proving in common form, and proving in a case of contention (c). For in connection with the court, and under its control, there are subordinate jurisdictions called "District Registries," held within various country districts set forth in a schedule to the Act; over each of which jurisdictions presides a "District Registrar;" and the Act provides, that in any of these registries all wills may be proved and administrations granted, (without resorting to the principal court,) where the testator or intestate had, at the time of his death, a fixed place of abode in the particular district, and where the business is in "common form," involving no contention as to the right of proof or grant (d).

III. Our third head of inquiry is, the manner of granting administration. If the deceased died intestate, then letters of administration (e) were granted by the ordinary or by the metropolitan, according to the distinctions with respect to bona notabilia before stated in the case of probate, to such administrator as the statutes of Edward the third and Henry the eighth, before mentioned, direct (f). But the grant is now, by the same section of 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, just cited, to be made in future by the Court of Probate. As to the person to whom the office is to be thus granted, the following rules have been hitherto obligatory on the ordinary; and will for the future be so, on the new court by which he is superseded.

1. Administration of the goods and chattels of the wife must be granted [to the husband, or his representatives (g):

(c) Vide sup. p. 203.

(d) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, ss. 2, 46 -48. In contentious cases, where the estate is small, resort may be had to the new County Court, ss. 54 -59.

(e) As to letters of administration, see Sewercrop v. Day, 1 Will. Woll. & Hodg. 463. On all letters of administration granted, there are ad valorem duties payable; as to which

see the statutes cited, sup. p. 203, n. (u).

(f) Vide sup. p. 197. As to the grant of administration in certain cases where the Crown is concerned, to the solicitor to the treasury, see 15 & 16 Vict. c. 3.

(g) Johns v. Rowe, Cro. Car. 106; stat. 29 Car. 2, c. 3; Squib v. Wyn, 1 P. Wms. 381.

[and of the husband's effects, to the widow, or next of kin ; but the court may grant it to either, or both, at its discretion (h). 2. Among the kindred, those are to be preferred that are the nearest in degree to the intestate; but of persons in equal degree, the court may take which it pleases. 3. This nearness or propinquity of degree shall be reckoned according to the computation of the civilians (i),] as expressed in the subjoined table, which allows one degree for each person in the line of descent, exclusively of him from whom the computation begins; and in the direct line counts the degrees from the deceased to his relative, but between collaterals, the sum of the degrees from the deceased to the common ancestor, and from the common ancestor to the relative; differing as regards collaterals from the canonists, who begin from the common ancestor and reckon downwards, and in whatever degree the two persons, or the most remote of them, is distant from the common ancestor, consider them as related in that degree to each other (k). And therefore [in the first place the children, or (on failure of children) the parents of the deceased, are entitled to the administration; both children and parents, indeed, being in the first degree; but with us (1) the children are allowed the preference (m).] Then follow brothers and sisters (n), and next to these, grand

(h) Fawtry v. Fawtry, 1 Salk. 36; Stra. 532.

(i) Prec. Chan. 593; Gilb. Ten. 9; R. v. Dr. Hay, 1 Bl. Rep. 641.

(k) 2 Bl. Com. 206, 207, 504; Toller's Executors, 87-90, 2d edit.; Lloyd v. Tench, 2 Ves. sen. 215.

(1) Godolph. p. 2, c. 35, s. 1; 2 Vern. 125; Toller's Executors, 90.

(m) In Germany there was a long dispute whether a man's children should inherit his effects during the life of their grandfather; which depends, (as we shall see hereafter,) on the same principles as the granting of administrations. At last it was

agreed at the diet of Arensberg, about the middle of the tenth century, that the point should be decided by combat. Accordingly, an equal number of champions being chosen on both sides, those of the children obtained the victory, and so the law was established in their favour, that the issue of a person deceased shall be entitled to his goods and chattels in preference to his parents. Mod. Un. Hist. xxix.

28.

(n) Prec. Chancery, 527; Blackborough v. Davis, 1 P. Wms. 41.

fathers and grandmothers: for though all these are in the second degree, yet we give the preference to brothers and sisters (o). Next to these are [uncles and nephews (p), (and the females of each class respectively); and, lastly, cousins. 4. The half blood is admitted to the administration as well as the whole, for they are of the kindred of the intestate;] and though they were formerly excluded from the inheritance of land, yet this was upon feudal reasons only, which have nothing to do with personal estate (q). Therefore [the brother of the half blood shall exclude the uncle of the whole blood (r); and the court may grant administration to the sister of the half, or the brother of the whole blood, at its own discretion (s).] 5. No preference obtains between relatives ex parte paternâ and those ex parte maternâ, standing in the same degree of kindred to the deceased (t), but administration may be committed to either. 6. [If none of the kindred will take out administration, a creditor may, by custom, do it (u). 7. And, lastly, the court may, in defect of all these, commit administration to such discreet person as it approves of (x); or may grant him letters ad colligendum bona defuncti, which neither makes him executor nor administrator; his only business being to keep the goods in his safe custody (y), and to do other acts for the benefit of such as are entitled to the property of the deceased (z). If a bastard (who has no kindred, being nullius filius), or any one else that has no kindred, dies intestate, and without wife or child, it hath formerly been held (a), that the ordinary might seize his goods and dispose of them in pios usus. But the usual course now is, for some one to procure

(0) Evelyn v. Evelyn, Amb. 191; 3 Atk. 762; Toller's Executors, 91. (p) Blackborough v. Davis, 1 P. Wms. 41; S. C. 1 Salk. 251; Lloyd v. Tench, 2 Ves. sen. 213.

(q) Vide sup. vol. 1. p. 417.

(r) 1 Ventr. 425.

(s) Aleyn, 36; Styl. 74.

(t) Moor v. Barham, 1 P. Wms. 53. (u) Gidley v. Williams, Salk. 38. (x) See Davis v. Chanter, 14 Sim.

212.

(y) Went. ch. 14.

(*) 2 Inst. 398.

(a) Manning v. Napp, Salk. 37.