reach of want, without the responsibilities of caring for wealth or the necessity of work, is contrary to this principle of public policy for two reasons: first, it produces an artificial inequality, and second, it deteriorates the character of the person provided for, and if there are many such, the general quality of the race will be lowered. There is no objection to an individual receiving a large fortune by way of gift, provided he has unfettered control of it. If he has the sense to keep the property, he can and probably will make proper use of it, and is not an undesirable member of the community. Reasonable opportunity must be afforded, on the one hand, for the gratification of natural affection and the desire to provide for offspring, but on the other hand, the door must be closed on the undue gratification of the wish, common to most parents of wealth, to preserve their descendants in an advantageous position without the danger of falling therefrom through incompetence and folly. Reason for Exception as to a Charity 13. A charitable gift is not within the public policy sustaining these rules, because money devoted to charity does not produce any of the evils mentioned in the last section. Consequently where a charitable gift cannot be sustained within. reasonable limits without violating the restraining rules of law," an exception will be allowed.' That this is the underlying thought of a charitable gift, is shown by the persistence with which the motive of the donor is dwelt upon in the attempt to define it. The motive need not be altruistic, but the object of the gift must be, and while, therefore, it is fair to assume that in such case the motive also is charitable, such assumption is unnecessary. Mr. Gray's Reason 14. Mr. Gray suggests that when ownership of property is in danger of being lost by a future contingency, the property is not likely to be used with the same energy and interest as it would were the contingency absent. This reason goes to The rule against perpetuities; the rule forbidding restraints on alienation; and the rule forbidding restraints on use and enjoyment. 8 7 For the exact application of the rules, see Chap. 26 on Charitable Gifts. 8 Gray, Rule Perp., 2 ed. (1906), §603f. the rule against perpetuities and has force, but has force, but does not explain, as Mr. Gray observes, the exception as to a charitable gift. Furthermore, the more remote the contingency, the more energy in the present use, as the probability of losing the property will be less present to the mind. A man who is going to lose his property in ninety-five or one hundred and fifty years is not likely to bother himself much about that remote contingency, whereas if he may lose it in three or five years, his attitude towards the use of the property will be radically different. It is apprehended, therefore, that the reason suggested by Mr. Gray is not a sufficient explanation either of the rule or the exception in the case of a gift to a charity. The Application of the Principle of Public Policy 15. The expression of this principle of public policy in the rule forbidding restraints on alienation and the rule forbidding restraints on use and enjoyment, is clear. It is plainly the effect of such restrictions to prevent the free circulation of property and to protect the holder from the consequences of his own lack of discretion. The application of the rule against perpetuities is not so clear. It is this: if the donor can create interests to begin at indefinite times in the future, he can create a succession of life estates in his descendants, which will result in keeping the property in his family to the remotest generation, and in restraining the dominion of each successive owner to his life only, and it is this very kind of a settlement that it is the purpose of this principle of public policy to prevent." The principles relating to restrictions on involuntary alienation are somewhat different, and are cussed at another point.10 9 See $8252-254. 10 For further discussion of the object of the rule against perpetuities, see §§332-333. Chap. 5. Uses and Trusts before the Statute of 27, Henry VIII. Chap. 7. Trusts. Title acquired in eminent domain. Confusion in terminology as to modified fees in Pennsylvania. § 28 § 27 Summary as to modified fees.. § 29 § 30 Alienability of Land in Feudal Times 18. Two theories have been entertained as to the alienability of land at the early common law. The first theory is that land was alienable, and that restrictions on that alienability gradually grew up.' The other, that land was inalienable, and that powers of alienation were subsequently acquired from time to time. The latest authority on the subject says that we cannot start from absolute alienability or absolute inalienability, but from a state of affairs in which the lord This was the view held by Coke, 2nd Inst., 65; Coke, Lit., 43a. 2 This was the view held by Blackstone, Com. II, 71, 72. |