and it is to be considered only as a law framed to meet a particular emergency, like the statute in the present reign, which provided for the administration of government by lords justices, in case of the next successor to the crown being out of the realm at the time of the demise of her Majesty (0); or that in a former reign, which appointed the heir apparent to the regency, while the sovereign was disabled, by a severe visitation of Providence, from conducting affairs of state (p). Another principle referable to the pre-eminence of the sovereign is, that [the law ascribes to him, in his political capacity, an absolute immortality. The king never dies. Henry, Edward or George may die, but the king survives them all. For immediately upon the decease of the reigning prince in his natural capacity, his kingship or imperial dignity, by act of law, without any interregnum or interval, is vested at once in his heir, who is, eo instanti, king to all intents and purposes. And so tender is the law of supposing even a possibility of his death, that his natural dissolution is generally called his demise; demissio regis, vel corona; an expression which

the care of the Duke of Gloucester; who was declared protector by the privy council. The statutes of 25 Henry 8, c. 12, and 28 Henry 8, c. 7, provided, that the successor, if a male and under eighteen, or if a female and under sixteen, should be till such age in the government of his or her natural mother, (if approved by the king,) and such other councillors as his majesty should by will or otherwise appoint; and he accordingly appointed his sixteen executors to have the government of his son Edward the sixth, and the kingdom; which executors elected the Earl of Hertford protector. The statute 24 Geo. 2, c. 24, in case the crown should descend to any of the children of Frederic, Prince of Wales, under

the age of eighteen, appointed the Princess Dowager; and that of 5 Geo. 3, c. 27, in case of a like descent to any of his majesty's children, empowered the king to name either the queen, the princess dowager, or any descendant of King George the second residing in this kingdom, to be guardian and regent till the successor should attain such age, assisted by a council of regency; the powers of them all being expressly defined and set down in the several acts. See also 1 Will. 4, c. 2.

(0) 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 72. Vide sup. p. 458, as to the provisions made in the event of her Majesty's demise leaving issue coming to the throne, under the age of eighteen.

(p) 51 Geo. 3, c. 1.

[signifies merely a transfer of property; for, as is observed in Plowden (q), when we say the demise of the crown, we mean only that, in consequence of the disunion of the sovereign's natural body from his body politic, the kingdom is transferred or demised to his successor; and so the royal dignity remains perpetual. Thus, too, when Edward the fourth, in the tenth year of his reign, was driven from his throne for a few months by the house of Lancaster, this temporary transfer of his dignity was denominated his demise; and all process was held to be discontinued, as upon the natural death of the king (r).]

2. Another attribute of the royal character is irresponsibility; it being an ancient fundamental maxim, that [the king can do no wrong.] This is not to be understood as if every thing transacted by the government was of course just and lawful. Its proper meaning is only this,- that no crime or other misconduct must ever be imputed to the sovereign. However tyrannical or arbitrary therefore may be the measures pursued by him, he is sacred from punishment of every description. [If any foreign jurisdiction had the power to punish him, (as was formerly claimed by the pope,) the independence of this kingdom would be no more; and if such a power were vested in any domestic tribunal, there would soon be an end of the constitution, by destroying the free agency of one of the constituent parts of the sovereign's legislative power.] On the same principle, [no suit or action can be brought against the sovereign, even in civil matters.] Indeed, his immunity, both from civil suit and from penal proceeding, rests on another subordinate reason also, viz. that [no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction implies superiority of power, and proceeds from the crown itself. But who, says Finch, shall command the king (s) ?]

While the sovereign himself however is, in a personal sense, incapable of doing wrong, yet his acts may in them

(q) Plowd. 177, 234.

(r) M. 49 Hen. 6, pl. 1—8.

(s) Finch, L. 83.

selves be contrary to law, and are in some cases subject to reversal on that ground. For, first, his grants, when they are of that description, are avoided or set aside by the law; but yet in such manner as to maintain the respect due to this inviolable maxim. Thus [if the crown should be induced to grant any franchise or privilege to a subject contrary to reason, or in any wise prejudicial to the commonwealth or to a private person, the law will not suppose the sovereign to have meant either an unwise or an injurious action, but declares that the sovereign was deceived in his grant, and thereupon such grant is rendered void, but merely upon the foundation of fraud or deception either by or upon those agents whom the crown had thought proper to employ.] So [if any person has in point of property a just demand upon the sovereign, (though he cannot, as we have seen, bring an action against him in a court of law,) he may petition him in his court of chancery, where his chancellor will administer right as a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion (t). And this is entirely consonant to what is laid down by the writers on natural law. "A subject," says Puffendorff," so long "as he continues a subject, hath no way to oblige his "prince to give him his due when he refuses it, though no "wise prince will ever refuse to stand to a lawful contract. "And if the prince gives the subject leave to enter an "action against him upon such contract, in his own courts, "the action itself proceeds rather upon natural equity, "than upon the municipal laws (u)." For the end of such action is not to compel the prince to observe the contract, but to persuade him.] As to any cause of complaint which a subject may happen to have against the sovereign, in respect of some personal injury of a private kind, but distinct from a mere claim of property, it would seem that this would not be a proper subject for a petition in chancery, and that there is consequently no remedy against vide post, bk. v. c. xv.

(t) Finch, L. 255. As to the state of the law with respect to the manner of obtaining relief in such cases,

(u) Law of N. and N. b. viii. c. 10.

the crown: but [it is well observed by Mr. Locke (x), that "the harm which the sovereign can do in his own person "not being likely to happen often, nor extend itself far; "nor being able, by his single strength, to subvert the laws, "nor oppress the body of the people (should any prince "have so much weakness or ill-nature as to endeavour to "do it), the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs "that may happen sometimes when a heady prince comes "to the throne, is well recompensed by the peace of the public and security of government, in the person of the "chief magistrate being thus set out of the reach of danger."]

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It is also to be observed, that, [notwithstanding this personal perfection which the law attributes to the sovereign, the constitution hath allowed a latitude of supposing the contrary, in respect of both houses of parliament; each of which in its turn hath exerted the right of remonstrating and complaining to the sovereign, even of those acts of royalty which are most properly and personally his own; such as messages signed by himself, and speeches delivered from the throne. And yet, such is the reverence which is paid to the royal person, that though the two houses have an undoubted right to consider these acts of State in any light whatever, and accordingly treat them in their addresses as proceeding personally from the prince, yet among themselves, (to preserve the more perfect decency and for the greater freedom of debate,) they usually suppose them to flow from the advice of the administration. But the privilege of canvassing thus freely the personal acts of the sovereign (either directly or even through the medium of his reputed advisers) belongs to no individual, but is confined to those august assemblies; and there, too, the objections must be proposed with the utmost respect and deference. One member was sent to the Tower (y) for suggesting that his majesty's answer to the address of the commons "contained high words to fright the members (x) On Government, p. 2, s. 205. (y) Com. Journ. 18th Nov. 1685.

[out of their duty;" and another (2) for saying that, “a part "of the king's speech seemed rather to be calculated for "the meridian of Germany than Great Britain, and that "the king was a stranger to our language and con"stitution."]

Still less are the houses of parliament precluded from imputing blame to those evil counsellors or ministers by whose aid or advice any private wrong or public oppression, or other violation of the rights and liberties of the people, may have been practised. For [the constitution has provided, that no man shall dare to assist the crown in contradiction to the laws of the land ;] and any man so offending is liable to be prosecuted and punished through the medium of an indictment or parliamentary impeachment.

If it be asked what remedy is afforded to the subject for such public oppressions or acts of tyranny as have not in fact been instigated by bad advisers, but have proceeded from the personal delinquency of the monarch himself, the answer is that there is no more remedy, than in the case before supposed of a personal injury inflicted by the sovereign on an individual. To suppose a remedy, indeed, in either case, (that is, a compulsory remedy,) would be to suppose a superior coercive authority in some other hand, to correct the abuse; the very notion of which destroys the idea of sovereignty. For such abuses therefore, whether they spring from the sovereign or from either house of parliament, the law is manifestly unable to make provision; [but if ever they unfortunately happen, the prudence of the time must provide new] expedients [upon new emergencies.

Indeed, it is found by experience, that whenever the unconstitutional oppressions, even of the sovereign power, advance with gigantic strides and threaten desolation to a State, mankind will not be reasoned out of the feelings of humanity; nor will sacrifice their liberty by a scrupulous

(z) Com. Journ. 4th Dec. 1717.