not be deemed or construed a change of the law, unless such phraseology evidently purport an intention in the legislature to work a change.* So in New Hampshire, it has been held that upon the revision of the statutes the construction will not be changed by such alterations as are merely designed to render the provisions more concise.t

In the adoption of the Code, it has been said in Alabama that, the legislature must be presumed to have known the judicial construction which had been placed on the former statutes; and therefore the re-enactment in the Code of provisions substantially the same as those contained in a former statute, is a legislative adoption of their known judicial construction.

In Massachusetts it has also been held in regard to the revision of statutes, to be a well-settled rule that when any statute is revised or one act framed from another, some parts being omitted, the parts omitted are not to be revived by construction, but are to be considered as annulled; to hold otherwise would be to impute to the legislature gross carelessness or ignorance, which is altogether inadmissible. So, in that State a very useful statute passed in 1754, concerning donations and bequests to pious, and charitable, &c. was decided not to be in force, on the ground that the legislature

* Yate's Case, 4 J. R, 359. Matter of Theriat vs. Hart, 2 Hill, 380. Parmelee vs. Thompson, 7 Hill, 77. Taylor vs. Delancy, 2 C. C. in Error, 150. Goodell vs. Jackson, 20 J. R., 722. Croswell vs. Crane, 7 Barb., 191. Young vs. Dake, 1 Seld., 463. Elwood vs. Klock, 13 Barb., 50. Douglass vs. Howland, 24 Wend., 35. Dominick vs. Michael, 4 Sand. S. C. R. per Duer, J. 374, 409.

Mooers vs. Bunker, 9 Foster, p. 421.

Duramus vs. Harrison & Whitman, 26 Ala., 326.

had in 1785 legislated on the same subject, and omitted to re-enact the provisions of the statute.*

Another rule connected with the subject of the revision of statutes, may be appropriately stated here. In this country the State statutes have been frequently revised and altered upon the report of officers appointed for the purpose, revisors or commissioners; and in submitting their proposed revision or alteration to the legislature, the legal advisers of the State have stated in the shape of a reports or of notes their reason for the proposed change of phraseology or provision, and the meaning which they affixed to it; but it has been held that such reports or notes are not to be taken as an authoritative construction of the revised or amended law, as the revisors might have meant one thing and the legislature another; and that the meaning of the statute is to be obtained and arrived at in the usual way.t

State statutes how construed in the United States courts. One great object of the Federal Constitution among others, was by the creation of a national judiciary to secure a tribunal free from all local influences to decide on controversies between the States themselves; between citizens of different States, and between citizens and foreigners. Besides this, in order to secure the supremacy of the Constitution of the United States, an appeal lies, in cases affecting the construction of the Federal charter or of acts of Congress, from the highest State courts to the Supreme

Ellis vs. Paige et al. 1 Pick. 43; Bartlett, et al. vs. King, Exr., 12 Mass. R. 537; Nichols vs. Squire, 5 Pick. 168.

Forrest vs. Forrest, 10 Barb. 46.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE LAWS IN U. S. COURTS. 431

Court of the United States.* It necessarily results that statutes of the several States, come constantly under revision in the Supreme Court of the United States. The rules of construction which are there applied to them, become therefore a matter of the highest interest.

On this subject the general doctrine is, that in construing the statutes of the several States, so far as those statutes belong to the local law of the States, the Supreme Court of the United States looks to the decisions of the highest courts of the State; and where the construction is settled by such tribunal, the Federal tribunal adopts it as its own. And the same principle has been declared to hold good in regard to State constitutions. So, in an early case in the Supreme Court of the United States, turning on the Pennsylvania acts respecting the registry of deeds, C. J. Marshall said, "Were this act of 1715 now for the first time to be construed, the opinion of this court would certainly be, that the deed was not regularly proved. But in construing the statutes of a State on which land-titles depend, infinite mischief would ensue should this court observe a different rule from that which has been long established in the State ;"***"the court yields the construction which would be put on the words of the act, to that which the courts of the State have put on it, and

*Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; Cohens vs. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 413, where the appellate jurisdiction was sustained in an elaborate opinion by Marshall, C. J.

M'Keen vs. Delancy's Lessee, 5 Cr. 22;

Polk's Lessee vs. Wendell et al. 9 Cr. 87; Gardner vs. Collins et al. 2 Pet. 58; Shelby vs. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361; Green vs. Lessee of Neal, 6 Pet. 291; Nesmith vs. Sheldon, 8 How. 812.

Webster vs. Cooper, 14 How. 488.

"The

on which many titles may probably depend." laws imposing a tax on lands, and regulating its collection, in perhaps almost all the States," says Mr. Justice M'Lean speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, "are peculiar in their provisions, having been framed under the influence of a local policy. And this policy has to some extent influenced the construction of those laws. There can be no class of laws more strictly local in their character, and which more directly concern real property, than these. They not only constitute a rule of property, but their construction by the courts of the States should be followed by the courts of the United States, with equal, if not greater strictness than the construction of any other class of laws."+

The rule of adoption of State construction by the Federal judiciary has been said to grow out of the constitution of the Federal tribunal. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, over cases where citizens of another State than the one in which the suit arises are concerned, rests upon the ground that the Federal courts, in applying the law, will be more free from undue influence. But the law to be applied is the local law, and that law is to be administered as it is, not reviewed or altered. And the tribunals of each State are rightly considered best to understand what is

* M'Keen vs. Delancy's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 22, 32, 33.

It has been said, that the Supreme Court adopts the local law of real property as ascertained by the decisions of the State courts, whether those decisions are upon the construction of the statutes of the State, or form a part of the unwritten law of the State. Jackson vs. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153; Also see Shelby vs. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, as to the adoption of State law generally; and Swift vs. Tyson, 16 Peters, pp. 1 and 18.

+ Games et al. vs. Stiles, 14 Peters, 322, 328.

STATE STATUTES, HOW CONSTRUED IN U. S. COURTS. 433

the law of the State. This course is pursued, it has been again said, "not on the ground of authority, but of policy. It would be injurious to the citizens of a State to have two rules of property. Such a course by the courts of the Union would produce unfortunate conflicts, and encourage litigation."

But the rule is not without exceptions. It does not apply to decisions on charters granted by the British crown, under which certain rights are claimed by the state on the one hand and by private individuals on the other; and in regard to these, the Supreme Court reserves its absolute independence of judgment. So, again, it has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States, that the rule of that court recognizing the decisions of the highest courts of the States made in regard to State statutes, as containing an authoritative exposition of their true meaning, does not relate to private statutes, relating to particular persons, or to statutes giving special jurisdiction to a State court for the alienation of private estates, "for the reason that whatever a State court may do in such a case, its decision is no part of the local law."§ But may be permitted to doubt whether the same reasons of comity, policy, and practical expediency which recommend the rule as to public statutes, should not make it operate with equal effect on private statutes; every statute affecting the tenure of real property in a State, whether public or private, is certainly in some sense a part of the local law.

I

* Wood arguendo, in Martin vs. Waddell, 16 Peters, 367, 390; Elmendorf vs. Taylor, 10 Wheaton, 152; Bell vs. Morrison, 1 Peters, 359; Green vs. Neal, 6 Peters, 301.

+ Woolsey vs. Dodge, 6 M'Lean, 142.

Martin vs. Waddell, 16 Peters, 367, 418.

§ Williamson et al. vs. Berry, 8 How. 495, 543.

1