requires. As, however, the law on the subject is somewhat intricate, and there are a number of special principles involved, it has been found necessary to devote a separate chapter to the discussion. We shall first examine the nature of a charitable object and then point out the particulars in which the rules against perpetuities, etc., apply.

Preliminary Discussion of the Nature of a Charitable Object

716. A consideration of the reason why gifts for charitable objects are allowed as exceptions to the principles of public policy which we have discussed, will be helpful in forming a correct idea of a charitable object.3 This principle of public policy is against the settlement of property for the benefit of an individual or his descendants. Therefore, a gift, which is altruistic, considered from the standpoint of the donor, toward the community at large, is charitable. The character of the object is the material point. And the notion that the motive of the donor is material has long since been exploded. There is a difficulty which springs from a looseness in the use of the word charity. A thing is said to be a charity, such as an act of charity, the giving of something to the poor, and, so also, an institution or a fund producing income for charity is said to be a charity. The word, it will be observed, is used in two different senses, one as meaning the giving, the other as the thing given. It is also used as meaning the object of the gift, and the latter is, it is apprehended, the proper legal meaning and is the sense in which it is used in this treatise.

Definition by Mr. Justice Gray

4

717. Many attempts have been made to define a charitable object. The best perhaps is that by Mr. Justice Gray which is as follows: "A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift to be applied, consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works,

3 See §13, ante, for a discussion of this point.

In Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539 at 556 (1867).

or otherwise lessening the burdens of government. It is immaterial whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described as to show that it is charitable in its nature." A gift to a charity is distinguishable solely by the character of the object, and may possibly be in violation of some rule of law, as, for instance, the rule against perpetuities, and yet be charitable. That part, therefore, of the learned judge's definition which requires that the gift be consistent with existing laws, seems to be inaccurate. Furthermore, the gift may be to a definite charitable corporation. The definition, therefore, appears to be too narrow in so far as it is confined to indefinite objects.

Not Possible to Define a Charitable Object

5 Perry, Trusts, 5 ed. (1899), Vol. 2, 8715.

See §§11-13, ante.

7 The rule against perpetuities, the rule forbidding the creation of restraints against alienation, and the rule forbidding the imposition of restraints on enjoyment. 8 In the following cases, the objects indicated were held charitable:

6

8

718. It is impossible to accurately define a charitable object. The court cannot bind itself by defining a charity, for if it did so, there would be danger, on the one hand, of unduly limiting the altruistic impulses of the community or, on the other hand, of affording an opportunity for dispositions violating those principles of public policy which find their expression in the three rules of law which we are considering. A number of cases have been collected in the note, illustrating some 142 (1888); Church's Petition, 166 Pa. 43 (1895). For Protestant Episcopal Church: Nicholson v. Daniel, 152 Pa. 461, (1893). For public use schoolhouse, meeting-house and graveyard: Trustees v. Sturgeon, 9 Pa. 321 (1848). Schoolhouse and house of public worship: McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. 140 (1851). Parsonage and burial ground: Supplee v. Hansell, 17 Pa. 384 (1851). For graveyard: Pearson v. Hartman, 100 Pa. 84 (1882). A devise of real estate to a church in trust to devote the income to keeping testator's family lot in a graveyard in order, and to distribute the balance, within specified limits as to amounts, to home or foreign missions for the spread of Christianity, and the residue among the needy poor of the vicinity, as the trustees and their successors may think best: Nauman v. Weidman, 182 Pa. 263 (1897). For foreign missionary work: Presbyterian Board v. Culp, 151 Pa. 467 (1892). To the

RELIGIOUS: To the support of the Gospel among the colored people of the cities of Pittsburg and Allegheny: Pulpress v. Church, 48 Pa. 204 (1864). For Methodist camp-meeting: Saxton v. Mitchell, 78 Pa. 479 (1875). For religious congregations, churches, and meetinghouses: App v. Congregation, 6 Pa. 201 (1847); Beaver v. Filson, 8 Pa. 327 (1848); Griffitts v. Cope, 17 Pa. 96 (1851); Keiper's App. 124 Pa. 193 (1889) (Church); Fidelity Ins. Co.'s App., 99 Pa. 443 (1882); Brown v. Church, 23 Pa. 495 (1854); Latshaw's App., 122 Pa.

9

of the objects which have been held charitable or non-charitable, from which the learned reader can form a tolerably accurate idea of the nature of a charity. It seems to be a common notion that a gift to a charity is a gift to an uncertain or indefinite object or indefinite number of persons, and that if the object is certain the gift cannot be charitable.10 This idea is inaccurate. A gift may be for indefinite or definite objects, and in either case the objects may or may not be charitable. That this is so will appear from the discussion of the nature of indefinite and definite objects which is next in order.

Preliminary Discussion of the Nature of Indefinite Objects

720. The objects of the gift may be said to be indefinite in two senses: (1) where there is an uncertainty in the language describing the object, a case of defective designation; (2) where the objects are in themselves uncertain and indefinite, although the language is free from ambiguity. A case of defective designation occurs where the donor has expressed himself in so vague or imperfect a manner, that it is impossible to ascertain from the language used what objects are to take. In such case evidence is admissible to repair, as it is said, the defective designation,' and a discussion of the principles involved belongs more properly to a treatise on the law of wills. Where the language of the gift is clear, the objects may be said to be uncertain in three cases: (1) where the gift is to an unas certained person, an example of which would be a gift to the heir of A., a living person: gifts of this kind do not concern us here, as they are clearly non-charitable. (2) A gift to a class. (3) A gift to a non-personal object, as a gift to build a college, repair a grave, or the like. Gifts of the third class can arise only where there is a trust, and the discussion of them will be postponed to another part of the

lence are confined exclusively to its contributing members: Swift v. Beneficial Soc., 73 Pa. 362 (1873). Odd Fellows' Lodge: Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle, 151 (1835) dictum; Blenon's Est., Brightly, 338 (1843). Trust for an "English schoolhouse and no other purpose:" Kirk v. King, 3 Pa. 436 (1846).

9 See Gray, Rule Perp., 2 ed. (1906), $680.

10

Pepper & Lewis's Digest of Decisions, Vol. II, col. 2754; Gray, Rule Perp., 2 ed. (1906), $680.

1 For cases involving this principle, see Domestic & Foreign Miss. Society's App., 30 Pa. 425 (1858); Pepper's Est., 154 Pa. 331 (1893); Croxall's Est., 162 Pa. 579 (1894); Amberson's Est., 204 Pa. 397 (1903). For an example of an insensible trust, see Newell's App., 24 Pa. 197(1855)