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fendants not being found in the county in which the court of king's bench sits, the writ of latitat issues to the sheriff of some other county, and after reciting the bill of Middlesex and the proceedings thereon, and that it is testified that the defendant latitat et discurrit lurks and wanders about in said county, commands the sheriff to take him and have his body in court on the day of the return.1 For examples of its use, see note 2. This

writ has been abolished.3

LATTER.

In the sense of last, latest, final. See note 4. LAUNCHED.—Past participle of the verb to launch; to let glide or slide into the water; to cause to move into the water; to push into the water.5

1. Blackstone's Com., bk. 3, ch. from fulfilling the contract. It was still 19, p. 286.

2. Wolfreston's Case, Yelverton 52; Roe v. Cock, 2 Term Rep. 257; Chase v. Joyce, 4 M. &. S. 412.

3. 2 Will. IV, ch. 39.

4. By a certain contract in writing A agreed to deliver to B certain goods the 20th December and 1st January, to be paid for at the time of delivery. Subsequently, this agreement was modified and the time of performance was by consent of the parties enlarged to "the latter part of January Part payment was made upon the contract, and on the 24th of January B called upon A to deliver the goods, which he refused to do, and declared that he would not then, nor at any other time, deliver said goods. B there upon brought suit, to which A demurred. The court sustained the demurrer, DAVISON, J., saying: "Another objection is raised to these counts. This suit was instituted on the 24th of January, when the time of performance was extended to the latter part of that month. It has been decided that where, by the terms of the contract, one party was to perform certain labour, and the other, in consideration thereof, to pay a sum of money in a certain month, an action commenced on the last day of the month was prematurely brought. Chitty on Cont. 730, 731; Harris v. Bleu, 4 Shepley, 175. The terms latter part of January' must be construed to mean the whole of that part. It follows that this suit was not maintainable until after the expiration of that period. But it is insisted that the statement of the defendants that they would not then, nor at any other time, deliver the goods' excused the plaintiff from waiting longer. We are not of that opinion. That statement did not incapacitate them

within their power to perform within the time stipulated. Until the expiration of the time we know of no principle upon which they could be held liable." But as to the latter observation, see CONTRACT, vol. 3, 904. Bailey v. Ricketts, 4 Ind. 488.

5. The Rev. Štat. of Maine, ch. 91, § 7 (ch. 91, § 8 of ed. of 1883) are as follows: "Any person who furnishes labor or materials for building a vessel, shall have a lien on it therefor, which may be enforced by attachment thereof, within four days after it is launched.

And a person who furnishes labor or materials for a vessel after it is launched, or for its repair, shall have a lien on it therefor, which may be enforced by attachment within four days after the work has been completed." Assumpsit was brought for materials and labor furnished for and used in rebuilding a schooner, to secure a lien, more than "four days after the work has been completed" having expired

It

before the attachment was made. appeared that the vessel was hauled in, in the first place, at the side of the wharf, and dismantled; then blocks were laid down on the beach and she was floated upon the blocks; she was raised somewhat aft, and while supported with shoes under the bilge and deck under the transom, the timber was taken out stick by stick and replaced with new so far as the old was removed. In the place where she was the tide flowed over a wall ahead of her some eight or ten feet from her stern. This wall was some three feet in height, and as she lay stern to the water, the tide, at ordinary tides, flowed all round the vessel. At full tides the water flowed over the top of the wall, and would have floated the vessel had she been tight, but holes had been

LAW. See note I. made in her for the purpose of allow ing the tide to ebb and flow to prevent her floating. There was evidence that without these holes in her it would not be safe to leave her in a full tide, lest she should go adrift. Upon these facts the court refused judgment against the vessel. DANFORTH, J., saying: "In these actions the several plaintiffs claim a lien upon the vessel under R. S., ch. 91, § 7. That the lien as claimed once existed is not denied; and the only question involved is whether it continued up to the time of the attachment. If it accrued under the first clause of the statute it is conceded that it did so continue, otherwise it did not. The first clause continues the lien four days after the vessel is launched; the last clause four days after the labor has been completed. It is quite evident that in contemplation of the statute, when labor or materials are furnished for a vessel in the water, whether for construction or repairs, the lien accrues under the last clause only, otherwise there can be no definite time from which the four days can be reckoned. Under the first clause the lien ceases in four days after the vessel is launched. But a vessel already in the water cannot be launched, the meaning of which in such cases is, to cause 'to move or slide from the land into the water.' During all the time the work in this case was going on. This vessel was in the water, certainly not upon the land. It was not in a situation where it could be moved from the land into the water. It was at no time upon the 'stocks' as a vessel in process of building. True, it was blocked up, but in a place where, by a preponderance of evidence at least, whenever the blocks are removed, it may be floated again. The launching is a definite period, one well understood as applied in shipbuilding, and the only period provided by law from which the four days can be computed under the first clause of the statutes. In this case there is no possibility of any such launching as the statute contemplates." Homer v. Lady of the Ocean, 70 Me. 350.

1. The Word Law May Include in Its Signification Both Common and Statute Law. The phrase "the laws of the State," in 2 of act 1 of the Vermont laws of 1874, which prohibits any foreign insurance company from transacting business in Vermont unless such

company is responsible by "the laws of the State" of its origin for the acts and neglects of its agents, includes the common law as well as the statute laws. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright, 12 Atl. Rep. (Vt.), 103; s. c., 22 Am. & Eng. Comp. Cas. 662, n.

A State Constitution Is a Law.-Art. 1, § 10, of the Constitution of the United States declares that "no State shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts. The constitution of a State is undoubtedly a law within the meaning of this prohibition. Railroad Company v. McClure,10 Wall. (U.S.) 511; Pacific R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 36.

Section 25 of the schedule of the constitution of Nebraska provides as follows: "The auditor shall draw the warrants of the State quarterly for the payment of the salaries of all officers under the constitution, whose compensation is not otherwise provided for, which shall be paid out of any funds not otherwise appropriated." The second clause of § 22, art 3, of the same instrument, provides that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by law." In an application for a mandamus against the auditor to compel him to draw his warrant for salary due the relator as an officer under the constitution, in accordance with the provisions of the schedule above set out, the answer of the respondent alleged that by § 22, art. 3, no money could be drawn except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by law; that there had been no session of the legislature, the law making power, and no specific appropriation made to cover said salary And on the argument the respondent contended that the two clauses above set out were in conflict, and that both could not stand. But the court held that there was no conflict, and that the appropriation made in § 25 of the schedule was a specific appropriation "made by law," within the meaning of § 22, art. 3. State ex rel. Roberts v. Weston, 4 Neb. 216.

Any Act of the Legislature. Whether Public or Private, Is a Law. --Section 426 of the New York Code of Procedure provides as follows: "Printed copies in volumes of statutes, code or other written law, enacted by any other State or territory, or foreign government, purporting or proven to have been pub

lished by authority thereof, or proved to be commonly admitted as evidence of the existing law in the courts and judicial tribunals of such State, territory, or government, shall be admitted by the courts and officers of this State, on all occasions, as presumptive evidence of such laws." It has been held that the printed copy in a volume of laws of the charter of a private corporation, granted by the legislature of another State, is a law within the meaning of this section. Said the court: "According to the legislative lexicology of the State of New York, any act of the legislature, whether public or private, is a law within the meaning of its statutory provisions, as to the time it takes effect, and the manner of proving it. Persse & Brooks' Paper Works υ. Willett, Robt. (N. Y.) 131.

An Unconstitutional Act of the Legislature Is a Law.-Section 32, art. 4, of the constitution of California provides as follows: "The legislature shall have no power

to pay or to authorize the payment of any claim hereafter created against the State, or any county or municipality of the State, under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law; and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void." In 1880, the legislature passed an act entitled "An act to promote drainage." Under the provisions of this act "Drainage District No. 1" was regularly organized, and public work under it commenced. A entered into contracts under the provisions of the act with the directors of the district to do certain work, and to furnish certain material. After he had done the work and furnished the materials under his contracts, and before he had received his pay therefor, the act under which the contracts were made was declared unconstitutional. Subsequently the legislature passed an act requiring the State comptroller to draw his warrant in favor of certain audited claims which accrued under the said "act to promote drainage," including A's. Upon the comptroller's refusal to draw the warrant under the provisions of this latter act, on the ground of its unconstitutionality under 32, art. 4, of the constitution, A made application for a mandamus to compel him to do so. The law court ordered the writ to issue, and, on appeal, its judgment was affirmed, TEMPLE, J., dissenting. Said the court: "It is claimed by appellant that

the act of April 23rd, 1880, having been held to be unconstitutional in the case of People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624, was void ab initio, the same, to all intents and purposes as if it never had been enacted-a pure nullity; that an unconstitutional law is no law at all for any purpose, and the word law,' in art. 4, $32, was used in its full sense, i. e., a valid constitutional law. On the other hand, it is contended by respondent that the word 'law,' in its popular sense, is a statute passed by the legislature, and approved by the executive, and it is in this sense that the word was employed in § 32. It is useless to attempt to ap ply iron-clad rules of interpretation to any phrase or word used in a constitution. Especially is this true of a word which has a technical as well as a popular meaning. There is no word in the language which, in its popular and technical application, takes a wider or more diversified signification than the word 'law,'—its use in both regards is illimitable.

The term law,' as

used in its popular sense, and in its common acceptation by 'those for whom laws are made,' it may be admitted, includes the whole body or system of rules of conduct, including the decisions of courts as well as legislative acts; but it certainly does not include that refined, technical and astute idea claimed by appellant which recognizes nothing within the meaning of the term which is not constitutionally and technically perfect. ... Upon an examination of the provisions of the constitution, in which the word 'law' is used, it will be found in a majority of instances that it has been employed in the sense of a statute, bill or legislative enactment, regardless of the constitutionality or validity of the act." Miller v. Dunn, I Am. St. Rep. (Cal.) 67; s. c., 72 Cal. 462; 14 Pac. Rep. 27.

A Resolution of One Branch of the Legislature Is Not a Law.-A resolution of the senate requiring its president and its secretary to certify the accounts of its duly elected and appointed officers for their per diem compensation during the recess, is not a law within the meaning of § 31, art. 4, of the constitution of Alabama,which declares that no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Reynolds v. Blue, 47 Ala. 671. See also People ex rel. Burritt v. Commissioners, 8 West. Rep. (Ill.) 465.

Is a Municipal Ordinance a Law?Section 13, art. 3, of the Pennsylvania

constitution declares that "no law shall extend the term of any public officer, or increase or diminish his salary or emoluments, after his election or appointment." The councils of a city passed an ordinance increasing the salary of a municipal officer during his term of office. It was held that the ordinance was constitutional. Said the court: "The word 'law' has a fixed and definite meaning. In its general sense it imports a 'rule of action'; in the particular sense in which we are now considering it, it means 'a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in the State, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.'-Blackstone. A law is an emanation from the supreme power, and cannot originate elsewhere. It is a rule which every citizen of the State is bound to obey. The ordinance of councils by which the plaintiff's salary was increased is not a law, and therefore does not come within the constitutional prohibition. It is a mere local regulation for the city of Philadelphia. It has perhaps the force of law in the community to be affected by it, but it is not prescribed by the supreme power, it concerns only a subdivision of the State, and does not rise to the dignity of law." Baldwin v. City of Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St. 164. Šee also Klingler v. Bickel, 117 Pa. St. 326.

The ordinances of municipal corporations levying taxes cannot be regarded

as the revenue laws of the State from which they derive their power of levying taxes, within the meaning of the act of congress of June 30th, 1870, which makes it the duty of the court to give to causes, where the execution of the revenue laws of any State are enjoined or suspended by judicial order, preference or priority over all other civil causes, and gives to the State or the party claiming under the laws of the State, the execution of whose revenue laws is enjoined or suspended, the right to have such cause heard at any time after docketing in preference to any other civil cause between private parties. Davenport City v. Dows, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 390.

The constitution of New York provides that the judges of the court of appeals and justices of the supreme court shall severally receive, at stated times, for their services, a compen sation to be established by law, which shall not be increased or diminished during their continuance in office. By an act passed shortly after

the adoption of the constitution, the justices of the supreme court were allowed an annual salary of twenty-five hundred dollars each. The act of the 16th of April, 1852. provides that it shall be lawful for the board of supervisors of the county of New York, to raise by tax upon said county, and pay to the justices of the supreme court, resident in the first district, such additional annual compensation as they may deem proper. The supervisors provided for an additional compensation to the justices of the said district, by virtue of the authority so vested in them. It was held that such additional compensation was established by law within the meaning of the constitution. Said the court: “A general law can be enacted only by the State legislature; a special law, however, may be passed by the board of supervisors of a county, where the requisite power has been conferred upon it by the sovereign legislative authority. (State constitution, art. 3, § 17.) In the case under consideration, the power was expressly conferred. If the resolution of the board of supervisors has not all the attributes of a local law, it may yet be valid as an exercise of the power conferred by the legislature. The constitution does not require that the amount of compensation shall be specified in any general statute. It calls for legislative action. That is the required basis, but the superstructure may be fashioned pursuant to such provisions as may be established by the legislature. An act is essentially accomplished by law when performed pursuant to statute, as if con summated by the statute itself." The People v. Edmonds, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 529.

The legislature of Louisiana granted to a company the exclusive privilege of supplying the inhabitants of the city of New Orleans with water, by a charter which provided that nothing therein should be "so construed as to prevent the city council from granting to any person, contiguous to the river, the privilege of laying pipes to the river, exclusively for his own use." It was held that the power conferred upon the city council was not legislative but administrative, and an ordinance of the city, permitting one to lay pipes for his own use, was but a licence, the validity of which was in no way dependent upon the constitution or laws of the United States. Said GRAY, J.: "In order to come within the pro

vision of the constitution of the United States, which declares that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, not only must the obligation of a contract have been impaired, but it must have been impaired by a law of the State. The prohibition is aimed at the legislative power of the State, and not at the decisions of its courts, or the acts of administrative or executive boards or officers, or the doings of corporations or individuals.

As later decisions have shown, it is not strictly and literally true that a law of a State, in order to come within the constitutional prohibition, must be either in the form of a statute enacted by the legislature in the ordinary course of legislation, or in the form of a constitution established by the people of the State as their fundamental law. In Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 183, it was said by MR. JUSTICE FIELD, delivering judgment: 'Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a State gives the force of law, is a statute of the State, within the meaning of the clause cited relating to the jurisdiction of this court.' (Rev. Stat., § 709.) And it was therefore held

that a statute of the so called Confederate States, if enforced by one of the States as its law, was within the prohibition of the constitution. So a bylaw or ordinance of a municipal corporation may be such an exercise of legislative power delegated by the legislature to the corporation as a political subdivision of the State, having all the force of law within the limits of the municipality, that it may properly be considered as a law, within the meaning of this article of the constitution of the United States. For instance, the power of determining what persons and property shall be taxed belongs exclusively to the legislative power. U. S. v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381, 392; Meriwether v. Garret, 102 U. S. 472. Accordingly, when the city council of Charleston, upon which the legislature of South Carolina, by the city charter, had conferred the power of taxing persons and property within the city, passed ordinances assessing a tax upon bonds of the city, and thus diminishing the amount of interest which it had agreed to pay, this court held such ordinances to be laws impairing the obligation of contracts, for the reason that the city charter gave limited legislative power to the city council, and, when the ordinances were passed un

der the supposed authority of the legislative act, their provisions became the law of the State. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 440. ̊ See also Insurance Co. v. City Council, 93. U. S. 116. But the ordinance now in question involved no exercise of legislative power. The legislature, in the charter granted to the plaintiff, provided that nothing therein should be so construed as to prevent the city council from granting to any person or persons, contiguous to the river, the privilege of laying pipes to the river exclusively for his or their own use.' The legislature itself thus defined the class of persons to whom, and the object for which, the permission might be granted. All that was left to the city council was the duty of determining what persons came within the definition, and how and where they might be permitted to lay pipes for the purpose of securing their several rights to draw water from the river, without unreasonably interfering with the convenient use by the public of the lands and highways of the city. The rule was established by the legislature, and its execution only committed to the municipal authorities. The power conferred upon the city council was not legislative, but administrative, and might equally well have been vested by law in the mayor alone, or in any other officer of the city. Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166, 172; Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 433, 438. The permission granted by the city council to the defendant company, though put in the form of an ordinance, was in effect but a licence, and not a by-law of the city, still less a law of the State. If that licence was within the authority vested in the city council by the law of Louisiana, it was valid; if it transcended that authority, it was illegal and void. But the question whether it was lawful or unlawful depended wholly on the law of the State, and not at all on any provision of the constitution or laws of the United States." New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. (U. S.) 741.

Are the Decisions of the Courts Laws?

-The thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary act of 1789 declares "that the laws of the several States, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise recognize or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States,

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