shall think fit to allow for his maintenance; and such guardian can grant no leases except by sanction of the court; though, on the other hand, the court's sanction will enable him or any other guardian to make a lease that will bind the infant even after he attains twenty-one (u), or to surrender the infant's leases with a view to renewal (x). And by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 120, s. 36, all powers given by, and all applications to the court of chancery under, that act, in respect of the alienation of "settled estates," may be exercised, made and given by guardians on behalf of infants (y). Finally, it is to be observed, that every guardian of the estate, [when the ward comes of age, is bound to give him an account of all that he has transacted on his behalf, and must answer for all losses by his wilful default or negligence;] and the ordinary method of compelling him to do so, is to take proceedings in equity against him, which may be done even during the ward's minority (z). In such account, allowance shall be made to him for all his reasonable costs and expenses (a); but he is not permitted in any case to make a profit out of his ward's estate (b).

(u) 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 65, s. 17.

(r) Ibid. s. 12. By the same statute, s. 32, the Court of Chancery has power to order the dividends of stock belonging to an infant to be paid for his maintenance, &c.

(y) As to this statute, vide sup. vol. 1. p. 478.

(z) Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 119.

(a) Litt. s. 123; R. v. Sutton, ubi

sup.

(b) Ibid.; Plowd. 293.

BOOK IV.

OF PUBLIC RIGHTS.

PART I.

OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

We have now taken a general survey of those rights and duties which attach to a man, individually considered; and that both as regards his person and his property. We have also examined those which belong to him in his private or domestic relations as member of a family. But we have still to contemplate him as a mere citizen or member of the community at large (a): and to treat of the rights and duties attributable to him in that public capacity; and which he consequently exercises in common with the whole, or large portions, of the community. This we propose to do under the general head of public rights; understanding duties (as we have done throughout) as involved in the correlative term of rights; and deeming it, therefore, unnecessary to refer to them by a separate designation. Public rights, then, concern either the relation between persons in authority, and persons subject to authority,—or they concern the social condition in general. And again, persons in authority are either of a civil or an ecclesiastical character; so that the whole subject of public rights naturally resolves itself into three parts, and may be discussed under the following titles-The Civil Government-The Church-and the Social Economy-and it is to the first of these that we shall at present devote our attention.

(a) See the division laid down at the commencement of the work, vol. I. P. 138.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE PARLIAMENT.

THE public rights which first claim our attention are those which concern the relation in which men stand to one another, [as governors and governed, or, in other words, as magistrates and people. Of magistrates, some also are supreme, in whom the sovereign power of the state resides; others are subordinate, deriving all their authority from the supreme magistrate, accountable to him for their conduct, and acting in an inferior secondary sphere.

In all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy, or the right both of making and of enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one and the same body of men; and wherever these two powers are united together, there can be no public liberty. The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and execute them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed, in quality of dispenser of justice, with all the power which he, as legislator, thinks proper to give himself. But, where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands, the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power as may tend to the subversion of its own independence, and therewith of the liberty of the subject. With us, therefore, in England, this supreme power is divided into two branches; the one legislative, to wit, the parliament, consisting of king (or queen), lords and commons; the other executive, consisting of the king (or queen) alone. It will be the business of this chapter to consider the British parliament, in which the legislative power, and (of course) the supreme and absolute authority of the state, is vested by our con

stitution.

[The original or first institution of parliament is one of those matters which lie so far hidden in the dark ages of antiquity, that the tracing of it out is a thing equally difficult and uncertain. The word parliament itself (parlement, or colloquium, as some of our historians translate it) is comparatively of modern date, derived from the French, and signifying an assembly that met and conferred together. It was first applied to general assemblies of the states under Louis VII. in France, about the middle of the twelfth century (a) ;] though what was latterly termed in that country a parliament, was only a high court of justice. In England the term was not used till the reign of Henry the third (b), or Edward the first (c). [But it is certain that, long before the introduction of the Norman language into England, all matters of importance were debated and settled in the great councils of the realm; a practice which seems to have been universal among the northern nations, particularly the Germans (d); and carried by them into all the countries of Europe which they overran at the dissolution of the Roman empire: relics of which constitution, under various modifications and changes, have been even in modern times still perceptible in the diets of Poland, Germany and Sweden, and the assembly of the Estates in France.

With us in England this general council hath been held immemorially, under the several names of michel-synoth or great council, michel-gemote or great meeting, and more frequently wittena-gemote, or the meeting of wise men. It was also styled in Latin, commune concilium regni, magnum concilium regis, curia magna, conventus magnatum vel

[procerum, assisa generalis, and sometimes communitas regni Anglia (e). We have instances of its meeting to order the affairs of the kingdom, to make new laws, and to mend the old, or, as Fleta (f) expresses it, “novis injuriis emersis, nova constituere remedia,” so early as the reign of Ina king of the West Saxons, Offa king of the Mercians, and Ethelbert king of Kent, in the several realms of the heptarchy. And, after their union, the Mirror (g) informs us, that King Alfred ordained for a perpetual usage, that these councils should meet twice in the year, or oftener if need be, to treat of the government of God's people; how they should keep themselves from sin, should live in quiet, and should receive right. Our succeeding Saxon and Danish monarchs held frequent councils of this sort, as appears from their respective codes of laws; the titles whereof usually speak them to be enacted, either by the king with the advice of his wittena-gemote, or wise men, as, "hæc sunt instituta, qua Edgarus rex consilio sapientum suorum instituit ;" or to be enacted by those sages with the advice of the king, as "hæc sunt judicia, quæ sapientes consilio regis Ethelstani instituerunt ;" or lastly, to be enacted by them both together, as “hæc sunt institutiones, quas rex Edmundus et episcopi sui cum sapientibus suis instituerunt (h).”

There is also no doubt but these great councils were occasionally held under the first princes of the Norman line. Glanvil, who wrote in the reign of Henry the second, speaking of the particular amount of an amercement in the sheriff's court, says it had never been yet ascertained by the general assize, or assembly, but was left to the custom of particular counties (i). Here the general assize is