[or discretion (b). And Sir Matthew Hale gives us two instances; one of a girl of thirteen, who was burned for killing her mistress; another of a boy still younger, that had killed his companion and hid himself, who was hanged; for it appeared by his hiding that he knew he had done wrong, and could discern between good and evil; and in such cases, the maxim of law is, that malitia supplet ætatem. So also, in much more modern times, a boy of ten years old,. who was guilty of a heinous murder, was held a proper subject for capital punishment by the opinion of all the judges (c).] Moreover [a male at twelve years old may take the oath of allegiance (d); at fourteen, is at years of discretion,] so far at least that he may enter into a binding marriage, or consent or disagree to one contracted before (e); [and at twenty-one he is at his own disposal, and may aliene his lands, goods, and chattels.] A female also [at twelve is at years of maturity,] and therefore may enter into a binding marriage, or consent or disagree to one contracted before; [and at twenty-one may dispose of herself,] and all her property. [So that full age in male or female is twenty-one years (f), which age is completed on the day preceding the anniversary of a person's birth (g).] And as in the computation of time the law in general allows no fraction of a day, it follows that if he is born on the 1st day of January, he is of age to do any legal act on the morning of the last day of December, though he may not have lived twenty-one years by nearly forty-eight hours (h). [Among the antient Greeks and Romans women were never of age, but subject to per (b) 1 Hale, P. C. 26; et vide post, bk. VI. c. II. (c) Foster, 72. (d) Co. Litt. 172 b. (e) As the law formerly stood, he might also at the age of fourteen (according to some authorities) have made a will of personal estate, if his discretion were actually proved. 1 Bl. Com. 463. But now a will is in no case valid if made under the age of twenty-one; vide 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 7. (f) Co. Litt. 171 b. (g) Salk. 44, 625; Ld. Raym. 480, 1096; Toder v. Sansam, Dom. Proc. 27 Feb. 1775. (h) Christian's Blackst. vol. i. p. 463, (n.). [petual guardianship (i), unless when married-nisi convenissent in manum viri,—and when that perpetual tutelage wore away in process of time, we find that in females as well as males full age was not till twenty-five years (k). Thus, by the constitution of different kingdoms, this period, which is merely arbitrary and juris positivi, is fixed at different times. Scotland agrees with England in this point, both probably copying from the old Saxon constitutions on the continent,] which also recognized twentyone as the age of majority (l). : Infants (by which we always mean, where the contrary is not expressed, persons under twenty-one) [have various privileges and various disabilities: but their very disabilities are,] for the most part, [privileges; in order to secure them from hurting themselves by their own improvident acts. An infant cannot be sued but under the protection, and joining the name, of his guardian (m),] that is, his guardian ad litem, appointed by the court for the purpose of the particular suit and on the other hand, he may by leave of the court (n), sue either by a guardian ad litem, or, what amounts to the same thing, by his prochein amy, that is, by any friend willing to undertake his cause (o). It is also a privilege belonging to infants, that they lose nothing during their minority by non-claim or neglect of demanding their rights-for though persons of full age (as we shall see hereafter) (p) are barred by their omission to take any step towards the recovery of their rights, within a certain period of time, it is otherwise with respect to infants, who are not (i) Pott. Antiq. b. 4, c. 11; Cic. pro Muræn. 12. (k) Inst. 1, 23, 1. (1) Stiernhook de Jure Sueonum, 1. 2, c. 2. The case is the same in modern Sweden, Mod. Un. Hist. xxxiii. 220. (m) Co. Litt. 135 b; Castledine v. Mundy, 4 Barn. & Adol. 90. (n) See Eades v. Booth, 8 Q. B. 718. (0) Co. Litt. 135 b, and n. by Harg.; Goodwin v. Moore, Cro. Car. bound to claim upon a title or cause of action which first accrues to them while they are under age, until after the expiration of a period commencing from their attainment of majority (q). It is indeed laid down generally as a maxim, that no laches or negligence shall be imputed to an infant; but this is chiefly true of the exemption that he enjoys (as just stated) from the ordinary bar by lapse of time. It cannot safely be understood in a much larger sense (r), So much with respect to an infant's privileges. As to his disabilities, they are very extensive: and it may be laid down generally, that infants cannot make any conveyance or purchase (s) that will bind them; nor enter into a binding contract (t); nor do any legal act (u); nor hold any public office of pecuniary trust, or any office (as it would seem) of a judicial kind (x). But to this there are some exceptions, part of which were just now mentioned, in reckoning up the different capacities, which they assume at different ages-and there are others, to which it will be also proper to advert. And, first, though an infant is generally under these disabilities where he acts on his own account, yet he is under none to act as agent for another person (y). For the person by whom he is appointed agent is the best judge of his ability in that particular case. [So an infant who has an advowson,] that is, the perpetual right to present to a benefice, [may present to the benefice when it becomes void (z). For the law in this case dispenses with one rule, in order to maintain others of far greater consequence; it permits an infant to present a clerk, who, if unfit, may be rejected by the bishop, rather than either suffer the church to be unserved till he comes of age, or permit the infant to be debarred of his right by (g) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16; 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, ss. 16-18; 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 4. (r) Co. Litt. 380 b. (s) Vide supra, vol. 1. p. 475. (x) Claridge v. Eveline, 5 Barn. & Ald. 81; Bac. Ab. Infancy, E. (y) Prestwick v. Marshall, 7 Bing. 565. -(z) Co. Litt. 172 b; Co. Litt. by Harg. 89 a, note (1). [lapse to the bishop,] which is the legal consequence of a neglect to present in due time. So though an infant is incapable of acting as a juror (a), yet he may be sworn as a witness, however young, provided he has competent discretion (b). Again, though infants cannot, as the general rule, so aliene or purchase estates, but that the transaction shall be voidable at their pleasure on the attainment of full age (c), yet by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, ss. 7 and 20, it shall be lawful for the Court of Chancery to make an order, vesting the lands of which any infant may be possessed as trustee or mortgagee in such person or persons and in such manner as the court shall direct, or to appoint a person to convey the same; which shall have the same effect as if the infant had been twenty-one and had duly executed a conveyance of the same estate (d). By the statute, also, of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43, any male infant of twenty years, or any female of seventeen years of age or upwards, may, with the sanction of the court of chancery, make a valid and binding settlement either of his or her real or personal estate in contemplation of marriage; and by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120 (for facilitating leases and sales of settled estates), all powers given by that act to the court (a) Bac. Ab. Infancy, E.; 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 1. (b) 2 Hale, P. C. 278; Co. Litt. by Harg. 172 b, n. (1). (c) Co. Litt. 2 b; Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794; vide sup. vol. 1. p. 457. (d) We may also remark here, that by 6 Geo. 4, c. 74, s. 11, stock standing in the name of an infant beneficially entitled thereto may, on the petition of the guardian, and by order of the court, be transferred to the guardian, for the benefit of the infant; and that by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 97, s. 3, reciting that, where stock is standing in the Bank books in the names of an infant or person of unsound mind and of some other person jointly, no power of attorney to receive dividends can be granted; it is enacted, that it shall be lawful for such last-mentioned person to grant a power of attorney to receive the dividends. See also the General Inclosure Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118, s. 20, providing for the case of persons under similar disabilities being interested in lands proper to be inclosed, and 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, s. 48, providing for the disposal of monies to which such persons may be entitled in certain cases arising under that act; and 16 & 17 Vict. c. 70, s. 82, enabling the infant next of kin of a lunatic to be represented by guardian in the proceedings under a lunacy. of chancery, and all applications under the same, and consents to such applications, may be exercised, made or given by guardians on behalf of infants (d). Important exceptions, also, attach to the rule, that an infant cannot enter into a contract that shall bind him; and though there is a great want of precision in the doctrines scattered through the books on this subject, the result of them has been stated (and apparently with good reason) to be as follows (e)—that all contracts which the court can pronounce to be to the infant's prejudice are void; all those which it can pronounce to be for his benefit are valid; and those which fall not distinctly under one predicament or the other, are voidable at his election. According to these distinctions, his contract to pay a penalty has been held absolutely void, being evidently to his detriment (ƒ); and on the same principle, his contract to serve another. for a fixed period is void, if it contain a stipulation enabling the master to stop the work and to retain the wages while it ceases (g): but on the other hand, an infant may bind himself apprentice, by deed, in the ordinary form of such a contract, that being manifestly for his benefit; though this binding will not make him liable to be sued on any covenants in the deed contained (h). And for the same reason, [he may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, apparel, physic and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good teaching and instruction, whereby he may profit himself afterwards (i);] and in determining what shall be necessaries, regard is to be had in each particular case to the infant's degree or station in life (k). An (d) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 36. (e) Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 511; vide 2 Kent, Com. 193. (f) Co. Litt. 172 a; Fisher v. Mowbray, 8 East, 330; 3 Mau. & Sel. 482; Corpe v. Overton, 10 Bing. 252. (g) Queen v. Ford, 12 Q. B. 757. (h) Gylbert v. Fletcher, Cro. Car. 179; R. v. Wigston, 3 Barn. & Cress. 486. (i) Co. Litt. 172 n. (k) See Burghart v. Hall, 4 Mee. & W. 727; Peters v. Fleming, 6 Mee. & W. 42; Brooker v. Scott, 11 Mee. & W. 67; Harrison v. Fane, 1 Man. & G. 550; Wharton v. Mackenzie, 5 Q. B. 606; Cripps v. Hills, ibid. 607. It has been said that necessaries for an infant's wife or |