Assault and failure. times he sent over Major-General Le Marchant's brigade of cavalry; and concentrated the remainder of the army between Morecsco and Cabrerizos, keeping the advanced post still at Aldea Lingua. By noon, every thing being prepared for a general action, the enemy had advanced as far as Calvarissa de Abaxo: but Marmont, observing the disposition so judiciously made for his warm reception, thought proper to retire again in the afternoon to recross the Tormes at Huerta, and from thence to the position he had before occupied.* These * Up to this period, the army was so completely occupied that the siege of the Forts did not advance with the rapidity the gallant Commander-in-Chief had expected. Indeed from the pains taken, and the expense incurred in their construction, he was prepared to meet with some difficulties, and provided an equipment accordingly; these difficulties were of a formidable nature; and the forts three in number, each defending the other, were very strong, although not of a regular construction. t By the 25th of June, there were breaches open in the Convent of St. Vincent, which was the principal work; but these could not be attacked with propriety until the assailants should get possession of San Cayetano; accordingly Major-General Clinton made an attempt to carry that work by storm on the night of the 23d, the gorge having been completely damaged by the fire from British batteries-but the attempt unfortunately failed and Major-General Bowes unhappily, but gallantly fell,** Every nerve was now strained to hasten the reduction of those forts, in order that the British army might proceed further against the enemy; and accordingly on the 26th, in the afternoon, the ammunition which was sent for having arrived, the fire was immediately recommenced upon the gorge of the redoubt of San Cayetano, in which a practicable breach was effected at about ten o'clock in the morning of the 27th, and the assailants had succeeded nearly about the same time in setting fire to the buildings in the large fort of St. Vincent, by the fire from which the approach to San Cayetano by its gorge was defended. The **The gallant Major-General was so eager for the success of the enterprise, that he had gone forward with the storming party, which consisted of a part of his brigade, and was wounded; and, after his first wound was dressed, he returned again to the assault, and received a second wound which killed him. The loss besides, both in officers and men, was considerable. Successful assault. These events were not only of importance to the general cause, but they tend also to display the cha racter The Earl of Wellington seized on the eventful moment, and instantly gave directions that the forts of St. Cayetano, and La Merced should be stormed; and some little delay occurred, in consequence of the commanding officers of these forts in the first instance, and afterwards the commanding officer of St. Vincent, having expressed a desire to capitulate after the lapse of a certain number of hours. As it was obvious, however, that those propositions were made in order to gain time, till the fire of St. Vincent should be distinguished, his Lordship refused to listen to any terms, unless the forts should be instantly sur rendered; and having found the Commanding Officer of St. Cayetano, who was the first to offer to surrender, was entirely dependant upon the Governor of St. Vincent, and could not venture to carry into execution the capitulation which he had offered to make, the Earl imme diately gave directions that the storming of that fort, and also of La Merced, should instantly take place. This gallant assault was performed in the most undaunted manner by detachments of the 6th division, under the command of LieutenantColonel Davies of the 36th regiment, under the direction of MajorGeneral Clinton. The troops entered the fort of St. Cayetano by the gorge; and escaladed that of La Merced the whole taking place with a very trifling loss on the part of the British. : The good effects of this rapidity of decision, and gallantry of execution, where soon apparent; for no sooner did the British flag display its united crosses through the retiring smoke, waving protection over those walls where the French Eagle had screamed the cry of desolation, than the governor of St. Vincent sent out to notify the surrender of that fortress, on the terms which had previously been offered. These were that the garrison should march out with the honors of war: that they should be prisoners of war; and the officers to retain their personal military baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks. With his accustomed promptitude and humanity, his Lordship deemed it expedient to accept the place by capitulation on those terms and put a stop to the attack; this was, however, a generous concession; for such were the judicious arrangements, and so ardent the inipetuosity, of the allied troops, that the 9th regiment of the Portuguese Caçadores had stormed one of the outworks, and were actually at that moment in possession of it. This was another lesson to the French that neither industry nor their valour could withstand the shock of British perseverance and British gallantry; in fact in less than three weeks, were thus carried works which had taken nearly three years in constructing, and that with increased activity for the preceding nine months. To make thea tenable, a ́large expense had been incurred; and indeed Movements of the armies. racter of the noble chieftain in the most admirable point of view; perhaps, indeed the most remarkable trait in his character upon this occasion, was the modesty with which he himself acknowledged the disappointment of his own expectations; saying that he was mistaken in his estimate of the extent of the means which would be necessary to subdue those forts, and was therefore obliged to send to the rear for a fresh supply of ammunition, thus necessarily causing a delay of six days. As soon as the enemy heard of the fall of those forts, they immediately withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes; and, indeed, it may be said that the operations were carried on in sight of Marmont's army which had remained in its position, with the right at Cabeza Vellosa, and the left at Huerta, till the night of the 27th of June, when they broke up, and retired in three columns towards the river Douro; one of them directing its march upon Toro, and the others upon Tordesillas. On the 28th Lord Wellington also broke up the cantonments of the allied army, and on the 30th of June they were encamped on the Guarena. On the 1st of July the British broke up their encampment, and the enemy having retired from Alaejos 3 N 2 indeed those works being sufficiently garrisoned with about eight hundred men, and armed with thirty pieces of artillery, were thus of a nature to render it totally impossible to take them, excepting by a regular attack; and it was obvious that the French Commander-inChief relied upon the strength, and upon their being sufficiently gar risoned, and armed, as he had left in St. Vincent large depots of clothing, and military stores of every description. Now * The total loss in these affairs on the allied side was 1 15 killed, and 382 wounded. The prisoners amounted to 706; and yet Marshal Marmont has since had the modesty to declare that these garrisons caused a greater loss to the allies than their own number amounted to. it must be remembered that even this total of the allies killed and' wounded did not absolutely take place at the attacks only, but in other partial affairs beween the two armies between the 16th and 27th of June inclusive, Cavalry skirmishes. Alaejos, they encamped that evening on the Trabancos, with the advanced guard upon Nava del Rey. The Earl of Wellington having there got information that Marmont had destroyed the bridge of Tordesillas he immediately gave orders for the British advanced guard to cross the Zapardiel, and to move upon Rueda, which took place on the morning of the 2nd supported by the left, whilst the right and centre of the army moved towards Medina del Campo. It appeared, however, soon after that the enemy had not destroyed the bridge as reported; but that their main body had retired upon Tordessillas, whilst their rear-guard was left at Rueda. On this, Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, immediately attacked their rear-guard with MajorGeneral's Anson's and Alten's brigades of cavalry, and drove them in upon the main body at Tordesillas. As the right and centre of the British army were, however, at some distance, Lord Wellington was unable to bring up a sufficient body of troops in time to attack the enemy during their passage of the Douro, and accordingly they effected that operation with but little loss, taking their position on that river, with their right on the heights opposite Pollos, their centre at Tordesillas, and their left at Simancos in the Pisuerga. His Lordship on the next day, the 3d of June, moved his left to Pollos, and obtained possession of the ford over the Douro at that place, in front of the positions of Marmont's right; but as the ford was scarcely practicable for infantry, and the enemy's corps were strongly posted, with a considerable quantity of artillery, on those heights already mentioned, which commanded the plain on which the British troops must have formed after crossing the ford; and, as at the same time, he could not with propriety establish the army on the right of the Douro until he had adequate means of passing that river, he did not at that mo t ment Advance of the British. ment think it prudent to push the advanced corps any further.* In the course of the 15th and 16th of June, the enemy moved all their troops to the right of their position on the Douro, and their army was concentrated between Toro and San Roman. A considerable body then passed the Douro at Toro on the 16th, when Lord Wellington immediately moved the allied army to their left on that night, with an intention to concentrate on the Guarena. As the Earl of Wellington most candidly and modestly observed in his public dispatches, it was totally out of his prevent Marmont from passing the Douro at any point which he might think expedient, as he had in his possession all the bridges over that river and many of the fords; however, he recrossed the Douro at Toro, on the night of the 16th, moved his whole army to Tordesillas, where he again crossed the river on the morning of the 17th, and there again assembled his army at Nava del Rey, having marched not less than ten leagues in the course of the 17th. power to The 4th and light divisions of British infantry and Major-General Anson's brigades of cavalry, had marched to Castrejon on the night of the 16th, with a view * General Bonnet who, in the latter end of June, had been at AquiJa del Campo, joined Marmont's army on the 7th of July. In fact, Marmont seems to have felt himself obliged to make every effort in his power to keep the British in check; and, in consequence of this, the moment Bonnet joined them, he exteneded his line, pushing his right as far as Toro, where he began repairing the bridge which he had be fore destroyed. Whilst the two grand armies were thus watching each other, Lieutenant-General Hill was doing good service in the south, where he kept Soult so much in check, as to prevent him from making any diversion in favour of the army of Portugal. General Hill broke up from Albuera on the 2nd of the month, and moved upon his enemy, who retired before him to Cordova; on the 9th he was at Llerena, and at that time part of Soult's force had marched upon Fuente Ovejuna from Berlenga; and General Drouet, with ten thousand men, with a very small proportion of artillery, had marched through Campillo upon Zalamea. Such was the state of af fairs in the south, previous to the important events now approaching. |