: for life;-which is also the tenure of the seat of all the rest of the lords temporal. The aggregate number of the lords temporal for the time being [is indefinite (n), and may be increased at will by the power of the Crown and once, in the reign of Queen Anne, there was an instance of creating no less than twelve together; in contemplation of which, in the reign of King George the first, a bill passed the house of lords, and was countenanced by the then ministry, for limiting the number of the peerage. This was thought, by some, to promise a great acquisition to the constitution, by restraining the prerogative from gaining the ascendant in that august assembly, by pouring in at pleasure an unlimited number of new created lords. But the bill was ill-relished, and miscarried in the house of commons, whose leading members were then desirous to keep the avenues to the other house as open and easy as possible. The distinction of rank and honours is necessary in every well-governed state: in order to reward such as are eminent for their services to the public in a manner the most desirable to individuals, and yet without burden to the community: exciting thereby an ambitious yet laudable ardour, and generous emulation, in others. And emulation, or virtuous ambition, is a spring of action, which, however dangerous or invidious in a mere republic or under a despotic sway, will certainly be attended with good effects under a free monarchy: where, without destroying its existence, its excesses may be continually restrained by that superior power from which all honour is derived. Such a spirit, when nationally diffused, gives life and vigour to the community; it sets all the wheels of government in motion, which, under a wise regulator, may be directed to any beneficial purpose; and thereby every individual may be made subvervient to the public good, while he principally (n) In the 1st page of the 4th Institute Lord Coke tells us, that the number of temporal peers when he was then writing, was 106, and of the commons, 493. [means to promote his own particular views. A body of nobility is also more peculiarly necessary in our mixed and compounded constitution, in order to support the rights of both the crown and the people, by forming a barrier to withstand the encroachments of both. It creates and preserves that gradual scale of dignity which proceeds from the peasant to the prince; rising like a pyramid from a broad foundation, and diminishing to a point as it rises. It is this ascending and contracting proportion that adds stability to any government; for when the departure is sudden from one extreme to another, we may pronounce that state to be precarious.] The nobility, while thus in a general point of view essential to the structure of the constitution, are of the more particular importance, as forming the immediate support of the throne. Accordingly, when in the time of the Great Rebellion, [the commons had determined to extirpate monarchy, they also voted the house of lords to be useless and dangerous. And since titles of nobility are thus expedient to the state, it is also expedient that their owners should form an independent and separate branch of the legislature. If they were confounded with the mass of the people, and like them had only a vote in electing representatives, their privileges would soon be borne down and overwhelmed by the popular torrent, which would effectually level all distinctions. It is therefore highly necessary that the body of nobles should have a distinct assembly, distinct deliberations, and distinct powers from the commons.] The commons, who form the remaining branch of the parliament, consist of the representatives of the nation at large (exclusive of the peerage), elected by the means that we shall have occasion to explain in the course of this chapter. [In a free state every man, who is supposed a free agent, ought to be in some measure his own governor ; and therefore a branch at least of the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the people. And this power, when the territories of the state are small and its [citizens easily known, may be exercised by the people in their aggregate or collective capacity, as was ordained in the petty republics of Greece, and the first rudiments of the Roman state. But this will be highly inconvenient, when the public territory is extended to any considerable degree, and the number of citizens is increased. Thus when, after the social war, all the burghers of Italy were admitted free citizens of Rome, and each had a vote in the public assemblies, it became impossible to distinguish the spurious from the real voter, and from that time all elections and popular deliberations grew tumultuous and disorderly; which paved the way for Marius and Sylla, Pompey and Cæsar, to trample on the liberties of their country, and at last to dissolve the commonwealth. In so large a state as ours, it is therefore very wisely contrived that the people should do that by their representatives, which it is impracticable to perform in person: representatives, chosen by a number of minute and separate districts, wherein all the voters are, or easily may be, distinguished. The counties are therefore represented] by persons elected by the landowners; [and the cities and boroughs (o) are represented] by persons chosen [by the mercantile part, or supposed trading interest of the nation (p);] the former class of representatives being technically called knights of shires, the latter, citizens and burgesses. Of the English and Welsh counties, Yorkshire returns six members, viz. two for each riding; twenty-six of the others, four each, viz. two for each division;-the ridings and divisions being, considered as separate counties for all electoral purposes. The number for the remaining shires (including the Isle of Wight, which ranks, for electoral purposes, as a separate county), is three, two, or one respectively. Of the cities (0) As to boroughs, vide sup. vol. I. p. 124; et post, bk. IV. pt. III. c. I. (p) This seems a correct statement of the present foundation of the electoral right of towns. As to its origin, it is involved in considerable obscurity. See Hallam's Mid. Ages, vol. iii. p. 166, and his Constit. Hist. vol. iii. p. 50. and boroughs, London returns four members, most of the others two, and the remainder one; but in Wales the right of election for some of the principal towns, or boroughs, represented, is shared by other boroughs, which are called "contributory boroughs" (q). The collective number of English and Welsh representatives is (at present) 496, of Scottish 53, of Irish 105, in all 654 (r). [And every member, though chosen by one particular district, when elected and returned, serves for the whole realm: for the end of his coming thither is not particular, but general; not barely to advantage his constituents, but the commonwealth; to advise the crown (as appears from the writ of summons (s) ) "de communi consilio super negotiis quibusdam arduis et urgentibus, regem, statum, defensionem regni Angliæ et ecclesiæ Anglicanæ concernentibus." And therefore he is not bound to consult with, or take the advice of, his constituents upon any particular point, unless he himself thinks it proper or prudent so to do. These are the constituent parts of a parliament; the king,] or queen regnant, [the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons: parts, of which each is so necessary, that the consent of all three is required to make any new law that shall bind the subject. Whatever is enacted for law, by one, or by two only, of the three, is no statute; and to it no regard is due, unless in matters relating to their own privileges. For though,] in the time of the Great Rebellion, [the commons once passed a vote(t), "that whatever is enacted or declared for law by the commons in (q) 2 Will. 4, c. 45, sect. 8, and sched. E.; et vide 27 Hen. 8, c. 26, ss. 28, 29; 35 Hen. 8, c. 11. (r) For England (including Wales) the number of county members and borough members respectively is 159 and 337 (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45). For Ireland, 64 and 41 (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 88). For Scotland there are 30 "commissioners of shires" and 23 "commissioners of burghs" (2 & 3 ["parliament assembled, hath the force of law; and all the "people of this nation are concluded thereby, although the "consent and concurrence of the king or house of peers "be not had thereto;" yet, when the constitution was restored in all its forms, it was particularly enacted by statute 13 Car. II. c. 1, that if any person shall maliciously or advisedly affirm that both or either of the houses of parliament have any legislative authority without the king, such person shall incur all the penalties of a præmunire,] that is, forfeiture of lands and goods, imprisonment, and loss of all civil rights (u). III. [We are next to examine the laws and customs relating to parliament, thus united together and considered as one aggregate body. The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says Sir Edward Coke (x), is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds. And of this high court, he adds, it may be truly said, "si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima; si dignitatem, est honoratissima; si jurisdictionem, est capacissima.” It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new model the succession to the crown; as was done in the reign of Henry the eighth and William the third. It can alter the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety of instances in the reigns of king (r) 4 Inst. 36. (u) As to a præmunire, vide post, bk. VI. c. VI. |