infant however is not liable for goods supplied to him while living unmarried under the roof of his parent, by whom his wants were sufficiently provided for, and who gave no consent to the purchase (m). His contracts, however, fall in the majority of cases under the third description above enumerated, viz. that of being voidable (n); but even here he may, by confirmation, or, in some cases mere acquiescence, after he becomes of age, render himself liable to perform them; and the case is the same with respect to his purchases and alienations. Thus if he has made a contract for goods, though of a kind not falling within the description of necessaries, he may confirm the contract by an express ratification in writing (o). So if a lease has been made to an infant during his minority, he may ratify it by continuing in possession after he has attained twentyone (p); or if he has demised lands during minority, he may ratify the demise by accepting the rent after he becomes of age (7). It is besides to be understood, that though infants may be thus exempt from liability for mere breach of contract, the law allows them no such privilege in respect of injuries of any other kind. Thus, as already for his lawful child, are necessaries for him (Turner v. Trisby, 1 Str. 168); and an infant widow has been held liable on her contract to furnish her husband's funeral (Chapple v. Cooper, 13 Mee. & W. 252.) (m) Bainbridge v. Pickering, 2 Bl. Rep. 1325; Dalton v. Gib, 5 Bing. N. C. 198. (n) As to the nature and extent of an infant's liability for calls made by a company of which he is a member, see 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, ("Companies Clauses' Consolidation Act, 1845"); Cork and Bandon Railway Company v. Cazenove, 10 Q. B. 935; Newry and Enniskillen Railway Company v. Coombe, 3 Exch. 565; Leeds and Thirsk Railway Company v. Fearnley, 4 Exch. 26; North-Western Railway Company v. M'Michael, 5 181. (0) 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 5. See Borthwick v. Carruthers, 1 T. R. 648; Cohen v. Armstrong, 1 Mau. & Sel. 724; Hartley v. Wharton, 11 A. & E. 934; Williams v. Moor, 11 Mee. & W. 256; Harris v. Wall, 1 Exch. 122; Mawson v. Lee, 10 Exch. 206; Willins v. Smith, 4 Ell. & Bl. 180. (p) 1 Rol. Ab. 731, l. 45; Ketsey's case, Cro. Jac. 320; 3 Burr. 1719; 8 Taunt. 37. See North-Western Railway Company v. M'Michael, ubi sup. (q) Baylis v. Dineley, 3 Mau. & Sel. 481. noticed, they are answerable long before their attainment of full age, for crimes; and so likewise an action may be brought against an infant for a private injury, such as a slander, a battery, or a trespass upon land (r). II. Having thus obtained some general idea of the legal condition of infants, who are alone capable of becoming wards, that is, of being placed under the custody of guardians, we shall be the better prepared to examine the nature of a guardian's office (s), and the distinctions between one kind of guardian and another; premising only that the observations which follow, apply (except where it may be otherwise expressed) to the case of legitimate children only, no others being the subjects of tutelage at common law. The following species of guardianship exist in the law of England: 1. Guardianship by nature. This applies only to the infant's person, and even as to that, it yields to guardianship in socage, of which we are presently to speak, supposing the title to both species of guardianship not to concur in the same individual, as it necessarily does in some cases (t). Guardianship by nature, in the correct and technical meaning of the term, is that which belongs to the ancestor in respect of his heir apparent, male or female (u); -for an heiress presumptive, though she cannot in strictness be termed heir apparent, is considered in the same light with one, in reference to this matter (x). And there (r) Green v. Greenbank, 2 Marsh. 485; Defries v. Davies, 1 Bing. N. C. 692. (s) The guardian, with us, is equivalent, according to Blackstone, to the tutor and curator of the Roman laws the former of which had the charge of the maintenance and education of the minor, the latter the care of his fortune. 1 Bl. Com. 460. (t) Co. Litt. by Harg. 88, notes 63-71, 15th ed. We may take occasion to remark here, that the dissertations on guardianship contained in Mr. Hargrave's notes are much superior in precision and accuracy to the chapter of Blackstone on the same subject. (u) 3 Rep. 38 b; Co. Litt. by Harg. ubi sup. (x) Co. Litt. by Harg. 88, (n.), 66, 15th edit. As to the definition of an heir apparent and an heir presumptive, respectively, vide sup. vol. 1. p. 387. is, properly speaking, no other kind of guardianship by nature than this; for though it is not uncommon to apply the term of natural guardian to the father or mother as such, and in reference to all their children, it is rather a popular than a technical mode of expression, the parent being designated by law, as guardian for nurture, when his right to the person of a child who is not his heir apparent is intended (y). In this guardianship by nature, the father has the first claim; and even, on his decease, the claim of the mother or other ancestor will be superseded, if he has appointed another guardian under the statute of Charles the second, of which we shall presently speak. It lasts until the full age of twenty-one (z). 2. Guardianship for nurture; which applies to all the children; but, like the last, extends to the person only. It belongs exclusively to the father, or, at his decease, the mother, and is said to terminate at fourteen, both with males and females (a). But though after that age the father or mother may not be properly designated as guardian for nurture, yet the parent is now understood to stand substantially in that capacity to the infant, by having the care and control of his person, until he attains twentyone (b). 3. Guardianship in socage; which extends both to the person and estate. This springs wholly out of tenure, as explained in a former part of the work (c); and while knight service existed, there was also a guardianship in knight service or chivalry (d), which formed a very important head in our law, until its abolition by 12 Car. II. c. 24, which (as we may remember) put an end to the (y) Mr. Hargrave holds that the term natural guardian, or guardian by nature, when not applied to an heir apparent, signifies only that nature points out the parent as the proper guardian, where positive law is silent. Co. Litt. by Harg. ubi sup. (z) Co. Litt. by Harg. 88. (a) Ibid. n. (13). (b) Vide 1 Bl. Com. 461; 2 P. Wms. 116; Mellish v. De Costa, 2 Atk. 14; Mendes v. Mendes, 3 Atk. 624; Macpherson on Infants, p. 61. (c) Sup. vol. 1. p. 205. (d) Ibid. p. 191; Co. Litt. by Harg. 88. tenure itself, by converting it into free socage (e). Guardianship in socage occurs only where the legal estate in lands or other hereditaments held in socage descends (f) upon a minor; in which case the guardianship of his person, and of his property, so far at least as regards the tenements in socage (g), devolves by the common law [upon his next of blood, to whom the inheritance cannot possibly descend (h).] Thus if the land descend to the heir ex parte paternâ, then the mother or other nearest maternal relative shall have the guardianship; and vice versâ it shall belong to the father or other nearest paternal relative, if the land descend ex parte maternâ (i). For while proximity of blood is a natural recommendation to this office, the law at the same time [judges it improper to trust the person of an infant in his hands, who may by possibility become heir to him; that there may be no temptation, nor even suspicion of temptation, for him to abuse his trust (k).] If there are two or more in equal degree (we are told), he who first gains possession of the heir shall have the custody of him, except where they happen to be brothers or sisters, in which case the law prefers the eldest (1). But if the infant derive lands by descent both ex parte paternâ and ex parte maternâ,-in which case it will be impossible (e) Vide sup. vol. 1. p. 205. (f) It is settled, though the point was formerly in controversy, that there can be no such guardianship where the infant is in by purchase. Co. Litt. by. Harg. 87 b, n. (1). (g) Co. Litt. by Harg. 88. Mr. Hargrave is of opinion that the guardianship in socage extends also to the copyhold estates of the ward in socage (vide post, p. 320), in the absence of a special custom for the lord to appoint a guardian; and even to his personal estate. see as to the personalty, Vaughan, 185; Rotherham v. Fanshaw, 3 Atk. 629. But (h) Litt. s. 123; Bac. Ab. Guardian, B. (i) Ibid. (k) "Nunquam custodia alicujus de jure alicui remanet, de quo habeatur suspicio quod possit vel velit aliquod jus in ipsa hæreditate clamare."Glanv. 1. 7, c. 11. See St. Hibern. 14 Hen. 3. This policy of our English law is warranted by the wise institutions of Solon, who provided that no one should be another's guardian, who was to enjoy the estate after his death. Pott. Antiq. bk. 1, c. 26; et vide Petit. Leg. Att. 1. 6, t. 7. (1) Co. Litt. by Harg. 88. to find any of his kin incapable of inheriting to the infant,— the next of kin on either side first seizing the infant, is entitled to the custody of his person; and the custody of the lands coming ex parte parternâ goes to the paternal line, and so vice versa as to the lands coming ex parte maternâ (m). [These guardians in socage, like those for nurture, continue only until the minor is fourteen years of age;] except in the case of land held in gavelkind, where the office lasts a year longer (n). 4. Guardianship by statute; which also applies both to person and estate. For the statute 12 Car. II. c. 24,-considering the abolition of guardianship in chivalry, the liability of guardianship in socage to be taken away by a devise of the lands in trust for the heir (o), and the imbecility of judgment in children of the age of fourteen, which renders the guardianship in socage inadequate to its purposes, even where it exists, has, with a view to the remedy of these inconveniences, introduced certain provisions, of which the substance is as follows:---In all cases, except those which fall within the custom of London, or other cities or corporate towns, (which the statute excepts from its operation,) a father may by deed or will, executed in the presence of two witnesses, dispose of the custody of all his children, born or to be born, that shall be unmarried at his decease, or be born afterwards; he may appoint as guardian any person except a popish recusant ; he may appoint the guardianship to last until twenty-one, or for any less time; the appointment may be either in possession or remainder; it shall be effectual against all persons claiming as guardians in socage or otherwise; and the guardian so appointed shall have the custody of the infant's person, and of all his estate both real and personal (p). It is to be observed, however, that this statute (m) Co. Litt. by Harg. 88. (p) 12 Car. 2, c. 24, s. 8; Co. Litt. by Harg. 88; Lord Shaftesbury's case, 2 P. Wms. 103; Ex parte Earl of Ilchester, 7 Ves. 348; Gilliat v. Gilliat, 3 Phill. Rep. 222. As to |