without evidence, yet in taking evidence they need not do so in legal form, nor are they obliged to take only such evidence as would be admissible in a court of justice. They may take cognizance of matters of public notoriety not directly before them, and though they may "set down naught in malice," yet they may take general repute into account in aggravation of to take up a newspaper and see that A. B. has written a letter which they may consider scandalous, or that C. D. has been brought up in a police court for drunkenness." For it might well happen that the wrong man was charged, because it was well known that men had given the name of a friend or an enemy. Inquiry meant inquiry into the facts, and also into whatever excuse or reason might be given by the member whose conduct is to be inquired into. They should have given notice, if they could, to the member that his conduct was about to be inquired into, and should have given him an opportunity of stating his case to them. And this is not merely a legal interpretation of the rule, but is, no doubt, what the framers of the rule meant to convey by it. "Is this what the committee did? All they did was this- they had brought before them a letter written by the plaintiff complaining of the conduct of another member to him as being injurious to the club, and they had also brought before them a newspaper, of which the plaintiff was the proprietor, containing a letter as to the terms of which I will not express an opinion. But they did not tell Mr. Labouchere that his conduct was brought before them; and though they adjourned their meeting to a future day, and wrote him a letter in the meantime, they did not say, 'Your conduct will be investigated at the next meeting, and we shall consider whether you ought to be turned out of the club,' which was what they had to consider. Nothing of the sort. They wrote him a letter, stating his letter of accusation of the 4th instant, and stating that a committee would be held to consider the matter of the letter, and that in the meantime he must undertake not to make any attack on any member of the club in his publication. There was really no inquiry. Even now I am unable to say what the exact nature of the charge against Mr. Labouchere was. Three have been suggested. There was his conduct as regarded the matter of the assault, or alleged assault; there was his conduct of writing the letter to Mr. Lawson; and there was his conduct of publishing that letter in Truth; but I am in the dark as to whether any one charge singly, or the three charges together, were considered sufficiently proved to the satisfaction of the meeting." Inquiry there did not appear to have been of any sort or description, either with or without notice, and it appeared to him that the committee was not justified in acting under Rule 20. "I state this for the information of the committees of all clubs, that where it depends on the judgment of the committee, where there is no power of appeal given to anybody, it is most important that the materials on which that judgment was formed should be actually asserted. Of course, that could only be done by a proper inquiry, with notice to the accused, and taking, I any act then before them. In fact, they may do — what a court of justice may not take evidence of bad character, not only for the purpose of passing sentence, but also for the purposes of trial, so long only as they are bona fide convinced in their own minds of the truth of the facts, and are so convinced as reasonable beings.1 § 92. Sources of jurisdiction of courts of equity. It is an ancient and well established rule of English law that no person shall be dispossessed of a place of profit or honor, or be deprived of rights which he has acquired by contract or otherwise, without a fair trial, and without the exercise of a bona fide and sound discretion on the part of those who claim the power so to dispossess or deprive him. It has been said, on the other hand, that the source of equitable jurisdiction is in some infringement of the property rights of members; that while the court will interfere for the purpose of protecting property rights of members of unincorporated associations in all proper cases, and when it takes jurisdiction, will follow and enforce, so far as applicable, the rules applying to incorporated bodies of the same character, yet that where no property rights are involved, there is no jurisdiction.5 3 do not say legal evidence, or that evidence not strictly legal ought not to be admissible, but taking evidence as to the question of the fact before them, and being satisfied in their own minds, at all events, of the truth of those facts. That was not done, and, in my opinion, the committee did not follow the rule at all." Labouchere v. Wharncliffe, 13 Ch. Div. 346; s. c. 28 W. R. 367; s. c. 41 L. T. 638. See review of this case in Canada L. Jour., Oct. 15, 1881, 381. 1 Leach's Club Cases, 45, and Labouchere v. Wharncliffe, 13 Ch. Div. 346, quoted in preceding note. 2 Willis v. Child, 13 Beav. 117; Deane v. Bennett, L. R. 6 Ch. 489. 3 Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. Div. 482. 4 Otto v. Journeyman Tailors' P. & B. U., (1888) 75 Cal. 308; s. c. 7 Am. St. Rep. 156, 158; Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. Div. 482; s. c. 49 L. J. Ch. 328; s. c. 42 L. T. 139; Sale v. First Regular Baptist Church, 62 Iowa, 26; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 136; Burke v. Roper, 79 Ala. 138. 5"The first question that I will consider is, What is the jurisdiction of a court of equity as regards interfering, at the instance of a member of a society, to prevent his being properly expelled therefrom? I have no doubt whatever that the foundation of the jurisdiction is the right of property vested in the member of the society, and of which he is unjustly deprived by such unlawful expulsion. There is no jurisdiction that I am aware of, reposed, in this country at least, in any of the § 93. Grounds of equitable intervention. Only courts of equity have jurisdiction over voluntary associations, and it is with reluctance that they will exercise it. A court will not interfere in case of a partnership merely because the partners do not agree, and there is certainly greater reason why it should not interfere in case of a voluntary association concerning mere internal regulation and discipline. In other words, the court will not interfere where the rules are reasonable, and have been strictly observed, unless it be shown that the club has acted maliciously and not in good faith. It is not for the court to say whether what was done was right, or even whether the decision was reasonable. The only question is whether it was done bona fide, and the mere fact that the decision was unreasonable is not a sufficient ground for interference, unless it was so manifestly absurd and idle as to show a want of good faith. Thus, where there is a rule that a member shall be expelled if his conduct is injurious to the interests of the club, it is not for the court to say whether his conduct is injurious, and it will not interfere with the decision of the club, even though unreasonable, if it be bona fide. Accordingly a court of equity can not decree a disso Queen's courts to decide upon the rights of persons to associate together when the association possesses no property. Persons, and many persons, do associate together without any property in common at all. A dozen people may agree to meet and play whist at each others' houses for a certain period, and if eleven of them refuse to associate with the twelfth any longer, I am not aware that there is any jurisdiction in any court of justice in this country to interfere. Or a dozen or a hundred scientific men may agree with each other in the same way to meet alternately at each others' houses, or at any place where there is a possibility of their meeting each other; but if the association has no property, and takes no subscription from its members, I cannot imagine that any court of justice could inter fere with such an association, if some of the members declined to associate with some of the others." Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. Div. 482; s. c. 49 L. J. Ch. 328; s. c. 42 L. T. 139. 1 See note to Austin v. Searing, 69 Am. Dec. 665. The power of unincorporated societies to expel members, and the jurisdiction of courts to interfere concerning expulsions, will be found considered in the notes to Hiss v. Bartlett, 63 Am. Dec. 776; and Austin v. Searing, 69 Am. Dec. 665. 22 Lindley on Partnership, *466. 3 Williams' Forensic Facts & Fallacies, (1885) 115. 4 Williams' Forensic Facts & Fallacies, (1885) 115. 5 Williams' Forensic Facts & Fallacies, (1885) 115. The committee are certainly invested with large powers. They are to be the sole judges of lution and distribution because of an unauthorized expulsion.' But the court will interfere in reference to the expulsion of members from societies of this character where the decision of the association can be shown to be contrary to natural justice, or that what has been done is contrary to the rules, or that there has been malice in arriving at the decision.2 how that rule (the expulsion clause) shall be exercised, with the exception that it must not be exercised capriciously, but bona fide, according to their discretion, and when in their opinion it is the proper course to do so. The committee, when called upon to do so, swear that they have not exercised their power capriciously, unjustly, maliciously, or corruptly, and give their reasons (the resolution set out above). I cannot take plaintiff's assertion, that in his belief or in his suspicion - for this is what it comes to the committee acted capriciously. The case of the plaintiff is disproved, that is to say, he has not succeeded in establishing it. Lyttleton v. Blackburn, 33 L. T. (N. S.) 642. 1 Burke v. Roper, 79 Ala. 138; Lafond v. Deems, 81 N. Y. 507; s. c. 8 Abb. N. Cas. 344; Fischer v. Raab, 57 How. Pr. 87, 94; Thomas v. Ellmaker, 1 Pars. Sel. Cas. 98. Contra, Gorman v. Russell, 14 Cal. 531; s. c. 18 Cal. 688. 2 Otto v. Journeyman Tailors' P. & B. U., (1888) 75 Cal. 308; s. c. 7 Am. St. Rep. 156, 159, citing Hirsch on Fraternal Societies, 56; Dawkins v. Antrobus, 44 L. T. 557; s. c. L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 615; Lambert v. Addison, 46 L. T. 20. "We are referred to the provision of appellant's constitution which provides that any member having a grievance shall have the right to lay his case before the central body, who shall take action thereon, and whose decision shall be final.' No doubt, when an ac tion is properly taken in the manner indicated, it is final and the courts will not interfere; but when under the guise of remedying the grievance of a member, the central body acts in bad faith and maliciously makes the subject of the grievance a pretext for oppression and wrong, its action may however, to that extent, be the subject of review." Otto v. Journeyman Tailors' P. & B. U., (1888) 75 Cal. 308; s. c. 7 Am. St. Rep. 156, 160. In Gardner v. Fremantle, 19 Week. Rep. 256; s. c. 24 L. T. 81, Lord Romilly in his judgment said: "I point out that these clubs are formed entirely for social purposes, and there must be some paramount authority to keep up their objects. In some cases this court will interfere with the exercise of that paramount authority, but only where there is a moral culpability, or if the decision is arrived at from fraud, personal hostility or bias. But in cases of this description all that this court requires is to know that the persons who were summoned really exercised their judgment honestly. The court will not consider whether they did rightly or wrongly." After reading. Rule 45, he proceeded: "It is not if the conduct is really injurious," but if it is injurious in the opinion of the committee. Then all that the court requires is that the committee shall form their opinion in a bona fide way. There is no power in this court to control the judgment or opinion of this committee." He then § 94. Of the member's remedy for unlawful expulsion.— The usual remedy of a member of a voluntary association who has been, or is about to be, unlawfully expelled, is by injunction to restrain the officers of the association or other members from interfering with his enjoyment of the privileges of membership, or to restrain the threatened resolution of expulsion.1 Or, if the member has been already expelled, mandamus may issue in a proper case for his re-instatement.? He has no remedy, however, by a decree of dissolution. And if the expulsion has been regular and authorized by the charter or under statute, mandamus will not issue. Nor will one goes into the facts and concludes: "I am satisfied that the gentlemen who sat in judgment on this matter came to a sound judgment; and if you see that they have seriously examined the case this court can not go a step further. I am satisfied I should wrongly apply the functions of this court if I were to sit in judgment on a set of gentlemen expressly selected for this purpose, who think it better that this gentleman should cease to be a member. I think the notices to the committee were sufficient, and make no order upon the suit.". 1 Niblack on Mutual Benefit Societies, 63; Thomas v. Ellmaker, 1 Pars. Sel. Cas. 98; Fitz v. Muck, (1881) 62 How. Pr. 69, 73-75; Leech v. Harris, (1870) 2 Brews. (Pa.) 571. Cf. Society of Italian Union &c. v. Montedonico, (Ky. 1884) 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 22. But an injunction to restrain a medical society has been refused in Massachusetts. Gregg v. Massachusetts Medical Soc.. (1872) 111 Mass. 185. Cf. "Law of Clubs," by Louis Claude Whiton, (1883) 27 Alb. L. J. 326. 2 Black & White Smiths' Soc. v. Vandyke, (1836) 2 Wharton, (Pa.) 309; Commonwealth v. German Soc., (1850) 15 Pa. St. 251; People v. Saint Francisco's Benevolent Soc., (1862) 24 How. Pr. 216; State v. Carteret Club, 40 N. J. 295; People v. Medical Soc. of Erie Co., (1865) 32 N. Y. 187; People v. New York Benevolent Soc., (1875) 3 Hun, 361; Medical &c. Soc. v. Weatherby, 75 Ala. 248. One who has been illegally expelled from an unincorporated voluntary benevolent association may maintain an action against its president to compel restoration to membership. If the rules of the association failed to provide for notice of the proceedings for expulsion, they were unreasonable, and the member, notwithstanding them, was entitled to notice and to an opportunity to be heard. Weekly payments which the member declared himself entitled to because of sickness, and of which he claimed that he was unjustly deprived during the period of his expulsion, can not, however, be recovered, the association, in the absence of fraud, being the sole judges of the propriety of making such payments. Fitz v. Muck, (1881) 62 How. Pr. 69. 3 Burke v. Roper, 79 Ala. 138; Thomas v. Ellmaker, 1 Pars. Sel. Cas. 98; Fischer v. Raab, 57 How. Pr. 87, 94. The case of Gorman v. Russell, 14 Cal. 531; s. c. 18 Cal. 688, to the contrary, is opposed to principle and authority. 4 Commonwealth v. Pike Beneficial |