1. In a statute that provides that "it shall not be lawful for any person or persons to geld any animal knowing that such animal is kept, or intended to be kept, for covering mares," the word "knowing" does not imply exact knowledge. "I think that notice in its legal acceptation is what the statute requires. It is such information as would lead a prudent man to believe that the fact existed; and that if followed by enquiry must bring knowledge of the fact home to him." Tucker v. Constable, 16 Oreg. 409; s. c., 19 Pac. Rep. 13.

In a statute rendering the officers of a corporation liable for its debts who sign an annual report "knowing it to be false," these words "import a wilful misrepresentation with actual knowledge of its falsity and not merely such constructive knowledge as can be imputed from the presumption that the officer signing the report knew the law and comprehended the precise import of the language used, when construed with reference to statutory provisions." Pier v. Hanmore, 86 N. Y. 95.

Where it is made an offence to bring a "poor and indigent" person into another county, "knowing him to be poor and indigent," the knowledge spoken of implies a culpable intent. Sullivan Co. v. Grafton Co., 55 N. H. 339; Merrimack Co. v. Sullivan Co., 45 N. H. ISI.

The statement "we know them to be good," on which some promissory notes were sold, held to constitute a guaranty that the notes were good and collectible at maturity. Un. Nat. Bk. v. 1st Nat. Bk., 45 Ohio St. 236.

"Well knowing" in a will is sufficient Bardswell. Bards

to create a trust.

well, 9 Sim. 323.

to or from an illicit distillery, the court said: "The distinction in this case is sought to be founded on the absence of the word 'knowingly.' But it would be more in harmony with the purview of the whole section and with the natural

meaning of the words 'suffer' and 'permit' to hold that the word 'knowingly,' where it occurs, can have no reasonable meaning as adding to the force of the words 'suffer' and 'permit,' and should be rejected there as surplusage. Every definition of 'suffer' and 'permit' includes knowledge of what is to be done under the sufferance and permission, and intention that what is done is what is to be done."

"Knowingly permits" implies consent as well as knowledge. State v. Stafford, 67 Me. 125.

"This appeared from the general scope of the act and from the nature of the evils to be avoided, and I am not aware of any other way in which it is possible to determine whether the word knowingly' is or is not to be implied in the definition of a crime in which it is not expressed." 2 Steph. Dist. Cr. L. Eng. 117.

4. State v. Stalls, 37 Tex. 440; State v. Arnold, 39 Tex. 74.

Nor by "fraudulently and unlawfully." Rex. v. Jukes, 8 T. R. 536.

5. Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 114, where in interpreting the expression in an act, "If any owner, consignee or agent shall knowingly make an entry of goods by means of any false invoice," the court held that this meant if such person shall make such entry of goods knowing that the invoice does not express their actual market valueswearing falsely and knowing it.

In the charge of the court below it is said: "I do not feel at liberty when the legislature has left out the word 'fraudulently' and inserted the word 'knowingly' to reinstate the word 'fraudulent.' At the same time I am bound to say that I cannot conceive any case where an entry could be knowingly made by means of a false invoice unless it were fraudulently made. . . What, then, shall we understand by this word 'knowingly' as here employed? It is

ingly' in the statute is superfluous, having no meaning which is not necessarily implied without it. The offence, therefore, subject to the alterations effected by the statute, ought to be deemed to have the character of the common law offence. If so, then knowledge on the part of the accessory, not only that the principal offence had been committed, but also that the person harbored had committed it, was a necessary ingredient in the accessory offence. We think there can be no doubt that the word 'knowingly, used in the section, was intended to have that meaning. The section in its present form increases the punishment, but in another respect it mitigates the severity of the law.

as

It also expresses what was probably before implied, that the guilt is incurred only when there is an intent to shield the principal offender from the law. These are the only alterations worthy of note which are apparent. Now the question is whether by reason of these alterations, the word 'knowingly' has acquired a different meaning from what it previously had. It seems to us that we must assume that the old word has the old meaning until it is clearly apparent that it was meant to have another. We do not find any sufficient indication that a different meaning was intended."

So, as to incurring a penalty for hindering or obstructing an arrest. Driskill v. Parrish, 3 McLean (U. S.) 631, 636. “He must act 'knowingly,' which presupposes a knowledge of such facts as authorize an arrest. If he act in ignorance of these facts he does not act 'knowingly.'

"And the same principle applies in the case of a rescue. To bring an individual within the statute he must have knowledge that the colored persons are fugitives from labor, or he must act under such circumstances as show that he might have had such knowledge by exercising ordinary prudence." Giltner v. Gorham, 4 McLean (U. S.) 402.

In an action to recover penalties imposed by statute upon "whoever shall knowingly" do certain acts, it was held that knowledge could not be imputed to the defendant from the acts of others and their agency for or relation to him.

"The term 'knowingly,' in an action like this, must undoubtedly be held to mean actual personal knowledge. The term 'knowingly' was used to designate the persons upon whom the penalty should be imposed; and it is not to be enlarged or extended so as to meet any supposed mischief which the statute was intended to guard against and prevent." Verona Cen. Cheese Factory v. Murtaugh, 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 17, 22.

1. U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 482. And in U. S. v. Claypool, 14 Fed. Rep. 127, it is said: "The terms 'knowingly and wilfully,' employed in the law and in the indictment, have the common and usual meaning attached to them, and are intended to signify that defendant . . . at the time of committing the offence charged against him, must have known what he was doing, and that with such knowledge he proceeded to commit the violations of law with which he is charged. The offence here denounced is the knowing and wilful obstructing the passage of the mail. I have already spoken of the meaning of the terms 'knowingly and wilfully,' and add, by way of further explanation, that they are used in contradistinction to innocent, ignorant or unintentional; so that defendant by the acts he did may have obstructed and retarded the mail in its passage yet he is not guilty under the law if he did it innocently and without intending to do so. There is a distinction between the act of obstructing done while in pursuit of a legitimate or innocent object, and being done while committing an unlawful act."

And see Meireilles v. Banning, 2 B. & Ad. 909, where the offence of "wittingly, wilfully or knowingly" detaining letters, was taken "to denote acts done with a conscious mind that the party is doing wrong," and not to apply to the case of a postmaster who delivered letters to the assignee of a bankrupt believing bona fide that he was entitled to them.

These words do not mean "that the person must be shown to have known what the law was and to have acted wilfully against it. Every man is presumed and must be held to know the law." A Quantity of Dist. Spirits,

For the grammatical force of

3 Ben. (U. S.) 559, where it was held that where a rectifier knew that stamps on barrels were not cancelled, and it was his will, freely exercised, that they should not be cancelled when the barrels were emptied, he had "knowingly and wilfully" neglected to comply with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Act.

Where the defendant was indicted for "knowingly and wilfully" cutting and carrying away trees on the land of another without his consent, and the court below charged the jury and "knowingly" and "wilfully" were in law synonymous terms, and that the defendant was guilty if he did the act "knowingly," it was held there was no error. "Whether the criticism on the language of the judge, in saying, in his charge, that the words "knowingly" and "wilfully" are in law synonymous, be just as a question of philology, is of no sort of consequence in this case, because the indictment follows the precise words of the statute, and that is entirely sufficient." Welsh v. State, 11 Tex. 368, 374.

1. An indictment, under Rev. St. U. S., § 3893, charging that the defendant did "knowingly deposit" for mailing and delivery certain obscene pictures, etc., is not open to the objection that it is not alleged that the defendant knew the character of that which he deposited. United States v. Clark, 37 Fed. Rep. 106. "Doubtless the question turns largely on whether the word 'knowingly, as used in the statute and the indictment, qualifies simply the adjacent verb 'deposit,' or the whole matter described. It may be conceded that ordinarily an adverb is understood as qualifying its adjacent verb; and yet that is not always true; and in construing words and sentences used in an indictment we are to give them their ordinary significance, in the absence of some technical construction necessarily imposed upon them. Now, it is a familiar use of the adverb 'knowingly' that it qualifies both its adjacent verb and the full act thereafter described. A few simple illustrations will make this clear. I say that a party knowingly told a lie. Everyone understands from that that I mean that the party has stated that which he knew to be a lie, and not simply that he stated that which was in fact untrue, yet unknown to hin to be untrue. And in the same way,

the word, see note I.

when I say that a party knowingly deposited an obscene picture, no one supposes that I mean that he simply deposited a picture, the character of which he was ignorant of. All understand that I mean to say that he has deposited that which he knew to be obscene; and this because the adverb 'knowingly', used in sentences of this kind, by the common understanding of all, goes beyond the mere verb, and includes broadly all that is expressed in the full act charged to have been done. Now, congress, in the section under which this indictment was framed, chose to use language in this way; and after defining what was nonmailable matter, declared that anyone who knowingly deposited such nonmailable matter should be punished. Shall I ignore this common understanding of the use of the word 'knowingly' in sentences of this kind, or shall I recognize that congress has used this language in its ordinary acceptation; and having thus sufficiently described the offence, hold that an indictment which follows that description is sufficient?"

See contra United States v. Slenker, 32 Fed. Rep. 691, where it was held that an allegation in an indictment, under the above statute, of "knowingly" depositing, etc., would not be extended to embrace an averment of scienter, as to the obscene character of the matter so deposited. The court said: "The defendant is charged with knowingly depositing, and causing to be deposited, in the mail, for mailing and delivery, cer tain obscene papers, etc. She may knowingly have done this, she may knowingly have caused it to be done, and yet be entirely ignorant of the obscene character of the writings, etc.. so deposited, and consequently not guilty of the offence described in the statute. 'Knowingly', in the indictment, must be limited to the act of depositing, for mailing and delivery the obscene matter in the mail, and cannot be extended to include a guilty knowledge of the writings, paper, etc. Suppose the indictment charged that the defendant knowingly deposited, and caused to be deposited, in the mail, for mailing and delivery, a certain dangerous and explosive substance, known as dynamite or gunpowder; would this be a sufficient allegation that she knew the material to be of a dangerous and explosive character? The court thinks not. The knowledge