CONTENTS.

OF REASON, or the undeRSTANDING, PROPERLY SO CALLED; AND THE

VARIOUS FACULTIES AND OPERATIONS MORE IMMEDIATELY CONNECTED

WITH IT,

Preliminary Observations on the Vagueness and Ambiguity of the common

Philosophical Language relative to this part of our Constitution-Reason

and Reasoning,-Understanding,-Intellect,-Judgment, &c.

CHAPTER 1.-Of the Fundamental Laws of Human Belief; or the Prima,

ry Elements of Human Reason,

SECTION 1.-Of Mathematical Axioms,

I.

II. Continuation of the same Subject,

SECTION II. Of certain Laws of Belief, inseparably connected with the

exercise of Consciousness, Memory, Perception, aud Rea.

soning,

SECTION III.-Continuation of the Subject-Critical remarks on some

late Controversies to which it has given rise. Of the Ap-

peals which Dr. Reid and some other Modern Writers

have made, in their Philosophical Discussions, to Common

Sense, as a Criterion of Truth,

CHAPTER II.-Of Reasoning and of Deductive Evidence,

SECTION 1.

19

ib.

20

32

I. Doubts with respect to Locke's Distinction between the

Powers of Intuition and of Reasoning,

ib.

II. Conclusions obtained by a process of Deduction often

mistaken for Intuitive Judgments,

SECTION II.-Of General Reasoning,

I. Illustrations of some Remarks formerly stated in treating

of Abstraction,

ib.

II. Continuation of the Subject.—Of Language considered

as an Instrument of Thought,

94

Page.

III. Continuation of the Subject.-Visionary Theories of

some Logicians, occasioned by their inattention to the

Essential Distinction between Mathematics and other

Sciences,

IV. Continuation of the Subject.-Peculiar and superemi-

nent Advantages possessed by Mathematicians, in conse-

quence of their definite Phraseology,

SECT. III.-Of Mathematical Demonstration,

I. Of the Circumstance on which Demonstrative Evidence

essentially depends,

101

108

110

ib.

II. Continuation of the Subject.-How far it is true that all

Mathematical Evidence is resolvable into Identical Pro-

positions,

121

III. Continuation of the Subject.-Evidence of the Mecha-

nical Philosophy, not to be confounded with that which is

properly called Demonstrative or Mathematical.-Oppo-

site Error of some late Writers,

SECTION IV. Of our Reasonings concerning Probable or Contingent

Tr ths,

I. Narrow Field of Demonstrative Evidence.-Of Demon-

strative Evidence, when combined with that of Sense, as

in Practical Geometry; and with those of Sense and of

Induction, as in the Mechanical Philosophy.-Remarks

on a Fundamental Law of Belief, involved in all our Rea-

sonings concerning Contingent Truths, .

131

150

ib.

II. Continuation of the Subject.-Of that Permanence or

Stability in the Order of Nature, which is presupposed in

our Reasonings concerning Contingent Truths,

III. Continuation of the Subject.-General Remarks on the

Difference between the Evidence of Experience, and that

of Analogy,

155

169

IV. Continuation of the Subject.-Evidence of Testimony

tacitly recognized as a ground of Belief, in our most cer-

tain Conclusions concerning Contingent Truths.-Differ-

ence between the logical and the popular meanings of the

word Probability,

178

CHAPTER III.-Of the Aristotelian Logic,

182

SECTION 1. Of the Demonstrations of the Syllogistic Rules given by

Aristotle and his Commentators,

ib.

SECTION II-General Reflections on the Aim of the Aristotelian Logic,

and on the Intellectual Habits which the study of it has a

Page.

tendency to form. That the improvement of the power of

Reasoning ought to be regarded as only a secondary Ob-

ject in the Culture of Understanding,

201

SECTION III.-In what respects the study of the Aristotelian Logic may

be useful to Disputants.-A general acquaintance with it

justly regarded as an essential accomplishment to those

who are liberally educated.-Doubts suggested by some

late Writers, concerning Aristotle's claims to the inven-

tion of the Syllogistic Theory,

CHAPTER IV.-Of the Method of Inquiry pointed out in the Experimental

or Inductive Logic,

SECTION I-Mistakes of the Ancients concerning the proper object of

Philosophy.-Ideas of Bacon on the same Subject.-In-

ductive Reasoning.—Analysis and Synthesis.-Essential

difference between Legitimate and Hypothetical Theo-

ries,

216

230

ib.

SECTION II-Continuation of the Subject.-The Induction of Aristotle

compared with that of Bacon,

253

SECTION III.-Of the Import of the words Analysis and Synthesis in the

Language of Modern Philosophy,

264

I. Preliminary Observations on the Analysis and Synthesis

of the Greek Geometricians,

ib.

II. Critical Remarks on the vague Use, among Modern

Writers, of the Terms Analysis and Synthesis,

273

286

SECTION IV.-The Consideration of the Inductive Logic resumed,

I. Additional Remarks on the distinction between Expe-

rience and Analogy.-Of the grounds afforded by the lat-

ter for Scientific Inference and Conjecture,

II. Use and Abuse of Hypotheses in Philosophical Inqui-

ries.-Difference between Gratuitous Hypotheses, and

those which are supported by presumptions suggested by

Analogy.-Indirect Evidence which a Hypothesis may

derive from its agreement with the Phenomena.-Cau-

tions against extending some of these conclusions to the

Philosophy of the Human Mind,

ib.

301

SECTION V. Of certain misapplications of the words Experience and

Induction in the phraseology of Modern Science.--Illus

trations from Medicine and from Political Economy,

325

SECTION VI. Of the Speculation concerning Final Causes,

I. Opinion of Lord Bacon on the Subject.-Final Causes

rejected by Des Cartes, and by the majority of French

Philosophers.-Recognized as legitimate Objects of re-

search by Newton.-Tacitly acknowledged by all as a

useful Logical Guide, even in Seiences which have no

immediate relation to Theology,

Page.

338

ib.

II. Danger of confounding Final with Physical Causes in

the Philosophy of the Human Mind,

353

ELEMENTS

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.

PART SECOND.

OF REASON, OR THE UNDERSTANDING PROPERLY SO CALLED; AND THE VARIOUS FACULTIES AND OPERATIONS MORE IMMEDIATELY CONNECTED WITH IT.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE VAGUENESS AND AMBIGUITY OF THE COMMON PHILOSOPHICAL LANGUAGE RELATIVE TO THIS PART OF OUR CONSTITUTION-REASON AND REASONING,—UNDERSTANDING, INTELLECT,-JUDGMENT, &c.

THE power of Reason, of which I am now to treat, is unquestionably the most important by far, of those which are comprehended under the general title of Intellectual. It is on the right use of this power, that our success in the pursuit both of knowledge and of happiness depends; and it is by the exclusive possession of it that Man is distinguished, in the most essential respects, from the lower animals. It is, indeed, from their subserviency to its operations, that the other faculties, which have been hitherto under our consideration, derive their chief value.

In proportion to the peculiar importance of this subject are its extent and its difficulty ;-both of them such as to lay me under a necessity, now that I am to enter on the discussion, to contract, in various instances, those designs in which I was accustomed to indulge myself, when I looked forward