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Movements of the armies.

racter of the noble chieftain in the most admirable point of view; perhaps, indeed the most remarkable trait in his character upon this occasion, was the modesty with which he himself acknowledged the disappointment of his own expectations ; saying that he was mistaken in his estimate of the extent of the means which would be necessary to subdue those forts, and was therefore obliged to send to the rear for a fresh supply of ammunition, thus necessarily causing a delay of six days.

As soou as the enemy heard of the fall of those forts, they immediately withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes; and, indeed, it may be said that the operations were carried on in sight of Marmont's army which had remained in its position, with the right at Cabeza Vellosa, and the left at Huerta, till the night of the 27th of June, when they broke up, and retired in three columns towards the river Douro ; one of them directing its march upon Toro, and the others upon Tordesillas.

. On the 28th Lord Wellington also broke up the cantonments of the allied army, and on the 30th of June they were encamped on the Guarena.

On the 1st of July the British broke up their encampment, and the enemy having retired froin

3 N 2

Alaejos

!

indeed those works being sufficiently garrisoned with about eight hundred men, and armed with thirty pieces of artillery, were thus of a nature to render it totally impossible to take them, 'excepting by a regular attack ; and it was obvious that the French Commander-inChief relied upon the strength, and upon their being sufficiently garrisoned, and armed, as he had left in St. Vincent large depots of clothing, and military stores of every description.

* The total loss in these affairs on the allied side was I 15 killed, and 382 wounded. The prisoners amounted 10 706; and yet Marshal Mar. mont has since had the modesty to declare that these garrisons caused a greater loss to the allies than their own number amounted to. Now it must be remembered that even this total of the allies killed and wounded did not absolutely take place at the attacks only, but in other partial affairs beween the two armies between the 16th and 27th of Junc inclusive,

Cavalry skirmishes.

Alaejos, they encamped that evening on the Trabancos, with the advanced guard upon Nava del Rey. The Earl of Wellington having there got

information that Marmont had destroyed the bridge of Tordesillas he immediately gave orders for the British advanced guard to cross the Zapardiel, and to move upon Rueda, which took place on the morning of the 2nd supported by the left, whilst the right and centre of the army moved towards Medina del Campo.

It appeared, however, soon after that the enemy had not destroyed the bridge as reported; but that their main body had retired upon Tordessillas, wbilst their rear-guard was left at Rueda.

On this, Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, immediately attacked their rear-guard with MajorGeneral's Anson's and Alten's brigades of cavalry, and drove them in upon the main body at Tordesillas. As the right and centre of the British army were, however, at some distance, Lord Wellington was unable to bring up a sufficient body of troops in time to attack the enemy during their passage of the Douro, and accordingly they effected that operation with but little loss, taking their position on that river, with their right on the heights opposite Pollos, their centre at Tordesillas, and their left at Simancos in the Pisuerga.

His Lordship on the next day, the 3d of June, mov. ed his left to Pollos, and obtained possession of the ford over the Douro at that place, in front of the positions of Marmont's right; but as the ford was scarcely practicable for infantry, and the enemy's corps were strongly posted, with a considerable quantity of artillery, on those heights already mentioned, which commanded the plain on which the British troops must have formed afier crossing the ford; and, as at the saine time, he could not with propriety establish the árny on the right of the Douro until he had adequate means of passing that river, he did not at that mot

ment

Advance of the British.

ment think it prudent to push the advanced corps any further. *

In the course of the 15th and 16th of June, the enemy moved all their troops to the right of their position on the Douro, and their army was concentrated between Toro and San Roman. A considerable body then passed the Douro at Toro on the 16th, when Lord Wellington immediately moved the allied army to their left on that night, with an intention to concentrate on the Guarena. As the Earl of. Wel. lington most candidly and modestly observed in his public dispatches, it was totally out of bis power to prevent Marmont from passing the Douro at any point which he might think expedient, as he had in his possession all the bridges over that river and many of the fords; however, he recrossed the Douro at Toro, on the night of the 16th, moved his whole army to Tordesillas, where he again crossed the river on the morning of the 17th, and there again assembled his army at Nava del Rey, having marched not less than ten leagues in the course of the 17th.

The 4th and light divisions of British infantry and Major-General 'Anson's brigades of cavalry, had marched to Castrejon on the night of the 16th, with

a view

* General Bonnet who, in the latter end of June, had been at AquiJa del Campo, joined Marmontis, army on the 7th of July. In fact, Marmont seems to have felt himself obliged to make every effort in his power to keep the British in check; and, in consequence of this, the moment Bonnet joined them, he exteneded his lipe, pushing his rigbt as far as Toro, where he began repairing the bridge which he had be lore destroyed.

Whilst the two grand'armies were thus watching each other, Lieutenant-General Hill was doing good service in the soutlı, where he kept Soult so much in check, as to prevent him from making any diversion jn favour of the army of Portugal. General Hill broke up from Albuera on the 2nd of the month, and

wl retired before him to Cordova ; on the 9th he was at Llerena, and at that time part of Soult's forcé. had marched upon Fuente Orejuna from Berlenga ; and General Drouet, with ten thousand men, with a very small proportion of artillery, had marched through Campillo upon Zalamea. Such was the state of af. fairs in the south, previous to the important events now approaching.

moved upon

his enémy,

Battle of Salamanca.

a view to the assembling of the army on the Guarena and were at Castrejon under the orders of LieutenantGeneral Sir Stapleton Cotton, on the 17th, not having been ordered to proceed further, in consequence of his Lordship having got information that the enemy had not passed the Douro at Toro: and there were suffi. cient time to call them in between the hour at which he received the intelligence of the whole of the enemy's army being at La Nava, and day-light of the morning of the 18tb.

The Earl of Wellington, therefore, with a due regard to prudence, immediately took measures to provide of their retreat and junction, by moving his 5th division to Tordesillas de la Orden, and Major-Generals Marchant's, Alten's, and Bock's brigades of cavalry to Alaejos.

Marmont's advance attacked the troops at Castrejon at the dawn of day of the 18th ; but Sir Stapleton Cotton maintained his post with great firmness, without suffering any loss, till the cavalry had joined him. Nearly about the same time the enemy were enabled to turn by Alaejos the left Aank of the British position at Castrejon.

These gallant troops now retired in admirable order to Tordesillas de la Orden, having the enemy's whole army on their flank, or in their rear; and thence to the Guarena, which river they passed under the same circumstances, and then effected their junction with

the army.

The enemy were now enabled to take a very strong position on the heights on the right of the Guarena, a river which runs into the Douro, and is formed by four streams that unite about a league below Canizel. In consequence of this, the Earl of Wellington immediately placed the 4th, 5th, and light divisions, on the opposite heights, and directed the remainder of the army to cross the Upper Guarena at Vallasa, in consequence of the appearance of an intention on the part of the enemy to turn his right. .

Shortly

Spirited skirmishes.

Shortly after this, however, Marmont crossed the Guarena at Carteillo, below the junction of the streams, thereby manifesting an intention to press upon the left, and to enter the valley of canizel. At this period, Major-General Alten's brigade of cavalry, supported by the 3d dragoons, were already engaged with the enemy's cavalry, and had taken, among other prisoners, the French General Carriere ; and his Lordship immediately directed the Honourable Lieutenant-General Cole to attack with Major-General Anson's and Brigadier-General Harvey's brigades of infantry (the latter under the command of Colonel Stubbs) ihe enemy's infantry which were supporting their cavalry. He immediately attacked and defeated them with the 27th and 40th regiments, which advanced to the charge of bayonets, Colonel Stubb's Portuguese brigade supporting, and the enemy gave way; many were killed and wounded ; and MajorGeneral Alten's brigade of cavalry having pursued the fugitives, two hundred and forty prisoners were taken.

The enemy, on that day, did not make any further attempt upon the left ; but having re-inforced their troops on that side, and withdrawn those which had moved to their left, Lord Wellington immediately countermanded that part of the army at Vallesa.

On the 19th in the afternoon, Marmont withdrew all his troops from the right, and marched to his left by. Tarragona, apparently with an intention of turning the British right ; but, with the most judicious rapidity, the gallant Earl crossed the upper Guarena and Vallesa and El Olmo with the whole of the allied army in the course of that evening and night ; and then made every preparation for the battle which was expected to take place on the plain of Vallesa, on the morning or the 20th.

Marmont, however, seems not to have relished this steady appearance of the British; for instead of bring. ing them to action, be made, shortly after daylight

anothe

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