enumerated articles of a kind to lie in small compass (1), when the aggregate value shall exceed 107., unless at the time of delivery to the carrier the value and nature shall have been declared, and such increased charge paid thereon, as by a legible notice affixed in the office shall have been previously advertised to the public (u); but if no such notice shall have been affixed, or if the carrier shall refuse (when required) to give a receipt acknowledging the parcel to be insured, he shall not be entitled to the benefit of the act, but shall remain liable as at common law (x); the whole being subject, however, to a proviso, that nothing in the act contained shall affect any express special contract between the carrier and customer, or protect the carrier, in any case, from loss arising from the felonious acts of any servant in his employ (y); or protect any such servant from liability for loss occasioned by his own personal neglect or misconduct (z).

(t) Vide Owen v. Burnett, 4 Tyr. 143; Mayhew v. Nelson, 6 C. P. 59. (u) Vide Syms v. Chapman, 5 Ad. & E. 642; Hart v. Baxendale, 20 L. J. (Exch.) 338, Id. in err. 21 L. J. (Exch.) 123.

(r) 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 68, sects. 1, 2, 3. It has been held, however, that where the carrier has complied with the act, and the customer has not, the former is not liable to the latter even for gross negligence. Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 646.

(y) Vide Boyce v. Chapman, 2 Bing. N. C. 222; Butt v. The Great Western Railway Company, 11 C. B. 140; The Great Western Railway Company, app., Rimell, resp., 18 C. B. 585.

(z) 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 68, ss. 6, 8. As to the liability of railway companies on the carriage of goods, it is the same (except as varied by any enactment of a special

kind) with that of other common carriers by land as existing at common law, modified by the provisions of 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 68, above-mentioned. (See 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, ss. 86, 89, and 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31.) And the case is the same as to canal and navigation companies. (See 8 & 9 Vict. c. 42, and 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31.) Companies of either description are by the act last mentioned (of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31) expressly made liable for neglect or default notwithstanding any notice attempting to limit their liability; but they may make reasonable conditions as to the receipt, forwarding and delivery of the goods, and the liability as to animals is limited to so much per head, unless declared at the time to be of higher value, and a per centage paid accordingly in addition to the ordinary charge. As to the liability of rail

As to the case of a conveyance by sea, it is to be observed, that the liability of the ship-owner (though he is in point of law a common carrier, if the ship be ordinarily hired to carry goods (a),) does not usually rest on the common law rule, but on the special contract created between the parties by the bill of lading or charterparty (b) usually attending a shipment of goods; and that these are commonly framed with exceptions as to the act of God and the queen's enemies, and, in the case of a bill of lading, all perils of the seas (c). By the recent statute also of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104 (d), no owner of any sea going ship(e) or of any share therein shall be answerable for loss or damage to goods on board, where it occurs without his actual fault or privity, beyond the value of his ship and freight during the voyage; and every owner is moreover entirely protected from loss or damage so occurring of or to any goods by reason of fire on board; or of or to any gold, silver, diamonds, watches, jewels, or precious stones, by reason of robbery or embezzlement, unless the true nature

way companies, see the following recent cases: Butcher v. London and South Western Railway Company, 16 C. B. 13; The Midland Railway Company, app., Bromley, resp., 17 C.B.372; London and North Western Railway Company, app., Durham resp., 18 C. B. 826; Collins v. Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, 11 Exch. 790; Walker v. York and North Midland Railway Company, 2 Ell. & Bl. 750.

(a) Morse v. Slue, 2 Lev. 69; 1 Vent. 190; Dale v. Hall, 1 Wils. 281, 282. See Laveroni v. Drury, 8 Exch. 166.

(b) As to a bill of lading, vide sup. p. 48. As to a charterparty,

vide post, p. 137.

(c) Abbott on Shipping, 218, 3rd edit. As to the exception of the act

of God, see Siordet v. Hall, 4 Bing. 607. Et vide Abbott on Shipping, 255. As to other exceptions sometimes inserted, see De Rothschild v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, 7 Exch. 734

(d) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, ss. 503, 504. Part IX. of the act (where those sections will be found) has numerous other provisions as to the liabilities of ship-owners and the mode of proceeding thereon. It applies by sect. 502 to the whole of her majesty's dominions.

(e) By sect. 2, "ship" includes every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars. By section 516, Part 1x. extends, however, to no British ship not being a recognized British ship within the meaning of the act.

and value of such articles have been inserted in the bill of lading, or otherwise declared in writing to the master or owner (ƒ).

III. The contract of the loan of money.

This differs from the contract of bailment (as above defined), inasmuch as the money which forms its subject is not to be re-delivered to the lender, or disposed of according to his direction, but to be applied to the use of the borrower; the latter yielding afterwards to the lender an equivalent sum by way of payment. And in addition to this equivalent, there is commonly also yielded an increase, by way of compensation for the use of the sum advanced, which increase is called interest, but when taken to greater amount than the law has at the time allowed, has also been denominated usury (g). In former times, indeed, many good and learned men were enemies, from doubts about its legality in foro conscientiæ, to any increase of money by way of interest-an hostility which [they grounded as well on the prohibition of it by the law of Moses among the Jews, as also upon what is said to be laid down by Aristotle (g), that money is naturally barren, and to make it breed money is preposterous, and a perversion of the end of its institution, which was only to serve the purposes of exchange, and not of increase. Hence the school divines have branded the practice of taking interest, as being contrary to the divine law, both natural and revealed; and the canon law has proscribed the taking any the least increase for the loan of money, as a mortal sin (h).

But in answer to this it hath been observed, that the Mosaical precept was clearly a political, and not a moral

(f) By 17 & 18 Vict. c. 120, the former acts on the same subject, of 7 Geo. 2, c. 15, 26 Geo. 3, c. 86, and 53 Geo. 3, c. 159, are repealed.

(g) Usury properly signifies any reward taken for the use of money.

(g) Polit. 1. 1, c. 10. This passage has been suspected to be spurious. (h) Decretal. 1. 5, tit. 19.

[precept. It only prohibited the Jews from taking] any increase or reward for the use of money, [from their brethren, the Jews; but in express words permitted them to take it of a stranger (i); which proves that it is not malum in se, since it was allowed where any but an Israelite was concerned. And as to the reason supposed to be given by Aristotle, and deduced from the natural barrenness of money, the same may with equal force be alleged of houses, which never breed houses, and twenty other things, which nobody doubts it is lawful to make profit of by letting them to hire. And though money was originally used only for the purposes of exchange, yet the laws of any state may be well justified in permitting it to be turned to the purposes of profit, if the convenience of society (the great end for which money was invented) shall require it. And that the allowance of interest tends greatly to the benefit of the public, especially in a trading country, will appear from that generally acknowledged principle, that commerce cannot subsist without mutual and extensive credit. Unless money therefore can be borrowed, trade cannot be carried on; and if no premium were allowed for the hire of money, few persons would care to lend it; or at least the ease of borrowing at a short warning, (which is the life of commerce,) would be entirely at an end (j). Thus, in the dark ages of monkish superstition and civil tyranny, when interest was laid under a total interdict, commerce was also at its lowest ebb, and fell entirely into the hands of the Jews and Lombards; but when men's minds began to be more enlarged-when true religion and real liberty revived-commerce grew again into credit, and again introduced with itself its inseparable companion, the doctrine of loans upon interest. And as to any scruples of conscience, since all other conveniences of life may either be bought or hired, but money (j) 2 Bl. Com. 454.

(i) Exod. xx. 25; Levit. xxv. 35 -37; Deut. xxiii. 19, 20.

[can only be hired, there seems to be no greater oppression in taking a recompense or price for the hire of this, than of any other convenience. To demand an exorbitant price indeed is equally contrary to conscience for the loan of a horse or the loan of a sum of money; but a reasonable equivalent for the temporary inconvenience which the owner may feel by the want of it, and for the hazard of his losing it entirely, is not more immoral in one case, than it is in the other.]

For these reasons the practice of taking interest upon loans has in general been sanctioned by the legislators both of antient and of modern times, and the scruples which once existed on this subject have been of late entirely disregarded; yet in most communities there has not the less prevailed a nearly universal sense of the expediency of restraining the exorbitancy of interest by force of positive enactment. And [different nations have at different times established different rates of interest. The Romans at one time allowed centesima, 17. per cent. monthly, or 127. per cent. per annum, to be taken for common loans; but Justinian (k) reduced it to trientes, or one-third of the as or centesimæ, that is, 47. per cent., but allowed higher interest to be taken of merchants, because the hazard was greater. So too Grotius informs us (1), that in Holland the rate of interest was then 81. per cent. in common loans, but 127. to merchants. And Lord Bacon was desirous of introducing a similar policy in England (m),] where the law (as elsewhere) limited in general the amount of interest, and prohibited usury, but (contrary to the practice in some countries) established one rate of allowable interest in all cases alike (n). This

(k) Cod. 4, 32, 36; Nov. 33, 34, 35. Blackstone here subjoins in a note, a classical discussion, of some length, on the meaning of the terms centesima and trientes. 2 Bl. Com. 462.

(1) De Jure B. et P. 1. 2, 12, 22. (m) Essays, c. 41.

(n) It did this, according to Blackstone, "lest, under the general pre"tence of vague and indiscriminate "hazards, a door should be opened