⚫ 434 STATE STATUTES, HOW CONSTRUED IN U. S. COURTS. So, too, where the Supreme Court of the United States have first decided upon State laws, the Federal tribunal does not feel bound to surrender their convictions on account of a contrary decision of a State court.* So, again, when the decisions of a State court are conflicting, the Supreme Court of the United States does not consider itself bound to follow the last case contrary to their own convictions, and especially, they have said, where after a long course of decisions some new light springs up, or an excited public opinion has brought out new doctrines subversive of former safe precedent. In Michigan, the original manuscript of the statute of limitations left out the saving clause "beyond seas;" but the published law contained the exception, and had been so received and construed by the people and the courts for a long series of years, and a subsequent legislature sanctioned the law as published; nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided that the printed statutes did not form a part of the laws of that State, but that the original roll must be received as the exact record of the legislative will. But the Supreme Court of the United States disregarded the decision of the Michigan tribunal, and decided that the printed statute might control the case.t In a case before the Supreme Court of the United States, it was contended that the decisions of the local tribunals on questions of general commercial law were to be treated as having the binding force of statutory enactments. But the court rejected the proposition. * Rowan vs. Runnells, 5 Howard, 139. Swift vs. Tyson, 16 Peters, pp. 1 and 18. As to harmony between the decisions of tribunals of co-ordinate jurisdiction in regard to the con Having, in the previous pages, endeavored to give a general outline of the system of our law in regard to the interpretation and application of statutes, I close this branch of my subject by some instances of the power of interpretation and construction as applied to particular words. It is not designed to do more than to give an idea of the mode in which the judicial authority in this respect is exercised. Banking Principles.-A statutory authority to a corporation to loan and negotiate their moneys and effects upon banking principles, has been said, "if the phrase has any peculiar meaning, to be an authority to deduct the interest at the commencement of loans, or to make loans upon discounts, instead of the ordinary forms of security for an accruing interest."* Billiards.-A license by the legislature of billiard tables, cannot be understood to authorize any other species of gaming.† Burglary at common law means the crime of breaking into a house in the night time, with the intent to steal or commit a felony; and it has been held in Alabama, that this term, when used in their Code, must receive the same construction. Cattle.-Various cases have been decided as to struction of statutes, I may notice that in Merville vs. Townsend, 5 Paige, 80, Mr. Chancellor Walworth said "that where the Supreme Court had given a judicial construction to a provision of a recent statute, that decision, if not clearly wrong, should be followed by the Court of Chancery, so that different rules of construction might not prevail in the courts of law and equity in relation to the same statutory provisions." * Maine Bank vs. Butts, 9 Mass. 49. † Barker vs. The State, 12 Texas, 273. Ex parte Vincent, 26 Ala. 145, the court say, "When words are used by the legislature in relation to a matter or subject, which, when used in reference to the same subject at the common law, have obtained a fixed and definite meaning, the inference, we think, is irresistible, that they were intended to be used in the common-law sense." what are considered cattle in England; and the construction varies with the statutes in which they are used.* Corporate Name.-Where an act required certain suits to be brought in the corporate name of cities or villages, it was held that the phrase meant the name by which the city or village was designated in its charter, and a suit brought in the name of the "President and trustees" of the village, &c. was held improperly commenced.+ Curtilage. This term, which is peculiar to England, and not very applicable to this country, has been held in Michigan to embrace a barn standing eighty feet from a dwelling house, in a yard or lane with which there was a communication from the house by a pair of bars. Deny. Where, in case of an alleged encroachment on the highway, the occupant must, within a limited time after notice, deny the encroachment, his denial must be in writing.S Descent.-"Descent from the mother" can not be held to mean descent from the maternal grandfather.] From. The word "descent from a parent," cannot be construed to mean "descent through a parent." * 3 Bing. 581. 2 W. Black. 723. Ex parte Hill, 3 C. & P. 225. Dwarris, p. 750. The President & Trustees of the village of Romeo vs. Chapman, 2 Mich. 179. The People vs. Taylor, 2 Michigan, 250. Lane vs. Cary, 19 Barb. 537. See to same effect, Gilbert vs. Col. Turnpike Co. 3 John. Cas. 107; and Matter of Cooper, 15 John. 533. In M'Ewen vs. Montgomery Insurance Co., 5 Hill, 101, it was held that a verbal notice is good, unless the notice be a legal proceeding, and then it must be in writing. Case vs. Wilbridge, 4 Indiana, 51. ¶ Gardner vs. Collins, 2 Peters, 58. High Seas. This word, as used in the Crimes Act of the United States (1825, ch. 276, § 22), is used in contradistinction to arms of the sea, and bays, creeks, &c. within the narrow headlands of the coast; and comprehends only the open ocean which washes the seacoast, or is not included within the body of any county in any particular State.* It has been held that by the same phrase, under the act of 30th April, 1790, is meant any waters on the seacoast which are without the boundaries of low-water mark.t Improvidence.-As to what improvidence is, for which a person will be held incompetent to be an administrator, see Coope vs. Lowerre, 1 Barb. Ch. R. 45. Justifiable cause.-Where an act declares it to be a crime for a master to force a seaman on shore in a foreign port without justifiable cause, these words do not mean such a cause as in the mere maritime law might authorize a discharge, but such a cause as the known policy of the American laws on the subject contemplates as a case of moral necessity for the safety of the ship and crew, and the due performance of the voyage. Maliciously. When an act declares it to be a crime to force a seaman on shore "maliciously and without justifiable cause," the word maliciously is not limited to acts done from hatred, revenge, or passion, but it includes all acts wantonly done, or willfully done, that are against what any man of reasonable knowledge and ability must know to be his duty.§ * U. S. vs. Grush, 5 Mason, 290. U. S. vs. Robinson, 4 Mason, 307. + U. S. vs. Ross, 1 Gall. 624. Per Story, J., U. S. vs. Coffin, 1 Sumner, 394. Per Story, J., U. S. vs. Coffin, 1 Sumner, 394. U. S. vs. Ruggles, 5 Mason, 192. Phillips' Case, 1 Moody's Crown Cases, 264, 273. May and shall. Shall and may. Shall or may.These words have been a fertile source of difficulty. In an early case on the construction of an English statute, empowering churchwardens and overseers to make a rate to reimburse constables, it was insisted that the statute only put the act in their power by the word "may," and did not require the doing it as a duty. "Sed non allocatur; for where a statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice, or the public good, the word may is the same as the word shall: thus, the 23 Hen. VI. says the sheriff may take bail ; this is construed shall, for he is compellable to do so."* So, under the acts giving the chancellor power and authority to grant a commission of bankruptcy, it was held not to be discretionary but de jure.† This subject has been recently much considered in England on the true construction of the act called the County Courts Extension Act, which declares that in certain cases "a judge at chambers may, by rule or order, direct that the plaintiff shall recover his costs." The word may was here held not to be discretionary, but to mean shall; and the court said that "when a statute confers an authority to do a judicial act in a certain case, it is imperative on those so authorized to exercise the authority when the case arises, and its exercise is duly applied for by a party interested and having the right to make the application; that the word may is not used to give a discretion, but to confer a power upon the court and judges,-and the exercise of such power depends not upon the dis * Rex et Regina vs. Barlow, 2 Salk. 609. † Alderman Backwell's Case, 1 Vern. 152; 1 Cas. in Eq. Abr., 52; 2 Ch. Cases, 143-190. Stamper vs. Miller, 3 Atk. 211. |