonel Stevenson being on his march to join for the attack on the following day, it was extremely probable in that case, that they would withdraw their infantry and guns in the course of the ensuing night, in order to avoid the combined assault of the British forces. The immediate attack, therefore, as the Marquis of Wellesley afterwards declared, was a measure dictated both by prudence and courage.

The force left at Naulniah, for the protection of the stores, consisted of a battalion of sepoys, and four hundred of a native corps; when the British army moved on towards the confederates, who were found encamped between, and along the course of two rivers, the Kaitna and the Juah, towards their junction. Their line extended east and west along the north bank of the Kaitna river, the banks of which are high and rocky, and are impassable for guns, excepting at places close to the villages.

The enemy's right, consisting entirely of cavalry, was posted in the vicinity of Bokerdun, and extended to their line of infanty, which was encamped in the neighbourhood of the fortified village of ASSYE. The British army had already marched fourteen miles to Naulniah; and the distance from that place to the enemy's camp being six miles, it was one o'clock in the afternoon before the British troops came in sight of the combined army of the confederates.

Although they had arrived in front of the enemy's right, yet Major-General Wellesley determined on reconnoitring the ground, to commence his attack on the left where the guns and infantry were posted; and, accordingly, he marched round to their left flank, covering the march of the column of British infantry, by the British cavalry in the rear, and by the Peishwah's and the Mysore cavalry on the right flank; a manœuvre dictated by a consideration that a defeat of of their infantry was most likely to be effectual.

The British army now advanced, and the river Kaitna

Preparations for the battle.

Kaitna was passed at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, when the General, with quick precision formed the infanty immediately in two lines, with the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space between the Kaitna, and a nullah, or dry ravine, running parallel to it. The Mahratta and Mysore allied cavalry* he posted on the ground beyond the Kaitna and on the left flank, so that they might keep in ́check a large body of the hostile cavalry, which had followed the right of the British line of march from the right of the enemy's position. The first line of the British army consisted of the advanced picquets to the right, two battalions of sepoys, and the 78th regiment; the second line was formed by the 74th regiment, and two battalions of sepoys; and the third consisted of the 19th dragoons with three regiments of native cavalry.

This gallant little band of Britons, and their allies, amounted to no more than 1200 cavalry, European and native, 1300 European infantry and artillery, and 200 sepoys; in all about 4500 men.

The enemy's force consisted of sixteen regular battalions of infantry, amounting to 10,500 men, (exclusive of the Rajah of Berar's infantry, and the irregulars of Scindiah,) commanded by European officers, having a well equipped train of artillery, exceeding one hundred guns in number, and some very large bodies of cavalry, amounting to a number between 30 and 40,000 men.

As soon as the British troops advanced to the Kait

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* The confidence placed in these two corps by the General was fully justified by their having gallantly and faithfully performed all the duties of light troops with his army since his march from Mysore, during which time they had been frequently engaged with the enemy, and that with a degree of alacrity and zeal which has seldom been display. ed by troops of that description.

Much of this, no doubt, depended on the regularity with which the new government of Mysore, much to their credit, had attended to their various comforts and to the regularity of their pay; circumstances also operating in the same manner on the cavalry of the Reishwah.

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