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fendants not being found in the county in which the court of king's bench sits, the writ of latitat issues to the sheriff of some other county, and after reciting the bill of Middlesex and the proceedings thereon, and that it is testified that the defendant latitat et discurrit lurks and wanders about in said county, commands the sheriff to take him and have his body in court on the day of the return.1 For examples of its use, see note 2. This writ has been abolished. 3
LATTER.- In the sense of last, latest, final. See note 4.
LAUNCHED.-Past participle of the verb to launch ; to let glide or slide into the water; to cause to move into the water; to push into the water.5
19, p. 286.
1. Blackstone's Com., bk. 3, ch. from fulfilling the contract. It was still
within their power to perform within the 2. Wolfreston's Case, Yelverton 52; time stipulated. Until the expiration of Roe v. Cock, 2 Term Rep. 257; Chase the time we know of no principle upon v. Joyce, 4 M. &. S. 412.
which they could be held liable.” But as 3. 2 Will. IV, ch. 39.
to the latter observation, see CONTRACT, 4. By a certain contract in writing vol. 3, 904. Bailey v. Ricketts, 4 Ind. 488. A agreed to deliver to B certain goods 5. The Rev. Štat. of Maine, ch. 91, Ø the 20th December and ist January, to 7 (ch. 91, 8 of ed. of 1883) are as folbe paid for at the time of delivery. lows: "Any person who furnishes laSubsequently, this agreement was modi. bor or materials for building a vessel, fied and the time of performance was shall have a lien on it therefor, which by consent of the parties enlarged may be enforced by attachment thereto "the latter part of January of, within four days after it is launched. Part payment was made upon the And a person who furnishes contract, and on the 24th of January B labor or materials for a vessel after it is called upon A to deliver the goods, launched, or for its repair, shall have a which he refused to do, and declared lien on it therefor, which may be enthat he would not then, nor at any forced by attachment within four days other time, deliver said goods. B there after the work has been completed.” upon brought suit, to which A demurred. Assumpsit was brought for materials The court sustained the demurrer, and labor furnished for and used in reDAVISON, J., saying: “Another ob- buil ng a schooner, to secure a lien, jection is raised to these counts. This more than "four days after the work suit was instituted on the 24th of Janu- has been completed” having expired ary, when the time of performance was before the attachment was made. It extended to the latter part of that appeared that the vessel was hauled in, month. It has been decided that where, in the first place, at the side of the by the terms of the contract, one party wharf, and dismantled; then blocks was to perform certain labour, and the were laid down on the beach and she other, in consideration thereof, to pay a was floated upon the blocks; she was sum of money in a certain month, an raised somewhat aft, and while supaction cornmenced on the last day of ported with shoes under the bilge and the month was prematurely brought. deck under the transom, the timber Chitty on Cont. 730, 731; Harris v. was taken out stick by stick and reBleu, 4 Shepley, 175. The terms · latter placed with new so far as the old was part of January' must be construed to removed.
In the place where she was mean the whole of that part. It fol- the tide flowed over a wall ahead of lows that this suit was not maintainable her some eight or ten feet from her until after the expiration of that period. stern. This wall was some three feet But it is insisted that the statement of in height, and as she lay stern to the the defendants that they would not water, the tide, at ordinary tides, flowed then, nor at any other time, deliver the all round the vessel. At full tides the goods' excused the plaintiff from wait- water flowed over the top of the wall, ing longer. We are not of that opinion. and would have floated the vessel had That statement did not incapacitate them she been tight, but holes had been LAW.-See note i. made in her for the purpose of allow- company is responsible by " the laws of ing the tide to ebb and how to prevent the State" of its origin for the acts and her floating. There was evidence that neglects of its agents, includes the comwithout these holes in her it would not mon law as well as the statute laws. be safe to leave her in a full tide, lest Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright, 12 she should go adrift. Upon these facts Atl. Rep. (Vt.), 103; S.C., 22 Am. Eng. the court refused judgment against the Comp. Cas. 662, n. vessel. DANFORTH, J., saying: “In A State Constitution Is a Law.- Art. these actions the several plaintiffs claim 1, $ 10, of the Constitution of the United a lien upon the vessel under R. S., ch. States declares that “no State shall pass 91, $ 7. That the lien as claimed once a law impairing the obligation of conexisted is not denied; and the only tracts. The constitution of a State is question involved is whether it con- undoubtedly a law within the meaning tinued up to the time of the attachment of this prohibition. Railroad Company If it accrued under the first clause of v. McClure, 10 Wall. (U.S.) 511; Pacific the statute it is conceded that it did so R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 36. continue, otherwise it did not. The Section 25 of the schedule of the first clause continues the lien four days constitution of Nebraska provides as after the vessel is launched; the last follows : "The auditor shall draw the clause four days after the labor has been warrants of the State quarterly for the completed. It is quite evident that in payment of the salaries of all officers contemplation of the statute, when la- under the constitution, whose compenbor or materials are furnished for a sation is not otherwise provided for, vessel in the water, whether for con- which shall be paid out of any funds struction or repairs, the lien accrues not otherwise appropriated.” The secunder the last clause only, otherwise ond clause of § 22, art. 3, of the same there can be no definite time from instrument, provides that “no money which the four days can be reckoned. shall be drawn from the treasury exUnder the first clause the lien ceases cept in pursuance of a specific appropriin four days after the vessel is launched. ation made by law.” In an application But a vessel already in the water can- for a mandamus against the auditor to not be launched, the meaning of which compel him to draw his warrant for in such cases is, to cause 'to move or salary due the relator as an officer slide from the land into the water.' Dur- under the constitution, in accordance ing all the time the work in this case with the provisions of the schedule was going on. This vessel was in the above set out, the answer of the rewater, certainly not upon the land. It spondent alleged that by $ 22, art. 3, was not in a situation where it could be no money could be drawn except in moved from the land into the water. It pursuance of a specific appropriation was at no time upon the 'stocks' as a made by law; that there had been no vessel in process of building. True, it session of the legislature, the law makwas blocked up, but in a place where, ing power, and no specific appropria. by a preponderance of evidence at tion made to cover said salary. And least, whenever the blocks are removed, on the argument the respondent conit may be floated again. The launch- tended that the two clauses above set ing is a definite period, one well under- out were in conflict, and that both could stood as applied in shipbuilding, and not stand. But the court held that the only period provided by law from there was no conflict, and that the which the four days can be computed appropriation made in § 25 of the under the first clause of the statutes. In schedule was a specific appropriation this case the is no possibility of any "made by law,” within the meaning of such launching as the statute contem- $ 22, art. 3. State ex rel. Roberts v. plates.” Homer v. Lady of the Ocean, Weston, 4 Neb. 216. 70 Me. 350.
Any Act of the Legislature, Whether 1. The Word Law May Include in Its Public or Private, Is a Law.--Section 426 Signification Both Common and Statute of the New York Code of Procedure Law.-The phrase "the laws of the provides as follows : “Printed copies State," in 5 2 of act i of the Vermont in volumes of statutes, code or other laws of 1874, which prohibits any for- written law, enacted by any other State eign insurance company from transact- or territory, or foreign government, ing business in Vermont unless such purporting or proven to have been published by authority thereof, or proved the act of April 23rd, 1880, having been to be commonly admitted as evidence held to be unconstitutional in the case of the existing law in the courts and of People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624, was judicial tribunals of such State, terri- void ab initio, the same, to all intents tory, or government, shall be admitted and purposes as if it never had been enby the courts and officers of this State, acted-a pure nullity; that an unconstion all occasions, as presumptive evi- tutional law is no law at all for any dence of such laws.” It has been held purpose, and the word law,' in art. 4, that the printed copy in a volume of $ 32, was used in its full sense, i. e., a laws of the charter of a private corpo- valid constitutional law. On the other ration, granted by the legislature of hand, it is contended by respondent that another State, is a law within the mean- the word law,' in its popular sense, is a ing of this section. Said the court: statute passed by the legislature, and "According to the legislative lexicology approved by the executive, and it is in of the State of New York, any act of the this sense that the word was employed legislature, whether public or private, in $ 32. It is useless to attempt to ap. is a law within the meaning of its stat- ply iron-clad rules of interpretation to utory provisions, as to the time it takes any phrase or word used in a constitueffect, and the manner of proving it. tion. Especially is this true of a word Persse & Brooks' Paper Works
which has a technical as well as a popWillett, 1 Robt. (N. Y.) 131.
ular meaning. There is no word in the An Unconstitutional Act of the Legisla- language which, in its popular and ture Is a Law.-Section 32, art. 4, of the technical application, takes a wider or constitution of California provides as more diversified signification than the follows: “The legislature shall have word · law,'—its use in both regards is no power to pay or to author- illimitable.
The term •law,' as ize the payment of any
ciaim hereafter used in its popular sense, and in its created against the State, or any county common acceptation by 'those for whom or municipality of the State, under any laws are made,' it may be admitted, agreement or contract made without includes the whole body or system of express authority of law; and all such rules of conduct, including the decisions unauthorized agreements or contracts of courts as well as legislative acts; but shall be null and void." In 1880, the it certainly does not include that relegislature passed an act entitled “An fined, technical and astute idea claimed act to promote drainage." Under the by appellant which recognizes nothing provisions of this act "Drainage Dis- within the meaning of the term which trict No. 1 was regularly organized, is not constitutionally and technically and public work under it commenced. perfect. . . Upon an examination A entered into contracts under the pro- of the provisions of the constitution, in visions of the act with the directors which the word law' is used, it will be of the district to do certain work, found in a majority of instances that it and
furnish certain material. has been employed in the sense of a After he had done the work and statute, bill or legislative enactment, furnished the materials under his regardless of the constitutionality or contracts, and before he had received validity of the act.” Miller v. Dunn, his pay therefor, the act under which I Am. St. Rep. (Cal.) 67; S. c., 72 the contracts were made was declared Cal. 462; 14 Pac. Rep. 27. unconstitutional. Subsequently the A Resolution of One Branch of the legislature passed an act requiring the Legislature Is Not a Law.-A resolution State comptroller to draw his warrant of the senate requiring its president and in favor of certain audited claims which its secretary to certify the accounts of accrued under the said “ act to promote its duly elected and appointed officers for drainage,” including A's. Upon the their per diem compensation during the comptroller's refusal to draw the warrant recess, is not a law within the meaning under the provisions of this latter act, of $ 31, art. 4, of the constitution of on the ground of its unconstitutionality Alabama, which declares that no money under Š 32, art. 4, of the constitution, shall be drawn from the treasury but A made application for a mandamus to in pursuance of an appropriation made compel him to do so. The law court by law. Reynolds z. Blue, 47 Ala. 671. ordered the writ to issue, and, on ap- See also People ex rel. Burritt v. Compeal, its judgment affirmed, missioners, 8 West. Rep. (III.) 465. TEMPLE, J., dissenting. Said the Is a Municipal Ordinance a Law?— court : "It is claimed by appellant that Section 13, art. 3, of the Pennsylvania
constitution declares that "no law shall the adoption of the constitution, the extend the term of any public officer, justices of the supreme court were alor increase or diminish his salary or lowed an annual salary of twenty-five .emoluments, after his election or ap- hundred dollars each. The act of the pointment.' The councils of a city 16th of April, 1852. provides that it passed an ordinance increasing the shall be lawful for the board of supersalary of a municipal officer during his visors of the county of New York, to term of office. It was held that the raise by tax upon said county, and pay ordinance was constitutional. Said the to the justices of the supreme court, court: “ The word “law' has a fixed resident in the first district, such addi. and definite meaning. In its general tional annual compensation as they sense it imports a 'rule of action'; in may deem proper. The supervisors the particular sense in which we are provided for an additional compensanow considering it, it means a rule of tion to the justices of the said district, civil conduct, prescribed by the su- by virtue of the authority so vested in preme power in the State, command- them. It was held that such additional ing what is right and prohibiting what compensation was established by law is wrong.'—Blackstone. A law is an within the meaning of the constitution. emanation from the supreme power, Said the court: “A general law can be and cannot originate elsewhere. It is enacted only by the State legislature; a rule which every citizen of the State a special law, however, may be passed is bound to obey. The ordinance of by the board of supervisors of a county, councils by which the plaintiff's salary where the requisite power has been was increased is not a law, and there- conterred upon it by the sovereign fore does not come within the consti- legislative authority (State constitututional prohibition. It is a mere local tion, art. 3, § 17.) In the case under regulation for the city of Philadelphia. consideration, the power was expressly It has perhaps the force of law in the conferred. If the resolution of the board community to be affected by it, but it of supervisors has not all the attributes is not prescribed by the supreme power, of a local law, it may yet be valid as an it concerns only a subdivision of the exercise of the power conferred by the State, and does not rise to the dignity of legislature. The constitution does not law." Baldwin v. City of Philadels require that the amount of compensaphia, 99 Pa. St. 161. See also Kling. tion shall be specified in any general ler v. Bickel, 117 Pa. St. 326.
It calls for legislative action. The ordinances of municipal corpora. That is the required basis, but the sutions levying taxes cannot be regarded perstructure may be fashioned pursuas the revenue laws of the State from ant to such provisions as may be estabwhich they derive their power of levying lished by the legislature. An act is taxes, within the meaning of the act of essentially accomplished by law when congress of June 30th, 1870, which makes performed pursuant to statute, as if con: it the duty of the court to give to summated by the statute itself." The causes, where the execution of the rev. People v. Edmonds, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) enne laws of any State are enjoined or 529. suspended by judicial order, preference The legislature of Louisiana granted or priority over all other civil causes, to a company the exclusive privilege of and gives to the State or the party supplying the inhabitants of the city of claiming under the laws of the State, New Orleans with water, by a charter the execution of whose revenue laws is which provided that nothing therein enjoined or suspended, the right to should be "so construed as to prevent have such cause heard at any time after the city council from granting to any docketing in preference to any other civil person, contiguous to the river, the cause between private parties. Daven- privilege of laying pipes to the river, port City v. Dows, 15 Wall. (U.S.) 390. exclusively for his own use." It was
The constitution of New York pro- held that the power conferred upon the vides that the judges of the court city council was not legislative but adof appeals and justices of the supreme ministrative, and an ordinance of the court shall severally receive, at stated city, permitting one to lay pipes for times, for their services, a compen- his own use, was but a licence, the sation be established by law, validity of which was in no way dewhich shall not be increased or di pendent upon the constitution or laws minished during their continuance in of the United States. Said GRAY, J.: oflice. By an act passed shortly after “In order to come within the pro
vision of the constitution of the United der the supposed authority of the legisStates, which declares that no State lative act, their provisions became shall pass any law impairing the obli- the law of the State. Murrayv. gation of contracts, not only must the Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 440. See obligation of a contract have been im- also Insurance Co. r'. City Council, 93 paired, but it must have been impaired U.S. 116. But the ordinance now in by a law of the State. The prohibition question involved no exercise of legisis aimed at the legislative power of the lative power. The legislature, in the State, and not at the decisions of its charter granted to the plaintiff, procourts, or the acts of administrative or vided that nothing therein should be so executive boards or officers, or the do- construed as to prevent the city counings of corporations or individuals. cil from granting to any person or per
As later decisions have shown, it is sons, contiguous to the river, the privinot strictly and literally true that a law lege of laying pipes to the river exof a State, in order to come within the clusively for his or their own use.' constitutional prohibition, must be The legislature itself thus defined the either in the form of a statute enacted class of persons to whom, and the object by the legislature in the ordinary for which, the permission might be course of legislation, or in the form of a granted. All that was left to the city constitution established by the people council was the duty of determining of the State as their fundamental law. what persons came within the definiIn Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 183, tion, and how and where they might be it was said by Mr. Justice Field, de- permitted to lay pipes for the purpose livering judgment: 'Any enactment, of securing their several rights to draw from whatever source originating, to water from the river, without unreawhich a State gives the force of law, sonably interfering with the convenient is a statute of the State, within the use by the public of the lands and highmeaning of the clause cited relating to ways of the city. The rule was estabthe jurisdiction of this court.' (Rev. lished by the legislature, and its execuStat., $ 709.) And it was therefore held tion only committed to the municipal that a statute of the so called Confeder- authorities. The
power conferred ate States, if enforced by one of the upon the city council was not legislaStates as its law, was within the pro- tive, but administrative, and might hibition of the constitution. So a by- equally well have been vested by law or ordinance of a municipal cor- law in the mayor alone, or in any other poration may be such an exercise of officer of the city. Railroad Co. v. Ellegislative power delegated by the leg lerman, 105 U. S. 166. 172; Day v. islature to the corporation as a political Green, 4 Cush. 433, 438. The permissubdivision of the State, having all the sion granted by the city council to the force of law within the limits of the defendant company, though put in the municipality, that it may properly be form of an ordinance, was in effect but considered as a law, within the mean- a licence, and not a by-law of the city, ing of this article of the constitution of still less a law of the State. If that the United States. For instance, the licence was within the authority vested power of determining what persons and in the city council by the law of Louisproperty shall be taxed belongs ex- iana, it was valid; if it transcended that clusively to the legislative power. U. authority, it was illegal and void. But S. 2. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381, 392; the question whether it was lawful or Meriwether v. Garret, 102 U. S. 472. unlawful depended wholly on the law Accordingly, when the city council of of the State, and not at all on any proCharleston, upon which the legislature vision of the constitution or laws of the of South Carolina, by the city charter, United States.” New Orleans Water had conferred the power of taxing per- Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Resons and property within the city, fining Co., 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. (U.S.) 741. passed ordinances assessing a tax upon Are the Decisions of the Courts Laws? bonds of the city, and thus diminishing -The thirty-fourth section of the Judithe amount of interest which it had ciary act of 1789 declares “that the laws agreed to pay, this court held such of the several States, except where the ordinances to be laws impairing the ob- constitution, treaties or statutes of the ligation of contracts, for the reason United States shall otherwise recogthat the city charter gave limited legis nize or provide, shall be regarded as lative power to the city council, and, rules of decision in trials at common when the ordinances were passed un- law in the courts of the United States,