Positions of the army. 6000 hors de combat. There were also taken nearly twenty pieces of cannon, ammunition waggons, two eagles, 3P 2 made several assemblages of his forces, and some light attempts to effect this passage at Pollos, a point which for him would have been very advantageous. The troops which I had disposed, and a few cannon-shot, were sufficient to make him immediately give up his enterprise. "In continual expectation ofr eceiving succours from the army of the North, which had been promised in so solemn and reiterated a manner,* I endeavoured to add, by my own industry, to the means of the army. My cavalry was much inferior to that of the enemy. The English had nearly 5000 horse, English or German, without counting the Spaniards, formed into regular troops; I had no more than 2000. With this disproportion in what manner could one manœuvre his enemy? How avail one's self of any advantage that might be obtained ? I had but one means of augmenting my cavalry, and that was by taking the useless horses for the service of the army, or such as belonged to individuals who had no right to have them, or from such as had a greater number than they are allowed. I did not hesitate making use of this means, the imminent interest of the army, and the success of the operations, being at stake. I therefore ordered the seizure of such horses as were under this predicament; and I likewise seized a great number which were with a convoy coming from Andalusia; all upon estimation of their value, and making payment for them. This measure, executed with security, gave, in the space of eight days, 1000 more horsemen; and my cavalry, reunited, amounted to more than 3000 combatants. Meanwhile I no less hoped to receive succours from the ariny of the North, which continued its promises, the per formance of which appeared to have commenced, but of which we have not hitherto seen any effect. "The eighth division of the army of Portugal occupied the Asturias; these troops were completely isolated from the army, by the evacuation of the provinces of Leon and Benevente; they were without succours, and without any communication with the army of the North; because on the one side the Trincadores, who should have come from Bayonne, could not be sent to Gijon; and, on the other side, the General-in-Chief of the army of the North, although he had formally promised to do so, had dispensed with throwing a bridge over the Deba,† and there establishing posts. This division had been able to bring only very little ammunition, for want of means of carriage; and this was *This succour, which had been sent, could not join the army of Portugal till after the battle, and at the moment of retreat. Particular circumstances appear to have opposed the execution of this measure. Prisoners. &c. taken. eagles, six colours, one General, three Colonels, three Lieutenant-Colonels, 130 officers of inferior rank was in part consumed; nor did they know how to replace it. Its posi tion might every moment become more critical, and the enemy seriously occupied himself with it; inasmuch as if it were still thus.isolated, it would remain entirely unconnected with the important events which were taking place in the plains of Castile. General Bonnet, calculating on this state of matters, and considering, according to the knowledge he has of the country, that it is much easier to enter than depart out of it, according as the enemy might oppose the entrance or departure, he decided on evacuating this province, and on taking a position at Reynosa. There, having learnt that the army of Portugal was in presence of the English army, and that they were on the point of engaging, he did not hesitate in putting himself in motion, and rejoining it. "Strongly impressed with the importance of this suecour, and with the augmentation which my cavalry was about to receive; not having learnt any thing positive farther concerning the army of the north; and being besides informed of the march of the army of Gallicia, which, in the course of a few days, would necessarily force me to send a detachment to repulse them, I thought it my duty to act without delay. I had to fear that my situation, which was become much meliorated, might change, by losing time; whilst that of the enemy would, by the nature of things, become better every moment. "I therefore resolved on recrossing the Douro; but this operation is difficult and delicate: it cannot be undertaken without much art and eircumspection, in presence of an army in condition for battle. I em ployed the days of the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th of July, in making a number of marches and countermarches, which deceived the enemy. I feigned an attention to turn by Toro, and turned by Tordesillas, making an extremely rapid march. This movement succeeded so well, that the whole army could pass the river, move to a distance from it, and form itself, without meeting with a single enemy. "On the 17th, the army took a position at Nava del Rey. The enemy, who was in full march for Toro, could only bring two divisions with celerity to Tordesillas de la Orden; the others were recalled from different parties to re-unite themselves. “On the 18th, in the morning, we found these two divisions at Tordesillas de la Orden. As they did not expect to find the whole army joined, they thought they might, without peril, gain some time. Nevertheless, when they saw our masses coming forward, they endeavoured to effect their retreat to a ridge which commanded the village to which we were marching. "We had already reached them. If I had a cavalry superior, or equal, to that of the enemy, these two divisions would have been destroyed. We did not, however, pursue them the less with all posible vigour Battle continued.. rank, whilst the number of dead on the field was very large. Marmont himself lost his arm, which was amputated vigour: and, during three hours' march, they were overpowered by the fire of our artillery, which I caused to take them in the rear and flank, and which they could withd 'ifficulty answer: and, protected by their numerous cavalry, they divided themselves to re-ascend the Guarena, in order to pass it with the greatest facility. "Arrived upon the heights of the valley of Guarena, we saw that a portion of the English army was formed upon the left bank of that river. In that place the height of that valley are very rugged, and the valley of a middling breadth. Whether it was necessary for the troops to approach the water, on account of the excessive heat, or whether it was from some other cause of which I am ignorant, the English General had placed the greater part of them on the bottom of the valley, within half cannon-shot of the heights of which we were masters: I therefore, upon arriving, immediately ordered a battery of forty pieces of artillery to be planted, which, in a moment forced the enemy to retire, after having left a great number of killed and wounded upon the spot. The army marched in two columns; and I had given the command of the right column, distant from that of the left three quarters of a league, to General Clausel. Arrived upon this ground, General Clausel, having few troops before him, thought he was able to seize upon the two rising grounds upon the left banks of the Guarena, and preserve them; but this attack was made with few troops, his troops had not halted, and scarcely formed; the enemy perceived it, marched upon the troops, which he had thus thrown in advance, and forced them to retreat. In this battle, which was of short duration, we experienced some loss. The division of dragoons which supported the infantry vigorously charged all the English cavalry; but General Carrie, a little too far advanced from the 13th regiment, fell into the enemy's power. "The army remained in its position all the night of the 19th; it even remained in it all the day of the 20th.^ The extreme heat, and the fatigue experienced on the 18th, rendered this repose necessary to assemble the stragglers. "At four in the evening the army resumed its arms, and defiled by the left to proceed up the Guarena, and take a position in front of Olmo. My intention was, at the same time, to threaten the enemy, and continue to proceed up the Guarena, in order to pass it with facility; or, if the enemy marched in force upon the Upper Guarena, to return by a rapid movement upon the position they should have abandoned. The enemy followed my movement. "On the 20th, before day, the army was in motion to ascend the Guarena; the advanced guard rapidly passed that river, at that part where it is but a stream, and occupied the commencement of an immense piece of ground, which continued without any undulation to near Salamanca. Errors of the French. amputated after the action, and himself nearly taken prisoner during the pursuit. Four General officers also were killed, and several wounded. ་ Such Salamanca. The enemy endeavoured to occupy the same ground, but could not succeed; then he attempted to follow a parallel rising ground, connected with the position they had just quitted, and which every where offered them a position, provided I should have marched towards them. The two armies thus marched parallel with all possible celerity, always keeping their masses connected, in order to be every moment prepared for battle. The enemy, thinking to be before hand with us at the village of Cantalpiro, directed a column upon that vil lage, in the hope of being before us upon the rising ground which commands it, and towards which we marched; but their expectations were deceived. The light cavalry which I sent thither, and the Sth division, which was at the head of the column, marched so rapidly, that the enemy were obliged to abandon it; besides, the road from the other plain approaching too close to ours, and that which we had, having the advantage of commanding it with some pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, greatly annoyed the enemy; for a great part of the army was obliged to defile under this cannon, and the remainder was obliged to repass the mountain to avoid them. At last I put the dragoons in the enemy's tract. The enormous number of stragglers which were left behind would have given us an opportunity of making 3000 prisoners, had there been a greater proportion between our cavalry and their's; but the latter, disposed so as to arrest our pursuit, to press the march of the infantry by blows from the flat sides of these sabres, and to convey those who could no longer march, prevented us. Nevertheless, there fell into our hands between 3 and 400 men, and some baggage. In the evening, the army encamped upon the heights of Aldea Rubea, having its post upon the Tormes. The enemy reached the position of San Christoval. "On the 21st, having been informed that the enemy did not occupy Alba de Tormes, I threw a garrison into it. The same day I passed the river in two columns, taking my direction by the skirts of the woods, and established my camp between Alba de Tormes and Salamanca, My object in taking this direction was to continue the movement by my left, in order to drive the enemy from the neighbourhood of Salamanca, and fight them with greater advantage. I depended upon taking a good defensive position, in which the enemy could undertake nothing against me; and in short come near enough them to take advantage of the first faults they might make, and vigorously attack them. "On the 22d in the morning, I went upon the heights of Calbaraca de Azzeva to reconnoitre the enemy. I found a division which had just arrived there; others were in march for the same place. Some firing took Result of the victory. Such an advantage could not be gained without an adequate loss on the British side, but it was not of a magnitude took place for the purpose of occupying the posts of observation, of which we respectively remained masters. Every thing announced that it was the enemy's intention to occupy the position of Trejares, which was a league in the rear of that in which he then was, distant a league and a half from Salamanca: they, however, assembled considerable forces upon this point; and, as their movement upon Trejares might be difficult if all the French army was in sight. I thought it right to have it ready to act as circumstances required. "There were between us and the English some isolated points called. the Arapiles. I ordered General Bonnet to occupy that which be longed to the position we ought to take; his troops did so with promptitude and dexterity. The enemy ordered their's to be occupied ; but it was commanded by our's at 250 toises' distance. '. I had destined this point, in the event of there being a general movement by the left, and a battle taking place, to be the pivot and point of support of the right to all the army. The first division had orders to occupy and defend the ridge of Calbaraca which is protected by a large and deep ravine. The 3d division was in the 2nd line, destined to support it, and the 2nd 4th, 5th, and 6th, were at the head of the wood en masse, behind the position of Arapiles, and could march equally on all sides; whilst the 7th division occupied the left head of the wood, which formed a point. extremely uneven, and of very difficult access, which I had lined with 20 pieces of artillery. The light cavalry was charged to clear the left, and place itself in advance of the 7th division. The dragoons remained in the 2nd line, to the right of the army. Such were the dispositions made towards the middle of the day. The enemy had his troops parallel to me, extending his right by leaning towards the mountain of Trejares, which always appeared to be his point of retreat. There was in front of the ridge occupied by the artillery another vast ridge, easy of defence, and which had a more immediate effect on the enemy's movements. The possesion of this ridge gave me the means, in case I should have manoeuvred towards the evening, of carrying myself on the enemy's communications on Tomames. This post, which was otherwise well occupied, was inexpungable; and in itself completed the position which I had taken. It was, besides, indespensably necessary to occupy it, seeing that the enemy had re-inforced his centre, from whence he might push forward en masse on this ridge, and commence his attack by taking this important point. In consequence, I gave orders to the 5th division to take position on the right extremity of this ridge, the fire from which exactly crossed that from Arapiles, to the 7th division, to place itself in a second line to s support this; to the 2nd to hold itself in reserve to the latter: and to the 6th to occupy the ridge at the head of the wood, where a large |