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II.

Continuation of the Subject. Of that Permanence or Stability in the Order of Nature, which is presupposed in our Reasonings concerning Contingent Truths.

I HAVE already taken notice of a remarkable principle of the mind, (whether coeval with the first exercise of its powers, or the gradual result of habit, it is not at present material to inquire,) in consequence of which, we are irre sistibly led to apply to future events the results of our past experience. In again resuming the subject, I do not mean to add any thing to what was then stated concern. ing the origin or the nature of this principle; but shall confine myself to a few reflections on that established order in the succession of events, which it unconsciously assumes as a fact; and which, if it were not real, would render human life a continued series of errors and disappointments. In any incidental remarks that may occur on the principle itself, I shall consider its existence as a thing universally acknowledged, and shall direct my attention chiefly to its practical effects;-effects which will be found to extend equally to the theories of the learned, and to the prejudices of the vulgar. The question with regard to its origin is, in truth, a problem of mere curiosity; for of its actual influence on our belief, and on our conduct, no doubts have been suggested by the most sceptical writers.

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Before entering, however, upon the following argument, it may not be superfluous to observe, with respect to this expectation, that, in whatever manner it at first arises, it cannot fail to be mightily confirmed and strengthened by habits of scientific research; the tendency of which is to familiarize us more and more with the simplicity and the uniformity of physical laws, by gradually reconciling with them, as our knowledge extends, those phenomena which we had previously been disposed to consider in the light of exceptions. It is thus that, when due allowances are made for the different circumstances of the two events, the ascent of smoke appears to be no less a proof of the law of gravitation than the fall of a stone. This simplification and generalization of the laws of nature is one of the greatest pleasures which philosophy yields; and the growing confidence with which it is anticipated, forms one of the chief incentives to philosophical pursuits. Few experiments, perhaps, in physics, afford more exquisite delight to the novice, or throw a stronger light on the nature and object of that science, than when he sees, for the first time, the guinea and the feather drop together in the exhausted receiver.

In the language of modern science, the established order in the succession of physical events is commonly referred (by a sort of figure or metaphor) to the general laws of nature. It is a mode of speaking extremely convenient from its conciseness, but is apt to suggest to the fancy a groundless, and indeed absurd analogy between the material and the moral worlds. As the order of society results from the laws prescribed by the legislator, so the order of the universe is conceived to result from certain laws established by the Deity. Thus, it is customary to

say, that the fall of heavy bodies towards the earth's surface, the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and the motions of the planets in their orbits, are consequences of the law of gravitation. But although, in one sense, this may be abundantly accurate, it ought always to be kept in view, that it is not a literal but a metaphorical statement of the truth; a statement somewhat analogous to that poetical expression in the sacred writings, in which God is said "to have given his decree to the seas, that they should not pass his commandment." In those political associa tions from which the metaphor is borrowed, the laws are addressed to rational and voluntary agents, who are able to comprehend their meaning, and to regulate their conduct accordingly; whereas, in the material universe, the subjects of our observation are understood by all men to be unconscious and passive, (that is, are understood to be unchangeable in their state, without the influence of some foreign and external force) and consequently the order so admirably maintained, amidst all the various changes which they actually undergo, not only implies intelligence in its first conception, but implies, in its continued existence, the incessant agency of power, executing the purposes of wise design. If the word law, therefore, be, in such instances, literally interpreted, it must mean a uniform mode of operation, prescribed by the Deity to himself; and it has accordingly been explained in this sense by some of our best philosophical writers, particularly by Dr. Clarke. In employing, however, the word with an

*So likewise Halley, in his Latin verses prefixed to Newton's Principia:

"En tibi norma poli, et divæ libramina molis,

Computus en Jovis; et quas, dum primordia rerum
Pangeret, amníparens leges violare Creator

Noluit."

exclusive reference to experimental philosophy, it is more correctly logical to consider it as merely a statement of some general fact with respect to the order of nature;—a fact which has been found to hold uniformly in our past experience, and on the continuance of which, in future, the constitution of our mind determines us confidently to rely.

After what has been already said, it is hardly necessary to take notice of the absurdity of that opinion, or rather of that mode of speaking, which seems to refer the order of the universe to general laws operating as efficient causes. Absurd, however, as it is, there is reason to suspect, that it has, with many, had the effect of keeping the Deity out of view, while they were studying his works. To an incautious use of the same very equivocal phrase, may be traced the bewildering obscurity in the speculations of some eminent French writers, concerning its metaphysical import. Even the great Montesquieu, in the very first chapter of his principal work, has lost himself in a fruitless attempt to explain its meaning, when, by a simple statement of the essential distinction between its lite. ral and its metaphorical acceptations, he might have at once cleared up the mystery. After telling us that "laws, in their most extensive signification, are the necessary relations (les rapports nécessaires) which arise from the nature of things, and that, in this sense, all beings have their laws;-that the Deity has his laws; the material world its laws; intelligences superior to man their laws; the brutes their laws; man his laws;"-he proceeds to remark, "That the moral world is far from being so well governed as the material; for the former, although it has its laws, which are invariable, does not ob

serve these laws so constantly as the latter." It is evident that this remark derives whatever plausibility it pos sesses from a play upon words; from confounding moral laws with physical; or, in plainer terms, from confound. ing laws which are addressed by a legislator to intelligent beings, with those general conclusions concerning the established order of the universe, to which, when legitimately inferred from an induction sufficiently extensive, philosophers have metaphorically applied the title of Laws of Nature. In the one case, the conformity of the law with the nature of things, does not at all depend on its being observed or not, but on the reasonableness and moral obligation of the law. In the other case, the very definition of the word law supposes that it applies universally; insomuch that, if it failed in one single instance, it would cease to be a law. It is, therefore, a mere quibble to say, that the laws of the material world are better observed than those of the moral; the meaning of the word law, in the two cases to which it is here applied, being so totally different, as to render the comparison or contrast, in the statement of which it is involved, altogether illusory and sophistical. Indeed, nothing more is necessary to strip the proposition of every semblance of plausibility, but an attention to this verbal ambiguity.*

I do not recollect any instance in the writings of Montesquieu, where he has reasoned more vaguely than in this chapter; and yet I am inclined to believe, that few chapters in the Spirit of Laws have been more admired. "Montesquieu (says a French writer) paroissoit à Thomas le premier des écrivains, pour la force et l'étendue des idées, pour la multitude, la profondeur, la nouveauté des rapports. Il est incroyable (disoit-il) tout ce que Montesquieu a fait apperçeuoir dans ce mot si court, le mot Loi." (Nouveau Diction. Historique, Art. Thomas. Lyon, 1814.

For some important remarks on the distinction between moral and physical laws, see Dr. Ferguson's Institutes of Moral Philosophy, last edit.

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