the Act of 1853 was intended to make void all accumulations of income for longer than the life of the grantor or testator and twenty-one years thereafter, in this remark overlooking the qualification introduced by the dictum in Washington's Estate. He then said that there was no direction to accumulate, and that the term was fixed at twenty years, from which it may be inferred that the learned judge thought that the accumulation in the case would be valid. It may also be inferred from his remarks that the act can only be taken advantage of by the parties entitled to the income directed to be accumulated, and that no question as to accumulation was before the court, since no such parties were claiming the accumulations. As the son was living in 1853, he was of the age of twenty-one years and upwards at the date of the death of the testatrix, which, according to the report in 13 Phila., was in 1876. This was a clear case of an accumulation of the income not for a minor and not of the income of a minor, and not to be sustained in any view.3 Conrow's Appeal 634. In Conrow's Appeal the testator created a temporary trust in the executors, by which the time of the enjoyment of the possession of the fee was postponed, to take effect when A., a son, should reach the age of twenty-five years. The case arose on a controversy between the trustees and the cestui que trust for rents of a property belonging to the trust estate. The court held that the trustee was entitled to the rent; that this was an active subsisting trust, and was not contrary to the Act of April 18, 1853, providing against trusts for accumulation. The fact that the trustee was entitled to the rent would not prevent the cestui que trust from claiming the accumulation. As A. was still a minor, there was another reason why no question concerning the accumulation was before the court. If there was a direction to accumulate, it was clearly void in so far as it applied to the income due A. between the time. he reached twenty-one and the time he reached twenty-five. If the dictum went to this point it was probably erroneous. 275 Pa. 102 (1874), stated §632, ante. 3 Mr. Gray, Rule Perp., 2 ed. (1906), $717, n. 2, says of this case: "The case is blindly reported, but it would seem that under the statute the income should have Prentice v. Pleasonton 635. In Prentice v. Pleasonton there was 5 a gift in trust to pay certain specific legacies and accumulate the surplus income, if any, and divide the same, with the principal, upon the death of certain persons. There was a specific decree of the Orphans' Court entered, directing the trustees to accumulate in pursuance of the provisions of the will. The direction to accumulate was plainly void, and the decree of the Orphans' Court in that particular, improper, and the point was apparently overlooked by the court and counsel. It may be that no question as to the validity of the direction to accumulate was raised by anyone entitled to the income. If this was so, that part of the decree directing the accumulations to remain in the hands of the trustee, would be proper; that part, however, directing them to be added to principal, was improper, in any view of the case. Ward's Estate 636. In Ward's Estate' there was a direction to accumulate and add the accumulations to principal. Two of the minor cestuis que trustent who were of age made an application at the audit of the trustee's account to have the principal distributed. The direction to accumulate was plainly void in so far as there was a direction to accumulate after any grandchild reached twenty-one and in so far as the direction to add the capital was concerned. Strangely enough, no question as to the accumulations was raised, although it is impossible to see how, if the grandchildren were of age and applied for the payment to them of the accumulated income, such application could have been refused. It may be that the trustees paid over the income directed to be accumulated without an order of court. Levy's Estate 9 637. In Levy's Estate there was a gift of the principal in trust to pay the income for the support of testator's wife, 56 Sadler's Cases, 90 (1887); see Dugan's Est., 18 Phila. 89 (1886). A similar decree seems to have been inadvertently entered in Howell's Est., 5 W. N. C. 430 (1878). 713 W. N. C. 282 (1883). See $350, ante, as to the application of the rule against perpetuities. Is not to be distinguished from the will in Stille's App., 4 W. N. C. 42 (1877); s. c. 11 Phila. 31 (1875). 153 Pa. 174 (1893); see $312, ante. with the further provision that she was not to have power to dispose of the same by will, but that any portion of the income not used was to be considered part of the residuary estate. This, of course, amounted to a direction to accumulate the income, although not noticed by the court. The case arose on an application by the personal representatives of the widow, against the trustees of the husband's will, to receive the income which was accumulated and due at the time of her decease, and which had not been paid her. The court directed the payment of the accumulation to the representatives of the widow, on the ground that the subsequent clause, that she should have no power to will, was inconsistent with the previous gift of the life estate and void. The power to dispose by will is not a necessary incident of a life estate. The question, therefore, in this case was not whether the prohibition of testamentary power was valid or not, but whether the testator could direct that the income, which his wife did not take from the trustees before her death, should become a part of the residuary estate. Summary of the Cases and Statement of Pennsylvania Law as to Valid Directions to Accumulate 1 639. Washington's Estate is the leading case on the subject in Pennsylvania, and the dictum of the case, however illogical and objectionable the reasoning adduced in its support, has been buttressed by many subsequent decisions. It cannot be reconciled, however, with the subsequent cases of Williams' 1 75 Pa. 102 (1874), stated §632, ante. 2 A direction to pay certain annuities or a certain sum to a life tenant and accumulate the balance during the lifetime of the annuitant or the life tenant, is void; Grim's App., 109 Pa. 391 (1885), same will before the court on another point in Grim's Est., 12 W. N. C. 354 (1882); Rhodes' Est., 147 Pa. 227 (1892); McKee's App., 96 Pa. 277 (1880). An express direction to accumulate and no disposition of accumulations is void; Schwartz's App., 119 Pa. 337 (1888). Where the direction is to accumulate the income of a minor, the accumulations must be paid to the minor on arriving at age; Farnum's Est., 191 Pa. 75 (1899). A direction by testatrix to accumulate the income of her estate until the death or probate of the will of her husband, is void: dictum, Penrose, J., in Brooks' Est., 140 Pa. 84 at 88 (1891). A direction to accumulate during the life of A., and pay the accumulations at her death to testator's brother and sisters is void: Matter of Sergeant, 11 Phila. 8 (1875); see also Martin's Est., 185 Pa. 51 (1898); Edwards's Est., 190 Pa. 177 (1899). A direction that surplus fund should be held to make up deficiencies in future years is void: Mitcheson's Est., 11 W. N. C. 547 (1882). A direction to accumulate until the 3 6 Estate and Prentice v. Pleasonton, or with the dicta in Conrow's Appeal and Ward's Estate. There are also a number of other dicta which are inconsistent with the decision in Washington's Estate, which are collected in the note." The weight of authority probably is in favor of the construction laid down in Washington's Estate, a construction which has at least the merit of simplicity. No income can be accumulated unless it is the income of a minor, and the accumulations must be paid to the minor upon arriving at the age of twenty-one.8 Must the Interest of the Minor be Vested for the Direction to Accumulate to be Valid? 640. If the gift of the income is contingent, it may vest in one not a minor, and consequently the direction to accumulate may turn out to be invalid under the act. No case deciding whether the direction is valid has been found." The youngest child of A. shall reach twentyone, and then pay the accumulations to the children of A. is void: Mellon's Est., 16 Phila. 323 (1884); s. c. sub nom. Gowen's App., 106 Pa. 288 (1884). Direction to accumulate until twenty-five, void as to all beyond twenty-one: Young's Est., 16 D. R. 541 (1907). 313 Phila. 325, s. c. 8 W. N. C. 310 (1880), stated §633, ante. 46 Sadler's Cases, 90 (1887), stated $635, ante. 5 3 Penny. 356 (1883), stated $634, ante. 613 W. N. C. 282 (1883), stated §636, ante. 7 Gordon, J., in McKee's App., 96 Pa. 277, at 284 (1880), said: "The extreme period allowed for accumulations by the act is twenty-one years, with the additional allowance of the ordinary period of gestation. Here the time is indefinite. It may be much more than twenty-one years, for it depends on the life of Mrs. McKee." Traces of this dictum are to be found in Schwartz's App., 119 Pa. 337 (1880) and Edwards's Est., 190 Pa. 177 (1899). The dictum seems to give countenance to the probably erroneous notion that a direction for an indefinite period in part violates the statute, and that a direction to accumulate for a definite period might be valid. In Vastine's Est., 190 Pa. 443 (1899), the validity of a direction to accumulate until twenty-three was tacitly recognized; the point was not raised. In Stephens v. Dayton, 220 Pa. 522 (1908), Mestrezat, J., said at 526 that the trust in that case did not violate the statute that prevents accumulations beyond the life or lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter; a statement so obviously erroneous that it must have been a slip of the pen on the part of the learned judge. For all that appeared in the report, which unfortunately is very imperfect, the remark was a dictum. 8 The Act of 1853 was only intended to apply to citizens of Pennsylvania, and a trust intended to take effect beyond the bounds of the State of Pennsylvania cannot be affected by it: Fowler's App., 125 Pa. 383 (1889). There was probably such a contingent gift in Howell's Est., 5 W.N.C. 430 (1878), although the point was not raised; see Gray, Rule Perp., 2 ed. (1906), §718, n. 2; see also Mellon's Est., 16 Phila. 323 (1884). invalidity of such a direction is, however, the logical conscquence of the construction of the act adopted by the Supreme Court. Where the Minor is Born After Testator's Death-Successive Minorities 641. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not had occasion to consider how far an accumulation can be directed of the income of a minor born after the testator's death, or for a succession of minorities, in each of which cases, if the direction were valid, there would be a period of accumulation during the minority or minorities falling beyond the twenty-one year period. There are dicta that the act applies,10 but it is submitted that the act does not apply.' The accumulation taking place after that part of the minority or subsequent minorities falling beyond the period of twenty-one years marked out by the act, is an accumulation taking place under the policy of the law." Time of Going Into Effect 642. The act applies to the will of a person dying after the 18th day of April, 1853, even though the will is dated before that time, and although the act contains no provision 10 3 See In re Cattell, (1907) 1 Ch. Div. 567 where it was decided under the fourth clause of the English act that the minor need not be born at the date of the testator's death. "But wherever a testator has directed an accumulation which will only commence in the event of the beneficial owner being a minor, and which will be limited by and engross only such income as would have been otherwise accumulated by force of law during such minority, the trust for accumulation seems to be founded on a different principle unproductive of mischief, within the express words of this clause, and not impeachable from any reported case." Hargrave on the Thellusson Act, 131, 132 (1842). 1 Penrose, J., in Furness Minors' Est., 14 W. N. C. 391 (1884), said: "It is far from clear that the Act contemplated an accumulation through a succession of minorities; certainly a trust for this purpose which might last, as in the case of the youngest of the present minors, for more than twenty-one years after the expiration of a life or lives in being at the death of the testator, would transgress not only the Act of Assembly, but would be void as creating a perpetuity." It to be is observed, however, that the learned judge gave no reason for his doubts, that the point was not before him for decision, and that his attention does not seem to have been called to the principle of law which permits the accumulation of the income of a minor in any event, whether so directed or not. See also Penrose, J., in the court below in McBride's Est., 152 Pa. 192 at 196 (1893). 2 See §615, ante. 3 The act provides: "This (section) shall take effect and be in force as well in respect to wills heretofore made by per |