CONCLUSION OF PART SECOND. IN the foregoing chapters of this Second Part, I have en deavoured to turn the attention of my readers to various important questions relating to the Human Understanding ; aiming, in the first place, to correct some fundamental errors in the theorics commonly received with respect to the powers of intuition and of reasoning; and, secondly, to illustrate some doctrines connected with the ground-work of the inductive logic, which have been either overlooked, or misapprehended by the generality of preceding writers. The bulk to which the volume has already extended, renders it impossible for me now to attempt a detailed recapitulation of its contents :-Nor do I much regret the necessity of this omission, having endeavoured, in every instance, as far as I could, to enable the intelligent reader to trace the thread of my discussions. In a work professedly elementary, the frequent references made to the opinions of others may, at first sight, appear out of place; and it may not unnaturally be thought, that I have too often indulged in critical strictures, where I ought to have confined myself to a didactic exposition of first principles. To this objection I have only to reply, that my aim is not to supplant any of the established branches of academical study; but, by inviting and encouraging the young philosopher, when his academical career is closed, to review, with attention and candour, his past acquisitions, to put him in the way of supplying what is defective in the present sytems of education. I have accordingly entitled my book Elements-not of Logic or of Pneumatology, but-of the Philosophy of the Human Mind; a study which, according to my idea of it, presupposes general acquaintance with the particular departments of literature and of science, but to which I do not know that any elementary introduction has yet been attempted. It is a study, indeed, whereof little more perhaps than the elements can be communicated by the mind of one individual to that of another. In proof of this, it is sufficient here to hint, (for I must not at present enlarge on so extensive a topic,) that a knowledge of the general laws which regulate the intellectual phenomena is, to the logical student, of little practical value, but as a preparation for the study of himself. In this respect, the anatomy of the mind differs essentially from that of the body; the structure of the former (whatever collateral aids may be derived from observing the varieties of genius in our fellow-creatures) being accessible to those alone who can retire into the deepest recesses of their own internal frame ; and even to these presenting, along with the generic attributes of the race, many of the specific peculiarities of the individual. On this subject every writer, whose speculations are at all worthy of notice, must draw his chief materials from within; and it is only by comparing the conclusions of different writers, and subjecting all of them to the test of our personal experience, that we can hope to separate the essential principles of the human constitution from the unsuspected effects of education and of temperament ;* or to apply with advantage, to our particular cir cumstances, the combined results of our reading and of our reflections. The constant appeal which, in such inquiries, the reader is thus forced to make to his own consciousness and to his own judgment, has a powerful tendency to form a habit, not more essential to the success of his metaphysical researches, than of all his other speculative pursuits. Nearly connected with this habit, is a propensity to weigh and to ascertain the exact import of words; one of the nicest and most difficult of all analytical processes; and that * I use the word temperament, in this instance, as synonymous with the idiosyncrasy of medical authors; a term which I thought might have savoured of affectation if ap plied to the mind; although authorities for such an employment of it are not wanting among old English writers. One example, directly in point, is quoted by Johnson from Glanville. "The understanding also hath its idiosyncracies, as well as other "faculties." upon which more stress has been justly laid by our best modern logicians, than upon any other organ for the investigation of truth. For the culture of this propensity, no science is so peculiarly calculated to prepare the mind, as the study of its own operations. Here, the imperfections of words constitute the principal obstacle to our progress; nor is it possible to advance a single step, without struggling against the associations imposed by the illusions of metaphorical terms, and of analogical theories. Abstracting, therefore, from its various practical applications, and considering it merely as a gymnastic exercise to the reasoning powers, this study seems pointed out by nature, as the best of all schools for inuring the understanding to a cautious and skilful employment of language as the instrument of thought. The two first chapters of this volume relate to logical questions, on which the established opinions appear to me to present stumbling blocks at the very threshold of the science. In treating of these, I have canvassed with freedom, but, I hope, with due respect, the doctrines of some illustri. ous moderns, whom I am proud to acknowledge as my masters; of those more particularly, whose works are in the highest repute in our British Universities, and whose errors I was, on that account, the most solicitous to rectify. For the space allotted to my criticisms on Condillac, no apology is necessary to hose, who have the slightest acquaintance with the present state of philosophy on the Continent, or who have remarked the growing popularity, in this Island, of some of his weakest and most exceptionable theories.-On various controverted points connected with the theory of evidence, both demonstrative and experimental, I trust, with some confidence, that I shall be found to have thrown considerable light in other instances, I have been forced to content myself with proposing my doubts; leaving the task of solving them to future inquirers. To awaken a dormant spirit o discussion, by pointing out the imperfections of generally received systems, is at least one step gained towards the farther advancement of knowledge. It is justly and philosophically remarked by Burke, that "nothing tends more to the corruption of science than to "suffer it to stagnate. These waters must be troubled be"fore they can exert their virtues. A man who works be "yond the surface of things, though he may be wrong himself, yet he clears the way for others, and may chance to "make even his errors subservient to the cause of truth."* The subsequent chapters, relative to the Baconian Logic, bear, all of them, more or less in their general scope, on the theory of the intellectual powers, and on the first principles of human knowledge. In this part of my work, the reader will easily perceive, that I do not profess to deliver logical precepts; but to concentrate, and to reflect back on the Philosophy of the Mind, whatever scattered lights I have been able to collect from the experimental researches to which that Philosophy has given birth. I have aimed, at the same time, (and I hope not altogether without success,) to give somewhat more of precision to the technical phraseology of the Baconian school, and of correctness to their metaphysical ideas. Before concluding these speculations, it may not be improper to caution my readers against supposing, that when I speak of the Baconian school, or of the Baconian logic, I mean to ascribe entirely to the Novum Organon the advances made in physical science, since the period of its publication. The singular effects of this, and of the other inestimable writings of the same author, in forwarding the subsequent progress of scientific discovery, certainly entitle his name, far more than that of any other individual, to be applied as a distinguishing epithet to the modern rules of philosophizing; but (as I have elsewhere observed)" the genius and writings of Bacon himself were powerfully influenced by "the circumstances and character of his age: Nor can there be a doubt, that he only accelerated a revolution "which was already prepared by many concurrent causes." -My reasons for thinking so, which rest chiefly on histori 66 Inquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful, Part I. Sect, xix. * Outlines of Moral Philosophy, first printed in 1793. cal retrospects, altogether foreign to my present design, I must delay stating, till another opportunity. . To this observation it is of still greater importance to add, that, in contrasting the spirit and the utility of the new logic with those of the old, I have no wish to see the former substituted, in our universities, in room of the latter. By a strange inversion in the order of instruction, Logic, instead of occupying its natural place at the close of the academical course, has always been considered as an introduction to the study of the sciences; and has, accordingly, been obtruded on the uninformed minds of youth, at their first entrance into the schools. While the syllogistic art maintained its reputation, this inversion was probably attended with little practical inconvenience; the trite and puerile examples commonly resorted to for the illustration of its rules, presupposing a very slender stock of scientific attainments but now, when the word Logic is universally understood in a more extensive sense, as comprehending, along with an outline of Aristotle's Organon, some account of the doctrines of Bacon, of Locke, and of their successors, it seems indispensably necessary, that this branch of education should be delayed till the understanding has acquired a wider and more varied range of ideas, and till the power of reflection (the last of our faculties which nature unfolds) begins to solicit its appropriate nourishment. What notions can be annexed to such words as analysis, synthesis, induction, experience, analogy, hypothetical and legitimate theories, demonstrative and moral certainty, by those whose attention has hitherto been exclusively devoted to the pursuits of classical learning? A fluent command, indeed, of this technical phraseology may be easily communicated; but it would be difficult to devise a more effectual expedient for misleading, at the very outset of life, the inexperienced and unassured judgment. The perusal of Bacon's writings, in particular, disfigured as they are by the frequent use of quaint and barbarous expressions, suited to the scholastic taste of his con |