1. Newhall v. Galena etc. R. Co., 14 Ill. 272.

The definition of a branch railroad can depend neither upon its length nor its direction. The word "branch" in such connection is equivalant to "section" or "subdivision," and is as applicable to a direct extension from the terminus as to an offshoot of the main road. McAboy v. Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. 107 Pa. Št. 548; 20 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 314. See also West. Pennsylvania R. Co's Appea!, 29 Pitts. Leg. J. 273.

2. Morris & E. R. Co. v. Central R. of N. J., 2 Vroom (N. J.) 205; New Orleans etc. R. Co. v. Second Municipality etc., La. An. 128; Knight v. Carrollton R. Co.. 9 La. An. 284; Baltimore & H. T. Co. v. Union R. Co., 35 Md. 224; Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 48 Pa. St. 355.

Under the Missouri Union Depot act, encouraging all railroads running to St. Louis to center at the Union depot, a company whose road runs near that city has a right to construct a branch road to the depot, where it is by its charter authorized to construct lateral railroads. Missouri v. St. Louis etc. R. Co., 3 Mo. App. 130. And a company having power to construct a branch road may, under that power, construct a branch, commencing near one of the termini and running in the same general direction as the main line, so as practically to form an extension thereof. Atlantic & Pac. R. Co. v. St. Louis, 66

Mo. 228.

from the main road to its depot buildings, whenever they become necessary in the proper management and operation of the road. Toledo etc. R. Co. v. Daniels, 16 Ohio St. 390.

In McAboy v. Pittsburgh & C. R. Co., 107 Pa. St. 548; 20 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 314, it was held that under an act conferring authority on the Pittsburgh & Connellsville R. Co. to build branches from its main line of railroad, that company has the right to extend its road in a direct line from its terminus in the city of Pittsburgh, along and over Water street on the Monongahela wharf to Smithfield street in said city. See also West Pa. R. Co.'s Appeal, 29 Pitts. Leg. J. 273, construing similar act with same result.

By defendant's charter. its terminus in Brooklyn was "at or near Atlantic avenue," its line, as shown upon the map and survey filed, stopped twelve feet south of the south line of the ave nue. It acquired the right to run its cars upon the tracks of L. I. Co., whose road was constructed along the center of the avenue, and tracks were constructed by the L. I. Co. connecting those of the two roads; similar curved tracks had long been used by the L. I. Co. to reach its depot south of the ave nue and for other purposes. The L. I. Co. by its charter had the right to build such appendages as it deemed necessary, and branches, when land was offered without expense. Held, that by dfendant's charter its terminus was not necessarily south of the ave nue, and there was nothing therein to prevent it from making such terminus in the center thereof where it could connect with the other road; that the con

Under the Ohio General Incorporation act of 1852, it has been held that a railroad company has power to condemn land for new side tracks, leading

necting tracks were authorized by the charters of the two companies, and the provision of the act of 1850 (§ 28, subd. 6), authorizing railroad companies to connect their roads, and in no respect could they be considered as a separate and independent line, and so requiring all the steps necessary to a newly organized street railway. People v. Brooklyn etc. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 75; 9 Am. & Eng, R. Cas. 454.

A railroad company, authorized by its charter to construct a road from an incorporated city to another point, accepted an ordinance passed by the councils of said city, granting it a right of way up to a certain point therein. It then built its track up to that point, and established there its freight and passenger depots. There was no other act upon its part indicating an intention to fix the terminus at that point. Held, that the power reposed in the company to locate and establish a terminus had not been exhausted, and that it might, with the consent of the city councils, subsequently extend its line to a point beyond that where its depots were situate; and independently of the question whether the company had fixed its terminus, the construction of the new track, above referred to, was fully authorized by the act of April 4th, 1863, § 9 (P. L. 62), enabling railroads to construct such branches from their main lines as they may deem necessary to increase their business and accommodate the public. Western Pennsylvania R. Co.'s Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 155; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 191.

But where a railroad company is authorized by its charter "to construct branch roads from the main route to other towns or places in the several counties through which the road might pass," it is limited to the construction of branch roads which leave the main route and terminate in the same county. It cannot extend such branches into another county. Works v. Junction R. Co., 5 McL. (U. S ) 425. And a provision in a charter that all railroad companies shall have the right to run upon equal terms over the track of the company in question, does not authorize the construction of a branch to enable a certain other railroad company to enjoy the privilege granted by the

charter. Baltimore etc. Co. v. Union R. Co., 35 Md. 224.

Limitation As to Time.-A limitation in the original charter as to the time within which the road must be finished does not apply to branch roads, at least where the right of way to build branch roads has been acquired prior to the expiration of the period mentioned in the charter. Atlantic & Pacific R. Co. v. St. Louis, 66 Mo. 228.

Where no limit is fixed in the charter to the time within which branch roads may be constructed, the courts will not, as a rule, fix any limit; and where, by an act of the legislature, the time for completing the main road has been extended, the provision will be held to apply also to the case of lateral railroads: Newhall v. Galena & Chicago Union R. Co., 14 Ill. 273.

A feeble railroad, of doubtful ability to construct any road between the terminal points of its charter, will be restrained, at the suit of a municipality which has subscribed to it, from wasting its means in the construction of branch roads; and where said subscriptions were conditioned upon the road running through the town, and the construction of the branch is substantially an evasion of that condition, and a diversion of the road from the municipality, the company will be restrained on that ground from building it. Platteville v. Galena & S. W. R. Co., 43 Wis.

493.

Purchase of Branch Road.-A statute authorizing a company to locate, construct and operate a branch road does not confer power to purchase a line already constructed. Gulf etc. R. Co. z. Morriss, 67 Tex. 692; 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 94; Campbell v. Marietta & C. R. Co., 23 Ohio St 168.

A reservation in the charter of a railroad corporation, of a right to authorize other railroad corporations to enter upon and use this railroad, extends to a branch road purchased from another corporation, whose charter contained no such reservation. Lexington & W. C. R. Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co., 14 Gray (Mass.) 267.

1. Newhall v. Galena etc. R. Co., 14 Ill. 273; Toledo etc. R. Co. v. East Saginaw etc. R. Co. (Mich. 1888), 36 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 553.

Where a railroad company has power to build an additional lateral road, auxiliary to the original road, whose construction and maintenance is possible only upon an independent right of way, the statute does not prevent the condemnation of land for such additional road. Lower v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 59 Iowa 563; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas.

17.

Section 16 of chapter 151 of act of 1851-2, old Code of Tennessee, § 1119, was intended as a general amendment to the charters of all railroad companies that might see proper to accept its provisions by exercising the rights and privileges conferred by it, and under it a railroad company authorized by its charter to condemn land for right of way, may condemn land to build a track connecting or uniting it with another railroad; and if it appropriates land for such purpose without having same condemned, it is not liable as a trespasser, but for its value and incidental damages, under the statute providing for the measure of damages in case of condemnation proceedings. Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Quinn, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 65; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 111.

1. McAboy v. Pittsburgh etc. R. Co., 107 Pa. St. 548; 20 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 314; Pittsburgh . Pennsylvania R. Co., 12 Wr. (Pa.) 359.

Width of Land Taken.-The Pennsylvania acts of 1832 and of 1865 on the subject of lateral roads, limit the width of such roads to twenty feet. If, under the latter act, a greater width is necessary for sidings, wharves, chutes, etc., such widths may be used for those specific purposes. In that event the special additional structures, together with the quantity of ground requisite for the purpose, should be carefully described in the petition and order, so that they may appear on the record. No inference of additional width can be drawn from the fact that double tracks are au

thorized. The width of such a road is a jurisdictional fact, and may be taken advantage of at any stage of the proceedings. In re Shoenberger, 111 Pa. 95; 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 177.

2. Getz's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 1; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 186. In this case the court said: "We cannot assent to the opposite contention,which holds that a side-track, which leads only to a manufacturing or mining establishment held in private ownership is illegal, because it does not subserve a public use. These establishments are very numerous, especially in Pennsylvania, along a near line of railroad. They serve to develop the resources of the State, they give employment to vast numbers of citizens, and constitute a most important element in the general wealth and prosperity of the community. Convenience and consequent cheapness of transportation are in most cases essential, and, in many, vital to their maintenance. Moreover, considerable portions of the general public are directly interested in the traffic which goes to them, and in that which comes from them. Hence in the connection in which we are now considering them, we cannot regard them as merely private interests, and therefore without the pale of that public use, for which private property may be taken in the construction of railroads lawfully established and actually used for public purposes." See also Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 38 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 384; Slocum's Appeal, 12 W. N. C. (Pa.) 84; Hays v. Risher, 32 Pa. St. 169.

Lewis, in his work on Eminent Domain, § 171, says with reference to the position of the Pennsylvania court: "Certain decisions in Pennsylvania have sometimes been understood as laying down the doctrine that private property could be taken for a lateral railroad connecting a mine or a mill with a railroad, canal or navigable stream, though

the lateral road was for the private use of the owner of the mine or mill. Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts (Pa.) 63 Harvey v. Lloyd, 3 Pa. 331; Shoenberger v. Mulhollan, 8 Pa. 134; Hays v. Risher, 32 Pa. 169. The supreme

court of that State seems to have so understood itself at an early date. Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts (Pa.) 631. But afterwards discovered its mistake. Hays v. Risher, 32 Pa. St. 169." And see New Central Coal Co. v. Georges Creek C. & I. Co., 37 Md. 537.

In Phillips v. Watson, 63 Iowa 28, it is held that a road or way established under ch. 34, Iowa Laws of 1874, over the land of another, to connect a mine or quarry with a railroad or highway, is a public way, in the sense that the public may use and enjoy it in the way in which roads and highways are ordinarily used by it, and that the mine owner who procures it to be established, must use the special privilege which the act confers on him in such manner as not to destroy this right of the public, or prevent its enjoyment. It follows, therefore, that said act is not in conflict with those provisions of the constitution of the United States and of the State of Iowa, which prohibit the appropriation by law of private property to private use.

Dietrich v. Murdock, 42 Mo. 279, upholds the validity of a Missouri statute authorizing the construction of a railroad from certain coal lands to another railroad. It was decided in this case that where, by the terms of a statute, a railroad company are incorporated for the use and benefit of that particular section of the State where the road is located, it will be assumed that the grant of authority to condemn the land necessary for a roadbed was a rightful exercise of legislative authority.

The laying of an underground railroad from a coal mine to a railway, under the New Jersey act, was sustained in Hibernia Underground R. Co. v. DeCamp, 47 N. J. L. 518; 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 273.

In National Docks R. Co. v. Central R. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755, DIXON, J., said: "But it is insisted by the complainants that the road which the National Docks R. Co. intends to construct will be a private and not a public

one; and to establish this they adduce the purpose of the corporators. But I think these purposes are foreign to the enquiry. The character of the road in this respect is dependent, not on the designs of its projectors, but on the terms of the law which governs it. Said JUDGE BALDWIN, in Bonaparte v. Railroad Co., Baldw. 205: 'A road or canal constructed by the public or a corporation is a public highway for the public benefit if the public have a right of passage thereon by paying a reasonable, stipulated, uniform toll.' Tested by this criterion, and it is the true one, there can be no doubt that every railroad built by corporation organized under our general law becomes ipso facto a public road."

In the case of Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. v. Benwood Iron Works (W. Va.), 36 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 531, however, a railroad company sought to condemn land for a side track to a certain steel mill. The statutes of West Virginia bearing upon the right, authorized the company "to extend its road from the city of Wheeling in the direction of the Kentucky State line, through such sections of the State contiguous to the Ohio river as the company may deem most desirable." A statute also provided that "the president and directors of any company incorporated to construct a railroad, or other work of internal improvement. may cause to be made, in connection therewith, branch railroads, or lateral works, not exceeding two miles in length; and may cause to be made branch railroads or lateral works, not exceeding ten miles in length." Another statute provided that "any railroad company organized under this chapter may build and construct lateral and branch roads or tramways, and of any gauge whatever, not exceeding fifty miles in length." The court held that the use to which the land was to be subjected was a private, not a "public use," and it could not therefore be taken. "We would do nothing," said the court, "to hinder the development of the State, nor to cripple railroad companies in assisting such development, but at the same time we must protect the property rights of the citizens. All that to which the corporations are entitled un