17 O. G. (Pat. Office U. S.) 1153; s. C., 2 Fed. Rep. 217.

1. Wharton's Law Lex.; In re Meason, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 167.

Contractors and sub-contractors are not "laborers" within meaning of statute giving right of action for labor debts. Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Sturgis (Mich.), 6 Ain. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 619.

Word "labor" construed to mean those who perform manual labor, and not members of engineer corps or assistant general manager. Peck v. Rust (Wis.), 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 642.

2. Anderson's Dictionary of Law. In Pennsylvania and Del. R. Co. v. Leuffer, 84 Pa. St. 168, a lien was denied to a civil engineer who claimed under statutes giving the same to contractors, laborers and workmen on railroad and other internal improvements by corporations. GORDON, J., said: "Worcester defines a laborer to be 'one who labors; one regularly employed at some hard work; a workman; an operative; often used of one who gets a livelihood at coarse manual labor, as distinguished from an artisan or professional man.' In like manner a workman is defined as 'one who works; one employed in any labor, especially manual labor.' So, if we consult the older English statutes, as that of 1 Jac., ch. 6, which provides that the statute of 5 Eliz. shall extend to the rating of all laborers, weavers, spinsters, or workwomen, either working by the day, week, month or year, or taking any work by the great, or otherwise,' we cannot doubt but that the terms laborers' and 'workmen' were intended to include only such as were engaged in manual occupations." See also Re Ho King, 8 Sawy. (U. S.) 438; Caraker v. Mathews, 25 Ga. 571.

In Pennsylvania, the word has been construed in favor of an architect who was employed not only to make plans and specifications, but also to direct and Oversee. Bank of Pa. v. Gries, 35 Pa.

St. 42. But it has been held not to include an architect who simply provides plans and specifications. Price v. Kirk, 90 Pa. St. 47. There is perhaps a conflict as to whether laborer applies to architects who superintend the building. Like Bank v. Gries have been decided: Mulligan v. Mulligan, 18 La. An. 20; Knight v. Norris, 13 Minn. 473: Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Rowand, 26 N. J. Eq. 389, 397; Stryker v. Cassidy, 76 N. Y. 50, reversing 10 Hun (N. Y.) 18. Contra, Foushee v. Grigsby, 12 Bush (Ky.) 75. Ames v. Dyer, 41 Me. 397, was a case of moulds for a ship. In Raeder v. Bensberg, 6 Mo. App. 445, the building was erected under the builder's superintendence. The architect was denied lien. The court neither approves nor condemns the cases cited above. Overseer of a plantation is not a laborer. Whitaker v. Smith, 81 N. Car. 340. An overseer employed for a year was held to be entitled to exemption, as a mechanic or laborer, from attachment and garnishment of his wages. Caraker v. Mathews, 25 Ga. 571.

3. A Chinese actor or theatrical performer is not a "laborer" within the treaty with China of November 17th, 1880, or the statute, in aid of such treaty, of May 6th, 1882, and therefore he may come to and reside in the United States at pleasure. Ho King, 8 Sawy. (U. S.) 438 (1883). As to immigration of Chinese laborers, see act of congress of October 1st, 1888, 25 United States Statutes at Large, that title in index.

Joinder of Miner's Liens.-An action to foreclose liens for labor on a mining claim of forty acres, which is a part only of defendant's entire property may be joined with other claims against the entire tract. Malone v. Big Flat Gravel Co., 76 Cal. 578; s. C., 18 Pac. Rep. 772. In this case the various placer claims all adjoined each other, with a ditch as a backbone, and were operated as one mine. See p. 582.

559.

11. Recognition of Right, 559
12. Delay by Agreement of
Parties, 559.
13. Act of Defendant, 560.
14. Negotiations for Com-
promise, 561.

15. Waiver of Objection, 561. 16. Continuing Influence, 561 VI. Application Dependent on Circumstances, 562.

VII. Laches of Sovereign Power, 562.

VIII. Laches of Municipal Officers, 565.

IX. Laches of Ancestors and Grantors, 566.

X. Executed and Executory In-
terests, 566.

XI. Continuing Obligations and
Wrongs, 567.

XII. Limited Estates, 568.
XIII. Family Quarrels, 569.
XIV. Bodies of Creditors, 570.

XV. Statute of Limitations, 570.

582.

XXI. Breaches of Copyright, 582. XXII. Corporate Matters, 583. 1. Subscription to Stock 583.

2. List of Contributors, 585. 3. Breaches of Duty, 586.

XXIII. Decedents' Estates, 559. 1. Accounting, 589

2. Suits by Legatees and Distributees, 591.

3. Breaches of Duty by Executors, 593.

4. Suits by Creditors Against Executors, 594. 5. Suits to Charge Heirs and Legatees, 594. XXIV. Breach of Condition Subsequent in Death, 597.

XXV. Claims for Dower, 597. XXVI. Setting Aside Fraudulent Conveyances, 598.

XXVII. Fraud, 600.

1. General Principles, 600.
2. Rescission of Contract,
603.

XXVIII. Guardian's Accounts, 605.
XXIX. Injunctions, 605.

XXX. Suits to Set Aside Judg-
ments, 605.

XXXI. Quieting Title and Removing Cloud, 606.

XXXII. Equitable Title to Land, 606. XXXIII. Interest, 608.

XXXIV. Costs, 608.

XXXV. Evidence, 609.

XXXVI. Pleading, 609.

Derivation. The term "laches" is derived from the French, lacher, to slacken, to let slip; lache, lax, indolent, slothful; lachesse, indolence.

"Laches, or lasches, is an old French word for slackness, or negligence or

not doing." 1 Co. Litt. 179. "Laches signifieth in the common law, recklessness or negligence, et negligentia semper habet infortumem comitem." 3 Co. Litt. 44.

"Slackness or negligence, as it appears in Littleton, where laches of entry means a neglect in the heir to enter. And probably it may be an old English word; for when we say there is a laches of entry, it is all one as if it were said: there is a lack of entry; and in this signification it is used. Litt. 136." 4 Jac. Law Dict. 67.

Neglect to Act.-In Sebag v. Abithol, 4 M. & S. 462, the question arose whether failure to present a bill of exchange at the specified place of payment was sufficient to discharge the acceptor. LORD ELLENBOROUGH said: "Laches is a neglect to do something which by law a man is obliged to do. Whether my neglect to call at a house where a man informs me that I may get the money amounts to laches depends on whether I am obliged to call there."

Negligence Must be Imputable. "Laches presupposes not only lapse of time, but also the existence of circumstances, which render negligence imputable, and unless reasonable diligence is shown in the prosecution of a claim to equitable relief, the court, acting on the maxim, vigilantibus non dormientibus subvenieunt leges, will decline to interfere." Lindley on Partnership (4th Eng. ed.) 902.

investment, and during all of which time the debtor is scrupulously fulfilling all his obligations,can never amount to such laches or neglect on the part of the creditor as to defeat his rights. In Nelson v. Carrington, 4 Munf. (Va.) 332, 343, the doctrine of this court was, that such lapse is only permitted in equity to defeat an acknowledged right, on the ground of affording evidence of a presumption that that right has been abandoned; that it therefore never prevails when that presumption is outweighed by opposing facts and circumstances."" Coles' Admr. v. Ballard, 78 Va. 139, 147. See also Wissler v.

Craig's Admr., So Va. 22, 30.

Inexcusable Inattention to One's Interests.-In Smith v. Duncan, 16 N. J. Eq. 240, 242, the court use the phrase "Inexcusable negligence and inattention to one's interests" as synonymous with the term "laches."

Lapse of Time Insufficient.-"What constitutes a stale equity is a vexed question, hardly susceptible of ar accurate definition. Length of time alone is not a test of staleness." Paschall v. Hinderer, 28 Ohio St. 568, 580.

1. Smith v. Clay, 3 Bro. Ch. 640.

LORD CAMDEN said in this case: "A court of equity has always refused to aid stale demands, where the party has slept upon his rights, and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting the court is passive and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced, and from the beginning of this jurisdiction there was always a limitation to suits in this court."

This dictum has met with general approval, and has been quoted frequently by the courts. See Piatt v. Vattier, 34 U. S. (9 Pet.) 405; McKnight v. Taylor, 42 U. S. (1 How.) 161; Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U. S. (1 How.) 189; Wagner v. Baird, 48 U. S. (7 How.) 234; Badger v. Badger, 69 U. S.

(2 Wall.) 87; Hume v. Beale, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 336; Marsh v. Whitmore, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 178; Sullivan v. Portland & K. R. Co., 94 U. S. 806; Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U. S. 201; Speidel v. Henrici, 120 Ú. S. 377; Johnson v. Johnson, 5 Ala. 90; Castner v. Walrod, 83 Ill. 171; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 369; Chew v. Farmers' Bank of Maryland, 2 Md. Ch. Dec. 231; Sedlak v. Sedlak, 14 Oreg. 540; Hayes' Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 380; Doggett v. Helm, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 96; Coleman v. Lyne, 4 Rand. (Va.) 454; Frader v. Jarvis, 23 W. Va.

100.

In many cases a similar doctrine has been enunciated, although stated in different language. See Perkins v. Cartmell, 4 Harr. (Del.) 270; Smith v. Coker, 74 Ga. 390; Akins v. Hill, 7 Ga. 573; Dickerman v. Burgess, 20 Ill. 266; Hughes v. Jones, 2 Md. Ch. Dec. 178; Smith v. Washington, 11 Mo. App. 5193 Pickering v. Pickering, 38 N. H. 400; Smith Duncan, 16 N. J. Eq. 240; Sharp v. King, 3 Ired. Ch. (N. Car.) 402; Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 168; Glasscock v. Nelton, 26 Tex. 150; Harcourt v. White, 28 Beav. 303; Cairncross v. Larimer, 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 827. Mayor of Colchester v. Lowten, 1 Ves. & B. 226, 246.

V.

"Every person is bound to take care of his own rights, and to vindicate them in due season and in proper order. This is a sound and salutary principle of law." Per KENT J., in Le Guen v. Gouverneur, 1 Johns. Čas. (N. Y.) 436, 502. See also Galena & S. W. R. Co. v. Ennor, 116 Ill. 55.

"Equity is no more bound to take care of those who can take care of themselves, and will not, than is a court of law." Sharpe v. King, 3 Ired. Ch. (N. Car.) 402, 495.

1. Hume v. Beale's Ex'r, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 336; McKnight v. Taylor, 42 U. S.(1 How.) 161; Johnson v.Toulmin, 18 Ala. 50; Akins v. Hill, 7 Ga. 573; Kline v. Vogel, 90 Mo. 239; Giles v. Baremore, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 545; Hayes' Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 380; Foulk v. Brown, 2 Watts (Pa.) 209.

Presumption that Claim Unjust. In Akins v. Hill, 7 Ga. 573, 577, the court said: "The peace of society requires there should be limits put to legislation. The justice and sense of civilized na

tions have ever favored limitation laws. There is no principle of equity sounder, more conservative, and more prolific in all the fruits of peace, than this: that he who slumbers over his rights, with no impediment to his asserting them until the evidence upon which a counter claim, if founded, may, from lapse of time, be presumed to be lost; until the generation cognizant of the transactions between the parties has passed away, and until original actors are in their graves, and their affairs are left to representatives, the law, in the exercise of an equitable sovereignty, presumes it to be unjust that under such circumstances a complainant should be heard; and in nine cases out of ten it is unjust in fact as well as in theory. It is presumed, and the presumption grows out of the principles of human nature, developed in universal experience, that men will use reasonable diligence to get what rightfully belongs to them. Our observation of men teaches that they are more likely hurriedly to assert a false claim than tardily to assert an equitable one. If the claim be equitable, and an adverse claim is acquiesced in until the rights of third persons are involved, or until from the obliterations of time the proofs of adverse claimants are lost, yet that equitable claim ought to yield to that general social peace upon which its exclusion is founded. Nor ought the claimant to complain; 'for long years the courts of justice were open to him; he might have entered, but would not. He loses his rights, because from stupidity, indifference, convenience, or some other cause, he has failed to assert them. His laches cannot be made available to him, through a visitation of wrong and disaster to hundreds of his fellows. The laws are not for the individual alone, they are also for the peace and safety of the whole state."

Presumption of Satisfaction.-In Giles v. Baremore, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 545, 551, KENT, Ch., said: "The presumption to be drawn by the courts, in the case of stale demands, are founded in substantial justice and the clearest policy. If the party, having knowledge of his rights, will sit still, and without asserting them, permit persons to act as if they did not exist, and to acquire intere-ts, and consider themselves as owners of the property, there is no reason why

the presumption should not be raised. It is, therefore, well settled that the presumption that a demand has been satisfied, prevails as much in this court as it does at law. Claims the most solemnly established on the face of them will be presumed to be satisfied after a certain length of time. Matters of record, deeds, and even a private statute, may he presumed to make a good title. A court of equity makes the presumption on the facts before it, without sending the case to law, provided a jury, upon the same facts, ought, and would, so presume. The presumption resolves itself into this, that a man will naturally enjoy what belongs to him. These are principles of decision adopted and sanctioned in a variety of cases, and by a succession of learned judges in the English court of chancery, and their solidity is not to be questioned."

and

1. In Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 270, the court said: "Each of the terms 'delay,' 'laches' and 'acquiescence,' has its appropriate meaning. Laches would strictly seem to imply neglect to do that which ought to have been done; acquiescence, a resting satisfied with or submission to an existing state of things. Laches (at least with other facts) may be evidence of acquiescence; acquiescence may be evidence of consent. In the decisions of the reported cases, however, laches' has sometimes been employed as the equivalent of 'mere delay, and sometimes 'laches' or 'gross laches as the equivalent of ‘acquiescence' It is, therefore, important to consider the context, in connection with which either of these expressions has been used by a judge, in order to ascertain in what sense it is employed."

So, in Fisher v. Boody, 1 Curt. 206, 219, CURTIS, J., said: “This distinction between a positive bar from lapse of time, and that of lying by and acquiescence which will cause a court of equity to look upon the proofs with some distrust, and to refuse relief unless the delay and acquiescence are satisfactorily accounted for, I consider a most important principle, necessary to be con

stantly kept in view in wielding the transcendent powers of a court of equity, and it rests upon ample authority, though in my judgment it has sometimes not been sufficiently guarded." It is evident that the intention was to distinguish laches from the statutory limitations of actions, but in doing so the phrase "lying by and acquiescence" was used as synonymous with "laches."

2. Life Assoc. of Scotland v. Siddal, 3 De G. F. & J. 58, 72; Trader v. Jarvis, 23 W. Va. 100; Pusey v. Gardner, 21 W. Va. 469; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 305. See also Jenison v. Hapgood. 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) I; Barnes v. Taylor, 27 N. J. Eq. 259; Villines v. Norfleet, 2 Dev. Eq. (1 (N. Car.) 167; Irvine v. Robertson, 3 Rand. (Va.) 549, 553

Laches as Evidence of Acquiescence.In Life Ass'n of Scotland v. Siddal, 3 De G. F. & J. 58, 72, TURNER, L. J., said: "Length of time, where it does not operate as a statutory or positive bar, operates, I apprehend,simply as evidence of assent or acquiescence. The two propositions of a bar by length of time and by acquiescence are not, as I conceive, distinct propositions. They constitute but one proposition, and that proposition, when applied to a question of this description, is that the cestui que trust assented to the breach of trust." CAMPBELL, L. Ch., concurred in these views, saying: "On the general doctrine of acquiescence by cestuis que trust, which has lately been so much canvassed, I agree in the explanation. of the subjecting which has been so lucidly given by LORD JUSTICE TURNER. I must add that although the rule be that the onus lies on the party relying on acquiescence to prove the facts from which the consent of the cestui que trust is to be inferred, it is easy to conceive cases in which from great lapse of time, such facts might and ought to be presumed."

In Villines v. Norfleet, 2 Dev. Eq. (N. Car.) 167, the court used language which agrees with this proposition, but which also seems to set up lapse of time as in itself a bar to an equitable